this is bbc news. been trying to go out as little as possible. my partner suffers quite the headlines... badly with asthma. as a family, we the number of people who have died in the uk with coronavirus have been trying to keep ourselves rises by more than 700, to ourselves as much as possible and bees gentleman make it so much pushing the total number of deaths easier. it goes to show that in this above 11,000. community and in cornwall in general, people do help each other as spain and italy begin as much as they can and do what they to relax restrictions, can for one another. since starting a couple of weeks ago, many people the uk faces its fourth week in lockdown — with the government have now volunteered, including a set to assess social distancing measures. chef, plumber and supermarket the mother of one of the nurses praised by borisjohnson for helping save his life says she's "exceptionally proud" worker. it is nice to go out, make of her daughter. it doesn't matter what patient she's looking after. this is what she does. people happy and make them laugh. and ijust find it incredible. any nurses can do this. give people a bit of happiness while we are in this pandemic at the moment. they are a mix of ages, russia records its biggest daily increase in coronavirus cases, over 2,500, including one who has onlyjust got his biker licence. medication, food, essentials... even though they did not know each other until recently,

it seems they will be...” not know each other until recently, it seems they will be... i think we are one big family and we will stick together. now it's time for a look at the weather. if you have already been out today for exercise, i am sure you will have noticed just how much colder it feels today. a chilly wind blowing off the north sea, often cloudy across eastern parts of the uk, and in fact easter monday is going to be the coldest day of the beat. these are our5pm the coldest day of the beat. these are our 5pm temperatures. around 12 degrees in london, and only 6 degrees in london, and only 6 degrees on the north sea coast in newcastle. tonight, a widespread frost as expected from the north towards the south, and certainly a grass forced down to the south coast. these are the city temperatures. in rural spot it will

be below freezing. tomorrow, a little less cold, because the wind is going to ease, and in many areas, with a sunny day, fairly average temperatures, around 13 degrees, it will actually not feel too bad at all. gradually, through the meat, it will warm upa all. gradually, through the meat, it will warm up a little bit. they're with us through the week. hello, this is bbc news. the headlines... the uk government is to assess how social distancing measures here are working, as the fourth week of the lockdown begins. 667 new deaths have been announced in england, and a further 15 in wales. the mother of one of the nurses praised by borisjohnson for helping save his life says she's "exceptionally proud" of her daughter. it doesn't matter what patient she is looking after, this is what she does, andi is looking after, this is what she does, and i just is looking after, this is what she does, and ijust find it incredible that any nurses can do this.

the prime minister is recuperating at chequers — after leaving hospital yesterday with millions of people continuing to work in essential services, we'll see how britain's electricity companies are keeping the lights on. and revving up to help the bikers from cornwall who've been helping vulnerable people — by delivering essential shopping and medication. now on bbc news, melissa hogenboom considers the age—old question of free will, and what the latest scientific research can tell us about how we make decisions.

i'm placing the electrodes. i chose to be here. this was my choice — at least, i think it was. most of you will believe that you chose to watch this video. we do worry about manipulation by the media and by advertising and by other people and so on. you freely willed it. what is the degree of freedom that you give to this definition of free will? our choices define us... so — if that's what we're talking about — then we don't have free will. ..but reality may not be so simple. there you go. he chuckles. in the early ‘80s, benjamin libet designed an elegant experiment to help us understand the mechanism of decision—making in the brain. this is the libet experiment. all i have to do is watch the spinning dots and click a button whenever i feel like it — then report to the scientist at what time i felt the urge to click. meanwhile, my brain activity is being monitored. most of us would assume that our choices register as an increase in brain activity and result in us clicking the button — but what's actually observed is a build—up of brain activity — called the readiness potential — a full second earlier than the conscious urge to click. this has been replicated hundreds of times. what are the implications of this kind of experiment? so, the folk definition of free

will is that your mind controls your body — meaning that your mind is free to decide what to do and send the command to your body — but — when you consider the libet experiment — it means that conscious intentions — instead of being the cause of motor preparation — is the consequence of an antecedent brain activity — so it challenges this dualistic view of mind—body causation. and so — in my group — you know — we've gone back and redone all the libet experiments very carefully — and we find that you get a readiness potential even in the absence of a motor act — like doing this versus that — if a person expects something to happen, so my own guess is that the readiness potential is tied up with expectation or anticipation that something is about to happen. the experiment is over. my mind is no longer the controller. rather, it's firmly seated in my conscious brain — guiding and responding to whispers from my subconscious. right, i need some food.

