this is bbc news. the headlines. fighting appears to be intensifying around the ukrainian city of lysychansk as russian forces try to take the only remaining city in the luhansk region not under their control. it's come under intense shelling, but a ukrainian spokesman denied claims that russian—backed fighters had now encircled the city. libyan activists say they'll continue protesting until the ruling elite steps aside. the comments follow rallies in most parts of the country on friday, which ended in the parliament building in tobruk being stormed and then set on fire. the united nations has called for calm in libya. a three—day meeting of religious and tribal leaders in afghanistan has ended with a call on the international community to recognise the taliban

government and lift all sanctions on the country. the male—only meeting also declared that any armed resistance against the militants would be considered a rebellion. now on bbc news, dateline london. hello, and welcome to the programme, which brings together leading uk commentators with the foreign correspondents who write, blog and broadcast to audiences back home from the dateline london. this is our 1937 moment — at least according to general sir patrick sanders, newly appointed head

of the british army. his speech this week was a shot across the bows to the politicians attending two national international talking shops — the nato summit in madrid and, before that, the g7 in the bavarian alps. both promised to support ukraine for as long as it takes. general sanders was arguing for muscular deterrents, the not very disguised message to presidents and prime ministers being, do you want history to remember you as it remembers neville chamberlain, who delayed war by appeasing hitler but did not prevent it? liz truss, the uk's foreign minister, seemed to get the message, declaring, "we are keen to protect the defence of taiwan against beijing." this in a week when china's president xijinping visited hong kong 25 years after british control came to an end. he was celebrating its rebirth. the uk isjoint guarantor of hong kong's freedoms. well, that went well, didn't it? in the studio with me, suzanne lynch, an irish journalist now based in brussels for politico.

polly toynbee, who has been writing a weekly column for the guardian since 1988 — which means she's seen off six prime ministers so far. and isabel hilton spelt many years as a foreign correspondent before founding china dialogue, an independent organisation focused on the environmental challenges that country has to face. lovely to have you all in the studio. welcome. you and i were both in the bavarian alps for the g7. we did. we bumped into each other, yeah, with the hundreds of journalists that were there gathered for the event, yes. let's start with that, suzanne. and with what the message coming out of that was. yeah. in terms of the atmosphere at the g7, because it did feel, even though it wasn't supposed to be, in the end all about ukraine? it was. i mean, let's cast our mind back a year ago to the last g7 in cornwall — who would have thought that a year on they would be faced with a war on the european continent? so it completely changed the dynamic this time around, there was a very obvious focal point and a very

obvious pressing team of these few days. and i think the issues that have emerged from the ukraine war as well the actual situation on the ground dominated everything, from sanctions to issues of food security, to climate as well and how that's linked into gas and oil position, so i think the leaders were under pressure to come out with results. but i have to say, i don't think there was that much progress made. take food security, for example — there was a lot of talk going into the summit that there would be some way of trying to deal with this issue of the tonnes of grain that are stuck in ukraine and can't get out. we really didn't see any progress on that. also, with sanctions, there was a plan to put a price cap on oil. yes, they agreed that, but the details still very much have to be worked out, so in terms of actual meat on the bones, i think it was quite disappointing. in some ways, the sanders speech was almost the most dramatic — and it wasn't by any leader of any country. it sort of implied a lot of the texts and what we were

told, but this was a kind of very, very direct... you could say, soldiers are bound to say, polly, that we want more solders and we need more weapons and there's always a risk of war, but the tone of this felt quite different? yes, it's a moment of reality, for this country, which lives in a fantasy world in many respects, into how it sees itself across the world, but right across europe. actually, are we going to fight? are they going to fight in ukraine — to the last ukrainian? well, as long as president zelensky wants to or as long as his people want to, but i do think that europe hasn't come to terms with what it's going to cost. we're not spending any more money, the general was saying we haven't even got any more ammunition left to send to them. they need these heavy weapons. we're not providing them. they keep promising to, but it doesn't actually turn up. and i don't think anybody has confronted — certainly in this country and probably not across europe — do you realise what going back to cold war really means in terms

