i'm kasia madera. the headlines: india is being devastated by a second wave of covid, a current of our storm as its premise is coded. in past funny four hours, there have been more than 2000 deaths, more than 300,000 cases. the usjustice department will conduct a civil investigation into the minneapolis police department to see whether there has been a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. he follows the conviction of a former police officer for the murder of george floyd. russian police are reported to have arrested almost 1500 supporters of the jailed opposition activist alexei navalny on a day of protest across the country. those are the headlines.

that's it from me. i will be back tomorrow, at the top of the hour, lewis will be here with the rest of the day's news. now on bbc news, it's time for hardtalk. welcome to hardtalk. i'm stephen sackur. wherever you look in geopolitics today, there's an overwhelming sense of uncertainty, and it's notjust because we're still grappling with a global pandemic. russian troops amassing on ukraine's border, china and the us are locked in cold war—style hostility, cyber warfare makes states, systems and individuals feel newly vulnerable. my guest, sir peter westmacott, was britain's ambassador in washington, paris and ankara. are we right now at a point of peak geopolitical risk?

peter westmacott, welcome to hardtalk. thank you, stephen. let me start with a big question. do you think the assumptions that underpinned your very long diplomatic career still hold good today? i'm thinking about britain's place in the world, its place in europe, relationships with the united states, the way multilateral institutions work. do all of those assumptions still hold good? i think a lot of it's changing at the moment. i think the uk's place in the world has been altered by brexit.

i think that we were pretty much off the pitch for about five years, while we worked out how to deal with the results of the referendum, and only now are we beginning to try to make some kind of sense of the global britain idea and work out what our role is going to be on our own, outside europe, but still a member of a lot of very important organisations and still with a permanent seat at the un security council. and then you've got a number of international institutions which have kept the peace and prosperity and free trade open since the 1940s and �*50s a little bit in uncertainty. donald trump didn't like any of those international organisations, the world has been asking itself questions about whether america is still a reliable leader of the free world, and into some of the vacuum and the unpredictability created by trump, we've got some very big players who are flexing their muscles, some of whom are making trouble. plus, covid has opened up a lot of questions about resilience and long supply chains and ways of getting stuff done, competence of democracies

and so on, so i think a lot of those, what we thought were pretty certain predictabilities, if you like, in international affairs, are now open to question. you are fairly recently retired, so of course you're no longer privy to the confidential information that used to cross your desk, but as you look at some of the flashpoints around the world today — and i'm thinking particularly of the russia—ukraine border and i'm thinking of the south china sea — do you think that because of the fragility of the multilateral system that you've just talked about that the world is a more dangerous place today that it was when even you retired about four years ago? i think what's changed, amongst other things, since then is that china has become more assertive, more, if you like, centralised, it's more a country which is run by a president for life and by the party, more than by the people,

if that was ever the case, and which has seemed to have convinced itself that america is in irreversible decline and that the unipolar world has gone and that china is going to be, if you like, top dog. and whatjoe biden has said is, "i'm not going to have on my watch china, the richest, most powerful, most dominant global power. that ain't going to happen. i'm going to stand up to it." so i think we are in a different place. i don't think it's a thucydides trap, and the inevitability of conflict between one declining superpower and one rising superpower. there's been a lot of talk of that sort of idea. i think this is manageable, but i do think that china is keen on a dominant role, although its spokesmen say that it is not. but there's an awful lot of interdependency there. and in some ways, engaging with china — although it's a huge, complex challenge — might be less difficult than engaging with russia, which i think is kind of more destructive and more determined to be talked about and be

the centre of attention, rather than set upon world domination, which it clearly is not capable of doing. well, i promise you i'll come back to both china and russia in the course of this interview, but let us now come closer to home. and i'm very mindful of your own sort of mindset, your worldview. if i may say so, you're of a generation of top british diplomats who were brought up inside the european union who, frankly, very much liked the notion of britain anchored in europe. well, that anchor has been cast away now. britain divorced itself from the eu after that referendum in 2016. and at the time, you said you felt "physically sick" when that result became clear. the question is, have people like you, five years on, come to terms with it? or are you still feeling physically sick? and are you still determined

