and damage on the tenth day of the invasion of ukraine. the mayor of mariupol says his city is simply being destroyed. it is enduring shelling as kharkiv. the ukrainian president volodymyr zelenskyy has expressed anger that nato foreign ministers again ruled out imposing a no—fly zone over the country. he said the failure to act was giving a green light to russian bombings. nato�*s secretary general says that they had a responsibility to ensure the ukraine conflict does not spread to other countries. australia has offered a state funeral to the family of shane ward who died at the age of 52. adored by millions worldwide, he was considered to be the greatest spin bowler of all time.

now, on bbc news, an spun world. essential viewing. hello, and thank you for joining me for unspun world, the programme where we discuss the big questions with the bbc�*s unrivalled range of experts. this is the finnish capital, helsinki, a city with a particular history, caught between russia and the west. finland has experienced russian occupation and invasion, and it's seen plenty of east—west negotiations over the years. so in this programme, are there any stirrings of peace talks

over ukraine yet? what is the way of allowing there to be a cessation of hostilities in a way that gives putin a way out? what are russians being told about a war that their media won't even call a war? for the russian authorities, the media is a tool that they can use in order to control what people see. and what effect will the surprising western solidarity over ukraine have on china? whatever happens now, the west's action will serve notice to beijing. russia seems to be getting more and more indiscriminate in its bombings, and it's been accused of using some very nasty weapons indeed, from cluster bombs to thermobaric bombs. there's an urgent need for a peace initiative,

but that usually only starts to work when both sides start to realise they can't win. still, efforts are starting. i asked the bbc�*s diplomatic correspondent james landale about any early signs of peace talks. there are some discussions between ukraine and russia, we've seen those initial talks. there's not a great sense that these are going to produce any kind of results, simply because talks like that have to happen after some kind of stability has been reached on the battlefield, either one side has gained on the other, and we're simply not at that stage at the moment. what might be the sort of shape of a final disengagement, and agreements? i mean, there will be something at some stage, won't there? even if it's a year or ten years down the line? yes, but as you say, it might take a long time, and there are an awful lot of variables that could happen in the short term

that we simply don't know how it is going to pan out. how far does the russian invasion go? how much territory does it occupy? what happens to the current ukrainian government? does it involve death or does it involve exile? what, for zelensky. . . ? for zelensky and other leaders. we simply don't know what will happen in these circumstances. what happens to the ukrainian insurgency? on the evidence of the ukrainian resistance in early days, that would suggest that an insurgency would continue. what does the west do with that insurgency? does it fuel it with weapons and ammunition? if it does, how does it do that without escalating the situation? insurgencies can last years. i mean, i read some research recently which said on average an insurgency lasts between eight to ten years. like in iraq? like in iraq, like in afghanistan. these things take time, and i think that then we are in the situation, how long is the west prepared to isolate russia economically? how long is it willing to support that insurgency? and as we say,

we get to the endgame. what is the way, if there is a way, of potentially allowing there to be a cessation of hostilities, some kind of russian withdrawal, in a way that gives putin a way out, but in a way that does not compromise western principles, does not give away too much of ukraine's interest. has it been a failure of western diplomacy, or do you think actually with hindsight it was pretty much inevitable that he'd do it? i think, in my view, it was a failure of diplomacy, but one dating back to the fall of the soviet union. the fact that the west failed to go that extra step further to try and accommodate russia into the new european security architecture. is it possible that in past examples of russian aggression, such as in moldova, such as in georgia, such as in crimea, could the west have been more robust at that point? because we've reached the stage now where many people feel that

putin thinks that he can do what he wants, because the west will huff and puff, but won't blow his house down. in the short term, the one thing that i've been really surprised by and find very striking is the degree of diplomatic activity by the west and the unity within the west. particularly germany, of course. particularly germany. what a surprise that's been, i have to say. germany has transformed its post—war foreign policy in the blink of an eye. it is now promising to raise its defence spending, it is promising to allow weapons to go from germany to ukraine. all the things they've refused to do... which they've refused to do because of the war guilt and the whole structure that has been built into the political system. do you think it can be kind of limited to ukraine, or are you worried that it's going to get really bad and we can all start to suffer? i mean, i worry because the one thing i've learned in the last few days is that the world has changed. i need to change the way i've been thinking for years, and how i think, you know, the western european security order operates, because we are now