probably we can see that a lot of our decisions — even not all our decisions — are the result of a prior brain activity — and — as an example — there is an elegant study by the team ofjohn—dylan haynes — who showed that — by using neuroimaging measurements with mri scanner — you can actually predict what will be the decision of participants before they're actually conscious of having taken that decision. this begs the question — how can we have free will if our unconscious brain is making decisions before we do? the unconscious is not unintelligent. guides us in ways which is itself responsive to reasons. take the following scenario. i'm walking, over eight months pregnant, hungry and very tired. when i listen into what my subconscious is saying, she's tired and hungry, too. strangely, she wants beans for lunch. sometimes we're influenced badly by unconscious reasons —

there's no doubt about it — because advertisers do psychological experiments to find what we're sensitive to and then they set up the environment so we make decisions through unconscious subliminal influences. we know there's lots of examples of priming. even if we start from the kind of everyday... which baked beans do i choose in the supermarket? it's sort of quite easy to get from there to a genuine worry about whether you really made that choice freely, when you pick the heinz versus the own brand or whatever it is. fine. no beans, then? or am ijust saying that because i feel my subconscious has been duped? that might be a problem, but then that happens with conscious decision—making too. but then that happens with conscious people lie to us. but then that happens with conscious once you start sort of pushing the boundaries of manipulation, it starts to be a really hard question. when are we sufficiently in control and when aren't we? how can we step outside that and get outside those influences — or can we, even? yeah. no, we can't. i mean, the best we can do is — because we're human beings and we're incredibly clever — we're able to reflect

on all of this stuff. i think a lot of our decision— making is playing out in this internal virtual reality of our imagination — and we spend about half of our waking day there imagining this versus that — and some of those imaginings or deliberations are not terribly consequential — like whom to invite for dinner. others are very consequential. like whom should i marry or what country should i live in? and i want to argue that our internal virtual reality of our imagination is where free will is really active. it's not picking — as in the libet task — it's really an issue of choosing consequential decisions. right, i'm still hungry. i'm back at the beans — but i'll take some time to avoid any unconscious bean—based biases i may have — and deliberate on which to buy. if you want to call free willjust our capacity to make intelligent decisions —

which is hugely impressive — then i have no problem with that. in that case, you'd want to say we have lots of free will. other animals have some. even a tiger can weigh its options — so we have the sort of ist order deliberation in common with the tiger. however, in addition, humans have this sort of higher level — or 2nd order — capacity to deliberate — namely, to deliberate about our own future self. and here's the strange thing — i felt much freer randomly clicking buttons for the libet test than i did when i started to overthink which can of beans to buy — or certainly any of the big life stuff — where all sorts of constraints are put upon the possible choices ican make. we do have some freedom to act within the parameters given to us by nature and by our society, and then those parameters that we set for ourselves — like deciding to learn a new language, or to go to the gym or even to become a better person.

when we spoke on the phone, you said you weren't sure about free will, and now you're saying you don't think we have it. yeah... because i'm just waiting for additional scientific evidence. it'sjust that — at the moment — with what we know — it's hard to really believe in free will, um, but perhaps somebody — no matter in the field neuroscience, neurobiology or physics — will find a new experiment. wait, why did she say physics? the laws of physics suggest that if something happens it's caused by something before it — and so — tracing all the way back to the big bang — the laws of physics tell us how one thing — one event — will lead to another — cause and effect. in this scenario, there are two choices i could make, but when i knock over the big bang domino right at the back, it would result in a cascade

