for an assault on the capital. russian troops advancing towards kyiv have been slowed down by attacks from ukrainian forces and hampered by serious logistical problems. civilians who've been trapped in besieged towns and cities have been scrambling for safety after a temporary ceasefire. america has banned imports of russian oil and gas. the uk government quickly followed suit, setting out a plan to phase out russian oil by year end. the eu said it would cut gas from russia by two thirds over the same period. poland says it's ready to put all of its russian—made mig—29 fighter jets at the disposal of the united states in an attempt to help ukraine fight russia's invasion. the us state department said it's surprised by poland's decision and a pentagon spokesman said the proposal was not tenable.

now on bbc news, hardtalk. welcome to hardtalk, i'm stephen sackur. vladimir putin's invasion of ukraine represents the most violent seismic shock to european security since the collapse of the soviet union. the us, nato allies, and the eu are now arming the ukrainian government. the return of hot war to europe seems destined to lead to a new long—term cold war. my guest is michael carpenter, us ambassador to the organization for security and cooperation in europe — an organisation which right now would seem to have failure written into its name. are we entering a new age of conflict?

michael carpenter in vienna, welcome to hardtalk. good to be with you. ambassador carpenter, you've spent many years of your professional life making it yourjob to study very closely vladimir putin and his intentions. when did you conclude that he was going to mount a full—on invasion of ukraine? well, stephen, we saw the indications of this already in the early fall, that the combat power that was being assembled on ukraine's borders was not just for show, but had all the enablers and all the other elements that would be necessary for a full—scale invasion. and we've been telling allies this for some time. a lot of them were incredulous.

unfortunately, i didn't want to believe myself, but we are where we are today with a full—scale russian invasion of ukraine. it's just tragic. if you felt that way and the administration felt that way, because i dare say you weren't the only adviser looking at this very closely, why did the administration not do more to try to pre—empt putin's invasion? look, we warned the world that this was coming. we also told the kremlin, in no uncertain terms, that there would be massive and unprecedented repercussions for a military escalation in ukraine of whatever variety, whether a full—scale invasion or something smaller. unfortunately, it looks like the kremlin didn't believe us or concluded that somehow, it could get away with this sort of a massive invasion of a peaceful neighbour. it's very unfortunate that deterrence didn't work, but here we are today and now

we have to impose massive consequences, notjust so that the pain is felt immediately in the kremlin right now, but also so that future kremlin leaders see that this operation was a failure, that it did not achieve what russia wanted to achieve, and in fact, that it left russia weaker as a result of this war than when it started. interesting that you say deterrence didn't work, and i guess we can conclude that many of the attitudes and indeed the institutions of diplomacy, as it was pre—ukraine invasion, are no longer useful. and i'm just thinking, as i look at you and i look at the board behind you, which has those initials, osce, you are the representative of the united states to the organization for security and cooperation in europe. that's redundant now, isn't it? well, we certainly have a lot less security and a lot less cooperation across

the european continent. but let's not forget that this organisation was born of a set of dialogues that took place in the early 1970s, when indeed there was very little security or cooperation in europe at the time. and so we managed to carve out a space to have dialogue with the soviets back then, in the 1970s, it led to the adoption of the helsinki final act, which is today regarded as a flagship — properly regarded as a flagship document that enshrines our common principles. but at the time, it was tough going. we're in a very difficult time now. it doesn't mean that this organisation is dead or that it doesn't serve a purpose, especially in the future. well, what service is it providing right now? you had the osce as an institution, had monitors in ukraine monitoring the front line of the eight—year—long conflict in the donbas region.

