we re were discussing the few weeks, we were discussing the issue, there were meetings in number ten. ~ , , issue, there were meetings in number ten. ~ c, , c, issue, there were meetings in number ten. ~ c, c, , issue, there were meetings in number ten. ~ i, c, , , r, issue, there were meetings in number ten. ~ c, c, , , t, , ten. was that an intense period? did ou have ten. was that an intense period? did you have the — ten. was that an intense period? did you have the leisure _ ten. was that an intense period? did you have the leisure to _ ten. was that an intense period? did you have the leisure to be _ ten. was that an intense period? did you have the leisure to be changing, | you have the leisure to be changing, adding to your blog of the previous year? i adding to your blog of the previous ear? ,, adding to your blog of the previous ear? i, i, , c, , i, year? i thought wrongly it was going to become an _ year? i thought wrongly it was going to become an issue _ year? i thought wrongly it was going to become an issue and _ year? i thought wrongly it was going to become an issue and i _ year? i thought wrongly it was going to become an issue and i knew - to become an issue and i knew everyone would start giggling the whole thing and i wanted people to realise that people had been hitting the panic button a year earlier. i thought it would be useful. if you look back at everything i have written over the last ten years, i have written over and over again about problems like pandemics, natural, engineered, crises, the number ten system, it never occurred to me given that there were thousands of words about it, that people would get so hit up about the whole thing. ijust people would get so hit up about the whole thing. i just thought people would get so hit up about the whole thing. ijust thought it people would get so hit up about the whole thing. i just thought it was very useful to people realise. as you see in the news recently, all

sorts of things are coming out from classified american sources suggesting that people were not well with covid—i9 in the wuhan lab back in november. i was wrong about the timing of this. i do think it is a very important issue that needs to be addressed. the words you wrote were note at a time when you are employed in public service to handle the most important emergency that the country has faced since the war. i emergency that the country has faced since the war-— since the war. i didn't quite understand. _ since the war. i didn't quite understand. you _ since the war. i didn't quite understand. you say - since the war. i didn't quite understand. you say that l since the war. i didn't quite i understand. you say that the since the war. i didn't quite - understand. you say that the blog contains your _ understand. you say that the blog contains your reflections - understand. you say that the blog contains your reflections over - understand. you say that the blog contains your reflections over the | contains your reflections over the years, the tens of thousands of words he wrote were written at times when you are not employed in the role that you had during that time. perhaps i'm expressing surprise that you had the time to be able to think about adding to or updating your

blog. i about adding to or updating your bloc. ., about adding to or updating your bloc. . , , blog. i re-read the bulletin but bear in mind _ blog. i re-read the bulletin but bear in mind at— blog. i re-read the bulletin but bear in mind at the _ blog. i re-read the bulletin but bear in mind at the time - blog. i re-read the bulletin but bear in mind at the time this . blog. i re-read the bulletin but l bear in mind at the time this was blog. i re-read the bulletin but - bear in mind at the time this was an actual live issue, notjust a sort of historical thing. i went back to number 10 downing street after the 12th and there were meetings asking, is this engineered, is it not engineered? has it escaped from the lab, has it not? what are the implications? there were meetings with the prime minister and national security about that question. i can't go into the details about that obviously but it was a live issue so i went back and be read notjust that piece but lots of pieces, pasting over text into a blog takes 90 seconds, it's not like this was something... it literally takes a minute or so. something. .. it literally takes a minute or so.— something... it literally takes a minute orso. �*, ., ., ., , minute or so. let's move on to this auestion minute or so. let's move on to this question of— minute or so. let's move on to this question of herd _ minute or so. let's move on to this question of herd immunity - minute or so. let's move on to this question of herd immunity or - minute or so. let's move on to this question of herd immunity or not. l question of herd immunity or not. just set out for us what i think

you've referred to as being a crucial week, the week beginning monday the 9th of march. just give us a brief summary of what happened in terms of the key meetings. mould in terms of the key meetings. would be if i exolained _ in terms of the key meetings. would be if i explained the _ in terms of the key meetings. would be if i explained the thinking - in terms of the key meetings. would be if i explained the thinking about herd immunity now? yes. be if i explained the thinking about herd immunity now?— be if i explained the thinking about herd immunity now? yes, please go ahead. obviously _ herd immunity now? yes, please go ahead. obviously lots _ herd immunity now? yes, please go ahead. obviously lots of _ herd immunity now? yes, please go ahead. obviously lots of confusion l ahead. obviously lots of confusion in the term _ ahead. obviously lots of confusion in the term can _ ahead. obviously lots of confusion in the term can be _ ahead. obviously lots of confusion in the term can be used _ ahead. obviously lots of confusion | in the term can be used differently and is used differently by different people to mean different things. essentially the logic of the official plan from the department of health was that this disease is going to spread. vaccines are not going to spread. vaccines are not going to spread. vaccines are not going to be relevant in any way, shape orform over the

going to be relevant in any way, shape or form over the relevant time period. we were told it was essentially a certainty that there would be no vaccines available in 2020. something else which turned out to be completely wrong because i think, as will come onto, we could have done vaccines much faster than happened and as we thought at the time, but at the time the whole plan was based on the assumption that it was based on the assumption that it was a certainty that there would be no vaccine in 2020 so the logic was you can either have, if it's unconstrained, it will come in and there will be a sharp peak like that and it will completely swamp everything and be a huge disaster. the logical approach therefore is to introduce measures which delay that

peak arriving and which push it down below the capacity of the health system. in response to the argument, but hang on a second, look at what they are doing in wuhan, look at what they're doing in taiwan and singapore and south korea, the entire assumption in whitehall was, first of all, that won't work for them and they will all have second peaks later on. secondly, it's inconceivable that the british public are going to accept wuhan style measures here. even if we therefore suppress it completely, all that you are going to do is get all that you are going to do is get a second peak in the winter when the nhs is already, every year, under

pressure so we only actually have a real choice between one peak and herd immunity by september, terrible but then you are through it by the time the next winter comes. if you try and flatten it now, this second peak comes up in wintertime. that's even worse than the summer so, horrific as the numbers look in the summer, they will be even worse if this happens in october, november, december. so it's important to bear in mind on this whole herd immunity point, obviously no one is saying that they want this to happen. the point is it was seen as an inevitability. you will either have herd immunity by september after a single peak or you will have herd immunity byjanuary with single peak or you will have herd immunity by january with the second peak. those are the only two options

that we have. that was the whole logic of all of the discussions in january and february and early march, and that's why in the week of the ninth, people from sage and elsewhere in the government started to say publicly and talk publicly about herd immunity. it's not that people are thinking, this is a good thing, we actively want it, it's that it's a complete inevitability. the only real question is one of timing. it's either herd immunity by september or byjanuary after a september or by january after a second september or byjanuary after a second peak. that was the september or by january after a second peak. that was the assumption up second peak. that was the assumption up until friday the 13th of march. so when matt hancock said on the 15th of march, we have a plan, herd immunity is not part of it, was that wrong? immunity is not part of it, was that wron: ? , ., immunity is not part of it, was that wron? , ., �*, immunity is not part of it, was that wron.? , ., �*, ., immunity is not part of it, was that wron? , ., �*, ., wrong? yes, and saying it's not part of it is completely _ wrong? yes, and saying it's not part of it is completely wrong. _ wrong? yes, and saying it's not part

of it is completely wrong. i - wrong? yes, and saying it's not part of it is completely wrong. i think - of it is completely wrong. i think it's a semantic problem now and i look through all of our whatsapp messages, there is a semantic question about, is the goal herd immunity? do we want herd immunity? versus is that the basic plan? of course nobody wants this to happen, nobody wanted any of it to happen, but the point was herd immunity was regarded as an unavoidable fact. it was —— the only question we practically had was one of timing. we can go through the chronology of it but after some sage members are set on the 11th publicly, we are going to be shielding people and by the time they come out of shielding, the time they come out of shielding, the rest of the population will have herd immunity, that was the plan. i'm completely baffled as to why at number ten has tried to deny that

because that was the official plan. you can see it in the cobra documents i brought along, hancock himself and the chief scientists and chief medical officers were briefing journalists during the week of the ninth, this is what the official plan is. ninth, this is what the official ian is. ., , ~ ninth, this is what the official ian is. . ninth, this is what the official ian is. plan is. let me ask you about the sane plan is. let me ask you about the sage meeting _ plan is. let me ask you about the sage meeting on _ plan is. let me ask you about the sage meeting on the _ plan is. let me ask you about the sage meeting on the 5th - plan is. let me ask you about the sage meeting on the 5th of - plan is. let me ask you about the| sage meeting on the 5th of march which ministers say you had. at that point on the 5th of march it was five weeks since the who said covid was a public health emergency of international concern in countries like china, taiwan, korea, even australia and new zealand were starting to lock their borders and set up test and trace programmes, stop mass events. but the minutes of that 5th of march meeting say that the only measures recommended were shielding the vulnerable and elderly. at that point on the 5th of march, did you advise the prime minister that sage was wrong? ihia. march, did you advise the prime minister that sage was wrong? ha. i minister that sage was wrong? no, i

didn't. i minister that sage was wrong? no, i didn't- i was — minister that sage was wrong? no, i didn't. i was ringing _ minister that sage was wrong? no, i didn't. i was ringing increasing alarm bells in the first half of march but i had a sort of... my thought process was, so i started getting people coming to me round about the 25th of february saying, very smart people, saying to me, america is completely screwing this up. you should be really aggressive. don't listen to all these people saying that there is an alternative to this. i personally started to take preparations and buying things, we are going to have to lock down etc. but the official view all the way through the first half of march and actually into the week of the 16th of march was that that would all be more dangerous. my mindset was, i

was really torn about the whole thing because in the first ten days of march, i was increasingly being told by people, i think this is going wrong, but i was also really, really worried about smashing my hand down on a massive button marked "ditch the official plan, stop listening to the official plan, i think there's something going wrong." i did do that as we will come onto, but around about the fifth, i was still reluctant to do that and we were exploring lots of different things that were going on. so that was two weeks before the champions league event in liverpool, the gold cup, and you didn't at that point advise us mass participation sports events should be cancelled? no, an advice at the time was, and it shows the at play, official advice was doing that won't make much difference to transmission, which seems bizarre in retrospect, the idea you would keep having mass

events through this whole thing, but also secondly it could be actively bad because you'lljust push people into pubs. and, of course, no one in the department of health do the obvious logical conclusion, shouldn't we be shutting all the pubs as well? at this point, round about the fifth, the logic was, where obviously is not going to be closing pubs in retail and leisure etc, then i see the point of the official advice because if you're not going to do those things, it does have a logic to it. the logic itself is completely flawed but that's what the thinking was around the 5th of march.— the 5th of march. let's talk about the 5th of march. let's talk about the weekend _ the 5th of march. let's talk about the weekend when _ the 5th of march. let's talk about the weekend when the _ the 5th of march. let's talk about the weekend when the planned . the 5th of march. let's talk about - the weekend when the planned change. this morning you tweeted a picture of a whiteboard from the prime minister's study of what you called plan b and you said you should do to him on the morning of saturday the 14th of march. was at the moment you

told him for the first time that the scientific consensus as we saw in those earlier stage meetings was wrong? those earlier stage meetings was wron: ? ., ., , wrong? no, not the first time. the data scientist _ wrong? no, not the first time. the data scientist ben _ wrong? no, not the first time. the data scientist ben warner- wrong? no, not the first time. the data scientist ben warner was - data scientist ben warner was working at number ten and his brother, coincidentally and thankfully, was working with the nhs to help the 0hs with building a data dashboard to deal with covid. he had beenin dashboard to deal with covid. he had been in various meetings about the official plan and he said to me, i'm really, really worried about this. it seems to me that people, this plan could easily be mad, it could be incredibly destructive. has this been tested, have you thought it through? should i and some other start thinking about plan b? ibm;i through? should i and some other start thinking about plan b? by when did ou tell start thinking about plan b? by when did you tell the _ start thinking about plan b? by when did you tell the prime _ start thinking about plan b? by when did you tell the prime minister-

start thinking about plan b? by when did you tell the prime minister we . did you tell the prime minister we had to change the reaction? fin did you tell the prime minister we had to change the reaction? on the mornin: of had to change the reaction? on the morning of the _ had to change the reaction? on the morning of the 12th, _ had to change the reaction? on the morning of the 12th, i _ had to change the reaction? on the morning of the 12th, i said... - had to change the reaction? on the morning of the 12th, i said... well, | morning of the 12th, i said... well, there's all sorts of different things. there's all sorts of different thins. ' ., , ., there's all sorts of different thins. ' ., ., , ._ things. the 12th was a thursday, that's the first _ things. the 12th was a thursday, that's the first time _ things. the 12th was a thursday, that's the first time you - things. the 12th was a thursday, that's the first time you told - things. the 12th was a thursday, that's the first time you told the | that's the first time you told the prime minister the scientific consensus is wrong and we need a plan b. fin consensus is wrong and we need a plan b. " plan b. on the 11th, i texted the prime minister _ plan b. on the 11th, i texted the prime minister and _ plan b. on the 11th, i texted the prime minister and chief - plan b. on the 11th, | texted the | prime minister and chief scientific adviser and so people can see the trajectory and how social distancing will be needed to flatten the curve, very clever people including health officials, and doctors are saying the risk of delay are much higher than the risk of going too soon. if we're not to say tomorrow, starting social distancing today, we are waiting and effectively telling people to wash their hands, there's going to be a massive push back saying why wait five days, why not move now, why not flatten earlier? proposing tomorrow that we delay

action until next week will require extremely clear justification with sporting data models etc. we have to make it public for global scrutiny. this is on the night of the 11th. this is on the night of the 11th. this is on the night of the 11th. this is why i and others had this mounting panic about the whole thing. mounting panic about the whole thin. ~ , ., , mounting panic about the whole thin. ~ , .,, thing. where the people in it sage who shared _ thing. where the people in it sage who shared your _ thing. where the people in it sage who shared your review— thing. where the people in it sage who shared your review that - thing. where the people in it sage who shared your review that we i thing. where the people in it sage i who shared your review that we were going in the wrong direction or was there a groupthink that was broadly shared by everyone? has there a groupthink that was broadly shared by everyone?— shared by everyone? as far as i can tell, and shared by everyone? as far as i can tell. and as — shared by everyone? as far as i can tell, and as far— shared by everyone? as far as i can tell, and as far as _ shared by everyone? as far as i can tell, and as far as i _ shared by everyone? as far as i can tell, and as far as i remember, - shared by everyone? as far as i can | tell, and as far as i remember, most people in sage thought this fundamental logic was still operative on the 11th and 12th at sage and this is the reason why i've been reluctant over the previous week to tell the prime minister i think the advice we are getting is wrong. but even around the 11th and

12th, as far as i could tell from sage and as far as the minutes show, the fundamental assumption remained that we can't do lockdown, we can't do suppression because itjust means a second peak letter. so on the night of the 11th, i sent that message and said if we are not going... 0n the 11th it became clear, which became a running feature of the whole thing, that contrary to our expectations, all sorts of things we thought were in train were outso not in train so on the 11th it was pushed back from within the system against advising the following day, the 12, to say stay at home if you've got symptoms. me and others were realising at this point the system is basically delaying announcing all of these things because there not a proper in

place. thejustification is, it doesn't really matter if it's now or in a weak�*s time, but the whole logic doesn't work and these things are being delayed simply because there hasn't been planning and preparation made. i wanted us to announce on the 12th the individual stay at home and also push through the household quarantine as well. how do we stop that happening in the future? because there was a consensus about the way to do things. we know with the benefit of hindsight that was wrong, but how would you change the structures and systems to prevent that kind of thing happening for a future pandemic?— thing happening for a future andemic? . �*, ., , , ., pandemic? that's obviously a huge auestion pandemic? that's obviously a huge question and _ pandemic? that's obviously a huge question and i _ pandemic? that's obviously a huge question and i think _ pandemic? that's obviously a huge question and i think there - pandemic? that's obviously a huge question and i think there is - pandemic? that's obviously a huge question and i think there is no - question and i think there is no doubt at all that the process by which sage was secret and overall

the whole thinking around the strategy was secret was an absolutely catastrophic mistake because it meant there wasn't proper scrutiny of the assumptions behind an underlying logic. sage agreed about this. when i said in the 11th were going to have to make these models public and whatnot, there wasn't pushback from sage or patrick vallance. he actually agreed with me. when i said we should publish the code for the model so people can play with the code themselves and see what these models are, patrick also agreed and said to sage that we should do that. the problem is by the time we were doing this, it was fundamentally too late. by the 11th and 12th we had already gone terribly wrong. this document tells you your previous question, jeremy. this is from a cobra document and

was in various documents over this time period. i put it on my twitter feed but it has this graph here. this was the logic from sage and the department of health at the time. the black line is doing nothing, the is do little bit, the green line is to a kind of wuhan style, not necessarily wuhan but in that style, suppression. social intervention such as those in china risks re—establishment. we seek to avoid this possibility. this is after the crucial meetings on 13th and 1ath, this remained the official logic for

days. this remained the official logic for da s. ., ,. , this remained the official logic for das. ., ,. , , ., ., ., days. you describe the behavioural sciences to — days. you describe the behavioural sciences to informed _ days. you describe the behavioural sciences to informed sage - days. you describe the behavioural sciences to informed sage as - sciences to informed sage as charlatans and were very critical of the advice about how people would react to a lockdown. did you commission research to challenge that view? we commission research to challenge that view? ~ , that view? we definitely did challenge — that view? we definitely did challenge it. _ that view? we definitely did challenge it. just _ that view? we definitely did challenge it. just to - that view? we definitely did challenge it. just to correct | that view? we definitely did - challenge it. just to correct that, i didn't say that everybody involved in spi—b were charlatans, that's not the case. in this field of behavioural science, there are a lot of charlata ns behavioural science, there are a lot of charlatans and anybody who has been involved with the political world knows that the whole field is riddled with tough studies, —— duff studies, memes that people think are true. 0ne studies, memes that people think are true. one of the things that people thought was wrong and the official

thinking in the department of health in february and march was, firstly, the british public will not accept a lockdown. secondly, the british public will not accept what was thought of as a kind of east asian style track and trace type system and the infringement of liberty around that. those two assumptions were completely central to the official plan and were both obviously completely wrong. in the first half of march, this was raised sometimes in the prime minister's office as me and others were literally pointing at the tv screen of lombardi and saying, look at what's happening in lombardi, we are getting text messages from our own families saying what's going on? this assumption that the public

aren't that frightened and don't want to have a lockdown is false and we should abandon it. but there is no doubt that was extremely important. no doubt that was extremely important-— no doubt that was extremely imortant. ., ., , ., , ., important. two final questions from me about that _ important. two final questions from me about that period. _ important. two final questions from me about that period. on _ important. two final questions from me about that period. on monday i important. two final questions from i me about that period. on monday the 16th of march, the prime minister announced a change of tack and people were advised to socially distance but pubs and restaurants were not closed, massive sports events were not stopped. did you advise that we should be going further at that point or did you go along with that softer version of the lockdown. flan along with that softer version of the lockdown.— along with that softer version of the lockdown. can i backtrack? i think we need _ the lockdown. can i backtrack? i think we need to _ the lockdown. can i backtrack? i think we need to understand - the lockdown. can i backtrack? i think we need to understand the crucial period between thursday the 12th and the sunday when things started to change. on the 12th, it was a completely surreal day because

i sent a message to the prime minister at 7:a8am and forgive the language that this is expressed in but i might as well say what i actually said, we've got big problems coming. the cabinet office is terrifying, plans behind the pace, we must announce today if you feel ill with cold or flu, stay home. some around the system want a delay because they haven't done the work. we must force peace. we are looking at several deaths between optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. " the cobra system didn't work as an open thing. so that's how the day started off with us thinking, today is going to be all about covid and whether or not we are going to announce the household

quarantine. we then got completely derailed because on the morning of the 12th, suddenly the national security people came in and said trump wants us to join a bombing campaign in the middle east tonight and we need to start having meetings about that through the day with cobra as well. everything to do with cobra as well. everything to do with cobra that day on covid was completely disrupted because you had these two parallel sets of meetings, these two parallel sets of meetings, the national security people running in and out talking about, are we going to bomb the middle east? and we had the cobra meeting being delayed as we were trying to figure out, what are we going to do about household quarantine? and it sounds so surreal it couldn't possibly be true, that day, the times had run a huge story about the prime minister and his girlfriend and their dog and the prime minister's girlfriend was

going crackers about the story and demanding the press office deal with that, so we had this completely insane situation in which part of the building were saying, are we going to bomb iraq? part of the building was arguing about whether we were going to do quarantine or not. the prime minister has his girlfriend going crackers about something trivial, and you have all of these meetings going on through the course of the 12th. in the end, we had a meeting on covid and we decided to push ahead with household quarantine pretty quickly. fortunately, thank god, the attorney general persuaded the prime minister not to go along with the whole bombing campaign. and then at the end of all of this, at roughly 9pm

that night, i sat down with ben warner and mark warner and at that point, that's essentially when they kind of hit the total panic button with me and they said, we are looking at all of this data and these graphs, we are heading for a total catastrophe and we need to have plan b. so ben then went off and spoke to patrick vallance about this on friday the 13th. on friday the 13th, we then started to look through all of this information, we started to pick apart all of these different graphs. ben spoke to patrick, patrick said i'm also extremely concerned. it seems something has gone fundamentally wrong in the wiring of the system. we got these graphs showing that even on the best case scenario with the official plan you are going to smash through the capacity of the nhs by multiple times. the evening

