the most important speech of his long political career, when he accepts the democratic party nomination to challenge donald trump for the white house. donald trump's former chief strategist, steve bannon, has pleaded not guilty at a court in new york to fraud and money laundering charges related to an online campaign to build a us border wall. he was released on bail of $5 million and must not leave the country. the russian government says it's prepared to consider a request for the kremlin critic, alexei navalny, to be transferred outside the country for treatment after his supporters said he was poisoned. he is said to be in a coma after collapsing on an internal flight.

now on bbc news, it's time for hardtalk. welcome to hardtalk with me, zainab badawi. increasing tensions between the united states and china have plunged relations to their lowest level in decades. this comes at a time when the world is facing its worst recession in living memory. could this reshape the global order? well, my guest is one of asia's most influential thinkers. kishore mahbubani, a former singaporean diplomat. he believes that covid—19 has weakened the west and made china bolder. is he right that this is now asia's century?

kishore mahbubani in singapore, welcome to hardtalk. why do you believe that covid—19 will mark a shift in power to asia? covid—19 is only going to accelerate the shift of power to asia, which is already happening beforehand. and as i always say, from the year one to the year 1800 — for 1,800 of the last 2,000 years — china and india were always the two largest economies. they're coming back. but clearly covid—19 is accelerating it, because what is a big shock to the world is that the most competent countries in dealing with covid—19 are the east asian countries. and just look at one statistic — the number of deaths per million in east asian countries — all the way, south korea, japan, china, vietnam, singapore, everywhere — is less than ten. in europe, it's in the hundreds, in the united states, in the hundreds. why exactly this is happening? i don't know, but it's an indicator that when it comes to competence in governance, it is shifting to asia.

that's a pretty sweeping statement. are you not reading too much into this? it could be that asian countries have had to deal with avian flu and sars in the past 20 years, which has perhaps improved their responses. senegal in africa did well because of its response to ebola six years ago, it learned important lessons. so that mayjust simply be a reflection of the fact that they are better prepared. you're just simply reading too much into this. you're absolutely right. it could be because of the past preparations, but i suspect it reflects also something quite deeper. canada, as you know, also suffered from sars, as singapore did. and certainly the more competent medical systems in the world were always supposed to be in the west, in every sense of the term. and you had much better health care systems too. so this is why i'm saying it's very puzzling that the east

asian countries have done so well. and if you look at the economic picture, too, the first economy to really bounce back from covid—i9 is china. you've written many books, you write evidence—based and so on, but the fact of the matter is, when you mention china and how its response has been good, we simply do not know. president macron of france in april, when he was asked about china's response to covid—i9, said, "let us not be so naive as to say china has been much better at handling this. we don't know. there are clearly things that have happened that we don't know about." you know, the chinese are accused by many people of withholding information. you just don't get the complete picture. i am very well aware of the perceptions of china. i suspect that if president macron was making his statement not in april, but in august, september, it'd be a very different picture that he would give today. and in the case of china, you're right.

we cannot get all the information. but, you know, there is data. there is the people going down there, and my friends have actually gone to china and they were in shanghai a few weeks ago and they were quite amazed that all the restaurants are full in shanghai. amazing. you cannot get a booking. life has returned to normal in a way... but that's what silvio berlusconi, the then italian prime minister, said when italy was deep in its economic problems — he said, "there can't be a problem here. the restaurants are full in italy." i mean, that's very anecdotal evidence. all right, you've made that point about china. you're not going to be swayed on that. all right. your new book on china, has china won?, very strategically placed over your shoulder there. you have said in that book, about china, that in asia, its neighbours, no—one feels comfortable sharing a small room with an elephant, no matter how benign. but the fact of the matter is, many of china's neighbours

don't see it as a benign power. there is a new level of concern over china. i mean, let's be clear about that, 0k? because, you know, china, which used to have an economy which was one tenth the size of the united states in purchasing power parity terms in 1980, now is a bigger economy than the united states. so it's become much bigger. and when you become much bigger, it's perfectly natural for the neighbours to be concerned. the big question is, most of the time, are they getting along with china or are they confronting china? and this is the one thing that you have to give credit to china for. most of the time, they're getting along with china. and guess what? for many of... even america's allies in east asia —japan, south korea, philippines, thailand — they do more trade with china than they do with the united states of america. so the chinese have clearly caused a lot of concern.