in a new phase, it's a new world, russia has done things that we previously thought were pretty unthinkable, so therefore, we should logically think he is prepared to go further. we're in a crisis here, there is escalation and there is miscalculation. you have nato building up its forces in the east at the moment, there are more nato jets in the air policing nato air space, but nato airspace is knocking up against russian airspace. as we know, the potential for error is significant. suppose finland and sweden joined nato, how would that change things? would that stir up putin even more? surely it will? yes, i think russia would view that as a hostile act, an aggressive act. they'd be very clear about that. certainly, the russian foreign ministry spokeswoman said there would be military and political consequences if that were to happen. so i think nato might think strategically in the long run it will be good to have these countries in their membership,

but at the height of a crisis like this, whether that is the right moment to do that, i think would give pause to thought. for years now, president putin has been squeezing russia's once lively and opinionated media to the point where independent voices have largely been silenced. so what are most russians hearing about the war that's being fought in their name? olga robinson from the bbc�*s russian monitoring department is herself half ukrainian and half russian. i think when it comes to russian disinformation, what you need to understand is that there's a whole industry of media narratives and media outlets that work essentially in unison. state—run? state—run, state operated, all pro—kremlin, privately owned, but still pro—kremlin in their output. for more than half

of the population, television is still the main source of news, and this is the core electorate for vladimir putin. apart from television, you've got pro—kremlin news websites, news agencies, you've got influencers on social media, media personalities that are incredibly popular, you would have a statement from let's say the russian defence ministry talking about atrocities in ukraine, and that would be picked up by a range of media outlets, creating the sense of wide support for the narrative. and it essentially creates almost like a parallel reality. at the moment, russian state tv is not even mentioning the word invasion or war. what they're talking about is a special military operation. and for the russian authorities, the media is a tool that they can use

in order to control or manage what people see, to a certain extent, what they think. so this is a typical example of what any russian viewer would see on their screens last weekend. so these are programmes that have been given lots of air time, they feature all sorts of experts, from russian mps to pundits, pro—kremlin pundits usually, with the occasion token liberal thrown in the next. —— thrown in the mix. so these programmes support these narratives, that the situation ukraine is so bad we really need to act, and act now. tell me about the type of propaganda coverage that there is? there's a whole host of daytime talk shows that are incredibly anti—western and anti—ukrainian in their nature. they're absolutely full of discussions of international politics, and these programmes

have been described by some analysts in russia as politics for housewives. what you are passively consuming is narratives that are in line with what you would normally hear on a current affairs programme, but it's presented in a more kind of friendly way. they have now replaced some entertainment programmes like the russian equivalent of dancing with the stars or who wants to be a millionaire, these were gone last weekend. well, if i may say so, you are, i think, half russian and half ukrainian. what are people like your parents, because there are so many mixed marriages,

it? there are possibilities, one is they have some agents inside the russian military or the kremlin and people have access to the plans, people, human agents, running by mi6 or the cia but the other option is if you like, the electronic signals world. so the west invest a huge amount in the big collection of democracies and gchq and american�*s nsa which suck up signals and intercept communications from russia as possible either to cyber espionage, hacking into the russian military�*s own internal systems or through intercepting the communications that got the plans as you say, the possibility exists that somebody in britain's entourage is working from the west. the russians will fear there is someone there is a spy hunt

within moscow. the fsp time russian security service, will be desperately trying to find out is there a mole at a high level or someone with the battle plans, other communications leaking and how does the west know about it and if it is a person they could be at great risk.— at great risk. does western intelligence _ at great risk. does western intelligence use _ at great risk. does western intelligence use kind - at great risk. does western intelligence use kind of - intelligence use kind of psychological profiling and so on? they must do to work out what is in britain's in mind. certainly, especially in a big organisation like the cia stop —— putin.. kind of psychologist to read the mind of their adverse area, to try to get insight into someone like vladimir putin which is high because this is a man who makes decisions himself. he because this is a man who makes decisions himself.— decisions himself. he has a small circle _ decisions himself. he has a small circle around - decisions himself. he has a small circle around him - decisions himself. he has a i small circle around him close advisers and in the last two years he has not wanted to meet people. he has stayed in his own bubble. even now, people are at the end of a desk far away from him when they meet. so to try and get his point is

hard. so to try and get his point is hard, ., so to try and get his point is hard. ., ,., ., ., .,, hard. so that isolation he has been through, _ hard. so that isolation he has been through, that _ hard. so that isolation he has been through, that might - been through, that might explain quite a lot about the anger that seems to be welling up anger that seems to be welling up in him against ukraine. he definitely has a sense from putin that anger at what he sees as russia's humiliation has been growing. that is what he came into powerfor at the turn of the millennium, as someone who was going to restore russia after a decade of humiliation, of being on the economic back foot politically and militarily, the language about russia being besieged and under attack, the sense in which he perhaps believes some of his own rhetoric, it is not just for public display. that will worry people because it suggests someone who is judgement may not be as rational as we think it is and there is an unpredictability to him. if he were to decide to