to casted in a negative light? i don't feel physically sick, and i'm certainly not determined to cast it in a negative light. i still feel regretful, sometimes resentful, about some of the things that were said to persuade people that this was a good idea, and i still think that such an enormously important change in the future direction of our country probably shouldn't have been done except on the basis of a majority of the electorate, or two—thirds, like you would have in many other democracies, for a change of the constitution. but it didn't happen. so people like me, i think, recognise that that's what's happened — that the famous 37% of the electorate have spoken, brexit has finally happened. it's not the kind of brexit that we were being told we would have, and i think it's in many ways

economically more damaging, but i think that what we're now looking at is a new set of realities. and i think there is potential for the united kingdom to make its own way but in a different manner. i don't think we're going to, by the way, sever all our links with the major european players. already you see that in a number of foreign and security policy issues, we are still talking to the french and the germans and others — not quite as much as we were before because we're not in the same meetings in brussels, but we're certainly talking to them bilaterally. and i think that's very important. and of course, even though we're outside the eu, we're still at the security council of the united nations, we're still leading members of nato, we're still — along with france — one of the only two serious players with a military capability in the european union and, if you like, we are no longer constrained by common foreign security policies and so on of the 28 member states. we are on our own. that does mean that we can be agile and independent... well... we don't even have to be bound by something like member state solidarity, if we want to try and solve some of the remaining territorial disputes in the world. well, if i may say so, sir peter, you are sounding

like prime minister borisjohnson, who of course was never your boss, but prime minister borisjohnson — who is rather keen on having his cake and eating it — and what you're suggesting is that, in a sense, britain has had a sweet spot where it can have its cake and eat it. it can still have a working relationship with the 27 member states of the eu, despite the spats over the northern ireland border, over the astrazeneca vaccine roll—out. as you just said, it has a working relationship with the eu 27. and at the same time, it does have more wiggle room, if you like, to build an independent foreign policy. what's not to like? well, what's not to like is that 43% of our exports go to the european union and we have left the single market and the customs union, and we read every day how much more complicated our commercial relationship with europe are and how much more difficult it's become for british subjects to go and live and work and study and someone subjects to go and live and work and study and so on

elsewhere in the eu... sure, sure, but with respect, the trade between britain and the eu is not going to fall off a cliff. it's quite clear. it may be, for a time, having to adapt to new circumstances, but you only have to look at the nature of the uk economy right now and compare it with its eu counterparts to see that the uk isn't suffering some massive post—brexit hangover. and, frankly, in some ways, there are signs that in other parts of the world, with trade agreements already made with japan and other countries, britain might actually make this work quite well. well, i hope britain will, although the trade agreements don't actually improve, in terms of trade that we already have with any of those countries, and nor will a free—trade agreement with america. i am simply somebody who accepts the reality as you challenge me to do, and i hope that we can make the best of it. but the challenge is still out there. i hope we can become significant players, on our own, if you like, outside the european union, in foreign and security policy,

but there's a lot of work still to be done and we do not have the structures that tie us with all those partners that we had before. and we've also got to do with, you know, a new administration in washington which will not take special relationships for granted in any way and we have to show that we are going to make a difference. i hope we can, but i'm not actually one of those who thinks, "what's not to like? we are having our cake and eating it." i just want us to make the best of the new situation. you've written a book about your diplomatic career, and a lot of it is about relations with the eu and with the united states as well, britain's twin sort of pillars of its foreign policy. do you buy the notion that's been peddled by foreign secretary dominic raab — and indeed by borisjohnson — that it's time for a new foreign policy? and the talk is of a tilt eastwards, that there's going to be a much greater focus on britain's relations with asian countries — and, of course, that means china, but it also means allies like japan

