and sent them to the us senate, where president trump will go on trial. nancy pelosi said it was an important moment in her country's history, donald trump has dismissed the process as a "con job". it's only the third impeachment trial of an american president in history. the us and china have signed an initial deal aimed at easing the trade war between the world's two biggest economies. some tariffs will be reduced and china has agreed to buy more american goods. and video of a turtle in thailand is doing well on our website. this is goody who thanks to a new prosthetic flipper is happily swimming again. she had been immobile since losing her flipper several years ago in a fishing net. that's all.

now on bbc news, hardtalk‘s stephen sackur speaks to douglas silliman, former us ambassador to iraq. welcome to hardtalk, i'm stephen sackur. though the fear of imminent war has receded, the middle east has been profoundly destabilised by the american assassination of iranian general qasem soleimani. the unfolding us—iran conflict will impact the whole not least iraq, where the iranians are intent on hastening the end of america military presence. much now depends on the strategic vision of the trump administration. my guest, douglas silliman, was us ambassador in iraq until one year ago. does trump have a strategy? if so, what is it? ambassador doug silliman in washington, dc, welcome to hardtalk. steven, i'm very happy to be here. well, you have a very special

perspective of what's happened over from your perspective, does the assassination of qasem soleimani in baghdad appear

to you both lawful and wise? i must say first of all, i'm not going to address the question of whether it is lawful or unlawful because i'm not an expert in international law or a particularly good diplomatic historian. looking at this from the standpoint of president trump and the trump administration, he seems to prefer shaking up the situation to see how the chips fall and then try to make things go his way on the back end. i think certainly with the killing of qasem soleimani, and also the killing of the chief iranian lieutenant, abu mahdi al—muhandis, inside iraq, he has certainly shuffled the deck and made things a little bit more interesting on the back end. shuffle the deck, you say — it's a metaphor that implies gambling. do you regard this move as a high—risk gamble? i don't know if this is a high—risk gamble, because there's certainly a lot of reason why an american administration would want to take out qasem soleimani. especially since the us invasion of iraq in 2003, soleimani has driven the iranian

expansion into iraq, into syria, into yemen, afghanistan and pakistan to some extent and has consolidated the control of the revolutionary guards inside iran and planted sleeper cells and trained rebels in saudi arabia, bahrain and other places in the region. he has been one of the most destabilising figures and has certainly been the mastermind behind the post—2003 hegemonic iranian expansion into the region and support for lebanese hezbollah. so he was a very high level target to take out, and i think iranian strategy and probably some of their implementation will suffer without him at the helm. interesting you rate it as that significant and i want to get back to soleimani and indeed the wider

iranian influence in iraq a little later in the interview, but one more point on the issue of lawfulness. you very carefully say it's really not for you to judge the lawfulness or not, i would put it to you that as a us ambassador long—standing, it really does matter to you and now your successor in baghdad this question of whether it's legal or not. you are there not as donald trump's representative but a representative of the us government, a government that prides itself by its abiding by international rules, international law. when you hear the un special raconteur on extrajudicial executions, agnes callamard, concluding that in this case the test of legality or illegality is unlikely to be met, i.e it looks illegal to her, you must be worried, musn‘t you? i'm worried about the reputation of the united states but frankly the reputation of the united states is still going to be shaky given the policies of the trump administration in many other places in the world. the reality is there's also a strong argument to made for self—defence,

and that's the argument the american administration is making. i am personally aware from my time serving as a us diplomat of what qasem soleimani and some of the groups he supported and trained in iraq and elsewhere have done to try to target american diplomats, american servicemembers and other coalition members serving in iraq and in other places in the region. i'm quite certain he was behind the escalating attacks in 2019, the attacks on shipping outside the strait of hormuz, attacks on saudi civilian infrastructure, the downing of an american drone and the attacks on abqaiq, the saudi arabian oil processing centre. so there are a number of reasons how you can define this as an act of self—defence. ambassador, if i may say so, when you put it like that it

makes me wonder why the americans sat back so long and allowed qasem soleimani to build his expansionist network inside iraq. you were sitting there as ambassador for more than two years. were you constantly telling washington they should be addressing in really serious terms what soleimani was building inside iraq with all of those popular militias, the popular mobilisation units, the shia forces at his disposal. should america have acted sooner? i was telling washington absolutely the threat i saw both to american policy and america citizens serving in iraq from the iranian supported shia militias. i will not paint the entire popular mobilization forces units with the same brush. there are some that were very responsive to soleimani and tehran, and there were others who are more iraqi nationalist and even some