as soon as putin's invasion happened, all of those monitors were pulled out. the entire osce presence in ukraine was pulled out. i just wonder why that happened when, goodness knows, monitoring what is happening across front lines is so very important at this moment. well, stephen, the special monitoring mission was designed to be able to call out ceasefire violations and the deployment of prescribed heavy weapons, and if it was falling on the russian—controlled side of the line of contact, we wanted the world to know that it was russia that was responsible. and i think the osce monitoring mission — these are unarmed civilians, by the way — did a heroicjob of doing just that. they let the world know that this aggression, that this war was unprovoked. it came from russia, it came from across the border. the ukrainians were peacefully in the same force posture they had been in for years. and so, it actually served its purpose. now there's a hot war on the ground, and we're into a different phase of this conflict, and we need different tools and mechanisms

to try to resolve it. right, but my organisation, the bbc, still has courageous staff on the ground, very close to the front lines, monitoring and reporting on what is going on. and we value that. i'm just wondering, what is the point of the osce if you can't maintain some sort of presence providing independent monitoring and verification of what is happening during this war. i notice your government, the us government, is very keen to move ahead with a prosecution at the international criminal court of the russian government and vladimir putin, but how can you do that if there isn't independent, verifiable evidence? well, stephen, i think it's hardly necessary at this point to verify ceasefire violations. i mean, we're watching russia pummel ukraine with missile strikes, artillery, aircraft. there's no need at this point to call out a ceasefire violation across

the line of contact. the line of contact is a thing of the past. we're in a new reality. and so therefore, we have adapted the osce's mission in terms of what we're focusing on right now — as you rightly said, to document gross violations of human rights, to look at possible war crimes, possible crimes against humanity, and the osce has experience there, too. and so we have now deployed, or we will shortly deploy a set of monitors to look at precisely those sorts of egregious and gross violations of international humanitarian law. yeah, you've used very strong language — i mean, you personally — about what you've seen in the first days of this war. you've referred to "barbaric acts". you've referred to evil being done by russian forces on the ground. we're not yet two weeks in. that's the way you see what is unfolding on the ground. do you believe that your government, nato, and european allies are doing all

that they could do to try to stop this war? well, i think it's clear that we all need to do more. however, that said, this is a very complex security environment in which we are trying to deter and defend nato space, which we have an obligation to do, and president biden has clearly said that the article five commitment to the defence of nato is ironclad, we'll defend every single inch of nato territory. now, ukraine is not a nato member, and we are very cognisant of the escalation risks, given that russia is a nuclear power, in fact, has the most nuclear weapons of any country on earth. yeah, i understand that, but you have said things which suggest — and maybe i'm misreading you — you have said things which suggest that you see some sort of valid comparison to the 1939—45 war,

and the activities of the nazis. you have said this — "amongst the many early warning signs of mass atrocities is the use of rhetoric denying a nation's right to exist. humanity has witnessed this sort of rhetoric before. shockingly, we are seeing it again today." so if i'm not misreading you, you are making direct comparisons with the nazis. and if that's the case, then surely you cannot just sit by and watch these — your word — atrocities happen time and again, can you? look, i'm not making a comparison with a specific regime, i am issuing a warning that we are in a stage where mass atrocities could very well become a reality. and so we have an obligation to try to get the russians to agree to a ceasefire, to have a humanitarian pause, to surge humanitarian

relief into ukraine, which we are doing — by we, i mean the united states, as well as some of our allies — and also to allow ukrainians to defend themselves. we heard an impassioned plea from the mayor of zhytomyr in the osce permanent council just a few days ago, in which he said, "look, we've got still some water, still some food. what we need is weapons to allow our citizens to defend their homes, their neighbourhoods, their cities, their homeland." and so, we're doing all of that. we're surging humanitarian relief. we're surging weapons and other equipment to allow ukrainians to defend themselves. and we're sounding an early warning that, look, we're into uncharted territory here, and there could be things that are egregious, barbaric, as i have said, in terms of what we might see in the near term future. yes, so my question again to you, ambassador, is what the united states ultimately will do to try to stop it? volodymyr zelensky, just a couple of days ago, said this direct to nato — looking into the camera,

he said, "all the people who die from this day forward will also die because of you — you, nato — because of your weakness, your lack of unity. the alliance has given a green light to the bombing of ukrainian cities and villages by refusing to create a no—fly zone." your position on that may have to change, may it not? look, the reality is that nato is more united than it has ever been. we have complete unanimity in terms of the types of steps that we're going to take to oppose russia's barbaric invasion of ukraine. that said, a no—fly zone involves kinetic... this is not like iraq, this is not like libya, this is not like the balkans. we're talking about russia, a nuclear power. and so, a no—fly zone is not some sort of antiseptic operation. it involves taking out aircraft and air defence systems. so president biden has been very clear, we're not going to do that.