of events that inevitably leads me to making choice a rather than b. this is determinism — the view that all our choices in life are in some way fated to happen. now, since we and our brains are — after all — only made of atoms — there's nothing else — no magic extra — then our brains are subject to the laws of physics — so — in a deterministic universe where one thing follows the other — surely when we think we're making free choices it'sjust the laws of physics playing themselves out. it's just that our brains are so complex that we can never predict in advance what someone's going to do or even what we ourselves are going to do — so we have the illusion of free will. "name a woman" and you might say — oh, i don't know — you'll name someone, and i say, "ok, name a woman politician," and you might say — oh, i don't know — hillary clinton. then i'll add a third criterion. name a european woman politician and you'll say theresa may or, you know, margaret thatcher or angela merkel. i would say a fundamental mistake the determinists make

is that they think of causation in general — and causation in the brain in particular — in terms of what is sufficient — that this event in the brain is sufficient to cause that event in the brain. if causation in the brain is, however, criterial — and there's lots of different ways to meet any given set of criteria, then causation is not a matter of sufficiency — that if this happens, that has to happen — it's a matter of adequacy. why did you say, say, angela merkel first as opposed to margaret thatcher? i would say, well, that comes down to chance. it's not utterly random, right? when i said to you, "think of a woman european politician," you didn't say frog or, you know, truth or democracy. you said, you know, whatever you said. so, it was not utterly random, but it was constrained randomness within those criteria. 0k. now i'll add some randomness with turbulence and we'll see that knocking over the big bang domino could result in either choice a or choice b. there are some criteria, though —

the blocks must all be the same size and not ducks. still, it could be argued that that randomness we added with the turbulence — even though incredibly complex — would still obey the laws of determinism. here's a pattern of energy. it's a rhythm. tap along. keep tapping. in a second, i will cut the track and you should carry on tapping. that pattern of sound caused a pattern of activity in your brain — which resulted in a pattern of movement in your finger, but not all of you would have kept to the rhythm exactly — and there would have been those amongst you who refused to tap at all. rebels. so, patterns of energy that trigger patterns of energy may not cause a predictable effect. patterns of energy don't obey the traditional laws of physics. what evolution has done is taken matter and made it sensitive to patterns of energy. let's go back to those dominoes.

let's zoom into this part here that's happening inside the brain. so, this pattern of dominoes will result in either choice a or choice b — depending on turbulence — but — in the brain — the pattern is not fixed. if i find choice a morally repugnant, i can change the pattern so that only choice b is ever possible. my abstract morality — which is itself a pattern of information — will shape the decisions i make. so, i think that evolution created a whole new kind of physical system — which we call life — which is rooted in patterns of energy — triggering patterns of energy — and paramount to that is our consciousness — which is, ultimately, a kind of pattern of information realised in the brain that allows us to model the world and ourselves in it. but what if our future already exists? in what way then are the choices we make ever truly free? the block universe is an idea in physics that developed pretty

soon after einstein came up with his special theory of relativity — where he said that time and space have to be unified. you can't talk about three—dimensional space and one—dimensional time as though they're separate things. they're part of one four—dimensional space time. so, the block universe is a bit like... imagine space was only flat — only two—dimensional, and then the third dimension is time. so, think of a loaf of bread. the time axis is along the length of the loaf and space are the individual slices. the block universe says that it's notjust the present time that exists. the past hasn't gone and been forgotten — and the future hasn't yet to be decided. in the block universe, all times co—exist. they're just different slices of the loaf. there is no universal present moment. in this scenario, it doesn't matter which of the domino

simulations i pick — because every single frame of that animation already exists and will exist forever. there can only ever be one outcome. we've done many, many experiments over the last century — since einstein's theory of relativity — and we know this is really the case. if the future already exists — if it's already set — as it were — even though we haven't experienced it yet — then that suggests that we have no free will. is that not a bit dangerous to go through life thinking, "oh, it doesn't really matter what decision i make "because it's all set in stone anyway"? would that not have a negative impact? i mean, i think it can engender a certain kind of worry about, you know, the meaninglessness of human existence or the futility of going through life as though we're making all these choices and determining our own path — and really we're not determining our own path. but actually, we can't see the future. we have that illusion that we have free will and that is powerful. in fact, that is good enough.