and south korea as well — and perhaps less of a focus on the twin pillars, of relations with european partners and the united states? do you think that's the right way for britain to go? there's a lot of talk about the indo pacific, whatever that means, and a tilt in that direction. i think that it makes eminently good sense, for economic and other reasons, to be looking in that direction. i talked briefly about the importance of the long—distance supply chains. and an awful lot of the things that we need for british industry, manufacturing and consumers, come a very long way, from that part of the world, and we have every interest in close relations and strong trading links to that part of the world. i don't want us to end up talking about a tilt to the east and finding we've got no resource there to actually make a difference. i think paying attention to those countries — india, china, the pacific rim countries — makes perfect sense. i don't think i would give up on the others.

as you said, we've got huge economic relations with the european union. you hope it won't fall off a cliff. i think it will go down. i think we've got to keep working at that. and i don't think we should give up on our relationship with the united states, though we need to recognise that america itself is entirely transactional, but there's many issues which the biden administration care about which happened to coincide with british values and interests, and i think we should carry on seeking to engage closely with them, too. you're one of the most experienced diplomats in the uk. how do you balance out principal and pragmatism in a relationship with china right now? again, going back to your past, you spent many years working as a diplomat under the blair government. now, tony blair was famous for talking about a foreign policy driven by values. he talked about humanitarian interventionism. we hear that the united states government believes the chinese are conducting a policy of "genocide" against the muslim minority uighur community in xinjiang province. when you deal with china,

how do you balance out principle and pragmatism? it's a very difficult issue. i think that with china, as with a number of other countries — including, for example, saudi arabia — there is a real need to take a stand on the values that we hold dear. the united kingdom has been ready for on human rights issues in china and the way hong kongers have been treated, and it's done the right thing by making it easier for them to come to the united kingdom. and we've also stood up for freedom of navigation and issues like that, which china feels strongly about and where we are not on the same page, in the south china sea. now, how do you reconcile pragmatism and principle? i think you have to be true to yourselves and you have to also pursue the things that you think really matter with those governments. in the case of china, it might be climate change and it might be trade and it might be supply chains and it might be innovation. it might be global trade. there's a lot of issues. if you look atjohn kerry,

for example, the us climate tsar, he will say, "we've taken a very firm line with china on values and human rights, but we're also discussing in a very productive way the importance of making progress on climate change." i don't see why the united kingdom can't and shouldn't do the same thing. you can do both. the one does not exclude the other. really? and you don't think that that smacks of cynicism, that you mouth the rhetoric of "standing up for human rights" while in fact acknowledging a very, very pragmatic principle that china is so economically important now that, frankly, you turn a blind eye to many of the abuses that they are alleged to be undertaking? no, i don't think you should turn a blind eye at all. as i was saying, i think you should stand up for the values and the principles that you hold dear, but you should also recognise that if you want, for example, to stop the destruction of this planet, you've got to talk to china, as well as to other people, about that. it's not about turning a blind eye, it's about trying to deal with all those different elements of a complex relationship, the one

not excluding the other. i think, for example, in the case of saudi arabia, it is right that america and the united kingdom should refuse to supply weapons that are being used indiscriminately in the civil war in yemen, and i believe we have done that. so i think you've got to do what is right, but you also... at the same time, you pursue the national interest as well. there's a couple of other really important arenas around the world i want to talk to you about and we don't have much time, so let's quickly get onto the united states. and you, in your career, left washington as british ambassador when the 0bama administration came to an end, so you watched trump from the outside. but the point about donald trump is that he changed so very much about the definition of us interests — he put america first, he adopted a clearly nationalist, and indeed protectionist, policy around the world, some would say isolationist too — and the assumption that joe biden�*s going to reverse