of friday the 13th, i'm sitting with ben warner at the prime minister's private secretary in the prime minister's study. we basically say, we're going to have to sit down with the prime minister tomorrow and explain to him that we think that we are going to have to ditch the official plan and we are heading for the biggest disaster that's going to be seen since 1940. this is the white board, i put it on my twitter account and i've also sent it to some journalists. account and i've also sent it to somejournalists. hopefully account and i've also sent it to some journalists. hopefully you'll be able to see it on the internet and you've got copies here. this has essentially plan b sketched on it. the timestamp is 908 pm on the friday. essentially what's happening at this point, we are thinking what to be doing this? at this point the

second most powerful official helen mcnamara is the deputy cabinet secretary. she walked into the office while we are looking at this whiteboard. she says, i'vejust been talking to the official, mark sweeney, who is in charge of coordinating the department of health. he said, "i've been told for years there is a whole plan for this. there is no plan full stop we are in huge trouble. i've come through here, helen mcnamara said, to tell you i think we are absolutely locked. it seems from the conversation we are having that is correct. i said, we think that is correct, we're going to sketch out what we think

plan b is. {lin going to sketch out what we think plan b is. ' , plan b is. on the 14th, things changed--- — studio: i want to apologise if any of the language dominic cummings has used has offended you. it is live, this committee hearing that we are watching. let's rejoin it now. could you answer that question. did you advise those things should happen? you advise those things should ha en? , you advise those things should ha--en? ,. you advise those things should ha en? , . ., you advise those things should ha en? , ., ., ”i happen? yes and no. on the saturday, we had the official— happen? yes and no. on the saturday, we had the official meeting _ happen? yes and no. on the saturday, we had the official meeting in - happen? yes and no. on the saturday, we had the official meeting in the - we had the official meeting in the cabinet room. after the official meeting ended, i got the prime minister into his study with me and ben warner and mark warner and the prime minister's private secretary for health and we showed him... did ou or for health and we showed him... d c you or did you for health and we showed him... li 1c you or did you not advise that pubs,

restaurants should be shut, yes or no? , , �* , restaurants should be shut, yes or no? , , i , ., restaurants should be shut, yes or no? ,, �*, ., , no? yes but it's more complicated than that. no? yes but it's more complicated than that- we _ no? yes but it's more complicated than that. we show _ no? yes but it's more complicated than that. we show it _ no? yes but it's more complicated than that. we show it in _ no? yes but it's more complicated than that. we show it in this - no? yes but it's more complicated j than that. we show it in this graph and it has here no mitigation, here is an actual plan which is locked down. i is an actual plan which is locked down. , ., ., , is an actual plan which is locked down. , ., . ., down. i 'ust want to be clear, you did down. ijust want to be clear, you did advise — down. ijust want to be clear, you did advise him _ down. ijust want to be clear, you did advise him and _ down. ijust want to be clear, you did advise him and he _ down. ijust want to be clear, you did advise him and he rejected i down. ijust want to be clear, you i did advise him and he rejected that advice and restaurants and massive sports events carried on for another week? it’s sports events carried on for another week? �* , ., sports events carried on for another week? �*, ., , week? it's more complicated as i said. we week? it's more complicated as i said- we said _ week? it's more complicated as i said. we said on _ week? it's more complicated as i said. we said on the _ week? it's more complicated as i said. we said on the 14th - week? it's more complicated as i said. we said on the 14th we i week? it's more complicated as i said. we said on the 14th we are | said. we said on the 14th we are going to have to lockdown. we are going to have to lockdown. we are going to have to lockdown. we are going to have to get there as soon as we possibly can. you are being shown... we will come back to the kind of logic. the basic answer to your question is yes, on the 14th we said to the prime minister, you're going to have to lockdown, but there is no lockdown plan. it doesn't exist. sage haven't modelled it, dh

don't have it, we are going to have to put together a lockdown plan. it to put together a lockdown plan. it wasn't so much you rejected your advice, you won't physically ready to proceed on that basis and we needed longer to work out how you would do things like that, is that the broad picture? sort would do things like that, is that the broad picture?— the broad picture? sort of, essentially _ the broad picture? sort of, essentially the _ the broad picture? sort of, essentially the prime i the broad picture? sort of, i essentially the prime minister, the broad picture? sort of, - essentially the prime minister, this is like a scene from independence day with jeff goldblum saying, is like a scene from independence day withjeff goldblum saying, the aliens are here and your plan is broken. that's what the scene was like this morning —— that morning. he took the prime minister through the grass and showed him the system is thinking this is weeks away, graphs about time to peak in the epidemic injune, but it is completely wrong. the nhs is going to be smashed in weeks and we are we have got days... lats to be smashed in weeks and we are we have got days- - -_ have got days. .. lots of colleagues want to

have got days. .. lots of colleagues i”ant to come _ have got days. .. lots of colleagues want to come in. _ have got days. .. lots of colleagues want to come in. it _ have got days. .. lots of colleagues want to come in. it is _ have got days. .. lots of colleagues want to come in. it is about - have got days. .. lots of colleagues want to come in. it is about your i want to come in. it is about your role. your title was assistant to the prime minister, but you were really the most powerful person in downing street after the prime minister, because everyone knew that he listened to youth more than he listen to any civil servant, more any cabinet minister, but you did not advise them in your own words to change tack until the night of the 11th of march, you would have a meeting to discuss that until the 14th of march, six weeks after our first case, six weeks after the world health organization had raised the alarm, you did not advise him to cancel the champions league matches, the cheltenham gold cup, the things that could have prevented in lockdown. he would have thought, i have notjust got the scientific establishment who are telling me i do not need to lock down, i have actually got dominic cummings who is interested in size and goes along to

the sage meetings. do you not recognise it was a massive failure on your part as his chief adviser that it took so long to come to him with advice to change tack? i that it took so long to come to him with advice to change tack?- with advice to change tack? i think there is no — with advice to change tack? i think there is no doubt _ with advice to change tack? i think there is no doubt in _ with advice to change tack? i think there is no doubt in retrospect i with advice to change tack? i think| there is no doubt in retrospect that it was a huge feeling of mine. i bitterly regret that i did not hit the emergency panic button aired earlier than did. the emergency panic button aired earlierthan did. in the emergency panic button aired earlier than did. in retrospect, there is no doubt that i was wrong not to. all i can say is that my worry was, my mental sword of state at the time was on the one hand, you could know from the last week of february that a whole bunch of things were wrong, it was clear that all the meetings, everything was going wrong. everything we pushed, everything was wrong, bad, terrible. but i was incredibly frightened, i

guess is the word, about the consequences of me pulling a massive emergency string and saying the official plan is wrong and it's going to kill everyone and you've got to change tack because what if i am wrong? what if i persuade him to change tack and that's a disaster? everyone is telling me that if we go down the alternative path, it is going to be five times worse in the winter and what if that is the consequence? i think in retrospect it is clear that the official plan was wrong, the advice was wrong, and it is clear that we should have looked down on essentially the first week of march at the latest. we have been doing all of the things earlier than we did. there is no argument thatis than we did. there is no argument that is the case. i personally bitterly regret that it was not until the 11th or the 12th that i

started to do that. to be clear, on the 12th, on this crazy day, we are sitting in the prime minister's office, we are talking about herd immunity, the cabinet said the prime minister should go on tv to explain the herd immunity plan which is like the herd immunity plan which is like the old chickenpox parties, we need people to get this so we get herd immunity by september. and i said, you have to stop using this chickenpox analogy. it is not right. and he said why? and he said because chickenpox is not kill killing hundreds and thousands of people. in the whole room, there was this kind of shock. it was really at that moment that we realised and to stress, this was not some weird thing the cabinet secretary had come up thing the cabinet secretary had come up with. he was saying what the official advice to him from the department of health was. it was a huge big dealfor me and for ben

warner to say, basically, we think that this whole thing is wrong. should we have done it earlier? in retrospect, obviously, we should and i am terribly deeply sorry that i didn't. hopefully, people can realise while i was also very fearful of doing that because it caused carnage. once we did this on the 14th and started to push the prime minister to change path, once people dead come to me and say, what on earth are you doing? we are going to have lockdown, it is going to bounce back up, it is going to be worse and it is going to be on youth and the people who are trying to change path. i've said it, i'm terribly sorry that i did not do it earlier but it seemed like such a massive thing. it was almost shot it was almost the whole experience,

part of what we were doing on the friday night, the next morning, the jeff goldblum seen with ben warner explaining things, it seemed like an out—of—control movie. in retrospect, it is clear that we should have acted earlier. at the time, we just... you know, wejust did not. we have got a lot of ground to cover so i'm to my colleague. in we have got a lot of ground to cover so i'm to my colleague.— so i'm to my colleague. in british olitics, so i'm to my colleague. in british politics. you _ so i'm to my colleague. in british politics. you are _ so i'm to my colleague. in british politics, you are considered i politics, you are considered extremely successful by many people. you took _ extremely successful by many people. you took back control, you got brexit — you took back control, you got brexit done. when it comes to this particular— brexit done. when it comes to this particular issue, why were you not able to— particular issue, why were you not able to iiail— particular issue, why were you not able to nailan particular issue, why were you not able to nail an earlier lockdown? | able to nail an earlier lockdown? i did able to nail an earlier lockdown? did not pay able to nail an earlier lockdown? i did not pay attention early

able to nail an earlier lockdown? l did not pay attention early enough, i... one of the things that i have done earlier on, one of the reasons why i finally had the confidence to say that i thought the system had gone catastrophically wrong was i also got in touch with a professor at cambridge, one of the smartest people on the planet, and i started sharing sage documents with him on the week of the ninth, i can't remember the exact date, and people like him and then shortly afterwards, another expert that i share documents with, they could understand these things. the combination of mark warner, and the other experts, three incredibly able people who could understand the technical is in the way i couldn't do, it gave me the confidence to say to the prime minister, it is obvious

in retrospect that i left this whole thing untilfar, far too late and i am terribly sorry about that. i should have done this injanuary is the reality of it. i think that was a big part of it. it was a classic, classic... you read about these things in history books, it was a classic historical example of thinking and action. because the process was closed, that is what happens in a closed bubbles, everyone reinforce themselves, and the more people from outside attack, the more people from outside attack, the more people internally said they did not understand and do not have access to the information, it was the classic groupthink bubble. a lot of people will say i did the wrong thing by going down a different path, and who knows? whether that is right or wrong, what is on arguably

the case, a part of my was to say, in situations like this, to challenge things, i did do it on other things, challenge things, i did do it on otherthings, i did challenge things, i did do it on other things, i did do it here but not early enough, and that is the heart of it. if the process had been opened up to an outside scientific scrutiny and other smart people scrutiny, a lot of people have figured out the answer to this were quantitative people who were not disease specialist, people like mark warner, if we open the process up to them injanuary and put warner, if we open the process up to them in january and put the assumptions on the table, we would have figured out at least six weeks earlier that there was an alternative plan and this whole thing of you have only got a choice of that peak and delay and that peak is complete garbage. the plan be put to the prime minister on the 14th, could have been developed six weeks earlier, suppress, build, crash probe —— programmes for drugs and

vaccines and everything else. i failed and i apologise for that. fin failed and i apologise for that. on our failed and i apologise for that. on your point about immersion... site we have _ your point about immersion... site we have been watching dominic cummings appearing in front of mps to answer questions about the government's handling of the coronavirus pandemic because i want to bring you some news into us at the bbc about the hillsborough enquiry. the trial of two retired police officers and an x solicitor over their actions after the hillsborough disaster has collapsed. four cheap super intendant donald denton and x detective chief inspector alan foster were accused of amending the statements to mask failings after the crash which you may remember resulted in the deaths of 96 liverpool football fans. they

were charged with perverting the course ofjustice. today the were charged with perverting the course of justice. today the justice has ruled they have no case to answer because the police statements were prepared for the public enquiry. that was chaired by lord taylor in 1990. this was not a statutory enquiry and therefore not considered a court of law. therefore the judge has considered a court of law. therefore thejudge has ruled that considered a court of law. therefore the judge has ruled that it was not a course of publicjustice which could be perverted and the jury has been ordered to acquit mr denton who is now 83, mr foster who is 74 and mr metcalfe who is 71, the denied two counts of perverting the course ofjustice. we are putting it in a context, they are complex legal arguments, 96 liverpool football fans died as a result of the stadium

crash at the fa cup semifinal match at sheffield wednesday hillsborough ground in 1989, these three men that i have been telling you about have been on trial at the court in salford for more than four weeks. the main takeaway from this is that the trial of these three, two retired police officers and an x solicitor over their actions after the hillsborough disaster has collapsed. this news hasjust come in at the bbc. we will bring you more details as we get it. in the meantime, though, we are going to return to the hearing and to westminster and listening to what else dominic cummings has got to say. part of the lack of urgency was the testing data that was wrong, the

graphs on the models were wrong because they were to the right, and that massively contributed to the lack of urgency. another critical thing was the reasonable worst scenario planning system. there is a guy who wrote a book and said you should not use words like reasonable, probable and likely because it is confusing. this is a classic example of how this happened. the reasonable worst—case scenario was originally seen at the end of february was basically, this is the worst thing that could happen but it is not going to happen. in the first week of february, sorry, march, i was told there is a 20% chanceit march, i was told there is a 20% chance it could happen. on the 2nd of march. i was told officially that there was a 20% chance the reasonable worst—case scenario could happen. the 2nd of march. by the time we get to the 13th of march,

and i am waving a red plan b, people start to come to us saying hang on, there reasonable worst—case scenario is now our central planning assumption. that is terrible because the whole thing has crept up on us from ten days earlier, probably not, definitely unlikely, 20% chance to a week later, now this is our central planning assumption and on top of that, the graphs all out to the right, meant that the truth was even more bad than the reasonable worst—case scenario. do you see what i mean? worst-case scenario. do you see what i mean? �* , ., , worst-case scenario. do you see what i mean? �* , .,, , ., i mean? briefly, last question, durin: i mean? briefly, last question, during january. _ i mean? briefly, last question, during january, february, i i mean? briefly, last question,| during january, february, march i mean? briefly, last question, i during january, february, march high was the _ during january, february, march high was the international experience of the likes_ was the international experience of the likes of china and taiwan being fed into _ the likes of china and taiwan being fed into the system? it

the likes of china and taiwan being fed into the system?— fed into the system? it was completely _ fed into the system? it was completely discarded i fed into the system? it was completely discarded by i fed into the system? it was| completely discarded by the fed into the system? it was - completely discarded by the system. that was another one of the tragic errors. it was —— it goes back to whatjeremy hunt mentioned earlier on, the behavioural assumptions. fundamentally, injanuary, february, fundamentally, in january, february, march, fundamentally, injanuary, february, march, even after we had got through to lockdown on the 23rd, in the immediate few days after that, basically almost universal view was that it basically almost universal view was thatitis basically almost universal view was that it is just inconceivable that we are going to be able to do a taiwan —type thing. i have got text messages from myself saying it taiwan is doing this, singapore is doing this, i was not going to do this? everything is in english. everyone can read what they are doing. it's not like it is in chinese. a highly competent country operating an english a completely different approach. if we are not

going to do that, we are going to have to have a really good explanation. the default mode was this country is not east asia. the people will not wear it. it is impossible. it was only after we started to push through the idea of plan b, this is why testing stopped. testing basically stopped and the government said there is no point. what should have happened was in january we were vamping up testing massively... hate january we were vamping up testing massively- - -— massively... we will come unto testini massively... we will come unto testing on _ massively... we will come unto testing on the _ massively... we will come unto testing on the next _ massively... we will come unto testing on the next session. i the group think about there is no option apart from one peak for the second beat was tied together with the east asian approach is completely politically technically in every sense not viable in this country. and that did not change until after their weekend of the 14th, 15th, as we try to push

through plan b. hate 14th, 15th, as we try to push through plan b.— 14th, 15th, as we try to push through plan b. 14th, 15th, as we try to push throu:h plan b. ~ ., ., through plan b. we will go to rosie cooer. through plan b. we will go to rosie cooper- good _ through plan b. we will go to rosie cooper. good morning. _ through plan b. we will go to rosie cooper. good morning. the - through plan b. we will go to rosie cooper. good morning. the chair. through plan b. we will go to rosie i cooper. good morning. the chair has asked ou cooper. good morning. the chair has asked you about _ cooper. good morning. the chair has asked you about the _ cooper. good morning. the chair has asked you about the long _ cooper. good morning. the chair has asked you about the long delays i cooper. good morning. the chair has asked you about the long delays in l asked you about the long delays in publishing to two papers and you described even more worryingly corporate — described even more worryingly corporate meetings leaking. why not -ain corporate meetings leaking. why not gain the _ corporate meetings leaking. why not gain the public trust and publish the papers? where are the political barriers _ the papers? where are the political barriers to— the papers? where are the political barriers to having those papers published? asi as i said, when i... when i try to patrick ballance about this, he was supportive of it as you would expect from a good scientist. i think that is correct, we should publish all of these things, the court for the models, there was no pushback from patrick at all. as far as i am aware there was no pushback from sage either. the problem was that by the time we had this conversation, we were into a crisis, if you see what

i mean. what should have happened we had that conversation injanuary and publish everything then, and that would have saved our bacon. we did not have the conversation about publishing things until the week of the ninth, when we were already, you know, dangling over the cliff. ok. i think the public _ know, dangling over the cliff. ok. i think the public will _ know, dangling over the cliff. ok. i think the public will be _ know, dangling over the cliff. ok. i think the public will be very - think the public will be very disturbed to hear the picture you paint— disturbed to hear the picture you paint which is a chaotic picture, almost — paint which is a chaotic picture, almost a — paint which is a chaotic picture, almost a pick and mix attitude to scientific— almost a pick and mix attitude to scientific evidence, talk of sending the virus _ scientific evidence, talk of sending the virus packing in 12 weeks, chickenpox parties and a knowledge ed-e chickenpox parties and a knowledge edge comment from the prime minister. — edge comment from the prime minister, you might want to comment on that _ minister, you might want to comment on that all— minister, you might want to comment on that. all the while, and its coordinating role, the department of health _ coordinating role, the department of health led specifically on ppe commuter —— procurement and the

design _ commuter —— procurement and the design of— commuter —— procurement and the design of test and trace. outsourced business _ design of test and trace. outsourced business model, no penalty clauses for bad _ business model, no penalty clauses for bad performance, and all we are really— for bad performance, and all we are really hearing as incompetence, chaos, _ really hearing as incompetence, chaos, how would you rate the performance of the department of health, _ performance of the department of health, the secretary of state? outstanding, good, requires improvement, inadequate? in outstanding, good, requires improvement, inadequate? in much of the government _ improvement, inadequate? in much of the government system, _ improvement, inadequate? in much of the government system, there - improvement, inadequate? in much of the government system, there were i the government system, there were many brilliant people at relatively junior and middle levels who were let down by senior leadership. i think the secretary of state for health should have been fired for at least 15, health should have been fired for at least15, 20 things including lying to everybody on multiple occasions and meeting after meeting in the cabinet room and publicly. filth. and meeting after meeting in the cabinet room and publicly. oh, clear. in that case. —

cabinet room and publicly. oh, clear. in that case. do _ cabinet room and publicly. oh, clear. in that case, do you _ cabinet room and publicly. oh, clear. in that case, do you think _ cabinet room and publicly. oh, clear. in that case, do you think people i in that case, do you think people should _ in that case, do you think people should be — in that case, do you think people should be worried about facing corporate manslaughter charges? | corporate manslaughter charges? i don't corporate manslaughter charges? don't know corporate manslaughter charges? i don't know about that because i do not know what the laws are and the rules are, but i think that there is no doubt that many senior people werejust... as i said in my opening statement, there is no doubt at all that many senior people performed far, far, disastrously low below the standards the country has the right to expect. the secretary of state for health is one of those people. i said repeatedly to the prime minister that he should be fired. so did the cabinet secretary and many other senior people.—

did the cabinet secretary and many other senior people. thank you. and the evidence — other senior people. thank you. and the evidence we _ other senior people. thank you. and the evidence we have _ other senior people. thank you. and the evidence we have heard - other senior people. thank you. and the evidence we have heard so i other senior people. thank you. and the evidence we have heard so far, i the evidence we have heard so far, and i_ the evidence we have heard so far, and i do _ the evidence we have heard so far, and i do understand we are going to come _ and i do understand we are going to come onto— and i do understand we are going to come onto test and trace later, i wonder— come onto test and trace later, i wonder if— come onto test and trace later, i wonder if you could comment on why the financial— wonder if you could comment on why the financial incentives for people with covid—i9 to self—isolate were so fundamentally weak? they were fatally _ so fundamentally weak? they were fatally weak. that is a big problem for the _ fatally weak. that is a big problem for the spread of this disease. 121 think— for the spread of this disease. 121 think that — for the spread of this disease. 121 think that is right. the for the spread of this disease. 12 i think that is right.— think that is right. the chancellor did an outstanding _ think that is right. the chancellor did an outstanding job _ think that is right. the chancellor did an outstanding job on - think that is right. the chancellor i did an outstanding job on furlough, but i would point out that him and his team had some brilliant people, that team had to basically create the whole furlough scheme out of thin air in it few days. there was no plan forfurlough. nothing, zero. they had to completely pull out of nothing and the problem you are

describing about the financial incentives, you are completely correct. they should have been a whole plan, like our testing, like on shielding, there was no plan. when we got to the point, what are we going to do on financial incentives, there wasn't any plan. if you go back to the third, the government published a document on the third which was the mitigate delay thing. when we got that document, we had been told for weeks, we have all these plans in place, when we got this document, we looked at it and then warner said this is the press release, where is the plan? no, no, where is the document that has all the stuff on things that you're talking about? we don't know. we don't have it. we don't know. we don't have it. we don't know. we don't have it. we don't know where it is. on all of these things, we at number ten were

operating on false assumptions. i blame myself terribly far not dealing with all of this before i did. we realise that in the last week of february and the first week of march. on shielding on the 19th, on the 19th of march, i pulled all the officials an on shielding asking where the plan was. there was not a plan and lots of people in the cabinet office said we should not have a plan, not a helpline for people to call because it will be swamped and we do not have a system. thank god a brilliant official in the department of health, they got a team together. the shielding plan was hacked together in two all—night sessions. after the 19th. there was no plan for shielding. there was no helpline for children. there was no plan for financial incentives or anything in any detail at all.

