russian forces have continued their offensive in ukraine with heavy bombardment reported north—west of the capital. our correspondence as a steady stream of people has been seen in the area on foot, taking only what everyone can carry with them to try to find safety. the israeli prime minister has met president putin in moscow to discuss the war with ukraine. the two spoke for three hours. they also discussed the situation in syria and the iranian nuclear deal. he is now heading to germany. the payment giants visa and mastercard are suspending their services in russia. mastercard said it would no longer support cards issued by russia. mastercard is issued by russia. mastercard is issued outside the country will not work at russian merchants are atms. russia says —— but visa says seesaw transactions in russia in the coming days.

hello, and welcome to the programme which brings together some of the bbc�*s most experienced correspondent clinic with international journalists to write, blog and broadcast to audiences back home from the dateline london. this week, what happens when one of the world's founding nuclear—weapons nations goes aerobics? can a strategic deterrent become a tactical weapon for the battlefield? and is war europe's future, no longerjust its past? today's dateline panel. john simpson, the bbc�*s world affairs editor, is in finland. jeffrey coffman has anchored news programmes in the us and canada, reported from war zones. in the studio with me is thomas kielinger, who's been explaining the british to german audiences since the 1960s, a time

when both europe and his own country were divided. welcome to all of you, it's good to have you with us today. i wanted to start, if i may, with you, geoffrey. what lessons do you think president putin has drawn from his previous military ventures which are informing this invasion in ukraine? i think that the lessons, they may not be putin's. they may be ours. and they are cautionary lessons, that he will stop at nothing if he feels like it. this is a man who is devoid of a moral compass. he does not believe in the geneva convention, the rules of war, cluster bombs are fine with him. just look at aleppo, look at chechnya. he left craters in the earth where those cities stood. and we don't know whether he's going to do that in ukraine, but we do know that he has the willpower, he has

the drive, and if he's angry enough he could well do that. that is really what is terrifying. he could not only drive the people out of ukraine, destroy a productive european country in the process, but he could leave nothing left in large areas. and that's just a devastating prospect. we're seeing that, we're seeing it in some cities, we're not seeing it across the country, in large part, certainly not in the capital, kyiv. but it's early days. we will have to see where this goes. we are barely two weeks into this conflict. john, what impact is all of this having on russia's immediate neighbours, who presumably had made certain assumptions about the way russia would conduct itself,

for all the grumbling and noises and the growls from moscow on occasions, that they could be reassured that certain rules would not be broken? absolutely. here in finland, for instance, people thought they had a really good relationship going with russia, a good trading relationships, a good political relationship, no real upsets or problems. then suddenly there starts to be talk that finland, like sweden, might feel happier being in nato. and immediately, russia threatens them with possible military consequences. ok, maybe they didn't mean they were going to bomb or invade, maybe they would just draw tanks up to the border, where i am now. but the fact is, it really worried people. and it had the precise reverse effect of what presumably president putin wanted. i mean, it has encouraged the finns to think about joining nato, and a majority of people here, according to the latest opinion poll, want to do that now. so it's an object lesson in how not to conduct relationships with your near— neighbours.

we had an incident on wednesday where the russian air force was in the airspace of the swedish island of gotland, the swedish flew up, and there was a bit of a confrontation, and it ended peacefully. but perhaps it was a sign that there were lots of ways of tweaking the tail, as it were, of your neighbours, without actually invading them or using aggression. perhaps the biggest change, though, has been in germany's approach. they have almost kind of abandoned decades of policy over this? it's an astonishing about turn. almost overnight, within days, virtually, we threw away all our sacred cows of political prudence and so forth. we stopped this nord stream 2 gas pipeline, first of all, which was to be our main source for our energy supply from russia, that's now gone. it cost tens of billions to build, it isn't going to happen, it isn't going to go into operation. we are sending military hardware, an unconscionable event in the olden days — only a few days before the conflict began, it was not thinkable that we would send stinger missiles and anti—tank

weapons to the fighters. we have now decided also to eventually upgrade our nato contribution to 2% of the budget every year, for which american presidents have fought for years and years, and for putin to convince pacifist germany to turn around, in one fell swoop. we also think again about nuclear energy. we want to completely phase out nuclear plants, that is now by a green minister, of all ministers in the cabinet, declaring, no, we will continue to use whatever nuclear plants we still have, for the interim period, until we found new energy supplies. and economically we are talking about letting germany go into bigger debt, which is another completely unbelievable procedure. this is a country that was to pay homage to balanced budgets and so forth, and now the finance minister comes and says, no, it's not a threat to our future, it's an investment in our future, if we accept debt. last but not least we join sanctions of the west, including swift sanctions, although there's a little exception for germany for payment for the gas and oil we import from russia. and so forth, and now the finance minister comes and says, no, it's not a threat to our future,

it's an investment in our future, if we accept debt. last but not least we join sanctions of the west, including swift sanctions, although there's a little exception for germany for payment for the gas and oil we import from russia. given you are so dependent, germany is so dependent, that makes it even more extraordinary they have been prepared to go this far. it is, absolutely. it's an unknown territory, it's terra incognita. yet the country which used to be so afraid of doing anything out of the ordinary has gone ahead with 30% or more of people following them. and it is an astonishing about turn. putin's actions, they ended in a totally counter—productive sort of fashion. he has achieved the opposite of what he wanted to achieve.