however, we are going to give weapons and equipment to ukraine to defend itself. we are going to give medicine, food, humanitarian supplies. we're going to do everything we can to support diplomatic efforts to end this conflict. so you see barbarism, you see depravity, you see evil. but in the end, because vladimir putin has nuclear weapons and has recently implied that he's prepared to use them, you are giving him some sort of veto over nato applying force in the skies over ukraine. have i got that right? well, we're not giving him a veto. we are providing... i'm not going to get into the specific types of equipment and systems that we're giving to the ukrainians because i don't think that would be wise for a variety of reasons. but we are providing, as i said earlier, our ukrainian partners with the sorts of tools and weapons, frankly, to enable them to defend themselves. it may not be a no—fly zone, it may not be everything that

potentially could be done. but i've laid out those escalation risks very clearly and they are real. i'm intrigued by some of the hints you are giving me about the extent of us military assistance. senator ben sasse in washington said recently the us should be arming ukraine to the teeth and also offering "tactical, actionable intelligence to the ukrainians on the ground so they can kill these russian invaders." is that deep sort of military intel cooperation happening hour—on—hour, day—on—day between the us and ukraine right now? well, again, i don't want to get into specifics, but i can say that we are coordinating very closely with our ukrainian partners.

and when it comes to warplanes, which again, zelensky is desperate to get his hands on, you are, should i say, encouraging very strongly poland to give those mig warplanes to ukraine quickly, are you? look, that's poland's sovereign choice. we are looking at all range of platforms to enable ukrainians to defend their skies and more importantly, to defend their neighbourhoods and their neighbours. because we are seeing a lot of civilians dying as a result of this unprovoked conflict, including strikes on hospitals, orphanages, schools, ambulances, pharmacies, etc. and so we're looking at a range of different systems. you have also — you, the government in the united states — have talked a lot about strengthening sanctions. there seems to be a move afoot to get an oil ban, oil purchase ban issued by the us government.

but it's clear that when it comes to fossil fuels, europe isn't necessarily going to follow america's lead. the german chancellor, olaf scholz, has made it plain that as far as he's concerned, it's simply not tenable to think of a boycott of russian gas in particular. so there's a division there, isn't there? well, you know, stephen, i think that's ok, because look, we import a lot less russian oil and gas than our european allies do. for sanctions to have an effect, it's not necessary that the europeans do every single thing that the united states does, or that the united states mimic every action that the europeans do. we want to be in lockstep as much as we can. we want to be coordinated. but sometimes that involves different countries taking different actions. and that's ok, because we have indeed — and i want your viewers to know this — we have indeed imposed

unprecedented sanctions in terms of the severity of what the russian economy will see in the coming days and weeks. i mean, their economy is really going to take a hit unlike anything we've seen in recent times. at the beginning of this interview, i referred to your long experience. you've been a russia adviser, an expert to the us government, both in the state department, the pentagon, inside the national security in the obama—biden white house. when you reflect on two decades and more of policymaking from the us toward russia, do you now acknowledge that maybe you got things wrong? you didn't appreciate just how much the eastward expansion of nato was going to build resentment, anger and, ultimately, the sort of response we've seen from vladimir putin in the last couple of weeks? no, i don't buy that at all, stephen. i think mistakes were made in the past, but i think those mistakes were actually of a completely different nature. i think the response after russia's invasion of georgia in 2008 was likely insufficient and more could have been done