finally, the picture you describe is terrifying — finally, the picture you describe is terrifying. you have described the department of health as smoking ruins. _ department of health as smoking ruins, what did you mean by that? did you _ ruins, what did you mean by that? did you actually hear the prime minister— did you actually hear the prime minister say words to the effect, if the bodies — minister say words to the effect, if the bodies pile up, so be it. why did i describe _ the bodies pile up, so be it. why did i describe the _ the bodies pile up, so be it. “iii"iy did i describe the department the bodies pile up, so be it. iii"i;.i did i describe the department of health as a smoking ruin? as i said, lots of great people, but the procurement system they were operating was completely hopeless. it was not set up to do... there was no system set up deal with proper emergency procurement. i will give you an example. on the 20... i think it was the day the prime minister tested positive, that friday, the

27th, i think, tested positive, that friday, the 27th, ithink, in tested positive, that friday, the 27th, i think, in that meeting, we were told at the cabinet table by officials that the department of health had been turning down... we are going to say goodbye note to viewers on bbc world. when i was having ppe meetings around the cabinet table i was told, this is not going to arrive for months. why not? because it takes that long for it to arrive by ship. why are you shipping it? we ship it because that's what we always do. hang on, we are going to have a peak in mid apriland hang on, we are going to have a peak in mid april and you are shipping things from china that are going to arrive in a month and all the aeroplanes are not lying? leave less meeting. commandeered the planes. fly them to china drop them in an airfilter and pick up our stop fly them to china drop them in an air filter and pick up our stop and slide back! the whole system was

waiting through treacle on all of these things. there was not an emergency fast track process for people to deal with these kind of things. it was a smoking ruin and thatis things. it was a smoking ruin and that is why the cabinet secretary quite rightly said we have got to basically divvy up the secretary of state's job because there are multiple huge things that are being dropped, testing, ventilators, ppe, vaccines, drugs, you name it. it was clear the department was completely overwhelmed. clear the department was completely overwhelmed-— overwhelmed. thank you. i want to ick u- overwhelmed. thank you. i want to pick up something _ overwhelmed. thank you. i want to pick up something that _ overwhelmed. thank you. i want to pick up something that you - overwhelmed. thank you. i want to pick up something that you said. i i pick up something that you said. i think i heard you correctly and accusing the health secretary of having lied. did i hear that correctly? that is a serious charge. can you provide the committee with the evidence behind that assumption?

yes. there are numerous examples. in the summer, he said that everybody who needed treatment got the treatment they required. he knew it was a lie because he had been briefed by the chief scientific adviser and the chief medical officer about the first peak, we were told explicitly people did not get the treatment they deserve. many people to die in horrific circumstances. i5 people to die in horrific circumstances.- people to die in horrific circumstances. , ., , , people to die in horrific circumstances. , ., , ., circumstances. is that the basis of our circumstances. is that the basis of your assumption? _ circumstances. is that the basis of your assumption? are _ circumstances. is that the basis of your assumption? are there i circumstances. is that the basis of your assumption? are there otherj your assumption? are there other pieces of evidence that you base that charge on?— pieces of evidence that you base that charge on? yes, in mid april, 'ust that charge on? yes, in mid april, just before — that charge on? yes, in mid april, just before the _ that charge on? yes, in mid april, just before the prime _ that charge on? yes, in mid april, just before the prime minister i that charge on? yes, in mid april, j just before the prime minister and that charge on? yes, in mid april, i just before the prime minister and i were diagnosed as having covid—19, the secretary of state for health told us in the cabinet room, everything is fine on ppe. we have got it all covered. when i came back, almost the first meeting i had

in the cabinet room was about the disaster over ppe and how we actually wear shorts and hospitals were running out. the secretary of state said in that meeting, this is the fault of the chancellor of the exchequer and it is not my fault, they have blocked approvals of all sorts of things. i said to the cabinet secretary, please investigate this and find out if it is true. the cabinet secretary came back and said it is completely not true, i have lost confidence in the secretary of state's honesty in these meetings. the secretary of state's honesty in these meetings.— these meetings. the cabinet secretary — these meetings. the cabinet secretary said _ these meetings. the cabinet secretary said that? - these meetings. the cabinet secretary said that? the i these meetings. the cabinet i secretary said that? the cabinet secretary said that? the cabinet secretary said — secretary said that? the cabinet secretary said that _ secretary said that? the cabinet secretary said that to _ secretary said that? the cabinet secretary said that to me - secretary said that? the cabinet secretary said that to me and i secretary said that? the cabinet i secretary said that to me and said that to the prime minister. did you make a note _ that to the prime minister. did you make a note of _ that to the prime minister. did you make a note of that _ that to the prime minister. did you make a note of that at _ that to the prime minister. did you make a note of that at the - that to the prime minister. did you make a note of that at the time? i make a note of that at the time? yes. ., , ., make a note of that at the time? yes. ., , ,_ ., ., yes. could you supply that to the committee? _ yes. could you supply that to the committee? yes. _ yes. could you supply that to the committee? yes. and _ yes. could you supply that to the committee? yes. and to - yes. could you supply that to the i committee? yes. and to corroborate the accusation _ committee? yes. and to corroborate the accusation that you made against the accusation that you made against the health secretary, you have given orally what is in your mind when you

make that charge, i would be grateful if you would write to the cabinet to set it out if you can consider it, it is a period serious thing to say. i am sorry to interrupt. can we have a question? thank you for speaking to us today. you mentioned whitehall dismissing the strict _ you mentioned whitehall dismissing the strict early measures taken in taiwan— the strict early measures taken in taiwan and — the strict early measures taken in taiwan and wuhan and you also set in whitehall, _ taiwan and wuhan and you also set in whitehall, the real danger was viewed — whitehall, the real danger was viewed as the economic one, rather than the _ viewed as the economic one, rather than the virus. indeed an article from _ than the virus. indeed an article from the — than the virus. indeed an article from the institute of new economic thinking _ from the institute of new economic thinking in — from the institute of new economic thinking in november last year noted that the _ thinking in november last year noted that the uk was one country of many that the uk was one country of many that chose _ that the uk was one country of many that chose to limit pandemic response in favour of economic stimulus— response in favour of economic stimulus in— response in favour of economic stimulus in the name of saving their economy— stimulus in the name of saving their economy at— stimulus in the name of saving their economy at the expense of their citizens— economy at the expense of their citizens lives. who was providing economic— citizens lives. who was providing economic advice to the government? what did _ economic advice to the government? what did it _ economic advice to the government? what did it say? and who within government was arguing against taking _ government was arguing against taking strict measures for economic reasons— taking strict measures for economic

reasons both at the start of the pandemic— reasons both at the start of the pandemic and throughout? and ultimately, did anyone with an government actively attempted trait of lives _ government actively attempted trait of lives in _ government actively attempted trait of lives in favour of economic activity? _ i slightly missed some of that but i think i got to the jester. there were people around whitehall who thought the real danger here was the economy. the prime minister's view throughout january, economy. the prime minister's view throughoutjanuary, february, march throughout january, february, march was, throughoutjanuary, february, march was, as he said in many meetings, the real danger here is not the disease, the real danger is the measure is that we take to deal with the disease and the economic destruction that will cause. he had that view all the way through. in fact, one of the reasons why it was so rocky getting from the 14th, when we suggested plan b to him that, to

actual lockdown, was because he kept basically bouncing back to, we don't really know how dangerous it is, we're going to completely destroy the economy by having locked out, maybe we shouldn't do it. but throughout that period, there was this constant back—and—forth of, here's the hourly data coming in at showing where a further ahead in the pandemic than we realised, the situation is worse, the nhs situation is worse, the nhs situation is worse, everything is getting worse, and that propelled things a bit towards lockdown but it's also the case that fundamentally, the prime minister just didn't really think this was the big danger. there have been lots of reports and accusations that the chancellor was the person who is trying to delay things in march, thatis trying to delay things in march, that is completely wrong. the

chancellor was totally supportive of me and of other people as we tried to make this transition from upland a to plan b. he got his team working on the furlough scheme but it was the case that there were senior officials who are worried... and it's not completely unreasonable either to say, if you completely shut down the economy, you are definitely having terrible effects on all sorts of people's lives. if you have a lockdown, you are definitely concerning some people to all kinds of suffering, and some of them might die because of the lockdown itself. so there were reasonable arguments, it's notjust like having a lockdown was the obvious thing to do, there were reasonable arguments to say we have to weigh up all the other destructive effects of what to do. me and others came to the conclusion

that, actually, the logic was fundamentally false because once we ended up arguing was, in fact, if you try not to lockdown, if you try and optimise for the short term economy, you won't actually even get that because what will happen is, the public will lock themselves down because they will realise that isn't going to be any nhs for anybody. that was the reality. even now, that point is constantly lost. in the scenario we were heading for, not only would you have had hundreds of thousands of deaths from covid, you would then have had absolutely no nhs at all for anybody. your seven—year—old daughter falls over and needs a&e, there is no a&e for her. you need cancer treatments, there is no cancer treatment. nothing at all for anybody for three months is what we were facing. part of our argument was, once people

realise that as the situation we're heading for, they will be so terrified they will stay at home anyway. there is going to be some kind of lockdown, whatever happens. either we get ahead of this and try and do it as intelligently and sensibly as we possibly can or if we plough into this process where we just say, there's an alternative, we will have to get through it, you will have to get through it, you will have to get through it, you will have not only hundreds of thousands of people are dead from covid, not only hundreds of thousands of people dead is because there is no nhs for three months, you will then have a gigantic economic disaster on top of it all anyway. economic disaster on top of it all an a . ., economic disaster on top of it all an a. ., , ., , ., anyway. some more questions from rebecca. anyway. some more questions from rebecca- sadly. _ anyway. some more questions from rebecca. sadly, i— anyway. some more questions from rebecca. sadly, ithink— anyway. some more questions from rebecca. sadly, i think not- anyway. some more questions from rebecca. sadly, i think not locking i rebecca. sadly, ithink not locking down hard enough _ rebecca. sadly, ithink not locking down hard enough or— rebecca. sadly, ithink not locking down hard enough or soon - rebecca. sadly, ithink not locking down hard enough or soon enoughj rebecca. sadly, i think not locking i down hard enough or soon enough has produced _ down hard enough or soon enough has produced many more long—term and first economic effects and needlessly cost lives, and that was a point _ needlessly cost lives, and that was a point made by the imf some time a-o. a point made by the imf some time ago that _

a point made by the imf some time ago. that the government commission official— ago. that the government commission official economic advice to set alongside the scientific advice it was receiving? and when you moved towards _ was receiving? and when you moved towards that groupthink on a plan b, as you _ towards that groupthink on a plan b, as you suggested earlier, was economic— as you suggested earlier, was economic advice produced alongside that to _ economic advice produced alongside that to show the outcome of decisions being taken? time-share that was all— decisions being taken? time-share that was all sorts _ decisions being taken? time-share that was all sorts of _ decisions being taken? time-share that was all sorts of economic i that was all sorts of economic advice happening, going on and being written. i don't personally remember it because it wasn't my focus. i know rishi sunak and his team were competent and i left them to deal with the economic stuff like furlough because i had confidence they would be able to do it. i was focusing my time and efforts on other things like shooting and the department of health, which was the system was broken. so i'm afraid i'm not... what i can definitely say is, there was not some kind of document

floating around that says, here is the economic costs and everyone was looking at that and the prime minister was looking at that and said, oh, looking at this document, maybe we shouldn't do this. that wasn't the case, that didn't happen. it was the case that the bank of england, the senior figures it was the case that the bank of england, the seniorfigures in it was the case that the bank of england, the senior figures in the treasury, the senior officials and the cabinet office, were saying we have to think about the consequences of, if we did this lockdown, will have to borrow huge amounts of money. what of the bond markets suddenly spike and go crazy and refused to lend us? will then have to find emergency powers to tell the bank of england to buy the debt, etc. said there were conversations going on about that potential problem, and, what we have a financial crisis, bond market crisis, sterling crisis, on top of the health crisis? there were conversations and meetings with the prime minister about that and the

chancellor and the cabinet secretary and me to discuss that. but, to stress, all of the story saying the chancellor tried to stop this happening or try to delay it, all those stories are wrong. the chancellor completely supported what me and ben warner and others and patrick vallance as well were arguing for from the 14th about accelerating through to plan b. final question, .24 under recent twitter— final question, .24 under recent twitter thread of the government handling — twitter thread of the government handling said that the public inquiries at no point will ask how does _ inquiries at no point will ask how does the — inquiries at no point will ask how does the deep institute a wiring of the party's civil service programme and destructive behaviour by putting the wrong _ and destructive behaviour by putting the wrong people in wrong jobs with destructive incentives. in your view, _ destructive incentives. in your view, it— destructive incentives. in your view, it was destructive, what were their— view, it was destructive, what were their incentives and where those incentives — their incentives and where those incentives financial? |

their incentives and where those incentives financial?— incentives financial? i think... there's very _ incentives financial? i think... there's very profound - incentives financial? i think... | there's very profound question incentives financial? i think... - there's very profound question about the nature our political system that means that the last election we got a choice betweenjeremy corbyn and borisjohnson, i think any system that ends up giving a choice between people like that elite is a system that has gone extremely badly wrong. —— like that to lead. that are so many people in this country that could provide better leadership than either of those two and there is something terribly wrong with political parties if that's the best they could do. it is also the case — i don't exclude myself from this — if any sensible, rational governments, it is completely crazy that i should have been in such a senior position, in my opinion. i“m senior position, in my opinion. i'm not smart, out and i'm not built great things in the world, it's

completely crackers at someone like me should have been in there, just like it's crackers that boris johnson was in there and the choice of the last election was jeremy corbyn. it“s of the last election was jeremy corbyn. it's also the case there are wonderful people inside the civil service, brilliant officials all over the place, but the system tends to weed them out from senior managementjobs and the problem in this crisis was very much lions led by donkeys over and over again, with people on the ground doing things, like i said, dispelling young women, she wasn't the top person in gds, there are great people further down there are great people further down the hierarchy that did brilliant things but their leadership, people like me and the prime minister, undersecretary of state for health, we let down the people on the front line, we let down those excellent officials as well. we should be asking ourselves, you people in the particle parties need to ask, what is it about europe artistic of choices likejohnson versus corbyn,

and to out ask what is it about whitehall that promotes so many senior people who are out of their depth? senior people who are out of their de th? , ., ., , senior people who are out of their deth? ,., . my depth? the question was specifically about the very _ depth? the question was specifically about the very specific _ depth? the question was specifically about the very specific comments i depth? the question was specifically | about the very specific comments you made _ about the very specific comments you made to— about the very specific comments you made to infer that there were people with destructive incentives informed that the _ with destructive incentives informed that the government level throughout the pandemic. who were those people and what _ the pandemic. who were those people and what were those destructive incentives? it's very, very specific statement — incentives? it's very, very specific statement to make and the answer you have given _ statement to make and the answer you have given is _ statement to make and the answer you have given is very general and outside — have given is very general and outside of— have given is very general and outside of the sphere of government, unfortunately. you outside of the sphere of government, unfortunately-— unfortunately. you are asking about destructive incentives, _ unfortunately. you are asking about destructive incentives, what - unfortunately. you are asking about destructive incentives, what i i unfortunately. you are asking about| destructive incentives, what i meant by that, i think you are implying, do i think corruption was part of the problem? that is not at all what i meant. what i meant was that politicians are incentivised to apply to the media, the headlines, officials are incentivised to keep their heads down and follow processes even when things like this are going to kill thousands of people. incentives are not programmed to say, how do we get

people understand how to make decisions? there are not, how do we get people with brilliant operational capability into key jobs. the incentives are constantly pushing people away from rational behaviour and building what's needed at scale, quickly. that's what i meant by destructive incentives. you sa ou're meant by destructive incentives. you say you're not _ meant by destructive incentives. gm. say you're not smart enough to keep pace with discussions at sage and all the rest, but you do have an appreciation of good order in government and you told us that cobra was not a place in which you could have candid conversations because they were on authorised briefings. did you engage in unauthorised briefings? what briefings. did you engage in unauthorised briefings? what do you mean by unauthorised _ unauthorised briefings? what do you mean by unauthorised briefings? i mean by unauthorised briefings? briefings i want authorised by the prime minister and those others in

senior positions in government. —— briefings that want authorised. mi; briefings that want authorised. my engagement with media was very different before and after the election. before the election, i had a lot of engagement with the media. once the election was called in october 2019, after that, i had very little dealings with the media. one of the issues that happened was, in january, i essentially stopped talking to almost alljournalists almost all the time, and in the course of 2020, one of the things you read constantly... this basically drove the media mounts because no—one in my position had essentially stopped talking to the media for decades. i was working roughly 100 hour weeks, at that time, less than an hour a week, less than 1% was spent talking to the media. i did occasionally talk to people. at the main person...

studio: we're going to say goodbye now to viewers on bbc two, continuing with our coverage of dominic cummings“ evidence here on the bbc news channel. .. give guidance to her on certain very big stories. for example, to give you an example of the sort of thing i did, on the 18th of march, huge news spread that was going to be a london under lockdown and picture started appearing in some of the media websites about tanks and circling the m25 and cutting it off. laura kuenssberg called me and asked if the story was true? i said it is categorically untrue, you should not report it so, and that meant the bbc did not run the story. i spoke to

her on average may be every three or four weeks throughout the course of the year, and i actually spoke to the year, and i actually spoke to the media close to zero in the course of 2020. i did, though, in your question about on authorised, yes, i did talk to people on authorised, in the sense of, actually pretty rarely did i speak to the prime minister before i spoke to the prime minister before i spoke to anyjournalist, ijust got on with things, because my view was the prime minister already is about 1000 times far too obsessed with the media in a way which undermined him during his ownjob, so the last thing i wanted to do is involve him with further conversations about the media. in fact, i with further conversations about the media. infact, i did with further conversations about the media. in fact, i did everything i could to limit the conversations the prime minister had regarding the media. so, on authorised in that sense, yes. in an area week you can convey a lot

of information. you said cobra became dysfunctional because you could not rely on its confidentiality. you have also said in the context of sage that there was too much secrecy, that things should be more in the public domain so people can interrogate it. in that spirit, will you publish the texts and e—mails you sent to members of the media during the period ofjanuary to... members of the media during the period ofjanuary to. . .— members of the media during the period ofjanuary to... period of january to. .. there is two different things. _ period of january to. .. there is two different things. the _ period of january to. .. there is two different things. the sage - period of january to. .. there is two different things. the sage staff i different things. the sage staff should be published unless they are very specific national security reasons for it. you can imagine it will be different in some areas. but not your briefings? i will come onto that. the cobra process is different. the problem there is is that the government should be much

more transparent that the answer for thatis more transparent that the answer for that is not ministers, officials leaving the room, picking up the phone and randomly calling someone to get a favour of someone. it is not good government. that so is absolute chaos through the whole system. what is the case on cobra is, and i think the whole working of the process around cobra, should have been much more open back down and a kind of orderly way we are, here we are, on the record, here is the logic, here is the workings of how we got to it. if people were able to see more of the kind of back—and—forth logic both in sage and on cobra, then it would have been an enormous help because i sighed experts could see this and say that is not right, we can help. that culture did not exist. does

that not apply _ that culture did not exist. does that not apply completely i that culture did not exist. does that not apply completely to i that culture did not exist. lire" that not apply completely to your briefings of the media to make sure that they are accurate and authoritative? it would be helpful for it to be in the public domain just in the way that you described the communications from cobra and the communications from cobra and the proceedings in sage.— the proceedings in sage. obviously the proceedings in sage. obviously the thin . s the proceedings in sage. obviously the things on _ the proceedings in sage. obviously the things on the _ the proceedings in sage. obviously the things on the rare _ the proceedings in sage. obviously the things on the rare occasions i the things on the rare occasions when i spoke to the media myself and try to explain things, i am trying to explain what is happening with official government policy. thea:r official government policy. they are. . . official government policy. they are- - - for _ official government policy. they are... for good _ official government policy. they are... for good minded - official government policy. the are... for good minded reasons official government policy. t"ie are... for good minded reasons i official government policy. t"ie1: are... for good minded reasons i am sure. it are... for good minded reasons i am sure. , ., ., , are... for good minded reasons i am sure. ,., ., i, , are... for good minded reasons i am sure. , ., ., sure. it is not in any sense normal for everybody _ sure. it is not in any sense normal for everybody to — sure. it is not in any sense normal for everybody to talk _ sure. it is not in any sense normal for everybody to talk about - sure. it is not in any sense normal for everybody to talk about every l for everybody to talk about every conversation they have with the media. ii conversation they have with the media. ., ., , media. if that was their intended... i cannot see — media. if that was their intended... i cannot see how— media. if that was their intended... i cannot see how that _ media. if that was their intended... i cannot see how that would - media. if that was their intended... i cannot see how that would work. | media. if that was their intended... | i cannot see how that would work. if that was their intended purpose, to give an accurate and fair reflection to correct misapprehensions and possibly as you say, sides to the

story that might be wrong, what is the problem with publishing that so people can see it? i the problem with publishing that so people can see it?— the problem with publishing that so people can see it? i would be happy to talk to you _ people can see it? i would be happy to talk to you about _ people can see it? i would be happy to talk to you about it _ people can see it? i would be happy to talk to you about it further. i i to talk to you about it further. i think there is huge lessons around... think there is huge lessons around- - -— think there is huge lessons around... ~ ., ., ,, ., around... we are talking now, can ou around... we are talking now, can you make — around... we are talking now, can you make a _ around... we are talking now, can you make a commitment. - around... we are talking now, can you make a commitment. you i around... we are talking now, can. you make a commitment. you have around... we are talking now, can - you make a commitment. you have made promises to publish other messages, given that these where, as you say, briefings designed to be clear and helpful, in that same spirit, will you share them with the committee? almost all of these things are conversations, first of all. first of all, there is nothing to share. secondly, having a system in which all written communication between everybody and government and all journalists is all published, is a very, very serious change to how the media operates in this country. i

mean, there are all sorts of ways that you can reef systems, all sorts of ways you can have greater transparency. i am of ways you can have greater transparency. iam not of ways you can have greater transparency. i am not sure that it is possible in a free society to say that we don't —— we are going to have everybody in government. we're due for example say that you will publish all of your whatsapp messages with journalists over the last 12 months? i messages with journalists over the last 12 months?— messages with journalists over the last 12 months? i haven't come here today- -- you — last 12 months? i haven't come here today... you published _ last 12 months? i haven't come here today... you published an _ last 12 months? i haven't come here today... you published an image, i last 12 months? i haven't come here today... you published an image, a | today... you published an image, a picture of a whiteboard in downing street, presumably, that was in private circumstances. you did it to put it into the public domain, helpful information. so will you share with the committee, clearly on the basis that they briefings that you gave, such texts as you have retained would be helpful, would you share them?— share them? there is almost nothing that i would — share them? there is almost nothing that i would have _ share them? there is almost nothing that i would have like _ share them? there is almost nothing that i would have like that _ share them? there is almost nothing that i would have like that that i share them? there is almost nothing that i would have like that that is - that i would have like that that is actually... to contribute very much.