john, just picking up on that point. the accusation russia has made is that listening but not hearing was the way the west had dealt with russia over the last few years. and that that fed this resentment that may have contributed to this action. to some extent, do the russians have a point? well, i used to think they had a point, actually, after 1991, when marxism—leninism collapsed in russia, i did think in those days there was quite a lot of triumphalism on the western side, generally, but particularly on the american side, that clinton and other people seemed to want to show, to demonstrate to everybody that russia had been defeated, notjust simply had changed its ways. but now, listening to, looking at the kind of things that are being said in moscow, i'm not sure quite whether, really, the west's part in all this is terribly important. i think he has just got it into his head that nato is an aggressive state, an aggressive group, that america wants

to break up russia. no evidence for any of this. but that is what he seems to think. and basically he has this deep, deep resentment against ukraine for having once been part of the russian family, as it were, and now deciding to turn its back on russia and move away. and i think we are really seeing that, the punishment for that decision. putin has had weeks, months of isolation for covid. i think he has just been working away on all this,

and the few people that could have access to him have been encouraging him in that. and if i may add to that, when you think of that chilling speech he gave on television, putin, two days ago, when he said he was not being moved from his conviction that the two countries are siblings, as it were, one nation. and to think that when that is his awareness, that they belong together, to punish them in this atrocious fashion, it reminds me of a sort of mad reaction of somebody who is, by hook or by crook, determined to muster his power over his neighbouring countries. which, geoffrey, raises the question of what can be done about it, in a slightly longer—term perspective. i mean, the us permanent representative to nato was talking about changing its long—term force posture, or at least discussing that with the other nato members. that implies the alliance does not see this as a one—off, that this is ukraine and that's it. they worry about the implications for that whole border sector of countries immediately around russia,

and what lesson putin will learn, therefore what the west has to learn from that. i think it really picks up on the themes that john and thomas have talked about. this is the law of unintended consequences. just because you have an objective in war, doesn't mean you will actually achieve that objective, the way that you think. i think nato, it's extraordinary what has happened, notjust germany, but with global sanctions, look at nato. macron was dismissing it asjust on death's door, donald trump said it was

irrelevant, and now it has come back and found its original purpose, which is bringing western countries together to defend themselves against the threat of what was the soviet union and now russia. and the consensus is extraordinary. you are now seeing western european countries sending troops to the border of eastern european countries, jets to support the ukrainian army — not with western or european pilots, i should say — but that's the problem. nato can do a lot of defending and may well expand as a result of this, asjohn said, into sweden and finland, potentially even one day into ukraine, many years from now, once we figure out how this settles. of course the problem is they don't want to escalate this. they don't want to go to that next level and send european troops in to support this war. so the outcome, long—term... emotions are high, and of course people support nato, but longer term, will this last? it may well have some after—effects. but five or ten years from now, nato may well again be marginalised. but people may not forget this. this is a really traumatic moment.

you said emotions are high. i have spoken to people in the us who've said, actually, public opinion is not greatly moved by this at the moment. i wonder whether having seen american troops coming back from afghanistan only last summer, whether there really is any desire in america to see those troopss who've been sent over at the moment mobilised? i think that's fair. i don't think there is. i don't think that the trauma of those forever was, particularly afghanistan, is very fresh, and i think also, there is an american perception that this is a european war and it's a european problem, and europe is very well equipped to deal with it. america is not rushing

to fly across the ocean, to fly across western or eastern europe to support ukraine with bombers and troops. i think that is very fair to say. the difficulty then, if it is europe's problem, is, how does europe its determination? sanctions are one thing, they will go so far. but in the end, if an aggressor has won territory through his or her aggression, and other countries accept that as the new status quo, then actually they're not able to defend very much. well, at least, asjonathan has said, they are united in strength and the alliance as it is. that in itself is a huge plus, and european nations will contribute to the cost of nato and so forth... but if you have a system where it says an attack on one member is an attack on all members, there's mutual defence, that's great if you are in the club. but if you are outside the club, at a time like this, it's incredibly scary. and if you want stability on the continent, isn't that something you are going to have to address? you have to continue to set boundaries for russia and putin, to go across them and start a tripwire occasion, which might lead to something bigger. that, i have to say, you have to add to your military posture, an element of containment. you have got to make russia feel the price of her actions. so overtime, hope is coming to ameliorate it.