of the units were trained by the coalition military and later absorbed into the popular mobilization forces. a number of shia militias, most of them predated the rise of isis, and many of them cut their teeth in fighting american forces in iraq between 2008 and 2011, forming the backbone of soleimani's iraqi proxy forces. they have been dangerous for a long time, and i was absolutely telling washington that they were dangerous. how difficult is it as an ambassador to represent a government that seems so chaotic in its thinking? donald trump in the last 48 hours has said he had direct information, there were four attacks in train under soleimani's guidance on four different embassies in the region. the defence secretary, mark esper, said he didn't see any such evidence. you've been at the sharp end working for the trump administration

as an ambassador, how difficult is it to make sense of what goes on in washington? i would also say the trump administration is not the first administration that had contradictions, and as an ambassador or a morejunior diplomat, i generally triangulated different statements and try to walk down the middle to try to make sure i captured the message washington was trying to convey. what about when the message isn't clear at all? what about when the president is speaking off—the—cuff, random quotes that don't seem to tally with the intelligence and information coming from other parts of the security establishment. what do you do then? well, in that case you go to the basic point that underlies what everyone is saying, qasem soleimani and iranian supported forces and iranian forces in some cases pose a danger to american and coalition forces in iraq and in the region, and likely to american diplomats in embassies in the region as well. let us now consider what next in iraq. it's a political situation you know very well.

you will have seen the acting prime minister, adil abdul—mahdi, has said this egregious violation of iraq's sovereignty must be met with a response and he supports the parliamentary vote to expel us troops from iraqi soil. do you think that's going to happen? it's a very good question and i honestly do not know yet. i will also note when the iraqi parliament took its vote, theoretically there were 170 votes to zero, but nearly that many members of the parliament, mostly kurdish and sunni members, but also some shia members, boycotted the session because they did not agree with the vote that was being taken. i also heard many allegations of threats of physical harm to mps who did not come and vote for the resolution to ask the prime minister to ask coalition forces to leave. what you have seen since that vote is statements by prominent politicians in the kurdistan, a number of sunnis and a couple of fears in support of a continued coalition military presence, focused on fighting isis and focused on training and professionalising the mainline iraqi security forces, i.e the air force and the counterterrorism forces. you talk about the focus on the islamic state group but the truth is the 5,000 or so military personnel in iraq

are completely hamstrung. they have bunkered down and they are focused on their own forced rejection, such is their own insecurity in iraq today, and they certainly aren't doing any counter is operations in conjunction with the iraqi military, who they don't seem to trust. that entire is strategy lies in ruins today. i would actually take issue

with your statement that the iraqi army or the us army do not trust the iraqi army. what you have in iraq unfortunately is security forces that are split in the middle. you've got the mainline forces — the army, the air force and the navy, and the counterterrorism service, largely supplied and trained and mentored by coalition forces. then you have the popular mobilization forces, which have been dominated by iran and qasem soleimani throughout this period. the impression i get from people who are still in baghdad is the personal and cooperative relationships between coalition military and the iraqi military remain strong. there is, however, more tension with the popular mobilization forces forces, especially those more tied with qasem soleimani. with respect... no, no, to answeryour question, the violence of the past week and a half has constrained

what the nato mission and what the coalition has been able to do, and it is incumbent upon the prime minister and the iraqi government to put in place methods to protect coalition forces from attacks from other parts of the iraqi security forces. this is an issue with which i've been most frustrated throughout my period, both under the 0bama administration and trump administration — the unwillingness or inability of the iraqi government to challenge the expansion of these shia militias to conduct activities, use force separate from the command structure of iraq with the prime minister at the top. surely another frustration is the apparent contradiction in a us strategy which needs a strong relationship with the iraqi government, which of course right now is still headed up by acting prime minister adil abdul—mahdi.

and at the same time, donald trump has started issuing threats toward the acting prime minister and his government, saying that if they couldn't make good on any attempt to remove forces from iraq, then the most punitive sanctions the iraqis had ever seen will be imposed. and we've got one source today talking about the americans telling the acting prime minister's office that the us is countenancing blocking iraqi's account at the federal reserve bank in new york, which would effectively completely destroyed iraq's oil economy. what on earth is going on here? what does donald trump want from the iraqis? does he want to be their friend, or does he now see them as an enemy? 0n the economic front, the iraqi government has been cooperating with the us treasury to prevent the flow of dollars into iran, as part of the sanctions, because we are afraid that especially the quds force and the revolution guards use the hard currency they earn to expand their activities