secondly, what i sadly would do is look back at my text and journalists and see are there things amongst these things that have a kind of... what i would say this, anything that has a kind of direct bearing on the decisions that were made and the mistakes that were made, i would be happy to share those. did mistakes that were made, i would be happy to share those.— happy to share those. did we be the 'ud . e happy to share those. did we be the 'udue of happy to share those. did we be the judge of that — happy to share those. did we be the judge of that so _ happy to share those. did we be the judge of that so that _ happy to share those. did we be the judge of that so that we _ happy to share those. did we be the judge of that so that we can - judge of that so that we can understand what you were briefing to? ~ ., understand what you were briefing to? ~ . , , . ., understand what you were briefing to? with great respect, i am not auoin to to? with great respect, i am not going to say _ to? with great respect, i am not going to say to _ to? with great respect, i am not going to say to you _ to? with great respect, i am not going to say to you that - to? with great respect, i am not going to say to you that i - to? with great respect, i am not going to say to you that i am - to? with great respect, i am not i going to say to you that i am going to hand over my public —— private phone and let you scroll through everything and let you think what deserves or does not deserve to be in the public domain. i will, certainly, look through what i have sent to various journalists. anything that i think is significant to how decisions are made, in particular, mistakes that were made, included by me, then i will share

those. but, once you get into that sort of thing, you are into difficult territory because you are also sharing things that are... which journalists themselves are assuming are going to be private. so it requires a lot of careful thought. if we were to go down a path like that. in principle i am in favour of maximum transparency in this whole process.— this whole process. there is no one on the committee _ this whole process. there is no one on the committee that _ this whole process. there is no one on the committee that wants - this whole process. there is no one on the committee that wants to - this whole process. there is no one i on the committee that wants to have access to your mobile phone. and perhaps we can, we can rely on your candour in selecting those messages... i candour in selecting those messages. . .— candour in selecting those messages. . . candour in selecting those messaues... , , ., messages... i will submit a few thins messages... i will submit a few things for _ messages... i will submit a few things for the _ messages... i will submit a few things for the public _ messages... i will submit a few things for the public enquiry. i messages... i will submit a few| things for the public enquiry. we are keen things for the public enquiry. - are keen to learn lessons on the way. i are keen to learn lessons on the wa . . ., ., ., ., are keen to learn lessons on the wa. . ., ., . ., ., way. i am going to have go through that process _ way. i am going to have go through that process anyway _ way. i am going to have go through that process anyway for _ way. i am going to have go through that process anyway for the - way. i am going to have go through that process anyway for the public. that process anyway for the public enquiry. once i go through that process, anything that is relevant

to this committee, then i will speak to this committee, then i will speak to the people involved and see what may be done. did to the people involved and see what may be done-— may be done. did anyone mention a andemic may be done. did anyone mention a pandemic plan _ may be done. did anyone mention a pandemic plan or — may be done. did anyone mention a pandemic plan or a _ may be done. did anyone mention a pandemic plan or a risk _ may be done. did anyone mention a pandemic plan or a risk strategy - may be done. did anyone mention a pandemic plan or a risk strategy to l pandemic plan or a risk strategy to you before — pandemic plan or a risk strategy to you before 2020? yes. in what circumstances did they do that? i had conversations with various people in the cabinet office between july 2019 and the general election in 2019. about the risk register in general, also... some specific national security risk register issues. and also in my time in government i had various specific meetings with people about the question of bio—terrorism which is obviously overlaps with pandemic

planning. did obviously overlaps with pandemic ”lannin. , ,. obviously overlaps with pandemic ”lannin. , ., ., , obviously overlaps with pandemic ”lannin. , . ., , ., planning. did you have any view on the auali planning. did you have any view on the quality of _ planning. did you have any view on the quality of the _ planning. did you have any view on the quality of the pandemic- planning. did you have any view on the quality of the pandemic plan i planning. did you have any view on | the quality of the pandemic plan you are shown _ the quality of the pandemic plan you are shown at that point? i the quality of the pandemic plan you are shown at that point?— are shown at that point? i thought that many of _ are shown at that point? i thought that many of the _ are shown at that point? i thought that many of the plans _ are shown at that point? i thought that many of the plans seem - are shown at that point? i thought that many of the plans seem to i are shown at that point? i thought| that many of the plans seem to me are shown at that point? i thought - that many of the plans seem to me to be, to fall very far short of what was actually needed. a lot of things are kind of power points and they lacked detail. but most importantly i think, lacked detail. but most importantly ithink, ithink lacked detail. but most importantly i think, i think the process around them, as with the pandemic plan, is just not open. there is not a culture of talking to outside experts. a recent example, i was talking to some people said to me, did you read the plan on solar flares question mark i said no. they said if you get some expert advice on that, you will see the current

government plan and that is hopeless. if that happens then we will be in a worse situation than covid. one thing that i did say to the cabinet secretary last year in the cabinet secretary last year in the summer and which i ardently hope is actually happening, is there ought to be an absolutely thorough and total review of all such rich —— risk register programmes. there ought to be an assumption of making this whole process open, but it should be open by default and only closed for specific things. for example, one of the other thing is high on the risk register is the anthrax plan. what if terrorists attack with anthrax. personally i would be extremely concerned if that plan is as robust as it should be. i cannot go into any details with it but i think there is no doubt that everything like that needs the most incredible, careful thought. this

country spends tens of billions of pounds on national security issues but we don't spend anything like the amount of money or engage the right kind of people involved. bear in mind, on this as soon as people like mark warner looked at what was being planned, they could say straightaway, this is wrong. the logic is wrong here. the logic is wrong there. i am absolutely sure if he opened up this kind of process, not to people like me who don't, would not have good questions to ask, but there is definitely a way in which that process can be improved. in which that process can be improved-— in which that process can be imroved. , y., ., ~ improved. did you make those comments _ improved. did you make those comments at _ improved. did you make those comments at the _ improved. did you make those comments at the time - improved. did you make those comments at the time in - improved. did you make those | comments at the time in 2019? improved. did you make those - comments at the time in 2019? you said you _ comments at the time in 2019? you said you made those comments in the summer— said you made those comments in the summer of— said you made those comments in the summer of 2020. did said you made those comments in the summer of 2020.— said you made those comments in the summer of 2020. did you make them in 2019? yes. summer of 2020. did you make them in 2019? yes- we — summer of 2020. did you make them in 2019? yes. we kicked _ summer of 2020. did you make them in 2019? yes. we kicked off _ summer of 2020. did you make them in 2019? yes. we kicked off a _ summer of 2020. did you make them in 2019? yes. we kicked off a whole - 2019? yes. we kicked off a whole process which is known as integrated review. but there were all sorts of conversations in the second half of 2019 which i was involved in about

rethinking the whole way in which we look at national security.— look at national security. questions like this. was — look at national security. questions like this. was anything _ look at national security. questions like this. was anything done - look at national security. questions like this. was anything done with i like this. was anything done with pandemic— like this. was anything done with pandemic plans with the questions that you _ pandemic plans with the questions that you raised in 2019? | pandemic plans with the questions that you raised in 2019?— that you raised in 2019? i don't know and _ that you raised in 2019? i don't know and l— that you raised in 2019? i don't know and i cannot _ that you raised in 2019? i don't know and i cannot remember l that you raised in 2019? i don't - know and i cannot remember now. i asked number ten before i came today if i could review my official diary and official e—mails from that time so i could help this committee as much as i could do. they denied that. i do not have records for that. i do not have records for that. i do not have records for that. ., , ., ~ ., , that. peer to your knowledge is responsible _ that. peer to your knowledge is responsible for _ that. peer to your knowledge is responsible for monitoring - that. peer to your knowledge is i responsible for monitoring future threats? — responsible for monitoring future threats? , . , , ., ., threats? very much depends on what threats? very much depends on what threats ou threats? very much depends on what threats you mean. _ threats? very much depends on what threats you mean. we _ threats? very much depends on what threats you mean. we are _ threats? very much depends on what threats you mean. we are thinking i threats you mean. we are thinking about the pandemic. _ threats you mean. we are thinking about the pandemic. who - threats you mean. we are thinking about the pandemic. who is - about the pandemic. who is responsible within government for monitoring those future threats, is that the _ monitoring those future threats, is that the civil contingency secretary? a that the civil contingency secretary? that the civil contingency secreta ? �* . ., , secretary? a fundamental problem with this whole _ secretary? a fundamental problem with this whole business, - secretary? a fundamental problem with this whole business, the i with this whole business, the fundamental problem that was exposed in one, this kind of multiple responsibilities. no one has an

answer to your question, that is part of the problem. in one sense you could say the cabinet secretary is responsible because he is responsible for the whole civil service, but that is nominal. he would say i am not a pandemic!, i am not at blah blah!. you have to speak to so—and—so. one of the fundamental problems were you find in this whole thing, it is a general problem in whitehall but it was very, very clear and disastrous during covid is, you have the system where on the one hand ministers are nominally responsible in various ways for a, b and c. but ministers cannot hire and fire anybody in the department. the officials are in charge of it hiring a, b and c. whenever you have a major problem, you have spider—man

pointing at each other. you have hancock pointing at the cabinet office. they are pointing back at them and all the different spider—mans pointing at each other saying you are responsible and are problem as is everyone is right and everyone is unhappy. everyone has a point about it but it is not clear and this was critical. in a well—run entity, what would have happened here is essentially in my opinion, you would have had a kind of dictator in charge of this. if i had been prime minister, i would have said, mark warner is in charge of this whole thing. he speaks with my authority. he has is close to kingly authority. he has is close to kingly authority as the state has. you're pushing them boundaries of legalities. and he can fire anybody and he can move anybody and he can juggle and he can move anybody and he can juggle the whole thing around. that way you actually have clear responsibility, one of the terrible

problems we had april, may and june as we were trying to build plan b, we at number ten could say we have to do this on the other. the cabinet secretary were saying hancock is responsible. but everybody is saying, hancock is incapable of doing the job so saying, hancock is incapable of doing thejob so he saying, hancock is incapable of doing the job so he cannot be responsible so no one gets to grips with who is in charge. who responsible so no one gets to grips with who is in charge.— responsible so no one gets to grips with who is in charge. who is racing that alarm and _ with who is in charge. who is racing that alarm and who _ with who is in charge. who is racing that alarm and who is _ with who is in charge. who is racing that alarm and who is the _ with who is in charge. who is racing that alarm and who is the person i that alarm and who is the person responsible to make sure we have a plan ready— responsible to make sure we have a plan ready for the pandemic. who were _ plan ready for the pandemic. who were you — plan ready for the pandemic. who were you having the conversations with in _ were you having the conversations with in 2019 with the risk register? it is a _ with in 2019 with the risk register? it is a diffuse group of people. there is a coordinating role in the cabinet office. on monday the 16th of march, we asked what is the view of march, we asked what is the view of the cabinet office civil

contingency secretary it on the various pandemic plans that have been given. as far as we could tell from our meetings, some of them do not exist and the ones that do exist have holes in them. to which we were given the answer, these plans are not held centrally by the cabinet office. so we are all clutching our heads, this is the 16th of march. and to be suddenly told we are assuming the cabinet office has had these things for a 6—8 weeks. we find on the 16th of march, not only they have not been scrutinising them, they have not seen them. they are only beginning in the wake of the 16th to interrogate what these... to get hold of these things. and you think that was a core competency?— and you think that was a core com eten ? , .., ., , and you think that was a core cometen ? , .., ., , ., �* competency? they come out they don't have the skills. _ competency? they come out they don't have the skills, they _ competency? they come out they don't have the skills, they don't _ competency? they come out they don't have the skills, they don't have - competency? they come out they don't have the skills, they don't have the i have the skills, they don't have the data or data architecture to collect the data cross whitehall. all of

that imploded and had to be reconstructed in april, may, june. and when you sit on the 12th of march — and when you sit on the 12th of march the _ and when you sit on the 12th of march the cabinet office is terrifyingly awful, is that what you are referring to, the failure in that— are referring to, the failure in that respect of not having any contingency plan centrally? yeah, that was a big _ contingency plan centrally? yeah, that was a big part _ contingency plan centrally? yeah, that was a big part of— contingency plan centrally? yeah, that was a big part of that. - contingency plan centrally? yeah, that was a big part of that. again, there are a lot of great officials in there but this is a problem, systems can make people smarter in some ways and dumber in others. all over whitehall, you had great people but it was clear the wiring was wrong, the responsibility and incentives were wrong. find wrong, the responsibility and incentives were wrong. and you spoke about the fact — incentives were wrong. and you spoke about the fact you _ incentives were wrong. and you spoke about the fact you think _ incentives were wrong. and you spoke about the fact you think a _ incentives were wrong. and you spoke about the fact you think a central i about the fact you think a central person— about the fact you think a central person should have been responsible for the _ person should have been responsible for the pandemic response getting going. _ for the pandemic response getting going, but in time to preparedness and monitoring future threats, is it 'ust and monitoring future threats, is it just the _ and monitoring future threats, is it just the secretary should do their 'obs just the secretary should do their jobs better or should that be a

different— jobs better or should that be a different organisation? essentially, the whole wiring _ different organisation? essentially, the whole wiring of— different organisation? essentially, the whole wiring of how _ different organisation? essentially, the whole wiring of how the - different organisation? essentially, | the whole wiring of how the cabinet office does national security issues in general needs to be radically changed to. i started to work with the cabinet secretary on this process last year and this overlapping venn diagram that touches on the civil contingencies but also touches on, essentially, and it goes back to the way in which the covid system couldn't work. it is a strap environment which means you don't have phones, you can't take on laptops, it is dealt with in a certain way so that intelligence services know that enemies can't smuggle things in to the cobra environments. that kind of thing is completely hopeless for pandemic because it meant, and this is why we

all moved out of cobra, we had to end up doing it in the cabinet room and just gerrymander i pounce on tv screens and things in there, because you couldn't get the people with the laptops and internet connections and data that we need to look at into the cobra room because that is a secure environment which doesn't allow such things in. so the whole wiring about how the cabinet office are set up to deal with this kind of crisis just fundamentally couldn't work. the last cobra meeting i can remember downstairs in the cobra room was a temporary meeting because it was with didiers, and the problem was a service we had these meetings, nicola sturgeon with go out and announce whatever she wanted, so we would have these potemkin meetings with no one taking into detail

because as soon as the meetings were finished, nicola sturgeon will pop up finished, nicola sturgeon will pop up on tv and start bad—mouthing them by knock six of that whole structure needs to be completely changed. the good news is, the cabinet secretary knows that, the cabinet secretary himself so, is that a lot of other people last year, that whole thing fall apart, and there is a plan to build a whole new system for dealing with this kind of thing. certainly, there was a plan and i was working on it was some great officials before i left my so i hope that is all still being done. we before i left my so i hope that is all still being done.— all still being done. we go to catherine _ all still being done. we go to catherine fletcher, - all still being done. we go to catherine fletcher, who i all still being done. we go to catherine fletcher, who is i all still being done. we go to catherine fletcher, who is al catherine fletcher, who is a lancashire mp. science is driven by actualities and not speculation, and ijust want to return— not speculation, and ijust want to return it _ not speculation, and ijust want to return it to—

not speculation, and ijust want to return it to the data and the raw numbers — return it to the data and the raw numbers you had to inform your decision— numbers you had to inform your decision making in the period between _ decision making in the period betweenjanuary and may decision making in the period between january and may last year. what is _ between january and may last year. what is your assessment of the data? because _ what is your assessment of the data? because we've heard concerns from others _ because we've heard concerns from others. ~ �* ., because we've heard concerns from others. �* ., . , because we've heard concerns from others. �* ., . others. we've got concerns about the situation in may _ others. we've got concerns about the situation in may 1940, _ others. we've got concerns about the situation in may 1940, in _ others. we've got concerns about the situation in may 1940, in all- others. we've got concerns about the situation in may 1940, in all sorts i situation in may 1940, in all sorts of ways, it didn't exist. the data system on monday the 16th of march was the following, it was me wheeling in that white board that you see from the photo, writing on it, a colleague reading out numbers from scraps of paper from the icu rows, and i words multiply them, and add another column, and working out if it doubled every few days. then

asking that could possibly be correct there was no functioning data system and that was connected with there was no proper testing data. because we don't have testing, all we could really do is look at people arriving in hospital so the whole thing therefore is weeks and weeks out of date. once you are looking at icu numbers as your leading data, you are in a world of trouble. fortunately, one of the things that worked incredibly well was, there is a brilliant official at the nhs, she worked with a great british start—up and they built her in a matter of weeks as a whole new nhs dashboard system. that was roughly between... they started

working on that in the first week of march, i think. working on that in the first week of march, ithink. a working on that in the first week of march, i think. a rant about the 16th of march, the 24th of march, it was still me scribbling things on a whiteboard and using my i phone calculator, when i came back from feeling ill, in april, there basically then had a brilliant data system. you had all the data, ventilator data, icu data, they then started to build models and predictions of where the nhs was going, and that made a huge difference. it actually made a huge difference. it actually made a huge difference to the whole data agenda across government, because senior people actually got to see, in a massive, epic crisis, the difference between a completely nonexistent data system and a world—class, brilliant data system, just

completely transformed decision making. completely transformed decision makinu . . completely transformed decision makinr. , ., , ., making. there is two things i want to pursue. — making. there is two things i want to pursue, firstly, _ making. there is two things i want to pursue, firstly, let's— making. there is two things i want to pursue, firstly, let's nail- making. there is two things i want to pursue, firstly, let's nail this i to pursue, firstly, let's nail this time, _ to pursue, firstly, let's nail this time. there _ to pursue, firstly, let's nail this time, there was a recognition that the data _ time, there was a recognition that the data was poor and work was commissioned in february to start in march _ commissioned in february to start in march to— commissioned in february to start in march to create an entirely new pandemic— march to create an entirely new pandemic data dashboard to support what we _ pandemic data dashboard to support what we were going to need to do to make _ what we were going to need to do to make decisions within the pandemic? correct _ make decisions within the pandemic? correct. . . make decisions within the pandemic? correct. , ., , , ., correct. given that is up to eight weeks after _ correct. given that is up to eight weeks after the _ correct. given that is up to eight weeks after the who _ correct. given that is up to eight weeks after the who declared . correct. given that is up to eight i weeks after the who declared the emergency, that's a reasonably quick response. _ emergency, that's a reasonably quick response, wouldn't you say? yes. we not luc response, wouldn't you say? yes. we got lucky in — response, wouldn't you say? yes. we got lucky in the _ response, wouldn't you say? yes. we got lucky in the sense _ response, wouldn't you say? yes. we got lucky in the sense that _ response, wouldn't you say? yes. we got lucky in the sense that there i got lucky in the sense that there was a brilliant company that was actually already working with simon stevens and the nhs on al, they were working on a long—term project. because they were working there already with the nhs data people and