after 2014 as well. as far as nato, consider this. if we had not enlarged nato — and by the way, it wasn't nato that decided to expand into other countries — it is countries seeing the threat coming from russia, desperately wanting to join nato so that they could have some protection. well, with respect, it's a two—way street, of course. you know, there is a feeling in many of the post—soviet east european countries that they wanted the protection of nato, but the existing nato membership had to want to embrace them and feel that was a wise thing to do. i mean, you're a very experienced diplomat. did you never read george kennan before his death writing and saying, "expanding nato would be the most fateful error of american policy in the entire post—cold war era"? look, i don't... i think the enlargement of nato was the single wisest security decision taken in europe

in the last three decades. imagine the citizens of warsaw, prague, and budapest if they were not guaranteed their security by nato�*s article five. imagine where they would be right today. imagine the citizens of the baltic states and the threat that they would feel from putin's russia. i mean, we're talking about tens of millions of peaceful citizens across eastern europe that would potentially be suffering the exact same fate as the citizens of ukraine are today. that's not a place we would want to be. nato is a defensive alliance, stephen. so nato has never posed a serious threat to russia. and all you have to do is look at the nato infrastructure on russia's borders. look at the battalions that nato has deployed to the baltic states and compare that to the divisions russia has fielded just on the other side of the border. we're talking about orders of magnitude of difference.

the only reason i'm rehearsing some of this history is because it seems to matter in terms of maybe a misunderstanding of russia and putin over years. i mean, we can talk about the �*90s and decisions taken then, but we can also talk about the years where you were directly involved in the obama—biden white house — 2012, for example, that famous quote of barack obama when he was mocking mitt romney for talking about getting tougher on putin. and obama said, "oh, it seems the 1980s are calling to ask for their foreign policy back." "listen," he said, "the cold war�*s been over for 20 years." even after the invasion of the donbas by russian forces, which of course led to that line of conflict, which we've already discussed, and the annexation of crimea, the national security strategy of the united states under obama—biden talked of needing strategic patience toward putin's russia. this immensely relaxed attitude to vladimir putin, despite what happened in georgia, despite what happened in ukraine in 2014, seems to have been plain wrong.

well, i think senator romney, to his credit, was very prescient, and i think we've had, frankly — we, meaning collectively, the west — has had decades of failure in assuming that russia's modernisation and the growth of a middle class in russia would somehow lead russia to be a more responsible stakeholder in the international system. but when you have a country that's run by a clique of kgb agents, things have turned out very differently. and i think that was a collective mistake that the west has made, as i said, over a much longer period of time. where's the, you know, there's this phrase — of course you know — the off—ramp for vladimir putin? you study him carefully, even to this day. where do you think the off—ramp for him is now? because right now, itjust looks like he is prepared to double down to do whatever it takes to subjugate ukraine. and it's not clear that he's going to back off, and it's not clear what we're going to do. yeah, well, the near—term

future does not look auspicious. he does appear to be doubling down, engaging in much more indiscriminate attacks on civilian objects and civilian neighbourhoods. but look, our goal has to be to expand ukraine's runway and shorten russia's, right? i mean, we need to apply those significant massive costs that we talked about to russia so that their timeframe collapses and ukraine's expands, so they can survive and they can defeat this brutal aggression. so what you call the atrocities, the barbarism, the depravity, the evil, will continue until a point at which you think vladimir putin's grip on power will break — is that it? well, i think we need to pursue all diplomatic avenues whenever and wherever they present themselves, precisely so that we do not end up with mass atrocities. we need to leave no stone unturned in terms of the diplomatic efforts to prevent that from happening. but at the end of the day, you do have a nuclear power that is invading its peaceful neighbour, and thatjust presents a very complex situation in terms of what we can do.