for all practical purposes, we are making free choices. the fact that once the future has arrived and we can turn back and say, "it was always going to be this way" hasn't detracted from us feeling that we were making free choices to begin with. so, i don't feel depressed about the fact that my free will isjust an illusion, because for me it's very real. which reality are we talking about? physics currently has two main theories to describe reality. the theory of relativity is used to describe events at the large and very large scale — while quantum mechanics describes events at the small and the very small scale. what quantum theory does is it predicts the probability of outcomes. so, now let's add a quantum domino. this domino can be in one of two places, but we'll only know which one once it's been hit by the previous domino. we can run the simulation over and over. sometimes we'll end up with

choice a and others with choice b. this is a truly random domino and we could substitute this for the turbulence that we added earlier to create a more accurate model that refutes determinism. now, you can talk about a block universe that's very different. this would be a block universe where all possibilities exist — and i think that is valid. now, take this new notion of a block universe of all possible things in some sense already having happened because they're possible. well, in that notion of a block universe, you carve out this reality versus that reality. you choose to make happen this reality where you will in a year from now speak swahili versus that alternate reality where in a year from now you'll speak mandarin — and that comes down to your own decisions. so, general relativity seems to support determinism and no free will — while with quantum mechanics the opposite is true. it's called indeterminism and does support the presence of free will. the problem is that both

theories work really well at describing their own events at their scale, but not at the other‘s. but which is most true for us? still, they do agree on one thing — that all our choices — freely willed or not — will echo through space for all time. i guess i think it doesn't really matter whether determinism is true or not — because i think even if it is true — we can have the kind of control over our actions that we need in order to be accountable. so, now we get to the crux of it. what's the actual point of asking these questions about free will in the first place? because humans have the capacity to reason and humans also have the capacity to realise their potential and become a new kind of person, they are moral or immoral — in the sense that they became the kind of person that could, for example, kill a girl — and they have some responsibility in having become such a person

because their own choices led to the cultivation of becoming this kind of person — say a murderer or that kind of person, say, someone who will take care of children. so if you offered me £100 to torture a kitten, i definitely wouldn't do it. definitely wouldn't. well done, me. but why is it that i wouldn't take the £100 to torture the kitten? well, it's probably partly an external constraint. like, if £100 was life or death, maybe i would take the £100 and torture the kitten, but it's not. so, there's the external constraints, but there's also internal constraints, right? here i am — i'm the sort of person that doesn't go around torturing kittens for a hundred quid — but that's a function of my background, my environment, my upbringing — all of those things. if i'd been brought up in a very different kind of environment, maybe i would have made a different decision. one example of reduced control over our choices seems to be when following orders. the moral behaviour of people can change drastically when theyjust obey the orders of an authority.

emily devised an experiment to investigate brain activity in this scenario. two participants were sat facing each other where the agent could deliver a mildly painful electric shock to the victim in exchange for money. sometimes she would order them to deliver the shock, and other times she would not. even if people know that they can say no and refuse an order — specifically in the context of an experiment — because in the case of war you can still consider that military are afraid of being sent to, like, the military court, but — for the sake of an experiment — people should mainly refuse to follow the orders to send the shock to somebody else. and in fact, we have observed that it's not the case. i've tested about 600 participants so far and only five refused to administer shocks to somebody else — which is, like, not a lot, for sure. how did the differences play out in the brain between the condition where the participant is free to decide how many shocks

versus when they're told to give shocks? first of all, the sense of agency of agents is reduced when they obey the orders of somebody else — in comparison with a condition in which participants are free to decide what to do — and that's very interesting because the sense of agency is a subjective experience that everybody has when one is performing an action. also, by using electrooculography we have seen that outcome processing is reduced when people obey orders. so, it means — somehow — that when people obey orders the brain uses less resources to process the surrounding environment. it's more like a passive condition for the brain. so, here we see external and internal constraints having a measurable effect on brain activity and inhibiting our ability to freely choose our actions. and it's by no means the only situation where this is the case. we've put people under

all kinds of disadvantages in terms of knowledge, education, opportunities — even brain development — because you can show that poverty leads to less in the way of the capacity to inhibit impulses neurally. and having put people in these circumstances through social choices, we then blame them when they commit the actions which they're likely to commit in any case. in that sense, i don't think we have free will. what i'm denying is the retributive punishment — which is what we do — we put them in worse conditions — they come out worse — not better. in order to do that, some people try to justify the existence of free will. i don't think that's morallyjustified. i think that's treating the unlucky worse because they're unlucky. i don't think we have that kind of free will. i don't think that that has to be the case.