but i believe that they're also managing it and they're making mistakes. i was questioning your use of the word benign, because when you hear what some of china's neighbours say, particularly pertaining to the fact that it set up military bases in the south china sea, malaysia is very annoyed, vietnam, the philippines, you know, mahathir mohamad, in august 2018, the malaysian prime minister, warned against a new version of chinese colonialism. indonesia in june this year sent a letter to the united nations stating that its economic interests are jeopardised by china's territorial claims in the south china sea. i could go on and on with numerous examples. they don't see china as benign, kishore. i completely agree with you. in fact, i believe that the term benign superpower is an oxymoron. no superpower is benign. united states is not benign, china is not benign. every superpower will defend its interests. that's a 3,000—year rule

of geopolitics and not going to change, whether it's china or united states of america. but at the same time, you mentioned that dr mahathir mohamad spoke in august 2019 about a new form of chinese colonialism. guess where he was in april 2020? april 2019 — he was in china for the belt and road forum initiative. he was one of the chief guests. in fact, he was one of the opening keynote speakers. it's facing setbacks. of course, this is the huge flagship policy by xijinping, came to power in 2012, launches in 2013. but it's facing setbacks now to build all its infrastructure projects all over the world. because covid—19 has meant that there's slower economic growth in china and elsewhere. there are growth, debt issues, high project costs and all the rest of it and a lack of local participation, even local opposition. so perhaps things are changing on that score. you know, it's important to get

one's timeframe right, 0k? the belt and road initiative is not a one—year, two—year initiative. it's a 100—year initiative. and the chinese probably have some things planned out over the next 30—110 years, 0k? and when you take a long journey, there will be setbacks. but let me just give you one statistic — countries around the world are free to join the belt and road initiative, or to reject the belt and road initiative. japan has rejected it, india has rejected it, australia has rejected it. but out of 193 member states in the un, 120 have signed up to join the belt and road initiative. now, if 3—4 reject, 120 accept, do you say it's a failure or a success? all right. no, isaid it's suffering setbacks... it is. ..and it may not necessarily transpire to become the great success that you talk about, for reasons which also become apparent as

we carry on talking. you've also described china as arguably having the most meritocratic government in the world. now, the british historian max hastings has accused you of letting off chinese authoritarianism and its ruthless repression of human and civil rights far too lightly. aren't you guilty of doing that, kishore? well, i am not a defender of chinese authoritarianism. i am an objective observer of china's performance. and, just for your information, the harvard kennedy school has come out with a study injuly 2020 pointing out that the level of support for the chinese communist party in the chinese population — and they did the surveys over a several—year period — has been going up steadily. now, why is that happening? are the chinese people stupid? why are they going up from 80 something to 90% something support for the chinese communist party? because the chinese communist party has become — and this is what i'm talking

about — one of the most meritocratic institutions in the world. and i tell the story in my book — when i had a research assistant in columbia in early 2018, a bright young student from china telling me the story of her life. i mean, she graduated from high school, she was so sad, she was number two in the class. so i said, what's wrong with being number two? she said, "only the number one is selected to join the chinese communist party." so you can imagine the aspirations of young people in china. the best people are going inside there. you know what, kishore... it has a lot of flaws, and we emphasise that. that is one example, one could cite you numerous examples. you know that there was a recent article in the economist magazine saying many in the chinese communist party resent xijinping's brutal anti—corruption campaign, which has been used in part to eliminate his political enemies. the degree of opposition he faces is reflected in the large number of personnel changes he's engineered in the party's intelligence, security and military hierarchies.