into and outside of the region. iraq has been very cooperative, and we think relatively few dollars have gone into iran from iraq. now that i'm outside the administration, i don't want to speculate too much. but i know that when i was doing myjob in baghdad, we were concerned that if the cooperation of the iraqi treasury or the iraqi central bank ended, that it would be much easier for iran to get dollars to iraq. and i think that is one of the main fears. because the goal of iran, of qasem soleimani, was not only a security goal. i mean, you keep telling me about all the concerns you had as ambassador, and that continue, about iran's various leverages inside iraq. is it not your concern and the truth that the killing of qasem soleimani has actually strengthened

iran's hand in iraq? it has made it much more difficult for your us troop presence to continue. it has made it more difficult for those allies of the united states inside iraq to have their voices heard. and what we see is an iran which over the next few months and years has every prospect of projecting more power and control over iraq. what i think the killing of qasem soleimani has done has a short—term impact that is sort of what you describe. it is clear that those in iraq who would like to see a continuation, an increase, of iranian influence in the country now have more enthusiasm for that point. it also has a short—term benefit to — or i should say provides an opportunity to an iraqi government that wants to be more independent of tehran, and for an international community that would prefer to see iraq plugged into the world community

and the world economy more effectively. let me tell you why. qasem soleimani and his iraqi lieutenant, abu mahdi al—muhandis, both accelerated expansion of iranian influence, attacks on coalition and other forces, and support for shia militias in iraq. they were also a brake on those activities when tehran and especially soleimani saw that to be to the benefit of iran. what happened through tehran, to soleimani, to muhandis, i suspect what you will see inside iraq over the coming year or two will be something akin to a power struggle. the shia militias in iraq are not unified. they are made up of individual commanders, often brigade—sized units, who have now lost

their recognised command structure, and i think they will now begin to struggle and jostle for predominance among this group. one thing seems clear, that as a result, again, of the soleimani assassination, tehran is now intent on pushing ahead with its nuclear programme. they haven't formally left the international agreement, the so—called jcpoa, but they are now enriching uranium to new levels. they are to all intents and purposes back on the nuclear weapons track — agree? i think this is in fact correct, and there are actually three points i want to make. all of what has taken place in the past two weeks has shuffled the deck, as i said, but it has not resolved any of the underlying issues. from the standpoint of washington, and largely from the west, there are still three big issues that iran continues. one is a support for proxy forces in the region.

the second is the now lack of commitment to thejcpoa, the nuclear agreement. and the third is iran's development and deployment of ballistic missiles, and you saw the strategic use of iranian ballistic missiles in the attacks on coalition forces last week. from the iranian side, you still have united states which is outside thejcpoa, and you have a united states which hass not only supporting sanctions, but last week secretary of state pompeo and secretary of the treasury mnuchin doubled down on sanctions and imposed a number of other sanctions. so the underlying questions and the reasons for the tension remain there. but, if i may, i want to keep this as simple as possible. itjust seems to me and to many observers around the world there is still a fundamental contradiction, a deep confusion, in trump's strategic vision for iran and the wider mid east region. and david singer of the new york times put it very well the other day. he said mr trump has yet to resolve

the two conflicting instincts that he has on national security. that is, on the one hand, bellicosity, and on the other hand, desire for disengagement. so for you, as a 35—year—long diplomat who is recently out of baghdad, which is driving a strategic vision here? is it the gut bellicosity of trump, or is it the desire, as he has said so many times, to get us forces out of this mid east sand, where so much blood has been shed for so little? which is it? i think it's fundamentally the difficulty that the trump administration has in following and articulating a consistent set of goals that they want to see on iran. the three that ijust mentioned, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and support for proxies, are always in the mix. but there are other members of the administration, and i am not certain whether president trump fits in that, who would like to see regime change. although last week president trump said very clearly in public remarks

that he did not seek regime change in iran, i think that there are still people in the administration hoping that pressure on the iranian economy, and perhaps now pressure on the quds force and the military, will result in a revolution from within, inside iran. if i may say so, ambassador, that's a very interesting answer, ‘cause you have just revealed to me your very deep confusion. because you have just left government, let's not say the administration, but you've been in baghdad for a long time representing the us government. it sounds to me like you are deeply, deeply confused about who is really driving policy in the white house, and what that strategy is. well, the day after, i believe, last week president trump said i do not seek regime change, former national security adviser john bolton tweeted that he supported regime change. and if i were in tehran, and i was not getting a consistent message from washington that we do not seek to pull down the regime, i would be very reluctant to go into any

sort of negotiations. i would also say that it appears to me that the trump administration seeks iranian capitulation under pressure. as i've said a couple of times in the media, economic sanctions are a tactic. they are not a strategy or a goal. and i'm struggling to find out, what does the trump administration hope to achieve at the end of this road? if it wishes negotiations, does it want to do negotiations in conjunction with our traditional allies, as we did in thejcpoa, plus the security council members? do we seek a smaller group? and what is in it for iran if they engage in negotiations? because the trump administration has been unable to articulate what the end result, the benefit for iran would be, were they to engage in serious negotiations on the three issues i mentioned.