the nhs x team, what happened was, in the first week of march, they essentially spoke to this brilliant official and simon stevens and said, drop all their long—term ai lab stuff, let's throw our resources into building this dashboard. from roughly speaking the third of the faith, they were working on that. i was fortunate enough to be starting to talk— was fortunate enough to be starting to talk to _ was fortunate enough to be starting to talk to colleagues about covid at the end _ to talk to colleagues about covid at the end of— to talk to colleagues about covid at the end ofjanuary and attended the briefing _ the end ofjanuary and attended the briefing from professor chris whitty that was _ briefing from professor chris whitty that was mentioned earlier, early february— that was mentioned earlier, early february time. what was apparently in that— february time. what was apparently in that was— february time. what was apparently in that was the set ratios, the maths — in that was the set ratios, the maths by— in that was the set ratios, the maths by which this disease travels. wrath _ maths by which this disease travels. wrath transmissibility rates, a range — wrath transmissibility rates, a range of— wrath transmissibility rates, a range of likely mortality rate across — range of likely mortality rate across the whole population. is a

fellow _ across the whole population. is a fellow start year of data, you know those _ fellow start year of data, you know those are _ fellow start year of data, you know those are relatively fixed and once they become narrower in ranges of certainties. — they become narrower in ranges of certainties, you can make predictions from those things that i know— predictions from those things that i know were — predictions from those things that i know were available in february. so, to what _ know were available in february. so, to what extent are you taking account — to what extent are you taking account of this expertise with your whiteboard in mid—march when these ratios— whiteboard in mid—march when these ratios and _ whiteboard in mid—march when these ratios and disease proliferation and disease _ ratios and disease proliferation and disease death rates were no in six weeks _ disease death rates were no in six weeks before? the disease death rates were no in six weeks before?— disease death rates were no in six weeks before? the problem was, i think what you're _ weeks before? the problem was, i think what you're saying _ weeks before? the problem was, i think what you're saying is - weeks before? the problem was, i think what you're saying is half i think what you're saying is half right. you're right that a lot of the key numbers, we kind of knew roughly with confidence intervals, and you can make predictions about those. but where this went wrong, we now know from various data that covid had to spread faster and further in january covid had to spread faster and further injanuary and february than

further in january and february than we realised at the time. so you're right that we knew a lot of these parameters and you could draw graphs from them but part of the whole point... at the meeting on the 14th and the prime minister's office, the independence dayjeff goldblum at meeting, part of the whole point of that, he was saying, these curves are all wrong. yes, the pattern, as you say, its clear, but they're all stretched out towards a peak in the june, it's not going to... that's not relevance. the graph is actually going up like that. 50. not relevance. the graph is actually going up like that.— going up like that. so, new data emerged- _ going up like that. so, new data emerged. final— going up like that. so, new data emerged. final question - going up like that. so, new data emerged. final question from . going up like that. so, new data i emerged. final question from mae... it was _ emerged. final question from mae... it was very— emerged. final question from mae... it was very confused... how emerged. final question from mae... it was very confused. . .— it was very confused... how the actual data _ it was very confused... how the actual data tied _ it was very confused... how the actual data tied in _ it was very confused... how the actual data tied in with - it was very confused... how the actual data tied in with the i actual data tied in with the protection data within the models, so, protection data within the models, so. to— protection data within the models, so. to what— protection data within the models, so, to what extent you, leading the charge _ so, to what extent you, leading the charge here, were able to put actual

compilations of the data into the scientific— compilations of the data into the scientific models to allow us to shift _ scientific models to allow us to shift from _ scientific models to allow us to shift from projections, which are inevitably— shift from projections, which are inevitably some time is right and sometimes wrong, into modelling the real world _ sometimes wrong, into modelling the real world are making life or death decisions — real world are making life or death decisions off the back of it, when did that — decisions off the back of it, when did that happen? that decisions off the back of it, when did that happen?— decisions off the back of it, when did that happen? that didn't really ha en did that happen? that didn't really happen until _ did that happen? that didn't really happen until i _ did that happen? that didn't really happen until i would _ did that happen? that didn't really happen until i would say _ did that happen? that didn't really happen until i would say april. i did that happen? that didn't really happen until i would say april. atl happen until i would say april. at the time we were making these huge judgments around the 13th—15th of march, there were models. but as the graph i showed you earlier shows, when we got the updated graph... i won't be able to see it, i don't think— won't be able to see it, i don't think you _ won't be able to see it, i don't think you shed it in advance. in a nutshell, once _ think you shed it in advance. ii a. nutshell, once used as cross site in a crush on you and the sage grouse of the time have these terrifying curse like that. but peaking in june. what ben warner and patrick

ballance and others said a rant about the 14th was, actually, we think from patchy data coming in, including icu data, we are further along this curve, we look back at weeks two with ten weeks ago, but were up there on the curve. helga weeks two with ten weeks ago, but were up there on the curve. new data emerued were up there on the curve. new data emerged and — were up there on the curve. new data emerged and we _ were up there on the curve. new data emerged and we refrained _ were up there on the curve. new data emerged and we refrained our- emerged and we refrained our hypothesis. emerged and we refrained our hypothesis-— hypothesis. yes, exactly. we realised in — hypothesis. yes, exactly. we realised in the _ hypothesis. yes, exactly. we realised in the week - hypothesis. yes, exactly. we realised in the week of i hypothesis. yes, exactly. we realised in the week of the i hypothesis. yes, exactly. we i realised in the week of the 16th. thank you, chair.— realised in the week of the 16th. thank you, chair. finally, another cuestion. thank you, chair. finally, another question- if— thank you, chair. finally, another question- if i _ thank you, chair. finally, another question. ifi could _ thank you, chair. finally, another question. ifi could return - thank you, chair. finally, another question. if i could return to i thank you, chair. finally, another question. if i could return to the i question. if i could return to the line of questioning _ question. if i could return to the line of questioning mr _ question. if i could return to the line of questioning mr hunter. line of questioning mr hunter pursued _ line of questioning mr hunter pursued earlier about the planning, you gave _ pursued earlier about the planning, you gave the quote from helen mcnamara on the 13th of march that there is— mcnamara on the 13th of march that there is no— mcnamara on the 13th of march that there is no plan but it is reported in late _ there is no plan but it is reported in late february 2020, i have seen the plan. — in late february 2020, i have seen the plan. it— in late february 2020, i have seen the plan, it is not a plan at all,

it is— the plan, it is not a plan at all, it is a — the plan, it is not a plan at all, it is a plan— the plan, it is not a plan at all, it is a plan to have a plan at some stage _ it is a plan to have a plan at some stage in— it is a plan to have a plan at some stage in the— it is a plan to have a plan at some stage. in the fortnight or so between _ stage. in the fortnight or so between those, there were hundreds of events _ between those, there were hundreds of events coming into the country, and that— of events coming into the country, and that quote was from your wife and that quote was from your wife and the _ and that quote was from your wife and the spectator. what were you doing _ and the spectator. what were you doing in— and the spectator. what were you doing in this two weeks when you already— doing in this two weeks when you already knew there wasn't a meaningful plan in those first two weeks _ meaningful plan in those first two weeks of— meaningful plan in those first two weeks of march? i was having meeting after meeting. so that quote was relating to... it was the mitigate delay thing. that was the mitigate delay thing. that was the mitigate delay thing. that was the document touted as a plan. but you can see it is not a plan at all. what i was doing from around about the 25th when people hit the panic button with me, i was having meeting after meeting with people with people around whitehall around shielding and testing to try and figure out, ok, who has got a plan around here? who is actually doing

what around here? there were all sorts of people doing all sorts of great things but it was clear overall there was not a coherent plan. in particular, that reference on the night of their 13th from helen mcnamara and with mark sweeney was about the nhs, was about this mismatch of where is the nhs plan to deal with the numbers. there isn't one because the nhs capacity is going to be maxed out by a factor of times ten. one of the things that was being spoken about, there is not a plan to bury all the bodies. there was a period _ a plan to bury all the bodies. there was a period when _ a plan to bury all the bodies. there was a period when we _ a plan to bury all the bodies. there was a period when we were - a plan to bury all the bodies. there was a period when we were saying we were four _ was a period when we were saying we were four weeks behind italy and then we — were four weeks behind italy and then we were two weeks backing italy _ then we were two weeks backing italy that — then we were two weeks backing italy. that was because of the multitude of seeding events. was there _ multitude of seeding events. was there any— multitude of seeding events. was there any thought given to those seeding — there any thought given to those seeding events during that early march _ seeding events during that early march period because obviously quarantine would have potentially delayed _ quarantine would have potentially delayed it and given as a bit more time _ delayed it and given as a bit more time was— delayed it and given as a bit more time. was there any time given to

that at— time. was there any time given to that at all? — time. was there any time given to that at all?— that at all? essentially know when it is connected _ that at all? essentially know when it is connected to _ that at all? essentially know when it is connected to what _ that at all? essentially know when it is connected to what i _ that at all? essentially know when it is connected to what i said i it is connected to what i said earlier on. the official view was that it earlier on. the official view was thatitis earlier on. the official view was that it is going to spread. in retrospect, obviously we should have had individual isolation in february. we should have had household isolation in february. obviously in retrospect we should have had their taiwan system, close the borders, ramped up testing, we should have had masks which were compulsory, quarantine and force, those should have been happening in january. those should have been happening in janua . . . . those should have been happening in janua . . ., ,. . january. that was the scientific advice. january. that was the scientific advice- and — january. that was the scientific advice. and we _ january. that was the scientific advice. and we heard - january. that was the scientific advice. and we heard from i january. that was the scientific advice. and we heard from mr| january. that was the scientific - advice. and we heard from mr balance in that— advice. and we heard from mr balance in that time _ advice. and we heard from mr balance in that time earlier. we were ranked second _ in that time earlier. we were ranked second for— in that time earlier. we were ranked second for pandemic preparedness which _ second for pandemic preparedness which was — second for pandemic preparedness which was based on flawed criteria. this is— which was based on flawed criteria. this is groupthink again. in your view— this is groupthink again. in your view we — this is groupthink again. in your view we are _ this is groupthink again. in your view we are all ministers, badly advised — view we are all ministers, badly advised in — view we are all ministers, badly advised in the period before the

first lockdown by their people looking — first lockdown by their people looking out for them. i first lockdown by their people looking out for them.- first lockdown by their people looking out for them. i think all senior people _ looking out for them. i think all senior people involved - looking out for them. i think all senior people involved with i looking out for them. i think all| senior people involved with that process, me, the cabinet secretary, i think all of us would say we got a lot of things wrong in that period. i have been critical of the prime minister, but there is... if you dropped, bill gates or someone like that into thatjob on the 1st of march, the most competent people in the world you could possibly find, any of them would have had a complete nightmare. there is no doubt. there is no doubt that the prime minister had made some bad misjudgments and got some things wrong. it is also the case that there is no doubt that he was extremely badly let down by the whole system and it was a system failure of which i include myself in that. j failure of which i include myself in that. . ,., failure of which i include myself in that. ., ., ., failure of which i include myself in that. . ., ., ., ., that. i also failed. i am wanting to close the session _ that. i also failed. i am wanting to close the session by _ that. i also failed. i am wanting to close the session by saying, i that. i also failed. i am wanting to close the session by saying, why l that. i also failed. i am wanting to i close the session by saying, why you are here _

close the session by saying, why you are here. your previous attitude to select_ are here. your previous attitude to select committees in this house has main content. you have decided not to give _ main content. you have decided not to give evidence to select committees. are you here to learn lessons _ committees. are you here to learn lessons are... | committees. are you here to learn lessons are- - -_ lessons are... i came here to exlain lessons are... i came here to exnlain the — lessons are... i came here to explain the truth _ lessons are... i came here to explain the truth about - lessons are... i came here to explain the truth about what| explain the truth about what happened. the families of all the thousands of people who died deserve the truth. that's why i am here. i can go into the reasons why i didn't attend meetings about the referendum if you like, but i am not sure that anyone wants to know that. l if you like, but i am not sure that anyone wants to know that. i just anyone wants to know that. i 'ust want to get fl anyone wants to know that. i 'ust want to get to i anyone wants to know that. i 'ust want to get to the i anyone wants to know that. i 'ust want to get to the bottom h anyone wants to know that. i just want to get to the bottom of, - anyone wants to know that. ijust want to get to the bottom of, you have _ want to get to the bottom of, you have made — want to get to the bottom of, you have made something —— make major swipes _ have made something —— make major swipes at _ have made something —— make major swipes at political leaders in the past few— swipes at political leaders in the past few errors. that leads me to ask what— past few errors. that leads me to ask what was your motivation for working — ask what was your motivation for working to — ask what was your motivation for working to the prime minister. was it to gel _ working to the prime minister. was it to get your ideas to get into government. it is the fact that covid — government. it is the fact that covid derailed that n is that a sort of regret— covid derailed that n is that a sort of regret to you? | covid derailed that n is that a sort

of regret to you?— covid derailed that n is that a sort of regret to you? i went in because in the summer— of regret to you? i went in because in the summer of— of regret to you? i went in because in the summer of 2019, _ of regret to you? i went in because in the summer of 2019, it - of regret to you? i went in because in the summer of 2019, it seemed | of regret to you? i went in because i in the summer of 2019, it seemed the choice the country faced with either sort out a concert essentially —— a referendum and has a country move on with a new agenda and havejeremy corbyn come in and have a second referendum which i thought would be catastrophic for the country. that is why i got involved with it in the summer. i thought i could help solve that problem and i do think... one way in this could have been worse thanit way in this could have been worse than it was, if you imagine that parliament collating with this disaster in january 2020, god parliament collating with this disaster injanuary 2020, god only knows what happened. at least here, this is not a comment at all on brexit. it is perfectly reasonable to have a view that we should have... i don't want to get into that whole thing. if that broken

parliament had limped on into 2020 and confronted this crisis, i think we would now be looking at, i think the whole system would have fallen apart and melted down. did the whole system would have fallen apart and melted down.— apart and melted down. did covid essentially stop _ apart and melted down. did covid essentially stop what _ apart and melted down. did covid essentially stop what you - apart and melted down. did covid essentially stop what you wanted | apart and melted down. did covid l essentially stop what you wanted to do and _ essentially stop what you wanted to do and achieve a number ten from happening. — do and achieve a number ten from happening, is that a fair assessment? you had a lot of designs on reforming whitehall and number ten itself~ _ on reforming whitehall and number ten itself. it on reforming whitehall and number ten itself. , ., ., ten itself. it is hard to say. in some ways — ten itself. it is hard to say. in some ways the _ ten itself. it is hard to say. in some ways the covid - ten itself. it is hard to say. in some ways the covid staff - some ways the covid staff accelerated a lot of the things i wanted to do. one of the big arguments i made was that civil service has got to reform and it does not have the right skills in place. that is now obvious. i said the science and technology should be the science and technology should be the centre of the policy in future. things like the vaccine task force show both in a defensive and sort of

positive building sense, what science and technology agenda can do. it's a very big question, hypothetical about how the world could have worked out differently. i am not sure what extent the committee wants me to get into broader comments about the political scene. i would broader comments about the political scene. iwould be broader comments about the political scene. i would be happy to come back to you and talk about that. it has to you and talk about that. it has been a long _ to you and talk about that. it has been a long first _ to you and talk about that. it has been a long first session. - to you and talk about that. it has been a long first session. but - to you and talk about that. it has been a long first session. but i i been a long first session. but i think we have covered a lot of ground and i think we learned a lot and i am sure further sessions, we can be a bit more brisk. i think one of the things we have noticed, as you have said, mr cummings, everyone in the world was looking at is in this phase of the pandemic darkly. whether we called it flattening the curve or herd immunity, as you said, this is a semantic question, but we were embarrassed: a policy which

doesn't require fan modelling. if you look at the figures, if you have a p0p “ you look at the figures, if you have a pop —— adult population of 60 million people and if two thirds of a get covid and i% of people who get it die, you have 100,000 people a get covid and 1% of people who get it die, you have 100,000 people who are going to die. and that logic was there, don't require the imperial model to be published. it was there from the beginning. and yet sage, for six weeks from the beginning of the pandemic until these events of the pandemic until these events of the 13th and 14th of march, was recommending this strategy of let's call it flattening the curve. and this wasn't changed until a kind of epiphany at that weekend. was this because there was a groupthink in sage and amongst the advisers that you were part of, which is ironic

because you have been a great critic of groupthink. you knew what was going on but felt too junior, notwithstanding the fact that you were if not the chief adviser then a very senior person, you felt too junior to call it out. which of those two as it is a combination of both? �* , ., ~ , those two as it is a combination of both? �*, ., a those two as it is a combination of both? a both? it's a mix. as i said, so i think there _ both? it's a mix. as i said, so i think there is _ both? it's a mix. as i said, so i think there is no _ both? it's a mix. as i said, so i think there is no doubt - both? it's a mix. as i said, so i think there is no doubt that - both? it's a mix. as i said, so i i think there is no doubt that sage and the department of health and the cabinet office... there was a general groupthink problem which was there is no alternative to either single peak, herd immunity by september or try and act now which probably won't work but even if it does it will lead to a second peak in the winter which will be even more catastrophic. you are completely correct, the basic numbers of it were obvious. and it was obviously going to be terrible. but the argument was terrible as

that looks, it's better than the alternative. because if you have the second wave in the middle of the nhs crisis in the winter, then it could be twice as bad as that are three times as bad as that. the fundamental groupthink problem was being trapped in the idea that there was only a choice between herd immunity by september or herd immunity by september or herd immunity by september or herd immunity byjanuary. immunity by september or herd immunity by january. whereas immunity by september or herd immunity byjanuary. whereas in fact the right way of looking at it was we can avoid both and that's what that stupid graph that i drew on the 13th and the whiteboard in the prime minister of�*s office, i was trying to do. you build up capacity by build and build and build and you manage a wiggly line along and below. untilwe manage a wiggly line along and below. until we started to discuss that around about the 12th, 13th, nobody in government thought that anything like that was possible. even on the 18th and 19th, after the

sage meeting on the 18th, at the sage meeting on the 18th, at the sage meeting on the 18th it was not unanimous in sage then that we should lockdown. i asked patrick vallance to bring an expert in. he laid out his numbers. he is one of the top data science peoples on the planet if not the top one. people in sage argued with them and said you are being too simplistic about all this. the field medallist in cambridge said no, that is not correct. dennis is right about this. to be fair to the prime minister, the scientists were still arguing about that at sage on the 18th and after that meeting, very senior officials and the department of health said, we don't understand what you are talking about with this possible plan b because after we come out of lockdown in a month's time this is going to come straight back up again and we are back at square one so why would we do that?