sure, sure, sure... we're trying to change the equation on the ground, as i said, to enable ukraine to survive and to repel this attack. you know what one senior washington official told the new york times recently? a cornered putin is a very dangerous animal. and if you add that to what fiona hill, a former senior adviser to the us government on russia said, which is that we are already in world war iii, it would seem to me it is time for europeans to be extremely worried about what could come next. well, i think we do have to be extremely worried and cautious. it is necessary to prevent escalation in this conflict, which is why we've just discussed the no—fly zone and why there are enormous escalation risks involved in that endeavour.

but we have to look at how we can blunt this offensive and how we can impose such costs on the russian economy that if the leadership in the kremlin does not realise that something is going wrong, at least those around them will signal the alarm that this is not a sustainable posture. that's what we've got to try to do. when people talk about... well, i mean, you're at the osce, organization for security cooperation in europe. i keep reminding myself of that phrase. when people talk of world war iii, do you think that is overblown? or are we very close? look, i wouldn't say that we're very close. but again, we have to manage the escalation risks in such a way that we do not end up pushing this conflict higher and higher up the escalatory ladder. i mean, certainly, there is the potential for that, and that is why wise and cool leadership is necessary at this

moment to find other ways to exert pressure without leading to a military spiral, getting out of control. michael carpenter, i thank you very much indeed forjoining me on hardtalk. thank you. my pleasure. hello. east—west differences in our weather across the uk for another day on wednesday. on tuesday, it's western areas that saw some rain. another weather front moving in on wednesday with wind and rain, butanother one that will weaken considerably as it attempts to move further east across the uk.

low pressure on the scene now, and the flow of air around that coming in from the south. so it is milder — but it feels mildest where you're staying dry and seeing some occasional sunshine, more especially in the east for wednesday. it's western areas where the cloud and rain gradually moving in. this is where we'll have the strongest winds, as well. many will start the day dry, no frost out there, there'll be some sunny spells around, but quite quickly in the morning, it'll be turning wetter through northern ireland. some of this rain will be heavy and into the western side of scotland, as well. and the rain very slowly moves in the afternoon towards the far south west of england, western counties of wales. by the evening, pushing into parts of northwest england. ahead of that, plenty of sunny spells breaking through, especially in the afternoon across the eastern side of england. it's blustery everywhere. gales, though, in the west and, for a time in the morning in the western isles. some severe gales gusts 60—70mph could be disruptive before those winds ease later. and a contrast in temperatures, too — just nine in the rain in belfast, but up to 13—14 celsius in the sunny spells in eastern england.

now notice how this weather system weakens, moving east overnight and into thursday. on its back edge, it will have some snow towards the highlands and southern uplands for a time. and in the clear spells in northwest scotland and through northern ireland as thursday begins, there'll be a frost here — and particularly in northern ireland, there is a risk of seeing some fog, whereas for wales in england, it's a fairly mild start to the day. we're left with a weak weather front sitting somewhere through scotland, wales and england on thursday. still some uncertainty about where any patchy rain from it may linger during the day. there'll also be a few sunny spells around. into northern ireland, well, belfast, a very different day at nine celsius. any sunny spells in eastern england could turn out to be very mild here, 15—16 celsius — but again, still some uncertainty about where the cloud will be sitting and any patchy rain. here comes another weather front on friday — so thursday's looking like a somewhat quieter day, won't be as windy. the winds pick up again on friday, it stays blustery through the weekend. there'll be some rain or showers

around, but not wet all the time.

this is bbc news. i'm sally bundock with the latest headlines for viewers in the uk and around the world. the us rejects an offer by poland to send all of its russian—made mig—29 fighterjets to ukraine, saying it would raise serious concerns for nato. on the frontline, ukrainian soldiers dig in north—west of the capital kyiv, with russian forces circling the city. there is a tangible fear in this place. that that russian offensive that has been stalled may be ready to regain momentum. america bans imports of russian oil and gas, as britain and the eu also target moscow's energy exports. we are enforcing the most significant package

of sanctions in history and it is causing significant damage