there are plenty of examples of his authoritarianism, both at home and also his reduction of autonomy in hong kong. his treatments of the millions of uyghurs, who are — according to the united states and many others — being held in concentration camps. i could go on and on, but you're still defending. you're still defending him. i'm glad you mentioned the economist, because in august 2020, the economist came out with a cover story pointing out, quite amazingly, people keep thinking that the chinese economy is going to collapse, going to have lots of problems, that he cannot recover. and, the economist, surprisingly, as you know, is among the magazines most critical of china, says don't count on china collapsing. so what i'm trying to emphasise is that as a geopolitical analyst, you must never engage in wishful thinking, but understand the reality you're dealing with.

and the china we are dealing with today in 2020 is the most formidable china there has ever been. the chinese people have experienced a greater improvement in their standard of living in the past a0 years than they have in the past 4,000 years. 0k, they have seen that. but you know now that because of covid—19, slowing global economy, recession, the worst in decades, the imf is now forecasting a growth rate in china of about 1%. 0k, granted, there's a drop of 8% in the united states, far worse. and in india, also a forecast of 8% drop. so china may be doing well, but by its own standards, 1% growth is really very poor. and this is what the former australian prime minister, kevin rudd — a big watcher of china, speaks fluent mandarin and all the rest of it — says. "an already slowing economy in china, "the ongoing impact

of the trade war with the us, and now covid—19, have placed xijinping's leadership under its greatest internal pressure yet." i have enormous respect for kevin rudd. and you're right. he's a very good china watcher, but at the same time, i also have a lot of other friends who watch china equally carefully, and it is all a matter of context. at a time when no major global economy — not one — can register positive economic growth after this massive global recession, china is registering positive economic growth. of course, china could fail. i completely agree with that. china can fail. but if you are a realistic planner, are you going to plan for something that may or may not happen? and in the case of china, you've got to have two plans. 0ne, it may fail, but one, it may succeed enormously. and if it succeeds enormously, guess what?

we have a very different global world, a very different global chemistry. and we now have to deal with a new elephant in the room. so i'm trying to help the west and say prepare yourself for something that you never imagined. and in fact, what china has accomplished in the last a0 years is something that nobody imagined. but i'lljust say now, of course, with the covid—19 pandemic, we're seeing many countries retreat from globalisation. countries like the uk here have said, "we can't even produce oui’ own personal protective equipment." there's a move to diversifying and shortening supply chains, localising them, regionalizing them and all the rest of it. and that will operate to china's detriment because, of course, it has been so plugged into all this. yes and no. i'll give you a concrete example. japan is moving its financing industries, taking them out of china. loss for china. it moves them where? to southeast asia.

southeast asia benefits? guess what? southeast asia's biggest trading partner is china. so there is a virtuous circle that is at play. so certainly there'll be... and by the way, i would say don't write off globalisation yet, 0k? please. because i want to emphasise that the reason why the asian economies are coming back so fast is because they have been the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation. and nobody, i can tell you, in east asia wants to walk away from globalisation. you got to be a bit more careful, do things slightly differently. but i don't buy this story that there'll be deglobalisation. and certainly in east asia, people are not closing their doors. they're just waiting for the time to come back so that they can open the doors again. all right. we don't know yet. sure, we don't know. i mean, bloomberg has said that even if relocations — you know, bringing production back onshore — even if these relocations are small, bloomberg says that the shift suggests that the trend of globalisation to localisation is real. but we will have to see. but turning to

the united states... just one — one line. the law of comparative advantage has not changed. and if countries that obey the laws of comparative advantage will succeed and do well, and the countries that don't, and close themselves up — like north korea — they will not do well. the law of comparative advantage is an economics law. 0k, sticking with the economy, i want to tell you what samm sacks, from yale law school in the united states, says — "both china and the united states have demonstrated that they are willing to weaponise global trade and supply chains. both view technology firms as national sectors and not global actors." we're now seeing how dominance of artificial intelligence has become a key component of the rivalry for power between the united states and china. i mean, that's the real battleground now, isn't it? absolutely. i completely agree with you.