use nuclear weapons, he has reminded us heavy handedly, hasn't he, that he has them and they are on the table. how quickly would we know that? fix, quickly would we know that? huge intelligence and machine was built up in the cold water answer that question and so they would study, using satellite imagery and communication intercept, the behaviour of the russian military and, particularly, the bits that looked after nuclear weapons. bombers, submarines, the missile silos. what does normal look like, what does an exercise look like? and then they would look for the abnormal. a change in behaviour. those of the signals they will be looking for now to try and understand if this is just rhetoric or are they really moving to a higher state of alert or are they potentially moving towards a launch. but there is a slight sense of instability and fear about what could happen and would we really know when what

is what —— russian doctrine? with these tactical weapons, what would that so there is some uncertainty. fascinating times. fascinating, _ some uncertainty. fascinating times. fascinating, dark, - times. fascinating, dark, difficult. _ times. fascinating, dark, difficult, not _ times. fascinating, dark, difficult, not times - times. fascinating, dark, difficult, not times many| times. fascinating, dark, l difficult, not times many of times. fascinating, dark, - difficult, not times many of us expected, even those of us who have been pessimistic about russia — west relations in recent years. even with that i think the thought that we would be where we are now, i think, is a dark surprise. for be where we are now, i think, is a dark surprise.— is a dark surprise. for some ears is a dark surprise. for some years now — is a dark surprise. for some years now china _ is a dark surprise. for some years now china has - is a dark surprise. for some years now china has been i years now china has been russia's supporter on the international stage. although it has been noticeable since the invasion of ukraine that that support is a little bit less warm. and now, china is offering to help facilitate peace talks over the crisis. i asked howard jane, the head of the bbc�*s china service what this all meant. the bbc's china service what this all meant.— the bbc's china service what this all meant. the whole world is callin:

this all meant. the whole world is calling it _ this all meant. the whole world is calling it a — this all meant. the whole world is calling it a war— this all meant. the whole world is calling it a war except - is calling it a war except russia and china. china is calling it a situation. occasionally you see a mention of special operation but most people, if you check deeper on the social media sharing, more and more people are getting the sense of what is going on. about half of the netizens in china, in the social media scape, are singing whatever the government is telling them, saying this is all the us's doing by continuing to push the nato expansion. "now you have asked for it, finally we have got a decisive "leader who is going to push back." but at the same time also, even on the very restricted chinese social media space, you start to see people challenging this view. recently we had five professors, this is really rare now in china, with all the crackdowns, openly coming out calling for peace and denouncing the war, and also we have lots and lots of people online

praising the bravery of the ukrainians, but those posts may not stay too long. we thought that china, the china russia relationship was so strong that china was actually making it possible for putin to invade ukraine. is that strength of relationship still there, or is it fading? i think if you just look at the official media, the strength is still there. but deep down, i think even scholars, pro—government scholars, government scholars, are privately airing a lot more caution and saying, "ok, we really have to think "about our own interest and put things into long—term perspective. "if we really, really decide to go down along "with putin in this way, this road, in five, ten years, "do we want to face the same scenario as being isolated totally "from the world?"

and from some of the actions, from the un vote, china decided instead of supporting russia they abstained, and from other signs that apparently chinese state banks have not really opened up their call for extended loans to russia, as many expected, yet. but china did lift the ban on importing russian wheat. and energy, of course, china's buying lots of energy. so those things will offer russia money. of course, china has a kind of sort of mirror version of that in taiwan, doesn't it? and i remember seeing something on weibo, the chinese equivalent of, i don't know, twitter or whatever, somebody writing, "now would be a good time to go into taiwan." do you think that is what the leaders believe? we did see a lot of what they call the wolf warrior youth,

or some of the really hot—blooded nationalists online, even taunting taiwan, saying, you know, the ukrainians are demonstrating to you what's going to happen if you keep pushing for it. but now i think even the officials have come out on a couple of occasions saying, "please do not link the two, "they are not the same issue." the taiwanese presumably would resist with something of the ferocity of the ukrainians, and the west would take the same action, sort of action, against china that they are taking against russia? whatever happens now, the west's action will serve notice to beijing. they will have to recalibrate their future actions on whether to take military action, even though taking military action in the taiwan straits is a lot more difficult than russia taking action in the ukraine. for taiwan, you do have a strait, you do have the water

that, and taiwan is armed to the teeth with all the modern defences, so it's not as simple as the ukraine operation, of course. is it true to say that the chinese government doesn't like losers, and if it identifies putin as a loser, will move away from him? beijing and moscow see the west as an example of failure, but now if putin's adventure in ukraine turns out to be a majorfailure — if not, you know, a complete disaster — i think it will eventually make quite few people think again. north korea, under its eccentric leader, kimjong—un, has also been a supporter of russia, and has duly blamed the united states for forcing russia to invade ukraine. but even north korea has become a bit less strident now.