but you were a person of significant influence and you, later on, began to realise the consequences of this. what you've described, you are like a whistle—blower in effect. did you forget to blow the whistle? i a whistle-blower in effect. did you forget to blow the whistle? i would not forget to blow the whistle? i would rrot describe _ forget to blow the whistle? i would not describe myself _ forget to blow the whistle? i would not describe myself as _ forget to blow the whistle? i would not describe myself as a _ not describe myself as a whistle—blower. i think that is not the right time. i kind of hit the panic button. it is true i hit the panic button. it is true i hit the panic button. it is true i hit the panic button and we have to ditch the official plan. it is right that i try to create what the official plan is, was. it is also true that in retrospect my own personal view, they people who think we should have stuck with the original plan will see it was a disaster that i interfered with it. i think it is a disaster i acted too late. the fundamental reason was i was really frightened of acting. if you have got an official plan, you have got all the sage advice, you have got

the cabinet office and cabinet secretary, everyone saying we need to do this and if we don't do it and try and do something different to stop it now, it is going to be many times worse in the winter, i was asking myself in that two—week period, if i hit the panic button and persuade the prime minister to shift and then it all goes completely wrong, i'm going to have killed god knows how many hundreds of thousands of people. and that is why essentially, you know, i do not know if i did the right thing or not in the end. that is why it was the combination of warner, gower, each of whom is a thousand times smarter than me, looking at the official documents and sing, everyone has lost the mood for the trees on this thing. it is not complicated, dominic. forget these complicated models. do everything you can to balance until the system to act as soon as possible. it is actually that simple, that is what you should

do. i only had the confidence to do that once i knew that people who are much smarter than me and looked at it and said, basically this age group think is wrong. the dh groupthink is wrong, we need to change course. as i say, i apologise for not acting earlier, if i had acted earlier, a lot more people might still be alive. the performed im ortant might still be alive. the performed important public _ might still be alive. the performed important public service. _ might still be alive. the performed important public service. someone who did summon up the courage to press the button was a long serving civil servant, press the button was a long serving civilservant, helen press the button was a long serving civil servant, helen mcnamara. press the button was a long serving civilservant, helen mcnamara. she did what you had tried. i civil servant, helen mcnamara. she did what you had tried.— did what you had tried. i wouldn't ut it did what you had tried. i wouldn't put it quite _ did what you had tried. i wouldn't put it quite like _ did what you had tried. i wouldn't put it quite like that. _ did what you had tried. i wouldn't put it quite like that. it _ did what you had tried. i wouldn't put it quite like that. it is - did what you had tried. i wouldn't put it quite like that. it is true - put it quite like that. it is true that, helen mcnamara... as soon as helena marco was alerted that the thing had gone wrong on 13th, she literally walked straight through

the doors from through the kind of security doors through from the cabinet office to come and find me and the prime minister. she walked into the prime minister's office and i think she deserves enormous credit for that. she came to us, then try to hide it, she said something has gone catastrophically wrong and i have come to tell you that. that was roughly speaking seven pmr apm on the friday the 13th. i think she deserves huge credit for that. —— 7pm, apm. that was something that gave me the confidence to say to the prime minister the next morning, something has gone terribly, terribly wrong. i do not know how this has happened but it is clear something has gone wrong in the wearing of the system. we something has gone wrong in the wearing of the system.— something has gone wrong in the wearing of the system. we are going to ad'ourn wearing of the system. we are going to adjourn now— wearing of the system. we are going to adjourn now for _ wearing of the system. we are going to adjourn now for 15 _ wearing of the system. we are going to adjourn now for 15 minutes - wearing of the system. we are going to adjourn now for 15 minutes and i wearing of the system. we are going | to adjourn now for 15 minutes and we will resume withjeremy hunt in the chain —— chairforthe will resume withjeremy hunt in the chain —— chairfor the next session. studio: so, about four hours in

totalfor studio: so, about four hours in total for this studio: so, about four hours in totalfor this evidence studio: so, about four hours in total for this evidence from dominic cummings. right now we are going to go to the beginning of prime minister's questions. mr speaker, i know colleagues from across the house will want to join me in know colleagues from across the house will want tojoin me in paying tribute to ourformer house will want tojoin me in paying tribute to our former colleague who sadly died last week. he was a dedicated parliamentarian and a fantastic servant to the people of hove place. this morning, i had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others, i will have further such meetings later today. i and others, i will have further such meetings later today.— meetings later today. i draw the house's attention _ meetings later today. i draw the house's attention to _ meetings later today. i draw the house's attention to my - meetings later today. i draw the . house's attention to my declaration of interests as a practising nhs doctors has been working on the front line during the pandemic. my right honourable friend will be aware of the 2012 health and social

care act resulted in the local authority addiction services and now they are almost all run by norman—nhs providers. many alcohol detoxes now take place in an unplanned manner and deaths are at an precedented level is. witty agree that we must bring addiction services back into the nhs and will emit with me and other experts in this field to discuss how we can get this field to discuss how we can get this right? i this field to discuss how we can get this riuht? ., ., ., ,, this field to discuss how we can get this riuht? . ., ., ~ , this right? i want to thank my honourable _ this right? i want to thank my honourable friend _ this right? i want to thank my honourable friend for - this right? i want to thank my i honourable friend for everything this right? i want to thank my - honourable friend for everything he has done throughout this pandemic and also for racing this vital issue. we are seeing the biggest increase in treatment for substance abuse for 15 years but the specific points he raises, we will make sure that we address with dame carol black, who is undertaking a review of drugs and treatment and will make sure his point is paid in. can”

sure his point is paid in. can i 'oin the sure his point is paid in. can i join the prime _ sure his point is paid in. can i join the prime minister - sure his point is paid in. can i join the prime minister and l sure his point is paid in. can i| join the prime minister and his comments about hillsborough and michael weatherby. this morning, the prime minister's closest adviser said, and the public needed us most, the government fails, just the prime minister agree with that? the handuna minister agree with that? the handling of — minister agree with that? the handling of this _ minister agree with that? the handling of this pandemic has been one of the most difficult things this country has for a very long time and none of the decisions have been easy. to go into lockdown as a traumatic thing for a country, to deal with a pandemic on this scale has been appallingly difficult and we, at every stage, try to minimise loss of life, to save lives and the nhs and have followed the best scientific advice we can. can i remind the prime minister that one year ago, almost to the day, it describes as former adviser as, in his words, in every respect, acting

responsibly, legally and with integrity. this morning, that same adviser has said that integrity. this morning, that same adviser has said— adviser has said that senior ministers — adviser has said that senior ministers felt _ adviser has said that senior ministers felt disastrously. adviser has said that senior - ministers felt disastrously short of the standards that the public can expect from its government and lives were lost as a result. does a that central allegation that his inaction led to needless deaths? iirla. central allegation that his inaction led to needless deaths?— led to needless deaths? no, mr seaker, led to needless deaths? no, mr speaker. and — led to needless deaths? no, mr speaker, and of _ led to needless deaths? no, mr speaker, and of course, - led to needless deaths? no, mr speaker, and of course, all- led to needless deaths? no, mr. speaker, and of course, all those matters will be reviewed in the course of a public inquiry that i have announced. i notice that he's fixated as ever on the rear view mirror, while we on this side of the house are getting on with ourjob of rolling out the vaccines, making sure that would protect the people of this country, and i think that has been the decisive development which i think people are rightly focusing. i can tell the house that is, in despite of the continuing concern that we have about the

indian variant, we are increasing our vaccination programme in such a way that we can now ask everybody over 30 to come forward and get vaccinated. it over 30 to come forward and get vaccinated-— over 30 to come forward and get vaccinated. , ., ., ., vaccinated. it is no good the prime minister attacking _ vaccinated. it is no good the prime minister attacking me, _ vaccinated. it is no good the prime minister attacking me, it _ vaccinated. it is no good the prime minister attacking me, it is - vaccinated. it is no good the prime minister attacking me, it is his - minister attacking me, it is his former chief adviser that is looking back and telling the world how useless the prime minister was in taking key decisions. his former adviser, one of the most serious points made this morning was that the prime minister failed points made this morning was that the prime ministerfailed to recognise the severity of this virus until it was too late, dismissing it as another scare story, like the swine flu. does the prime minister recognise that accounts of his own behaviour, and if so, will he apologise for being so complacent about the threat this virus posed? i about the threat this virus posed? i don't think anybody can credibly accused its government about being complacent about the threat of this virus at any point. we have worked

flat out to minimise loss of life, to protect the nhs, what they have flip—flopped from one position to another, back in curfew one day, passing it the next, backing lockdowns one day, opposing it the next, calling for tougher border controls one day, then sing quarantine is a blunt instrument. we have got on with the job of protecting the people of this country from one of the worst pandemics in loving memory, if not the worst. we have turned the corner and it is no thanks to the loyal opposition opposite. i and it is no thanks to the loyal opposition opposite.— and it is no thanks to the loyal opposition opposite. i can see that the evidence _ opposition opposite. i can see that the evidence of— opposition opposite. i can see that the evidence of his _ opposition opposite. i can see that the evidence of his former- opposition opposite. i can see that the evidence of his former adviser| the evidence of his former adviser is really getting to the prime minister. another incredibly serious statement from the prime minister's former adviser this morning concerns the conduct of the health secretary. and closing allegation that the health secretary misled other ministers and officials on a number of occasions. i don't expect the

prime minister to respond to that but can confirm, from this morning's evidence... can he confirm, to the cabinet secretary advised him that he had lost faith in the health secretary's honesty? the he had lost faith in the health secretary's honesty? the answer to that is no and _ secretary's honesty? the answer to that is no and i'm _ secretary's honesty? the answer to that is no and i'm afraid _ secretary's honesty? the answer to that is no and i'm afraid i _ secretary's honesty? the answer to that is no and i'm afraid i haven't i that is no and i'm afraid i haven't had the benefit of seeing the evidence that he's bringing to be house but i must say that i think what the people of this country want us all to do is to get on with the delicate business now of trying to reopen our economy and restore a people's freedoms, get back to our way of life, by rolling out the vaccine. i would have thought that was so much more profitable line of inquiry for the right honourable gentleman today, and that's why think the people of this country want to focus on. the

think the people of this country want to focus on.— think the people of this country want to focus on. ~ , want to focus on. the prime minister can't have it — want to focus on. the prime minister can't have it both _ want to focus on. the prime minister can't have it both ways. _ want to focus on. the prime minister can't have it both ways. either- want to focus on. the prime minister can't have it both ways. either his . can't have it both ways. either his former adviser is telling the truth, in which case the prime minister should answer the allegations, or the prime minister has to suggest that his former adviser is not telling the truth, which raises serious questions about the prime minister'sjudgment in serious questions about the prime minister's judgment in appointing him in the first place. there's a pattern of behaviour here, there was clearly a lack of planning, poor decision—making and a lack of transparency and a prime minister he was absent from the key decisions, including five early cobra meetings and was, to quote his former adviser, about 1000% too obsessed with the media. but another central allegation briefed overnight is that the prime minister delayed the socket break over the autumn half term because covid was only killing 80—year—olds. can i remind the prime minister that over 83,000 people

over 80 lost their lives to this virus. and that his decision to delay for a0 days from the sage guidance on the 21st of september until the 31st of october will be seen as one of the single biggest failings of the last year. now having been told of the evidence, does the prime minister accepted that he used the words "covid was only killing 80—year—olds" or words to that effect? mr only killing 80-year-olds" or words to that effect?— to that effect? mr speaker, we saw what happened _ to that effect? mr speaker, we saw what happened during _ to that effect? mr speaker, we saw what happened during the - to that effect? mr speaker, we saw| what happened during the pandemic and in particular, he talks about the september lockdown and my approach to it and the very difficult decision that the country faced. of course, this will be a matter for the faced. of course, this will be a matterfor the inquiry faced. of course, this will be a matter for the inquiry to go faced. of course, this will be a matterfor the inquiry to go into it but we have an objective test, in the sense there was a circuit breaker of the county describes in wales, it did not work, and i'm

absolutely confident we took the decision is in the best interest of the british people. when it comes to hindsight, mr speaker, iwouldjust remind the right honourable gentleman that he actually denied this at the time, and had to correct it, but he voted to stay in the european medicines agency, which would have made it impossible for us to do the vaccine roll—out at the pace we have. it’s to do the vaccine roll-out at the pace we have-— to do the vaccine roll-out at the pace we have. it's not me giving evidence at _ pace we have. it's not me giving evidence at this _ pace we have. it's not me giving evidence at this morning, - pace we have. it's not me giving evidence at this morning, it's i pace we have. it's not me giving| evidence at this morning, it's his former adviser and i note the prime minister's careful not to refute these allegations. what we have seen todayis these allegations. what we have seen today is the latest chapter of a story of confusion, chaos and epic misjudgements from this government. from a prime minister governing by press released, not a planned. in the last 2a was, we have seen the same mistakes made again, with the

mistake made that millions in various areas of the country have been treated. in that light of the trip of these very serious allegations and the failure of the prime minister to provide even basic answers and continuing mistakes affecting millions of people, does the prime minister now recognise he must bring forward at the timing of the public inquiring into covid and richard had to make this summer and as soon as possible? trio. richard had to make this summer and as soon as possible?— as soon as possible? no, and as i have said — as soon as possible? no, and as i have said before, _ as soon as possible? no, and as i have said before, i— as soon as possible? no, and as i have said before, i am _ as soon as possible? no, and as i have said before, i am not- as soon as possible? no, and as i have said before, i am not going| as soon as possible? no, and as i l have said before, i am not going to concentrate valuable official time on that now while we're still battling a pandemic. i thought that is what the house had agreed on. he continues to play these pointless political gains while we get on with delivering on the people's priorities. a0 new hospitals, thousands more police on our streets. we're sorting out the railways, we're giving people the opportunity of home ownership in a way they have never had before with

95% mortgages and we have delivered 16 million vaccinations across this country. he lost his european comparisons, more than any other european country, including 22 million at second dosis. and that, with great respect, i believe that is the priority of the british people. that is what they're focused on, and he voted to stay in the european medicines agency. they vacillate, we vaccinate, they deliberate, we deliver. i vacillate, we vaccinate, they deliberate, we deliver.- vacillate, we vaccinate, they deliberate, we deliver. i am sure my riaht deliberate, we deliver. i am sure my right honourable _ deliberate, we deliver. i am sure my right honourable friend _ deliberate, we deliver. i am sure my right honourable friend the - deliberate, we deliver. i am sure my right honourable friend the prime . right honourable friend the prime minister remembers with great fondness a strip ofjuly last year to the discovery school in kingshill, but probably remembers best his meeting with tony, an inspirational young boy who at that point had already raised £1.5 million for charity and been awarded by my right honourable friend the

award he hands out to those who have achieved so much. when hejoined tony and tony's parents and me and many others around the country and campaigning for tony's law, a new close to the police, crime and sentencing bill. this is a very minor change to a very important bill that would bring child abuse sentencing in line with that of aduu sentencing in line with that of adult abuse. i know he has put his heart into this place and i'm sure we can all look forward to his support. i we can all look forward to his su ort. . ~ , we can all look forward to his suuort. ., ,, , ., ., support. i thank my honourable friend and _ support. i thank my honourable friend and of— support. i thank my honourable friend and of course _ support. i thank my honourable friend and of course i _ support. i thank my honourable | friend and of course i remember support. i thank my honourable - friend and of course i remember tony very well. i remember his incredible campaign and the amount of money he raised and i thank him for it. all i can say, it is a very important that, injustices such as that suffered by tony, to receive the full force of the law. people who

commit serious offences against children it can receive the same sentences as those who commit offences against adults however, we will keep this under review, if there is a gap in the law, we will make sure that we remedy it. can there is a gap in the law, we will make sure that we remedy it. cami make sure that we remedy it. can i associate myself _ make sure that we remedy it. can i associate myself with _ make sure that we remedy it. can i associate myself with the - make sure that we remedy it. caryl associate myself with the remarks of the prime minister for those seeking justice for hillsborough, to quote the sun, you'll never walk alone. thousands of people have died of coronavirus in the united kingdom. this morning, the prime minister's most seniorformer adviser, this morning, the prime minister's most seniorformeradviser, dominic cummings, apologised on behalf of the uk government saying, when the public needed us most, we failed. we know of the prime minister gave a series of catastrophic errors throughout the crisis. went on holiday when it should have been leading efforts. he was too slow to go into lockdown, he failed to

secure our borders. he sent millions of people back to their offices prematurely. there is no doubt that these mistakes caused many of thousands of deaths. when you can adjust rates figure like dominic cummings is willing to own up and apologise, isn't it time that the prime minister does the same? i take full responsibility for everything that has happened. as i have said before in this house and elsewhere, i am truly sorry for the suffering the people of this country have experienced. i maintain my point... you can continue to watch prime minister's questions on bbc parliament and bbc two. let's go back to dominic cummings. the who was talkin:

back to dominic cummings. the who was talking about _ back to dominic cummings. the who was talking about test, _ back to dominic cummings. the who was talking about test, test, - back to dominic cummings. the who was talking about test, test, test. - was talking about test, test, test. south korea and taiwan were using test entries to avoid national lockdown is. but on the 12th of march we stopped community testing in this country, that was following clear sage advice that when there was sustained community transmission, contact tracing would no longer be useful. you talked before at length about how there were problems and mistakes in the scientific consensus up until the weekend of the 1ath, 15th of march. but sage didn't even model korean style test and tracing until may. why was there such a long delay even after that march inflection point? fundamentally it goes back to what we talked about at length in the previous session, that the logic was if you are going for the optimal single peak strategy, herd immunity

by september, then in the same way that you don't take vaccines as a kind of urgent priority, you don't take testing as an urgent priority. that's why they develop —— department of health said in that week, we don't need to test everyone any more. the view was simply, you know, 60% or 70% of the country are going to get it. that's going to happen for sure. why would you even bother testing all of those different people? because we are not going to have a test, track, isolate, quarantine system because we are going for herd immunity by september. so no one challenged really that idea strongly until we challenged it as part of the whole shifter plan b. there were conversations about it. i asked patrick and chris about it. but even

then late march, it was said officially on the record, there was no way that this country is going to do test, track and trace like they are doing in southeast asia. that was just completely common assumption. i end others, including patrick vallance, started to push back against that and say, hang on a second. if we are going to go for accelerate it, if we are going to ditch plan a and accelerate as fast as possible into lockdown in the coming days, the whole point of that is you are buying time and then you have got to deal with the fundamental argument that you have a second wave in the autumn. then of course you're going to have to build test, track and trace systems from

essentially ground zero pretty much. but those conversations didn't really properly happen until after that weekend and after i started talking to people about about plan b. l talking to people about about plan b. ., talking to people about about plan b. . . ., ,., y b. i am curious about why it took so lonu. b. i am curious about why it took so long- sage. — b. i am curious about why it took so long- sage. as _ b. i am curious about why it took so long. sage, as far— b. i am curious about why it took so long. sage, as far as _ b. i am curious about why it took so long. sage, as far as i _ b. i am curious about why it took so long. sage, as far as i can _ b. i am curious about why it took so long. sage, as far as i can tell, - long. sage, as far as i can tell, did not model test entries as a containment strategy for two months after that. we did not set up test entries until the end of may. that is a very long time. you realise plan a is wrong, you change direction. why did it take another two months before we got into gear with south korean style track and trace? , ., ., , ., trace? remember that, in lots of wa s the trace? remember that, in lots of ways the whole — trace? remember that, in lots of ways the whole core _ trace? remember that, in lots of ways the whole core of _ trace? remember that, in lots of. ways the whole core of government fundamentally fell apart on the

friday... friday... the day that the prime minister, so... we have lockdown on the 23rd. on the... over the weekend, so slightly backtracking, over the weekend of the saturday the 1ath, sunday 15th, one of the things i did was i called a brilliant official who had been working on the brexit no deal preparations. i said to him, total meltdown. we need all great people. will you quit yourjob on monday and come in? he did do that. he went to a whole bunch of people who he had

worked with on the brexit preparations, including the former commanding officer of the sas. alex cooper, who is a brilliant guy. alex cooper, who is a brilliant guy. alex cooper was then essentially drafted in to get and build a team to start building factories on the ground, to start trying to take this... you had pag, this entity that was doing very few tests and had no plan for how to expand it and did not think it was possible for the reasons we discussed. alex cooper was given the job to go around and build factories so we could scale this whole thing up. however, the government then, the core of the government kind of collapsed when the prime minister got ill himself because he had suddenly gone and then people were

thinking he might die. by the time i came back on the 13th i think it was of april, we had this terrible situation where alex cooper and his team were trying to build the foundations for a whole new test entry system, for mass testing, pcr, the whole thing. and bear in mind at the whole thing. and bear in mind at the time we also had the classic problem that all the supply chains were collapsing because we could not buy all the things that we needed abroad, because people were impounding things on the airfield. they had to build a domestic manufacturing hub. in my opinion disastrously, the secretary of state had made, while the prime minister was on his near death bed, made a pledge to do 100,000 by the end of april. this was an incredibly stupid thing to do because we had already

had that goal internally, we had already had conversations ten days earlier to say instead of cancelling testing, we should have been ramping it up. it should not be100,000 but 1 million or more. that means building the kind of foundations to do this properly. what happened when i came back around the 13th was i started getting calls saying a number ten were getting calls were sane, hancock is interfering with the building of the test entry system because he is telling everybody what to do to maximise his chances of hitting his stupid target by the end of the man. so we had half the government with me and number ten calling round frantically saying, do not do what hancock says. build the thing properly for the medium term. we had hancock calling them all sing, downed tools on this, do this. whole tests back so that i

can hit my target. in my opinion, he should have been fired for that thing alone and that itself meant that the whole did by different parts of whitehall fundamentally trying to operate in different ways, completely because hancock wanted to be able to go on tv and say, look at me, my100 k target. it was criminal, disgraceful behaviour that cause serious harm. one of the consequences of it was, we will get onto that with a vaccine programme. that was one of the reasons why the cabinet secretary and i agreed that we had essentially to take testing away from hancock and put it in a separate agency. so we could say here is a separate person responsible directly to the prime minister and the cabinet secretary that hancock could not in fear with theoretically. there was all this

bureaucratic infighting in april. the prime minister was not back then. dominic rab was doing a brilliantjob chairing the meeting is that this was a huge call and difficult for him to basically start carving up the department of health in april. essentially we never got to grips with it until the prime minister was back in the office and the cabinet secretary and i could say to him, we have to do the track and trace thing in a different way. would it be right to say that you had which was their meltdown weekend when we went into the first lockdown and move to plan b. there actually was not the point when as a country and government we are going to go south korean. we were saying it is time to save the nhs. where was the point that we said we are going to do it the south korean way? well... it was an emerging _ do it the south korean way? well... it was an emerging thing. _ do it the south korean way? well... it was an emerging thing. so - do it the south korean way? well... it was an emerging thing. so overi it was an emerging thing. so over the week, after meltdown weekend

this week of the 16th, you had part of the system still operating and all the grass at the time which i can share with you, show the cabinet office system were showing graphs showing if we go to head immunity. in the same week you have me and others trying to bounce the system to lock everything down and hacking together what plan b would look like. but it was extremely disjointed and confused. there are techs for me to other people that says we need to have a plan for 100,000, 1 million tests. we did not have a plan for lockdown, so we were trying to get to lockdown and also get other people working on what with the south korean thing look like. then the prime minister goes down and nearly dies. so it was really only when i come back in the second half of april, i talk to the cabinet secretary, both of them are

tearing their hair out about the situation about the hundred k target completely correctly. saying we need to do something about this and we need to get a grip on hancock. it was only when the prime minister came back and we sat down and said, we need to set up as separate agency. we have to reject the whole whitehall paraphernalia around this. and we have got to build a testing system but also the whole data system but also the whole data system and potentially a whole set of tools as well. so what i wanted to do was essentially the same as what had happened in south korea and taiwan where you start using back data, you use mobile phone data, of cell phone towers and that. it was notjust cell phone towers and that. it was not just the testing system cell phone towers and that. it was notjust the testing system we needed to build up, there was also the whole data architecture as well. and of course we had huge legal problems. because you had a whole