and if you ask me my wish, i wish that united states and china could have had some kind of basic agreement on what they can and cannot cooperate with in the technology field. but there is a major school of thought in the united states. and, you know, the united states, as i explain in my book, is trying to suppress the rights of china. and they believe the only reason why china succeeded is because the access to the american market. so they are trying to decouple the united states from china, hoping that china would collapse. now, china may collapse but, frankly, i wouldn't bet on it, because the chinese have invested so much in their own technology. you're going to have a bifurcated technology world that is coming, which is going to create lots and lots of complications for lots of countries. but this is an unpleasant reality that we have to live with. but itjust shows how business and economic and trade logic no longer prevails in this relationship between china and the united states. even if it hurts profits, the united states,

and what donald trump is saying to companies — cut your ties with, for example, wechat, the chinese app, even if it causes harm. and this was put to donald trump and he said, "whatever." we're seeing a real change, a hardening in the position of the united states. that's basically what my book is about. trying to explain the structural forces, why the united states is standing up to china. but at the same time, i hope the united states will also focus on the most important reality for the united states, which is that the average income of the bottom 50% in the united states has gone down over a 30—year period. and, you know, two princeton university economists, case and deaton, have described how there's a sea of despair among the white working classes. so the united states also have, you know, they has to revive its economy and make it strong again. and guess what? the most dynamic economies are in east asia. china is one of them, but there are others over here. so if united states wants

to jump—sta rt its economy and to improve the wellbeing of its people, it's got to work with asia. so at some point in time, it will come back. but we're seeing that shift. i mean, apple has already said that it's shifting part of the manufacture of its iphones to india, notjust in china. we're seeing bans on sales of us computer chips to china. but you make it out as though it's just the united states, but it's who fired the first shot in this technology war. google, facebook, banned by china. so there's, you know, reciprocal action. you can blame both sides. ah, you can blame both sides. but at the same time, let's be — if you don't mind — let's be fair. the trump administration has been acting erratically, irrationally, and without a strategy. and henry kissinger told me this — the united states doesn't

have a strategy to deal with china. the chinese do have a plan and they are working according to it. and so, if the united states wants to enhance its own interests — and i'm not saying that united states should act against its own interests, i think we want to see a strong united states — then what the united states should be doing is cooperating with the rest of the world. and as you know, the united states walked away from the tra ns—pacific partnership that had been negotiated by president 0bama and vice presidentjoe biden. that was a geopolitical gift... yeah, 0k. ..to america which trump threw away! 0k, henry kissinger told you that there is no proper strategy, and a slightly long quote to give to you, but it's one by the former m16 chief, the british, obviously, sirjohn sawers, speaking injuly this year. he said, "we must be careful not to turn china into an enemy." as you were just saying. "we need its engagement on crucial issues such as managing climate change and regulating international trade.

but china's leadership must also understand they will pay a price if they try to impose their system and standards on other countries — be that through the belt and road initiative, by manipulating economic leverage for political ends or by more forceful military and intelligence actions." so there is also an onus on china to be mindful of what sirjohn sawers has just outlined there. china is not interested in exporting communism to the rest of the world. so pompeo is wrong on that. and the second point is this — the americans believe that the american society, american example is universalisable. so anybody can become an american. you and i can become americans too and they would love it if we became americans. china is different. the chinese view is that chinese civilisation is good, but it's for chinese. the chinese are trying to strengthen chinese civilisation to make it once again a strong,

respected civilisation. but they'd be very puzzled if i went there and said, "can i become chinese?" they'd say, "no, you're not chinese." that's a big difference. you were referring there to mike pompeo, the us secretary of state, talking of america and china's ties. we've seen a real deterioration, you could argue, because of what's gone on over taiwan. alex azar, the us health secretary, pays a visit to taiwan, the most high—profile visit by an american in a0 years, makes some very conciliatory statements about taiwan. and we've seen, recently, military exercises in the region by china. so there is real concern now that, as wang yi, the foreign minister of china, warns that thais are at their lowest point since relations were re—established in 1979, and called for both sides to pull back from touching upon red lines of the relationship. of course, taiwan, a big, big red line for china. do you think we might actually see an escalation in relations between us and china?