a few days ago, it fired what south korea thought was a ballistic missile into the sea nearby, but north korea said it was just launching a communication satellite. what is the north korean approach now? su min hwang, editor of the bbc korean service. we have seen missile launches and tests in the past. however, the timing of this and the frequency of this is very, very unusual. there are various reasons for this. one is to do with the us and joe biden's lack of appetite of engaging with north korea. as we've seen, we have seen a flurry of excitement a few years ago when donald trump was in power, and they even met a few times. however, joe biden has called kim jong—un a tyrant, and he has imposed his very first sanction in north korea this january. so what north korea wants to do is to get attention from the us and create a sense of crisis

so that north korea can resume the talks with the us. because things are going really badly? things are very bad. covid has not helped at all. the north korea border has shut down very tightly and strictly in the last two years, and because the trade has been shut down, mainly with china, and due to the imposed sanctions, strict sanctions from the international world the economy has been going down and down and down. so this is essentially kimjong—unjumping up and down, shouting, saying, "take notice of me, i want to talk to you. "i'm going to make you talk to me." have i got that right? in a sense, yes. north korea is also showing a show of force here. yes, the economy's really bad. it's also showing to the world, despite those things that's going on locally, we still have these capabilities and we are seeing various range, long range, short range. they are getting faster. some of them can evade detection, the radar detection. so it is saying to the world

that "we are improving and you've got "to take notice of us." this also sends a very powerful message to their own people in north korea. it unifies people against the common enemies — normally, the south korea and the us. it also distracts people from the economic difficulties. what do you think about the relationship between kimjong—un and china? we have been seeing some very interesting, subtle changes in their relationship. china still continues to be their biggest ally, economically and politically, and recently we have been seeing signs of north korea opening up their borders and opening up imports from china. however, in the last few years, there has been some rhetoric and nuances from china condemning north korea's continued missile launches. do you get the feeling that

he's walking a tightrope, that everything could start collapsing in north korea and he would collapse with it? or do you think he's there like his father, like his grandfather, into the long, distant future? when you see all these missiles being launched from north korea so frequently, it might seem as if it's a very rogue nation just throwing its toys out of the pram or throwing a tantrum. however, when you really look into that tone, what they say and what they don't say, you can really see a lot of calculations being put behind this. what kim is doing here is that, yes, they are testing missiles, but actually they're toning back on that really super duper ultra aggressive message to the world. su min hwang, editor, the bbc�*s korean service. here in the centre of helsinki is the idiosyncratic monument to the winter war of 1939 to a0

when the russians invaded finland full of confidence and got a bloody nose. sound familiar? the fighting ground on until peace talks came up with a solution. russia kept some finnish territory, but finland maintained its independence. might there be parallels with ukraine? it's certainly worth bearing in mind. thank you forjoining me for unspun world. until the next time, goodbye. hello again. a really slow—moving weather front has taken the last three days to reach eastern areas of england. and that's where it is at

the moment, this stripe of rain you can see here affecting east anglia and south—east england. none of the rain heavy, light and drizzly stuff really, a bit misty as well. whereas we've got clearer skies in the north—west. that's allowing a widespread frost with temperatures down to about “4 or —5 in the highlands, likely the cold spot as we head into saturday morning. now, we'll still have this zone of cloud and patchy outbreaks of rain and drizzle. the front actually starts moving back westwards, so we'll see the cloud building again across the midlands and central, southern england, maybe with an odd spot of rain through the afternoon. the north and west, though, staying dry with some sunshine. top temperatures for most between 8—10 degrees. now, the dregs of that front still bring a little bit of patchy rain initially across the south—west of england. and with this cloud flowing from the north sea, we could still see an occasional patch of rain elsewhere, mainly across the south of england. but otherwise, some sunny spells, but feeling chilly in a strengthening cold wind.

welcome to bbc news. i'm james reynolds. our top stories: in ukraine's second—biggest city, residential buildings are reduced to rubble and families are hiding underground. we have a special report from inside kharkiv. this is so far from normal. this is so farfrom normal. it is hard to describe. these people have no idea what they are going to do next. ukraine's president criticises the west for ruling out. a no—fly zone over his country. translation: they want to continue knowing that new strikes and casualties are inevitable. nato deliberately decided not to close the sky over ukraine.