bunch of people coming back in the legal system sing, first of all, eu data lot and gdp are means all of the stuff is illegal. medium term. secondly, a whole bunch of things around human rights and right to privacy. we have got to build this testing, build this data. we have to think about all these complexities about the legal side. back at the end of february, i had got the cabinet office to call the ico and basically put out a notice thatjust said, if you are working on covid, assume what you are doing is legal in terms of gdp are. no one even knew if that was legal. we were otherwise faced with the fact that if someone somewhere in the system said ignore gdp are, no one could connect all these databases. all

these things were happening in parallel. they only got properly discussed in detail in may about what are the technical, operational, legal, everything else things you need. ., ~._ ,, legal, everything else things you need. ., ,, , ., need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set — need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set up. _ need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set up. can _ need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set up. can i _ need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set up. can i put _ need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set up. can i put it - need. the end of may, nhs test and trace was set up. can i put it to - trace was set up. can i put it to you that by that stage, our daily infections had got up to 2000 a day. by infections had got up to 2000 a day. by that stage at the end of may when it was set up. our daily infections i'm gone to 2000 a day. and actually that wasjust i'm gone to 2000 a day. and actually that was just too high to have an effective test and trace system. no one has test entry is going south korean style at that level of daily infection. so a lot of the problems we had and reasons why test and trace did not go towards preventing later lockdown is, we left it too later lockdown is, we left it too late and there were literally too many people to track down and asked to isolate. l

many people to track down and asked to isolate. ~ many people to track down and asked to isolate. ,, , ., ., ~ many people to track down and asked to isolate. ~' , ., ., ,, ., to isolate. i think you are kind of 9896 to isolate. i think you are kind of 98% correct- _ to isolate. i think you are kind of 98% correct. how _ to isolate. i think you are kind of 9896 correct. how effective - to isolate. i think you are kind of 9896 correct. how effective we i to isolate. i think you are kind of. 9896 correct. how effective we could 98% correct. how effective we could have made it and if you are exactly right in terms of the 2000 threshold and if we could have coped with that, is a complicated question. the conception and what you're saying is fundamentally correct, in that we left... it to too long to get set up. we were hugely distracted by the hancock pledge. fundamentally, they should have been happening from january. that is the central thing. the problem is that betweenjanuary and roughly mid march, everyone was thinking, given we are doing one single peak, herd immunity by september, there is no point building up this whole thing. apart from the second bit of the groupthink which was the country won't stand for it. my answer arguments, patrick barr balance and other said, arguments, patrick barr balance and othersaid, in arguments, patrick barr balance and other said, in the same way that everyone was wrong about the country

being in lockdown, everyone in whitehall is wrong arguing against track entries. people will accept this kind of infringement on civil liberties because what is the alternative? the only alternatives are you do herd immunity strategy at some point in 2020 with hundreds of thousands of people dead. you lock everybody down and bankrupt the country until you managed to get vaccines going. are you trying get some kind of test entry system going and enforce it and then potentially with local lockdown is as well. for all those people saying we cannot do it and it's too late and all that, my argument was what we are going to do? are we going to go back to planning. but do? are we going to go back to ”lannin. �* ,, planning. but you were the prime minister's adviser— planning. but you were the prime minister's adviser and _ planning. but you were the prime i minister's adviser and understanding youriu minister's adviser and understanding your ill for part of that period, do your ill for part of that period, do you blame yourself for the fact it took another two months after that

incredibly challenging march weekend to get sage to model test and trace and get it set up? i to get sage to model test and trace and get it set up?— and get it set up? i blame myself for many. — and get it set up? i blame myself for many. many _ and get it set up? i blame myself for many, many things _ and get it set up? i blame myself for many, many things in - and get it set up? i blame myself for many, many things in this - and get it set up? i blame myself. for many, many things in this crisis but one thing i can say completely honestly is, on this, i said repeatedly, from february, march, if you don't fire the secretary of state and we don't get the testing into someone else's hands, we are going to kill people and it will be a catastrophe. i wasn't the only one town the prime minister that. i made lots of mistakes but i honestly don't think i could have been any more explicit with anybody at this time about this and actually went with a cabinet secretary to the prime minister directly and said... the cabinet secretary said to the prime minister, because remember, in april, we had this terrible pledge which was distorting the whole system, we also had this constant

repeated line about ppe. the cabinet secretary said to the prime minister and almost the first meeting when he came back, prime minister, the british system is not set up to deal with the secretary of state repeatedly lies in meetings. we can't operate like that. you have made that _ can't operate like that. you have made that point... _ can't operate like that. you have made that point... my _ can't operate like that. you have made that point... my point - can't operate like that. you have made that point... my point is, l can't operate like that. you have i made that point... my point is, we couldn't get _ made that point... my point is, we couldn't get to _ made that point... my point is, we couldn't get to grips _ made that point... my point is, we couldn't get to grips with - made that point... my point is, we couldn't get to grips with the - made that point... my point is, we couldn't get to grips with the test. couldn't get to grips with the test and trace until we got it out of dh's hands into a separate agency. those are very serious allegations, set under parliamentary privilege, and we have mr hankel coming here in two weeks' time to respond to those, but as greg clark said, we were grateful for early evidence you have to back up those assertions before mr hancock comes to this committee. one more question on test and trace and then i will go to my colleague dawn butler. one of the issues were test and trace, on the longer time horizon, is the fact that such a low proportion of people who are asked

to isolate by the system actually isolated. what is your analysis of the main reason why it is that, according to dido harding, when she was in front of the health and social care select committee, it was between 20%—a0% at one point where people who weren't isolating to spike they had been there someone had covid. what you think the flaw in the system is that meant that happened? l in the system is that meant that happened?— in the system is that meant that ha ened? ,, ., , .,, .,, happened? i think a huge problem was that... it is happened? i think a huge problem was that--- it isa— happened? i think a huge problem was that... it is a slightly _ happened? i think a huge problem was that... it is a slightly complicated - that... it is a slightly complicated thing to explain. i think that one of the problems we had from the beginning that was critical at this time, and actually still is critical, is that we, senior people,

did not understand well enough to be a problem of asymptomatic transmission and it being airborne, this combination. that is why the masks were all wrong as well. one of the fundamental reasons why people were not isolating is, we, the government, failed terribly to explain to people that a lot of people are being infected asymptomatically and also it's airborne and even now, even today, the government communications are still over stressing wash your hands and under stressing airborne. and thatis and under stressing airborne. and that is a big problem. lots of people were not isolating because they didn't understand this basic point. it wasn't their fault, they didn't understand this basic point. it wasn't theirfault, it they didn't understand this basic point. it wasn't their fault, it was ourfailure to explain point. it wasn't their fault, it was our failure to explain to people. we never our failure to explain to people. , never made a straightforward promise that any salary you lose from not being able to go to work because you are being asked to isolate, we will make up.

are being asked to isolate, we will make u -. . are being asked to isolate, we will make u. . .,, are being asked to isolate, we will make u . _ ., ., , , are being asked to isolate, we will make u. ., i, are being asked to isolate, we will makeu. ., i, make up. that was my second point, correct. make up. that was my second point, correct- ltoth — make up. that was my second point, correct. both sides, _ make up. that was my second point, correct. both sides, we _ make up. that was my second point, correct. both sides, we didn't - correct. both sides, we didn't explain the danger properly and we didn't provide the incentive properly. this was discussed at the time. i had meetings where i got people to print out the documents from south korea and places that said, here's south korea's system. it is a combination of stick and carrot, it's much stricter in terms of legal things, you could be put in jail if you break the quarantine, but also provide food to your door, we will pay you so you're not financially disadvantaged, etc. lots of things, essentially, if we had just cut and pasted what was being donein just cut and pasted what was being done in singapore or taiwan and said that was our policy, everything would have been better, there is no doubt about that.— would have been better, there is no i doubt about that._ thank doubt about that. dawn butler? thank ou ve doubt about that. dawn butler? thank you very much- _

doubt about that. dawn butler? thank you very much. thank— doubt about that. dawn butler? thank you very much. thank you, _ doubt about that. dawn butler? thank you very much. thank you, mr- you very much. thank you, mr cummings, _ you very much. thank you, mr cummings, for coming into the committee today. a lot of things you're _ committee today. a lot of things you're saying, actually, from the evidence — you're saying, actually, from the evidence taken from the science and technology— evidence taken from the science and technology committee is now making sense _ technology committee is now making sense why _ technology committee is now making sense why it was done. after the election. — sense why it was done. after the election. it— sense why it was done. after the election, it seems yourjob went through— election, it seems yourjob went through the roof, the amount of work you had _ through the roof, the amount of work you had to _ through the roof, the amount of work you had to do, did you have time to prepare _ you had to do, did you have time to prepare for— you had to do, did you have time to prepare for that or did you just jump— prepare for that or did you just jump straight in? in prepare for that or did you 'ust jump straight mi jump straight in? in terms of january? _ jump straight in? in terms of january? no. _ jump straight in? in terms of january? no, after— jump straight in? in terms of january? no, after the - jump straight in? in terms of i january? no, after the election. jump straight in? in terms of - january? no, after the election. i basically don't — january? no, after the election. i basically don't have _ january? no, after the election. i basically don't have a _ january? no, after the election. i basically don't have a day - january? no, after the election. i basically don't have a day of- basically don't have a day of between december and the day i left downing street. you between december and the day i left downing street.— downing street. you are talking about data _ downing street. you are talking about data and _ downing street. you are talking about data and gdpr _ downing street. you are talking about data and gdpr and - downing street. you are talking about data and gdpr and track| downing street. you are talking i about data and gdpr and track and trace _ about data and gdpr and track and trace. faculty ai, who you know very

well, _ trace. faculty ai, who you know very well, and _ trace. faculty ai, who you know very well, and palin tear, the data harvesting company, was at your brainchild — harvesting company, was at your brainchild to get them working on the nhs? — brainchild to get them working on the nhs? the brainchild to get them working on the nhs? ,, , .,. , i the nhs? the nhs hireds faculty, i'm not sure the nhs? the nhs hireds faculty, i'm rrot sure when. _ the nhs? the nhs hireds faculty, i'm not sure when, sometime _ the nhs? the nhs hireds faculty, i'm not sure when, sometime in - the nhs? the nhs hireds faculty, i'm not sure when, sometime in 2019, i the nhs? the nhs hireds faculty, i'm| not sure when, sometime in 2019, i'm fairly sure it was before the election that simon stevens hired them. but that wasn't to do with core nhs data stuff, that was to do with very specific building an ai lab for the future. it was about how can we use data science and ai techniques over the next few years on genomic data and all kinds of nhs data. it was a complete fluke, just good luck, they were already working in the nhs, with nhs x, the particular division of nhs. so when we started to hit the crisis on

covid, simon stevens spoke to mark warner and said, ditch the long ai staff, can you help us with immediate data problems? so mark brought his team in and that is what brought his team in and that is what brought a fortuitous chain of circumstances which is then he started telling me on the 5th of march, i'm in these meetings about the plan, this plan seems insane, is this right? so we kind of got lucky. palin —— palantir got brought in because mark warner referred to earlier this outstanding official who worked within the nhs, they were looking through all the things we needed to do and they agreed, i can't remember now, but it was microsoft will do this part of it,

palantir will this part of it, faculty will do some of the very sophisticated ai stuff. they worked with a team of people to combine the best of the official system was getting help. because some of these companies had stuff you canjust getting help. because some of these companies had stuff you can just use off the shelf. by the 5th of march, we didn't have time to go around building a whole lot of things from scratch, so what they did was go round the different tech companies and asked if we could pinch that from you, that from you, that from you, and then hack it together in the nhs. d0 you, and then hack it together in the nhs. _, ., ., , you, and then hack it together in thenhs. ., ., . , the nhs. do you have any concerns around faculty _ the nhs. do you have any concerns around faculty ai _ the nhs. do you have any concerns around faculty ai and _ the nhs. do you have any concerns around faculty ai and palantir- the nhs. do you have any concerns around faculty ai and palantir at i around faculty aland palantir at all? around faculty ai and palantir at all? l _ around faculty ai and palantir at all? ., �* ~ ., around faculty ai and palantir at all? ., �* ~' ., , around faculty ai and palantir at all? ,, ., , . around faculty ai and palantir at all? ., �* 4' ., , . all? i don't know very much about palantir. all? i don't know very much about palantir- l— all? i don't know very much about palantir. i know _ all? i don't know very much about palantir. i know that _ all? i don't know very much about palantir. i know that mark - all? i don't know very much about palantir. i know that mark warneri all? i don't know very much about i palantir. i know that mark warner is one of the smartest and most ethical people that i've ever met in my

life. without him, thousands of people were to be dead. know his informant and it has come at a great personal cost for himself and his company. doubled as his involvement. he and his company have suffered in various ways of having got involved with the government and having helped. in with the government and having heled. . ., with the government and having heled. ., j with the government and having heled. ., well, helped. in what way, exactly? well, 'ust hue helped. in what way, exactly? well, just huge conspiracy _ helped. in what way, exactly? well, just huge conspiracy theories - just huge conspiracy theories everywhere, all kinds of claims about, he was getting blamed for the app, which they had absolutely nothing to do with. it all became part of this conspiracy of cummings, facebook, the referendum, data,... you mean they got them for the app that got— you mean they got them for the app that got scrapped?— that got scrapped? exactly. reputational _ that got scrapped? exactly. reputational damage i that got scrapped? exactly. reputational damage that l that got scrapped? exactly. i reputational damage that had that got scrapped? exactly. _ reputational damage that had nothing to do with them. itrtuiith

reputational damage that had nothing to do with them.— to do with them. with the app that not to do with them. with the app that got scrapped. _ to do with them. with the app that got scrapped, there _ to do with them. with the app that got scrapped, there was _ to do with them. with the app that| got scrapped, there was something to do with them. with the app that i got scrapped, there was something in there that _ got scrapped, there was something in there that said people's data would be kept _ there that said people's data would be kept for 20 years. was it because of that— be kept for 20 years. was it because of that why— be kept for 20 years. was it because of that why they were being blamed? because _ of that why they were being blamed? because theirjob is data secrecy, so that— because theirjob is data secrecy, so that would help them, having data in 20 years _ so that would help them, having data in 20 years -- — so that would help them, having data in 20 years —— theirjob is gene seguencing _ in 20 years -- their 'ob is gene sequencineh in 20 years -- their 'ob is gene seaauencin. ., ., , �* ., sequencing. no, it doesn't do gene sequencing — sequencing. no, it doesn't do gene sequencing and _ sequencing. no, it doesn't do gene sequencing and also _ sequencing. no, it doesn't do gene sequencing and also had _ sequencing. no, it doesn't do gene sequencing and also had zero i sequencing and also had zero involvement with the app. white exec of the first app fails, understands it failed because fundamentally that apple and google insisted on certain kinds of control and how that data would be used. igate kinds of control and how that data would be used.— would be used. we know before it started at things _ would be used. we know before it started at things like _ would be used. we know before it started at things like the - would be used. we know before it started at things like the plutus i started at things like the plutus wasn't — started at things like the plutus wasn't going to work... job in a with— wasn't going to work... job in a with respect, it was very complicated, there are all sorts of complicated, there are all sorts of complicated discussions about what technically was possible... there

was only one _ technically was possible. .. there was only one other— technically was possible... there was only one other country i technically was possible... there was only one other country that l technically was possible... there i was only one other country that was trying to use the same technology using bluetooth, butl trying to use the same technology using bluetooth, but i don't want to get into that. can i get into what amnesty said. — get into that. can i get into what amnesty said, days _ get into that. can i get into what amnesty said, days have - get into that. can i get into what amnesty said, days have said that palantir— amnesty said, days have said that palantir is — amnesty said, days have said that palantir is a — amnesty said, days have said that palantir is a data mining company and over— palantir is a data mining company and over the course of the pandemic, the uk _ and over the course of the pandemic, the uk government has quietly granted — the uk government has quietly granted access to uk health records to various _ granted access to uk health records to various companies to build a covid-19 — to various companies to build a covid—19 database. so amnesty has expressed _ covid—19 database. so amnesty has expressed concerns about who has the data on _ expressed concerns about who has the data on what they will do with it, and they— data on what they will do with it, and they stress that the public needs— and they stress that the public needs transparency. do you agree with amnesty? | needs transparency. do you agree with amnesty?— needs transparency. do you agree with amnesty? needs transparency. do you agree with amnes ? , , ., with amnesty? i completely agree the ublic needs with amnesty? i completely agree the public needs transparency _ with amnesty? i completely agree the public needs transparency but - with amnesty? i completely agree the public needs transparency but from i public needs transparency but from what you've it out, i think there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what amnesty are saying. i'd be gobsmacked if non—anonymized data, patient data, is being shared with companies like that. i will spend a

lot of money that that's not the case. that data is anonymized. when ou sin case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up. — case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up. so _ case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up. so i— case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up, so i went _ case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up, so i went to _ case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up, so i went to order i case. that data is anonymized. when you sign up, so i went to order now lateral— you sign up, so i went to order now lateral flow— you sign up, so i went to order now lateral flow test to my home and it said, _ lateral flow test to my home and it said. your— lateral flow test to my home and it said, your information may be used for different purposes that may not directly _ for different purposes that may not directly relate to health care and may not — directly relate to health care and may not be anonymized. and so it actually _ may not be anonymized. and so it actually says that when you sign up. in actually says that when you sign up. in the _ actually says that when you sign up. in the end. — actually says that when you sign up. in the end. i— actually says that when you sign up. in the end, i didn't sign up and i 'ust in the end, i didn't sign up and i iustwent— in the end, i didn't sign up and i just went and picked up... this is the nhs, — just went and picked up... this is the nhs, when you order, so, you say it is unlikely— the nhs, when you order, so, you say it is unlikely and it is companies would _ it is unlikely and it is companies would be — it is unlikely and it is companies would be given data that is not anonymized and i'm saying to you that actually, it is not that unlikely— that actually, it is not that unlikely because it actually says it in black— unlikely because it actually says it in black and white that your data may be — in black and white that your data may be given to companies and it may not be _ may be given to companies and it may not be anonymized. i�*m may be given to companies and it may not be anonymized.— not be anonymized. i'm not an expert in all of this. —

not be anonymized. i'm not an expert in all of this, exactly _ not be anonymized. i'm not an expert in all of this, exactly which _ in all of this, exactly which companies, i know it is incredibly complicated. what i am sure is that faculty does not have personalised data, they don't operate like that. any data they use is anonymized. personal data is not any gears to faculty. personal data is not any gears to facul . �* , ., , personal data is not any gears to facul . �* , ., faculty. but it is of use to palantir. _ faculty. but it is of use to palantir, they _ faculty. but it is of use to palantir, they are - faculty. but it is of use to palantir, they are more i faculty. but it is of use to i palantir, they are more artificial intelligence. my palantir, they are more artificial intelligence.— intelligence. my only real engagement _ intelligence. my only real engagement of _ intelligence. my only real engagement of the i intelligence. my only real. engagement of the palantir intelligence. my only real— engagement of the palantir question was, on the nhs beds, icu, capacity, ventilator, etc, all of which is obviously not patient data at all so there are no questions about personal records, that was my only engagements with the stuff, because i was involved with the dashboard. my i was involved with the dashboard. my engagement with the whole project was the data dashboard that palantir was the data dashboard that palantir was working with the nhs on for decision making. all of that was

nothing to do with personal medical records of any description. whether or not palantir is also working on the separate thing involving personal records, i've no idea, i'm afraid. did you have any more questions? yes _ did you have any more questions? yes can _ did you have any more questions? yes can you — did you have any more questions? yes. can you tell us a little about that _ yes. can you tell us a little about that who — yes. can you tell us a little about that. who attends, have you attended a nreeting. _ that. who attends, have you attended a meeting, who is on it? yes. that. who attends, have you attended a meeting, who is on it?— a meeting, who is on it? yes. it was created partly _ a meeting, who is on it? yes. it was created partly as _ a meeting, who is on it? yes. it was created partly as an _ a meeting, who is on it? yes. it was created partly as an attempt... i a meeting, who is on it? yes. it was created partly as an attempt... as i created partly as an attempt... as jeremy said, how do we make this transition from plan a to plan b? i begged part of it is test and trace. pag had just, the senior management, the whole thing had not worked is

putting it politely. everybody in april came to me, including the csa and cmo and said you cannot trust pag with what needs to be built. so the new... it was part of the whitehall rejigging of the system. we need to integrate all of this data. we had at this point i was getting the analytical built up and they were looking at all the different things across the world so there were things like sewage data. they had these different kinds of staff coming in. we need to have an entity to look at all those different staff.— entity to look at all those different staff. ., ., , different staff. can i ask who else was on it? _ different staff. can i ask who else was on it? in _ different staff. can i ask who else was on it? in what _ different staff. can i ask who else was on it? in what sense? - different staff. can i ask who else was on it? in what sense? who i different staff. can i ask who else i was on it? in what sense? who else attended _ was on it? in what sense? who else attended these meetings?— attended these meetings? senior officials and... _ attended these meetings? senior officials and... if _ attended these meetings? senior officials and... if you _ attended these meetings? senior officials and... if you mean - attended these meetings? senior officials and... if you mean if- officials and... if you mean if there were private companies