you don't have to have a punishment—oriented notion ofjustice at all. i think, you know, for example, the attitude in sweden — where you try to cultivate a new way of thinking in a prisoner as opposed to, you know, hanging them for being an evil person — works great — and that is totally consistent with the libertarian free will. this is a very unpopular view, but i'm a bit inclined to think that moral responsibility kind of comes in degrees — and a big part of the reason why it comes in degrees is because control comes in degrees. so, there's a sort of sliding scale of how much control we're exercising and degree of moral responsibility maybe kind of goes along with that. that's quite interesting — because in the dutch criminaljustice system — from what i understand, it's the only system where there is five degrees of moral responsibility when you commit a crime — it's not black and white — and the punishment is according to which level you are. that's really interesting, yeah, and i think the british criminal justice system does tend to see

things in black and white, right? so, there's an insanity defence for murder, but it sets the bar pretty high — where that's kind of it. when you think about the age of criminal responsibility, right, i mean, you know, in some sense, when you've got a legal system, you need to impose some boundaries, but the idea that you suddenly flip from being the kind of person that can't be convicted of a crime to someone who can is... that's a very strange idea, right? the human brain and mind meets the scaffolding of our culture — of our family, our society, our community — to help build us up in every way, right? we didn't invent our mother language, right? my mother language is english. i didn't invent english. i was surrounded by people who spoke english as scaffolding — and we — as a society — should really think about how can we enhance the scaffolding that goes into the construction of human minds and affords their ability to notionally choose later in life? how can we enhance that? our society doesn't really ask that question. well, i think we do have to face up to the fact that certain people — due to no fault of their own —

are more likely to commit crimes than others because badly distributing resources damages people. they‘ re not necessarily lovable because they're damaged, but they have a right to better opportunities — and we have an obligation to ensure that the next generation isn't damaged in the way they have been. so, thinking about free will is much more than academic navel gazing. there are real—world implications that force us to reflect not only on ourselves but the societies we wish to build. our consciousness — determined or not — does have a direct impact on the universe where the choices we make will play out for all time.

hello. well, a real chill in the air out there today, and some of us are stuck underneath the grey skies. a bit of light rain and drizzle here and there too. and easter monday is going to be the coldest day of the week. tomorrow, i think it's going to feel a little less cold. this is what happens when a cold front sweeps across the uk, and in fact the northerly winds have brought cold air all the way from the subarctic regions. and on top of that, a fair amount of cloud as well. you can see it and eastern scotland, and down to the south—east. but many western and south—western areas, wales, cornwall, devon, enjoying plenty of sunshine. this is where we will see the highest temperature. 1a in plymouth, 13 or 1a in cardiff, but only 6 degrees in newcastle. tonight, called, a widespread air force developing, for the blue colours are, and these are the temperatures in some city centres.

that means in rural spots, it will be two or three degrees lower than that. widespread frost on the way. tuesdayis that. widespread frost on the way. tuesday is going to feel less cold, because we are going to be in the middle of the high pressure. when you're in the middle, the windsor tent not to be so strong, they are usually strong around the area of high pressure. inside, it is going to be sunny, winless in places, and won't feel too bad at all. in liverpool, sunshine and 13 degrees, and it will feel pleasant if you're out in the garden or going for your daily work. on wednesday, we are still in the middle of high pressure, so that means it winds will be like, it will be sonic across will be like, it will be sonic a cross m ost will be like, it will be sonic across most of the uk, but a pleasa nt across most of the uk, but a pleasant day. temperatures could pick up to around 18 degrees across parts of the midlands, but still nippy across western scotland. towards at the end of the week, we will see changes develop to the south—west of the uk. clouds gather, these are weather fronts, and they are expected to bring some rainfall

as we head into friday and we can. before that, on thursday, quite a warm day and southerly winds. temperatures in london could get up to around 21 degrees, but this is the outlook for the week ahead. you can see, by the time we get too crowded, increasing amounts of cloud. i think friday, saturday and sunday there is a chance of a few 00:29:22,348 --> 4294966103:13:29,430 spots of rain. goodbye.