it is decades of containment. and george kennan predicted in 1947 that russia will eventually fall of its own weakness internally, cannot sustain its domination. so i think europeans are faced with needing to set boundaries for vladimir putin, increase sanctions or whatever, and a containment element, and hope that, eventually, no further encroachments by russia will occur. we hope for the best. we cannot be sure. but if we insist on setting the boundaries that are keeping it for russia, maybe we might deter putin from tearing further. john, i wonder what your thoughts are on that. i think actually the best hope is what he said is right, the whole sort of strong jar of putinist roster

as with stalinist russia and so on, will simply not be able to take the weight of the top man kind of desires and wishes. and it will come to a juddering halt. i can't see much hope beyond that because, actually, until about the last 10—12 years, until before the adventure in crimea in 2014, when russia simply walked in and took it over, with relatively little serious response from the west, personally i think that is what lies in the hinterland of this particular attack, until that kind of thing is seen to be a matter of the past instead of the present 41 as well as everything else, i think we have got problems.

geoffrey. i think there is also an equation internally in russia. one of the agendas in crossing the russian economy and these very harsh sanctions in bringing such hardship is it destabilises the equation that gave putin power. russians have lived that in the last 20 years and ever. they have material goods, they have been able to travel to the west and take vacations if they are middle—class, and they really have become a kind of quasi—european, the trade—off has been they do not get involved in putin's increasingly despite its radical politics.

you can live well if you let me govern the way i want. that is the trade—off. well, that is gone now, they are now plunging into hardship, they are rolling back to 1998, when the country was in a crisis, when life was very hard, and suddenly putin, that authority, that compact is gone. the hope may be that the people rose up against putin and he is overthrown orassassinated, something like that, think there is no evidence that they can happen, he has such fine control. i would say, one of the consequences of this that seems almost inevitable is he is not only in danger of destroying ukraine, but he may well be destroying his own country. russia is now such a pariah state. and just a moment happened to me today that i've found incredibly moving, eye bumped into a russian woman here in london who i know well and have worked with and just casually said how are you and she burst into tears and she said i feel so ashamed. they feel so guilty. i left russia because it was such a hard place to live, but this is something else, i don't know what to do. i think this is a feeling

that is increasingly shared by russians who are observers in their own country's maniacal mission here. and it is going to leave russia in a terrible, terrible spot, economically, politically, and marginalised. john, the thing that shocked many in the west was last weekend when it was indicated that president putin had given the order to put his nuclear forces on a higher level of alert, which reduces the timeframe for potential use of weapons. there have been suggestions in recent years that maybe the russian military�*s attitude to nuclear has changed, that they can see some limited circumstances where it could be a tactical advantage of deploying a weapon, knowing that the other side will not retaliate in that way and that that shifts from just being a deterrent, but the implications are really quite serious, aren't they? absolutely chilling.

and, i'm afraid, i think there is a really strong chance that if putin doesn't get his way quickly, and he's not getting it, clearly, that he may decide to use some sort of tactical nuclear weapon in order to terrify zelensky and the ukrainian government and make them simply surrender. and what the west does then, i think, is very, very worrying. there is only one trump card, china. the chinese must be really getting very worried indeed about putin. their whole policy is based on the growth of the international economic community. putin is doing everything to destroy that. is it maybe possible that china willjust step in and say, look, no more of this, sort it out?

i want to come back to you, geoffrey, on his nuclear question. michael mcfaul used to be ambassador to russia when it was negotiating the new treaty, said that although it is a possibility, he still thinks it is a low possibility of some kind of use of a nuclear weapon. nonetheless, it must worry the white house if this talk is even being considered in military circles in russia.

you know, the whole principle of russia, the soviet union, having nuclear arms and the us have a nuclear arms was this notion of mutually assured destruction. if you blow us up, we'll blow you up, we'll send them before yours land and we'll all be gone. that was kind of the tacit understanding of the cold war that led to thousands upon thousands of nuclear arms being aimed across the world at one another. and that is really what kept the peace. and that remains the case. in fact, this is really the first time in the post—cold war era where we have seen this kind of escalation. i think the biden white house is very clearly signalling we are not going to be drawn into this tit—for—tat, when putin escalated the level of alert on his nuclear forces, biden said we're not doing anything, maybe discreetly they are, but his point was let's not raise the temperature here. let's not aggravate what is already a very severe situation by threatening to throw nuclear weapons at each other. i thinkjohn is right. whatjohn says, i think, is kind of the worst nightmare