involved, no. there were private companies involved. no— there were private companies involved, no. ., , ., involved, no. the final question, i was confused _ involved, no. the final question, i was confused about _ involved, no. the final question, i was confused about amazon. i involved, no. the final question, i| was confused about amazon. what involved, no. the final question, i- was confused about amazon. what role has amazon _ was confused about amazon. what role has amazon played in all of this? all i has amazon played in all of this? all i can — has amazon played in all of this? all i can say about amazon is as amazon came to us in march and offered to help in various ways and said we have got huge distribution networks in various ways. if there are ways we can use that to help you then we will. i have got a vague idea that we did ask them for some help with something but i cannot remember any details.— help with something but i cannot remember any details. thank you very much. remember any details. thank you very much- thank— remember any details. thank you very much- thank you _ remember any details. thank you very much. thank you for _ remember any details. thank you very much. thank you for coming _ remember any details. thank you very much. thank you for coming this i much. thank you for coming this afternoon _ much. thank you for coming this afternoon dominic. _ much. thank you for coming this afternoon dominic. it _ much. thank you for coming this afternoon dominic. it has - much. thank you for coming this afternoon dominic. it has been l afternoon dominic. it has been fascinating _ afternoon dominic. it has been fascinating and _ afternoon dominic. it has been fascinating and incendiary - afternoon dominic. it has been i fascinating and incendiary session. you have _ fascinating and incendiary session. you have described _ fascinating and incendiary session. you have described the _ fascinating and incendiary session. you have described the secretary. fascinating and incendiary session. i you have described the secretary of state _ you have described the secretary of state as _ you have described the secretary of state as a _ you have described the secretary of state as a serial _ you have described the secretary of state as a serial liar, _ you have described the secretary of state as a serial liar, stupid, - state as a serial liar, stupid, criminal. _ state as a serial liar, stupid, criminal, disgraceful. - state as a serial liar, stupid, criminal, disgraceful. can. state as a serial liar, stupid, l criminal, disgraceful. can you state as a serial liar, stupid, - criminal, disgraceful. can you give us any— criminal, disgraceful. can you give

us any insight— criminal, disgraceful. can you give us any insight into— criminal, disgraceful. can you give us any insight into why _ criminal, disgraceful. can you give us any insight into why he - criminal, disgraceful. can you give us any insight into why he is - criminal, disgraceful. can you give us any insight into why he is still. us any insight into why he is still the secretary— us any insight into why he is still the secretary of _ us any insight into why he is still the secretary of state? - us any insight into why he is still the secretary of state? why- us any insight into why he is still the secretary of state? why the| the secretary of state? why the prime _ the secretary of state? why the prime minister— the secretary of state? why the prime minister did— the secretary of state? why the prime minister did not- the secretary of state? why the prime minister did not take i the secretary of state? why the| prime minister did not take your advice? — prime minister did not take your advice? he— prime minister did not take your advice? .., prime minister did not take your advice? . ., ., advice? he came close to removing him in april. _ advice? he came close to removing him in april, but... _ advice? he came close to removing him in april, but... just _ him in april, but... just fundamentally wouldn't do it. it wasn'tjust me saying this, lots of people said to him, the cabinet secretary said to him, pretty much every senior person around number ten said to him we cannot go into the autumn with the same system in place otherwise we will have another catastrophe on our hands. can place otherwise we will have another catastrophe on our hands.— catastrophe on our hands. can you uive us catastrophe on our hands. can you give us any — catastrophe on our hands. can you give us any reason _ catastrophe on our hands. can you give us any reason that _ catastrophe on our hands. can you give us any reason that the - catastrophe on our hands. can you give us any reason that the prime | give us any reason that the prime minister— give us any reason that the prime minister gave _ give us any reason that the prime minister gave for— give us any reason that the prime minister gave for keeping - give us any reason that the prime minister gave for keeping him i give us any reason that the prime minister gave for keeping him in. minister gave for keeping him in position? — minister gave for keeping him in osition? ., ., , ., .,

position? that would be speculation on my part- — position? that would be speculation on my part- there — position? that would be speculation on my part. there is _ position? that would be speculation on my part. there is certainly - position? that would be speculation on my part. there is certainly no i on my part. there is certainly no good reason for keeping him. i on my part. there is certainly no good reason for keeping him. i mean, this enquiry — good reason for keeping him. i mean, this enquiry by — good reason for keeping him. i mean, this enquiry by the — good reason for keeping him. i mean, this enquiry by the two _ good reason for keeping him. i mean, this enquiry by the two committees i this enquiry by the two committees and the _ this enquiry by the two committees and the major— this enquiry by the two committees and the major enquiry— this enquiry by the two committees and the major enquiry into- this enquiry by the two committees and the major enquiry into it - this enquiry by the two committees and the major enquiry into it next l and the major enquiry into it next year. _ and the major enquiry into it next year. are — and the major enquiry into it next year. are looking _ and the major enquiry into it next year, are looking into— and the major enquiry into it next year, are looking into the - and the major enquiry into it nextj year, are looking into the history. you are _ year, are looking into the history. you are seeing— year, are looking into the history. you are seeing this _ year, are looking into the history. you are seeing this on _ year, are looking into the history. you are seeing this on a - year, are looking into the history. you are seeing this on a day- year, are looking into the history. you are seeing this on a day by. year, are looking into the history. you are seeing this on a day by day basis _ you are seeing this on a day by day basis you — you are seeing this on a day by day basis. you were _ you are seeing this on a day by day basis. you were with _ you are seeing this on a day by day basis. you were with the _ you are seeing this on a day by day basis. you were with the secretaryl basis. you were with the secretary of state, _ basis. you were with the secretary of state, who _ basis. you were with the secretary of state, who has _ basis. you were with the secretary of state, who has an _ basis. you were with the secretary of state, who has an enormous . basis. you were with the secretary- of state, who has an enormous amount of state, who has an enormous amount of influence _ of state, who has an enormous amount of influence and — of state, who has an enormous amount of influence and messing _ of state, who has an enormous amount of influence and messing things - of state, who has an enormous amount of influence and messing things up. - of influence and messing things up. you have _ of influence and messing things up. you have been— of influence and messing things up. you have been very _ of influence and messing things up. you have been very open _ of influence and messing things up. you have been very open about - of influence and messing things up. you have been very open about it . of influence and messing things up. j you have been very open about it in the first— you have been very open about it in the first part — you have been very open about it in the first part. when— you have been very open about it in the first part. when it _ you have been very open about it in the first part. when it came - you have been very open about it in the first part. when it came to - you have been very open about it in the first part. when it came to the i the first part. when it came to the second _ the first part. when it came to the second lockdown, _ the first part. when it came to the second lockdown, the _ the first part. when it came to the second lockdown, the chair- the first part. when it came to the second lockdown, the chair will. the first part. when it came to the i second lockdown, the chair will come to that _ second lockdown, the chair will come to that later, — second lockdown, the chair will come to that later, but _ second lockdown, the chair will come to that later, but similar— second lockdown, the chair will come to that later, but similar mistakes . to that later, but similar mistakes seem _ to that later, but similar mistakes seem to _ to that later, but similar mistakes seem to have _ to that later, but similar mistakes seem to have been— to that later, but similar mistakes seem to have been made. - to that later, but similar mistakes seem to have been made. i- to that later, but similar mistakes seem to have been made. i knowl to that later, but similar mistakes - seem to have been made. i know from working _ seem to have been made. i know from working with _ seem to have been made. i know from working with you — seem to have been made. i know from working with you in _ seem to have been made. i know from working with you in a _ seem to have been made. i know from working with you in a different - working with you in a different context — working with you in a different context that _ working with you in a different context that you _ working with you in a different context that you are _ working with you in a different context that you are a - working with you in a different context that you are a man - working with you in a different context that you are a man ofi context that you are a man of

principle _ context that you are a man of principle. could _ context that you are a man of principle. could you - context that you are a man of principle. could you not - context that you are a man of principle. could you not have| principle. could you not have changed _ principle. could you not have changed things _ principle. could you not have changed things by— principle. could you not have changed things by either- principle. could you not have - changed things by either threatening are actually— changed things by either threatening are actually resigning _ changed things by either threatening are actually resigning in— changed things by either threatening are actually resigning in order- changed things by either threatening are actually resigning in order to- are actually resigning in order to stop some — are actually resigning in order to stop some of— are actually resigning in order to stop some of this _ are actually resigning in order to stop some of this bad _ are actually resigning in order to stop some of this bad practice? i are actually resigning in order to- stop some of this bad practice? yes, i could have — stop some of this bad practice? yes, i could have done. _ stop some of this bad practice? yes, i could have done. and _ stop some of this bad practice? yes, i could have done. and i _ stop some of this bad practice? i could have done. and i thought about it. i thought about it in march. if the prime minister had not, if we had not bounced thing successfully in the weekend of 16th of march, i spoke to various people about resigning. the government will kill hundreds of thousands of people. we bounce things through so i didn't do it. i had similar conversations with people in september, which i think we will come until later on. and i did say to... i had a conversation with the prime minister. as had been reported, the day that the prime minister became the prime minister, i was supposed to have an operation that i delayed it. at the end of

july, i went to see him. the night before my operation. i said i am going for this operation tomorrow. and i am reflecting on things. you need to know i am going to leave out the latest by friday the 18th of december. i think it is best if you are i part ways. and he said why? and i said because this whole system is chaos, this building is chaos. you know perfectly well that from having worked with me, that i can get great teams together and manage them that you are more frightened of me of having the power to stop the chaos than the chaos and this is an unsustainable position for asbos to be and i am not to work with people like hancock any more. i have told you umpteen times you to remove them, it is something you have not done. it will be a disaster in the autumn. and the prime minister says which says a lot, he laughed, i am

more frightened of you of having the power than the chaos. i think that was a fundamental problem in a relationship. and it was a fundamental problem in how number ten was governed and it was one of the reasons why i said injuly that i was going to leave. in all sorts away i probably should have left then in the summer. the only reason why i didn't was because people said to me, we are going to have another disaster in the autumn and you should stay because maybe you can persuade the prime minister of what to do and maybe he'll listen to you. back from a personal point of view it would have been far better for me to go then. it would have been better for the country as well. flan better for the country as well. can i 'ust better for the country as well. can liust move _ better for the country as well. can liust move on _ better for the country as well. can ijust move on to _ better for the country as well. can ijust move on to test you have explained _ ijust move on to test you have explained that— ijust move on to test you have explained that alex _ ijust move on to test you have explained that alex cooper- ijust move on to test you have| explained that alex cooper was brought— explained that alex cooper was brought in— explained that alex cooper was brought in and _ explained that alex cooper was brought in and you _ explained that alex cooper was brought in and you had - explained that alex cooper was brought in and you had to-

explained that alex cooper was brought in and you had to get. explained that alex cooper was| brought in and you had to get it explained that alex cooper was - brought in and you had to get it out of the _ brought in and you had to get it out of the clutches _ brought in and you had to get it out of the clutches of _ brought in and you had to get it out of the clutches of the _ brought in and you had to get it out of the clutches of the department l brought in and you had to get it outi of the clutches of the department of health _ of the clutches of the department of health to— of the clutches of the department of health to set — of the clutches of the department of health to setup _ of the clutches of the department of health to set up a _ of the clutches of the department of health to set up a south _ of the clutches of the department of health to set up a south korean - health to set up a south korean system — health to set up a south korean system the _ health to set up a south korean system. the south— health to set up a south korean system. the south korean - health to set up a south korean i system. the south korean system, health to set up a south korean - system. the south korean system, i cannot _ system. the south korean system, i cannot remember— system. the south korean system, i cannot remember the _ system. the south korean system, i cannot remember the figure - system. the south korean system, i cannot remember the figure of- system. the south korean system, i cannot remember the figure of the l cannot remember the figure of the top of— cannot remember the figure of the top of nry— cannot remember the figure of the top of my head. _ cannot remember the figure of the top of my head, but _ cannot remember the figure of the top of my head, but it _ cannot remember the figure of the top of my head, but it was - cannot remember the figure of the top of my head, but it was pretty i top of my head, but it was pretty decentralised. _ top of my head, but it was pretty decentralised. probably- top of my head, but it was pretty decentralised. probably about. top of my head, but it was prettyj decentralised. probably about 155 laboratories — decentralised. probably about 155 laboratories set _ decentralised. probably about 155 laboratories set up. _ decentralised. probably about 155 laboratories set up. a _ decentralised. probably about 155 laboratories set up. a lot - decentralised. probably about 155 laboratories set up. a lot more i decentralised. probably about 155. laboratories set up. a lot more than were _ laboratories set up. a lot more than were set— laboratories set up. a lot more than were set up— laboratories set up. a lot more than were set up in— laboratories set up. a lot more than were set up in this _ laboratories set up. a lot more than were set up in this country. - laboratories set up. a lot more than were set up in this country. where i were set up in this country. where you are _ were set up in this country. where you are involved _ were set up in this country. where you are involved with _ were set up in this country. where you are involved with alex - were set up in this country. where you are involved with alex cooperl were set up in this country. where i you are involved with alex cooper in deciding _ you are involved with alex cooper in deciding it _ you are involved with alex cooper in deciding it would _ you are involved with alex cooper in deciding it would be _ you are involved with alex cooper in deciding it would be much _ you are involved with alex cooper in deciding it would be much more - deciding it would be much more centralised _ deciding it would be much more centralised than _ deciding it would be much more centralised than the _ deciding it would be much more centralised than the south - deciding it would be much more l centralised than the south korean system, _ centralised than the south korean systenr, or— centralised than the south korean system, orwas— centralised than the south korean system, or was that _ centralised than the south korean system, or was that his _ centralised than the south korean system, or was that his decision? j system, or was that his decision? why was— system, or was that his decision? why was the _ system, or was that his decision? why was the decision _ system, or was that his decision? why was the decision taken - system, or was that his decision? why was the decision taken to - why was the decision taken to centralise _ why was the decision taken to centralise it? _ why was the decision taken to centralise it?— why was the decision taken to centralise it? ., , ., centralise it? there two separate thins centralise it? there two separate things they _ centralise it? there two separate things they are. _ centralise it? there two separate things they are. there _ centralise it? there two separate things they are. there is - things they are. there is centralisation in the sense of labs but then there is centralisation in the sense of the actual contract, contact tracing. i don't know what

the logic is about... i do not know how the work in terms of centralising lab capability. it probably was the sensible thing to do in the short term. if you are going to ramp up this huge capability, what you do is you build a few really big labs that can kind of take the bulk of staff while simultaneously... what should have also happened in one huge problem we have all the way through was that we couldn't open up whitehall to see, here are contracts for all kinds of relatively smaller companies that can contribute. back in the days of february, march when pag was short of tests, we had companies banging on the door saying we can help. because of the whole procurement fiasco, we can quickly integrate them and bring them in. when you have got a national crisis like that, whatever should have happened,

the government says we are going to build a bunch of things, and smaller companies can come in. secondly your point about decentralisation on the tracing. my understanding is that you are correct, in places like south korea and taiwan, they have strong local forces that are on the ground. one of the problems with how things work here in the summer was we had a system that was built that in terms of the contact tracing was too centralised and too much of it was trying to be done from very big labs. i stress, was trying to be done from very big labs. istress, i was trying to be done from very big labs. i stress, i am was trying to be done from very big labs. istress, iam not was trying to be done from very big labs. i stress, i am not an expert on this and i did not go into a lot of details but i did hear that criticism from a lot of people at the time. alex cooper himself and the time. alex cooper himself and the people who got involved did an outstanding job within the remit that they had, but remember they were not senior officials in charge of it, they were taking orders. lstallion

of it, they were taking orders. when the national — of it, they were taking orders. when the national audit _ of it, they were taking orders. when the national audit office _ of it, they were taking orders. when the national audit office did a report— the national audit office did a report on— the national audit office did a report on test _ the national audit office did a report on test entries, - the national audit office did a report on test entries, they. the national audit office did a l report on test entries, they said the national audit office did a - report on test entries, they said it was a _ report on test entries, they said it was a very— report on test entries, they said it was a very marginal— report on test entries, they said it was a very marginal benefit. - report on test entries, they said it was a very marginal benefit. one i report on test entries, they said it i was a very marginal benefit. one of the reasons— was a very marginal benefit. one of the reasons was _ was a very marginal benefit. one of the reasons was that _ was a very marginal benefit. one of the reasons was that the _ the reasons was that the communication- the reasons was that the communication between| the reasons was that the . communication between the the reasons was that the _ communication between the central laboratories — communication between the central laboratories and _ communication between the central laboratories and the _ communication between the central laboratories and the local— communication between the central laboratories and the local public- laboratories and the local public health— laboratories and the local public health teams— laboratories and the local public health teams was _ laboratories and the local public health teams was either- laboratories and the local public health teams was either too - laboratories and the local public. health teams was either too slow laboratories and the local public- health teams was either too slow or nonexistent — health teams was either too slow or nonexistent. people _ health teams was either too slow or nonexistent. people in— health teams was either too slow or nonexistent. people in the - health teams was either too slow or nonexistent. people in the second i nonexistent. people in the second level— nonexistent. people in the second level of— nonexistent. people in the second level of testing _ nonexistent. people in the second level of testing weren't _ nonexistent. people in the second level of testing weren't being - level of testing weren't being given, — level of testing weren't being given, they— level of testing weren't being given, they were _ level of testing weren't being given, they were not - level of testing weren't being given, they were not passing| level of testing weren't being . given, they were not passing the infornration— given, they were not passing the information onto _ given, they were not passing the information onto local— given, they were not passing the information onto local people. ii information onto local people. i understand _ information onto local people. i understand what _ information onto local people. i understand what you're - information onto local people. i understand what you're saying. information onto local people. i- understand what you're saying about smaller _ understand what you're saying about smaller laboratories _ understand what you're saying about smaller laboratories and _ understand what you're saying about smaller laboratories and the - smaller laboratories and the contracts _ smaller laboratories and the contracts. but _ smaller laboratories and the contracts. but there - smaller laboratories and the contracts. but there were i smaller laboratories and the - contracts. but there were people like universal— contracts. but there were people like universal laboratories, - contracts. but there were people| like universal laboratories, public health— like universal laboratories, public health laboratories, _ like universal laboratories, public health laboratories, all— like universal laboratories, public health laboratories, all offering l like universal laboratories, publicl health laboratories, all offering to do it within — health laboratories, all offering to do it within the — health laboratories, all offering to do it within the remit. _ health laboratories, all offering to do it within the remit. do - health laboratories, all offering to do it within the remit. do you - do it within the remit. do you understand, _ do it within the remit. do you understand, can— do it within the remit. do you understand, can you - do it within the remit. do you understand, can you tell - do it within the remit. do you understand, can you tell us . do it within the remit. do you . understand, can you tell us why those _ understand, can you tell us why those were _ understand, can you tell us why those were turned _ understand, can you tell us why those were turned down - understand, can you tell us why those were turned down and - understand, can you tell us whyl those were turned down and why understand, can you tell us why- those were turned down and why the

system _ those were turned down and why the system between _ those were turned down and why the system between the _ those were turned down and why the system between the central- system between the central laboratories _ system between the central laboratories and _ system between the central laboratories and the - system between the central laboratories and the local. system between the central- laboratories and the local public health— laboratories and the local public health teams— laboratories and the local public health teams didn't _ laboratories and the local public health teams didn't work - laboratories and the local public health teams didn't work so - laboratories and the local public| health teams didn't work so that there _ health teams didn't work so that there was— health teams didn't work so that there was only _ health teams didn't work so that there was only marginal- health teams didn't work so that there was only marginal benefitl health teams didn't work so that - there was only marginal benefit from all that— there was only marginal benefit from all that expenditure? _ there was only marginal benefit from all that expenditure? it— there was only marginal benefit from all that expenditure?— all that expenditure? it was part of their general— all that expenditure? it was part of their general procurement - all that expenditure? it was part of their general procurement horror l all that expenditure? it was part of| their general procurement horror in dh that people like paul nurse. we had companies beating our doors down saying we cannot get people on the phone, we have these tests, we can get them verified it porton down. that was... that was certainly a huge problem. it also another hole part of this that hasn't been appreciated so far is that it turned out that actually there was a brilliant young woman whose name now escapes me, who basically approved in march that this technology because lamp could work for fast tests. there is also other work done in march showing that lateral flow tests would work. and various people

put together a plan for how to scale up put together a plan for how to scale up all of the staff in march. in retrospect, the whole of autumn could have been completely different if this had been observed properly by the system and testing. we could definitely, without any shadow of a doubt, we should have been able to have tests on the order of a million or 2 million or 5 million a day available by the first week of september. absolutely zero doubt about it. the problem was, the first i was made aware of this was just a couple of days before my operation, so roughly speaking july the 20th. a special adviser inside number ten and who i brought in who is a scientist, came to me and said i have been speaking to her whole bunch of scientists. they are basically being blocked by every part of the system on doing mass

testing. they haven't been able to get the money, they haven't get their manufacturing and distribution set up that this could be esh huge game changer while we wait for the vaccines. we at number ten got to grips with it. i organised a meeting with patrick vallance, oxford and they said straightaway, yes, we should be doing this. yes it could be a game changer. yes, we have dropped another massive ball by not working on this for the past three months. essentially, it should all happen from january. but once we made the decision in late march to go with plan b and c plan b involves testing and all these different things, testing. at that point we should have been putting money into this whole lateral flow and lamp stuff in march, april. if we had done than, then we would