a military confrontation, possibly? i am very worried because i fear that there are some people in the trump administration who believe that the only way to get donald trump elected now — because, as you know, the polls show that biden and kamala harris are leading — the only way to get donald trump elected is to start a small naval skirmish in the south china sea. and then there's a rally around the flag, and then donald trump gets re—elected. that will be very, very dangerous. i mean, as you know, when you start these sort of naval skirmishes, especially within two nuclear powers, it can get out of hand. things can get out of control. so i hope that the saner, wiser voices saying, "please don't do that". and i was happy to learn that the defense secretary of united states may be going to china in the near future. and if that happens, that'll be very good for the world, because at the end of the day, these two powers have to talk to each other.

sirjohn sawers is right. they have to talk to each other. kishore mahbubani in singapore, thank you very much indeed for coming on hardtalk. my pleasure. thank you. in the last day or so, we've had some very windy weather across western parts of the uk. a storm swept across ireland, but on friday, it is going to be blowing a gale across many parts of the uk, certainly wales, england, southern parts of scotland as well. and all because of this low which has decided to park itself very close to the uk, and it will be with us until around about saturday night. eventually on sunday, it should finally pull away into scandinavia.

but until then, blustery conditions expected throughout friday. on top of that, some heavy showers, thunderstorms are possible, too. the heaviest of the showers will be across more western and northern areas of the uk. but let's focus on those winds because they will be hazardous. in fact, strong enough to take branches off trees, and even this time of the year, 50—60 mph winds are capable of bringing down weaker trees. so, some really nasty conditions for some of us. the funny thing is it's actually going to be a mostly sunny day, particularly across many eastern and southern areas of the uk. yes, with a few showers, but predominantly bright or sunny, and the temperatures will get up to around 25 degrees in norwich. obviously a lot fresher around western coasts where we'll see those howling gusts of wind. now, friday night into saturday, the low pressure is starting to pull away, but it's still very much in charge of our weather. so, saturday, once again it's going to be a blustery day across the uk. the gusts of wind won't be quite as strong,

but strong enough. on top of that, we've got further showers in the forecast and thunderstorms as well. i think the winds will be gusting more like 30—a0 mph on saturday, so not quite as strong as the ones on friday. temperatures despite the wind still managing to get up to around 22 degrees in london and norwich, and not far off 20 for our northern towns and cities as well. now, sunday, the low pressure has actually by this stage pulled into norway, and the winds are falling lighter across the uk. still a few showers in the forecast carried on a mostly north—westerly breeze. temperatures in the north dipping down to around 1a degrees, so a bit of a chill in aberdeen. but in the south, still making around 20 degrees celsius. so, once again, a very blustery day on friday. saturday's going to be quite windy, too. and then from sunday, it is going to finally calm down.

this is bbc news with special coverage for viewers in the uk and around the world. i'm christian fraser. it's been a democratic party convention like no other. 0n the final night of this virtual event, the party waits forjoe biden to set out his vision for america as he prepares to accept the nomination as presidential candidate. joe biden, my name is. look me up joe biden, my name is. look me up once you? he's tried twice before, but never been this close. we look at the journey that got joe biden one step away from the presidency. we'll be live injoe biden‘s home—town of wilmington, delaware and in washington. also coming up: the convention will also hear from everyday americans — and some of those — including pete buttigieg and michael bloomberg — who ran in the presidential primaries.