all of that seems in some ways to be a little misguided, not least because of what we've seen of his decision—making in afghanistan, where he is going to stick to the trump idea that troops have to be pulled out. he's extended the deadline until september, but nonetheless they're coming home. so would it be fair to say that, actually, there are things about the trump presidency and what he did to the definition of us national interests that joe biden will actually continue rather than reverse? i think you're right. there are some things that will not change. we haven't yet seen, for example, the elimination of all the extra tariffs which trump put on some of america's trading partners. 0n iran, even though the biden administration thought it was completely wrong of trump to tear up the nuclear deal, the current administration is saying, "well, we're happy to go back to talks, but it needs to be the nuclear deal, plus additional obligations on iran." there are a number of issues,

i think, on which, if you like, biden will have to build on some of where trump was. 0n the other hand, whereas donald trump was against nato, against the european union, against the wto, against the who, against the united nations, i think we have an administration which is much more multilateralist and ready to work with those institutions than his predecessor was... but hang on, that's important, that's a really interesting point you're making, sir peter. but isn't it the truth that many in europe, despite hearing joe biden�*s rhetorical commitment to nato, for example, they're not sure they can buy into it? i mean, emmanuel macron not so long ago said he believed that nato was effectively brain dead, he said it was no longer pertinent. and we've heard many other european officials in the last few months saying, "just because biden�*s now in power doesn't mean that we in europe can assume that we can rely on america as a trusted and constant partner in the future, in the way that we did in the past.

we have to learn the lessons of trump." given all that, isn't vladimir putin right now looking at nato, looking at the lack of cohesiveness — and, frankly, credibility — in nato, and thinking to himself, "i can pretty much do what i want"? he's certainly been thinking like that for the last four years because, on the whole, he got a free pass from donald trump. i think he will be looking at nato with a slightly different approach now, but he's testing us. look at all that build—up of troops on the ukraine border. what is nato? of course, nato is not treaty—bound to defend ukraine, but what is nato going to do about european security? but the other point that you're sort of hinting at, which i think is a very important one, is that this is an american president who is on record as opposing most military interventions — not iraq, but in libya and in the surge in afghanistan, and a number of other places, his view was that america should not be getting involved in far—away wars where it's not in

a position to build nations or make things better. so you are dealing with a president who instinctively — and as we've seen in the decision that he has taken on afghanistan — wants to bring the troops home, but he's also committed to the alliances of which america is a member. and he's repeated his commitment to article five of nato, which is "an attack on one is an attack on all". so i would rather hope that russia and other people are looking at the alliance and saying, "well, it is still very much intact," while recognising that america is in a rather different position than it was. but even as we talk, it strikes me there's so much more scope for misunderstanding and for unpredictable behaviours in the next few years than there were perhaps in the period in which you were serving as a british ambassador. do you feel that, too? do you feel that there is a much greater sense of risk right now? i think there was great unpredictability over the last four or five years, when even

american officials had to understand what policy was by looking at twitter at 5am, because it often didn't reflect the advice the administration was giving to their own boss. and i think a lot of countries, china and russia amongst them, but plenty of others — including ourselves — wondered what was happening from one day to the next. there was a level of unpredictability there. i think that some of that is now going, but we are in a global situation where an awful lot of things have changed, where a number of critical relationships are under review — and biden has made that clear. i would hope that we can engage with china in a collective way which finds benefits for china, as well as for others in the region. the indo pacific point you were making. and for the rest of us, rather than leave everybody wondering what's going on, and you end up with a, kind of, 1914 conflict by accident because of changing capabilities. i think we are moving away from the unpredictability we had in the last few years

toward something which i hope is a bit more predictable. and you've seen a very firm position from americans and others against russia, for example, with substantial sanctions applied in response to the latest bits of cyber warfare. i think russia is getting a clear message. i want to end by switching focus and, rather dramatically, shifting subject matter — but it is, in a sense, linked. we've talked a lot about the future of britain's role in the world. you, in the early 1990s, spent a couple of years working very closely with prince charles in his office. you know him very well, and many viewers around the world will have, of course, have watched the funeral of prince philip, the duke of edinburgh, in recent days. and they — well, all of us — are mindful that the queen is of a very great age, and that, before too very long, we expect to see a king charles. and i would like to ask you whether you feel it will be a very different kind of monarchy when that transition comes about?