you say you're struggling to really comprehend what the trump endgame is. many other diplomats have quit, saying that they can no longer serve a president that they don't really respect, in terms of the way he conducts foreign policy. i'm mindful that bill burns served 35 years in the state department and in diplomacy, just the same way you did with your 35 years, and he left saying this. he said, i've never seen an attack on diplomacy as damaging as what we have seen under the trump administration. notjust on the state department as an institution, but our international influence. did you leave feeling the same, and is that frankly why you were pleased to leave government? i think that the trump administration came in in 2017 not quite knowing what to do with the state department. first of all, the way that we are structured, if you look at the top, with ambassadors, ambassadors are the personal representatives of the presidents that appoint them, as well as the representatives of the united states. and i think that president trump

felt that all of the ambassadors appointed by president 0bama really represented 0bama, and did not represent him. so you have seen a replacement of a lot of ambassadors, and the departure of a lot of people, even though they were career diplomats, who had been in senior positions in the 0bama administration. so i think some of that is trump not believing that a cadre of diplomats, of civil servants who are committed to the constitution, would be as committed to him as he would like, and i think he wanted to see more of his own people in senior positions at the state department. and, to put it bluntly, were you glad to get out? i should say i'm very happy now, being in the private sector, and i enjoy the opportunity for the first time in 35 years to say what i actually believe, as opposed to having to speak only on behalf of the united states. so i've found a bit of freedom

in leaving the us government. all right, well, ambassador douglas silliman, i thank you very much indeed for being on hardtalk. stephen, thank you very much. it was a pleasure. hello. wednesday brought us a largely fine day with good spells of sunshine, but this brief window of fine weather is short—lived because for thursday, the next area of low pressure will be moving in to bring another spell of wet and windy weather

to our shores. you can see it here showing up on the pressure chart hurtling up from the south—west. the isobars all packed together towards the west, so this is where we'll see the strongest of the winds. they will start wet and windy from the word go in scotland and northern ireland, snow on the hills for a while, and then the rain will pile into many southern and western parts of england and wales, gradually spreading eastwards, probably reaching many eastern areas just after dark. this some heavy bursts of rain likely, 40—50mph gusts, maybe more than that in the south—west. it will be mild for england and wales but it won't feel like that because of the strength of the wind and the rain. the wet and windy weather sails northwards on thursday night and into friday. we've few isobars on the chart so less windy, that is away from the north of scotland. there will be a mixture of sunshine and showers. the showers will tend to fall in bands along minor weatherfronts, so we could see some pretty heavy ones. scotland and northern ireland, snow on the hills, a few in england and wales as well, but good spells of sunshine in between. those temperatures lower — we've got a cooler air mass coming from the north—west, so 6 to maybe 9 or 10

in the south—east. for the weekend, colder. we've got high pressure moving in so drier with sunny spells, but you'll notice the chill by day and certainly by night, with return to overnight frost. you can see this high pressure building in across the country gradually over the weekend. still the low pressure to the north of the uk will bring windy conditions on saturday across scotland with some showers, some of which will be heavy, wintry, on the hills. maybe the odd shower further south but for many, it should be dry with increasing dry weather on saturday afternoon. so, plenty of sunshine around but it will feel colder — 6—8 will be the high. a frosty night saturday night with some mist and also some freezing fog, which could be slow to clear in places. eventually it should lift in many areas and if it doesn't, it will stay quite chilly. we should be looking

at lighter winds for all, plenty of sunshine for sunday. something a little bit breezier and less cold heading to the far north—west of the country, so nine or ten in stornoway, but for most, 6—8 degrees.

welcome to newsday. i'm kasia madera in london. the headlines: politics and parchment — donald trump's impeachment trial moves a step closer, as house speaker nancy pelosi signs the key documents and sends them to the senate. let me be very clear that this president will be held accountable — nobody is above the law. the us and china sign an initial deal aimed at easing the 18—month trade war between the world's two biggest economies. i'm mariko 0i in singapore. also in the programme: wildfires, flooding and drought — the last decade is confirmed as the world's