situation, if putin feels he has been defeated, which for him has the same meaning as humiliated, that is when he might feel the need to lash out and say damn to you, fly the nukes and so be it. putin clearly doesn't care, it's his own vanity that is driving this. it's his own hubris that is driving this. and some people think he may be mad, i think that may be too simple. he'sjust maniacal. thomas, you were born in 1940, and you were born in danzig, now gdansk, when world war ii began. and it had been a free city, international city, and suddenly that all came to an end, from your perspective, how does this moment feel? i must say, the destruction of danzig in 1945, i have always assumed was the result of hitler's wars in russia and the, well, he was the pariah of mankind, and innocence, although a terrible thing happened, it was not per se an atrocity because russia defended itself against an aggressor called germany and in the course of that destroyed all before it, including my hometown, the difference to the modern day is the ukraine people, and ukraine as a country, is a peace loving innocent neighbour who was being overruled by an aggressive sort of dictator like putin. so he commits atrocities on the level which crimes against humanity, which convulse mankind and therefore they hit me on a deeper level of insensitivity than even

the destruction of my own hometown. and i cannot sort of compare the two issues. i grieve for the ukrainians far more than ever before the loss of my hometown, because they are suffering. they told an atrocity and crime for which there's no way to explain it and i think it goes deeper nowadays than everything i've experienced when we became refugees and had to leave danzig under atrocious circumstances, of course. it's a bigger event at the moment only two things cannot compare because this is an innocent country which wanted nothing else but be a free and democratic neighbour, and for that it's

being punished in the most inhumane, atrocious manner. we must insist on making putin the pariah of the world, as hitler was in his day. that is the only way to remind russians and the rest of the world that there is a limit to what you can do, as a criminal determined on having it your way. you can't have it all your way. there is going to be a price to pay. in the degradation of russia is also a sad part of all of this. but it is putin first and foremost to has to be hit hard to remind him that nothing will go without punishment. in our last minute, geoffrey, what price do you think russia could pay for this? i think, as i said earlier, i think enormous. it is catastrophic for the average russian person who doesn't want this to happen. i think russia as a pariah state, russia cut off economically, the standard of living absolutely collapsing, the western europe, germany, in particular,

winning itself of russian oil and gas, as it has been worn for decades and years, i don't see russia recovering from this way very, very long time. it is a tragedy for russia, but i think back to what thomas says, this is provoked, unfortunately, by their leader and the real tragedy is what is happening in ukraine and that is, whatever, it has to be stopped and i fear it is going to get much more horrific before that happens. thank you all very much. more from dateline same time next weekend. goodbye.

hello — it is cold and frosty across the northern half of the uk where we have clearer skies and light winds. sunday morning starts off on that chilly note, but some sunshine on offer for most of the day. the lowest temperatures will be across rural scotland, perhaps as low as —8 during the early hours of sunday morning. further south we have more cloud across england and wales producing some spots of drizzle through the morning. cloud should tend to break up with more sunshine for many areas compared to what we saw on saturday. perhaps a bit more cloud for south—western england and into wales as well. further north, like winds and lots of sunshine on offer back towards southern england and wales, a breeze coming in from the north—east and that will take the edge off the temperatures. not particularly warm with high of between 7—9 celsius but with the light winds and the sunshine it should be a fairly pleasant day across the north. on sunday night and on into monday morning, cloud still towards the south and south—west, tending to fade so under those clearer skies with light winds, the frost will be even more

extensive as we head in to monday morning. that is not quite as low, those temperatures, but many of us seeing a touch of frost to start monday morning. monday, largely dry with spells of sunshine, always a bit more cloud across england and wales, just drifting northwards into northern ireland and southern scotland but it will be well broken, so some sunny spells but still chilly at around 7—9 celsius. looking further ahead, high pressure will ease towards the east overnight into tuesday, allowing that to work in from the rest and as it does, the breeze will be picking up on tuesday from a south—easterly direction and we are likely to see some showers arriving across south—west england and wales and northern ireland later in the day. warmer by this stage, around 7—11, the top temperature on tuesday. midweek and it looks as though low pressure will try to move in from the atlantic as high pressure slips away the east. that will mean a bit more cloud and rain at times but milder air working in, so a bit of a chilly start

to the new working week. it looks like things will turn a bit more unsettled, but also milder for midweek. goodbye for now.

welcome to bbc news — i'm james reynolds. our top stories. as more people flee the bombings and missile strikes a former ukrainian president tells the bbc his country is desperate. you see all these people are suffering from that and this is completely unacceptable and when we are asking the no—fly zone, this is exactly for these people. israel's prime minister meets with president putin in moscow to discuss the ongoing conflict. the economic fallout from the war continues — visa and mastercard announce they're disconnecting their services in russia. solidarity in the streets — and in the football stands — thousands continue to show support for the people of ukraine.