i think what we will see in the coming months and years is a kind of seamless process, whereby the prince of wales becomes, you know, the dominant male member of the royalfamily, stepping into the shoes quietly of his late father. i think that is excellent preparation for everyone getting used to the idea of him becoming the monarch when that time happens. will it be a very different sort of monarchy? well, the prince of wales is his own man. he, along with other members of the family have been aware — as aware as any of us — for years that if the monarchy does not keep itself relevant and modernised, it is going to lose its way and people are going to question what it is for. so already, there's been streamlining, there has been cutting back, if you like, of the number of royals who are undertaking duties — although funnily enough, because of changes within the family, we're seeing one

or two of the younger members now assuming new roles, and we saw that at the time of prince philip's funeral. so i think you'll see a change of personality, for sure. what i took away from that funeral, a sign of the monarchy, even in these extraordinarily difficult covid times, being an institution which helps the people of britain — and perhaps, more widely, the commonwealth and further afield — realise that our monarchy is capable of getting us to lift our eyes temporarily through the awfulness of covid and from the daily grind of politics and individual scandals and other things that are going on in the newspapers each day. sir peter westmacott, we have to end there. i thank you very much indeed forjoining me on hardtalk. thank you, stephen.

hello. after slightly cloudy conditions across england and wales on wednesday, the clear blue skies and strong sunshine experienced in scotland, northern ireland, akin to what we can see here from one of our weather watchers during the day, well, they will become a bit more abundant. but those clear skies by day also mean colder nights are back, and a widespread frosty start to the day, temperatures as low as —5, —6 through some parts of eastern scotland and northeast england, very few immune to a frost. and that's because we've got high pressure in charge. it's keeping those skies clear. high pressure generally means dry weather as well, stops the rain clouds from going up. and around the centre of it, which is right over us, there will be light winds. a little bit more breeze, most notable across the far south of england. and whilst most will see sunshine from dawn to dusk, there will be a bit more cloud in northern scotland through thursday compared with

wednesday, and the sunshine in central parts of scotland that little bit hazier. but with much more sunshine around on thursday, pollen levels are back up again, high in most parts, limited a little bit across this southeast corner and through the english channel because we've got more of a breeze here. that breeze, coming in from an east or northeasterly direction, will also limit the rise in temperatures here to between 10—13 celsius. but with lighter winds further north and west, because the ground is so dry at the moment, it means the air above it warms quite quickly and that's why we could get to around 16—17 celsius in some western areas through the afternoon. but what will follow, again, will be clear skies for most away from northern scotland into thursday night, so another frost is likely. notice how that area of high pressure has barely changed. the lines on the chart, the isobars, where we see the windy conditions, will be out to the south and the west, so more of a breeze potentially for northern ireland, but still that breeze blowing through the english channel and through southern parts of wales. the cloud in the far northeast of scotland mayjust produce the odd isolated shower, but for most, again, it's another day of sunshine from dawn to dusk. and with each day being sunny, the ground warms up a bit more.

temperatures could reach 19—20 celsius, particularly across parts of north wales, northwest england and southwest scotland. still cooler with that onshore breeze, though, to east anglia and the southeast. now, if you're expecting any change into this weekend, they'll only be subtle ones. dry, sunny sums it up for most, the nights still chilly with a risk of a frost. there will be a bit more cloud developing through saturday and sunday, and by sunday, temperatures dropping just a little bit. bye for now.

this is bbc news — i'm lewis vaughanjones with the latest headlines for viewers in the uk and around the world. a health system on the verge of collapse — india suffers a second wave of covid, with record numbers of daily deaths and infections. 0nce once the first wave subsided, the government almost declared victory over covid—19. the country has been caught unprepared. thousands of supporters of russia's jailed opposition leader, alexei navalny, take to the streets — hundreds are arrested. vladimir putin always says that everything is ok, everything the word he says is a lie and i am not ok with that. that is why i am here. as america reflects on the conviction of derek chauvin, the us justice department announces