of defence spending? it is vast. it either means vast tax raises or it means huge cuts in things people really care about, like health and social care and education. i don't think anyone... borisjohnson is not a man for unpleasant realities and he's not facing the country with it, nor is he facing up to do it himself. i want to talk a bit about the energy issue in a bit more detail in a moment, but on this question of spending on the military, we had a defence review barely a year ago that envisaged a smaller and smaller standing army of kind of about another 10,000 — i think it takes us to around 70,000 from about 83,000 — but now we're saying actually we're going to spend more of our gdp on defence between now and 2030. in a sense, we clearly have the aspiration, but can we actually generate the troops and equipment to deliver on the pledges we're making? well, ithink it's. going to be pretty difficult, as polly said. we have got accustomed to .

the idea of the peace dividend. ever since 1989, we've been cutting back on defence — i actually quite rightly. if we don't need it, - don't spend the money. but according at least - to the military, we've gone so far that actually building back up not only takes - money, it takes time. you can'tjust conjure up troops, you can'tjust . conjure up technologies. we don't have conscript armies these days... we don't have conscript armies. we're actually very - slow on delivering new military kit, you know? endless delays - and cost overruns. we're not very good at that, so i think it's going to be - a fairly hard reality if we're going to build back up. - just on that, i think it's quite interesting about this issue of defence spending now. obviously it's something the us has said for such a long time about the other nato allies, they weren't paying their way enough, but it can be very politically difficult. some countries — italy, for example — their prime minister, draghi, has got a difficult political situation because one of the main parties there is divided over how much they should send to ukraine. so particularly in countries

where there's maybe a coalition government — you see that in germany, chancellor schultz has come in for a lot of criticism — but germany has done a u—turn when it comes to defence spending. a lot of people may have thought it was maybe a bit late. but he's been trying to keep a fractious enough traffic light coalition government together. so these decisions and this policy—making can be very, very complex. i think there has to be a measure of respectl for germany because they have had to do the biggest _ somersault, intellectually, emotionally, politically, i of any country, they have been the ones who don't do defencej and now they have to face up to the fact that the russian l bear is back, is a real threat, it is a real enemy is naturally germany has to step up as well and i think they have done - remarkably well at it. we'll see how long it lasts. the question is, whose nerve lasts longer? - president putin's or. the rest of the west? i was very struck, talking to a middle—aged german woman broadcast journalist in the week who was saying

she knows of no comparable time when people in germany feared about turning a switch on the wall and they're not being any power there. you worry about rationing and we now start to think actually we are headed for a really uncertain future. they seem to have realised this. i wonder if we've yet realised it in the uk? no. we haven't realised iti and i mean, to be fair, germany's dependence on russian . energy is greater than ours is, l but we are facing a perfect - storm of brexit consequences, inflation, cost of living, | and that reality, i think. how long this is going to last, how slow any recovery - is going to be, it hasn't really sunk in. - we could use less energy, all of us, if we had to, if we're confronted with that, and maybe it's time that the world actually stopped and thought, we don't need to squander the amount of electricity... absolutely, but the response

in this country to that - proposition, you know, the obvious thing to do is to insulate british houses, which are the leakiest - and least efficient in europe - and all the government response has been on the supply side, not the demand side, - so talking... instead of putting forward - a programme to insulate houses, they're talking about more oil and gas from the north sea, i which will take 25 years. and takes through 2050. yes, it's very interesting in that, how this is coinciding with ideas about the need to tackle climate change, but i do think really big users of energy ultimately is big industry and big business and there's lots of talk about people in europe, they're prepared to wear an extra sweater or whatever, but really, when it comes down to it, i think the mood now in europe to not sanction russian gas, that is not on the table at the moment, any more sanctions when it comes to russian gas, in particular. it's really about the dependence of industry and business and i think that is happening in the background, that kind of lobbying. and that's really interesting

because the one thing they were able to agree on in g7 was they were going to sanction russian gold exports, which according to one expert i was speaking to on bbc news earlier in the week, is a pretty small beer and it's the same problem on his programme mark roche was talking about a few months ago with diamonds, where you can mix the diamonds up with other diamonds, so you don't know where they come from. you can do it with oil, indeed, there's a good point. so the sanctioning of these things can be very ineffective and they are going for what you might call the low hanging fruit because the oil and gas is just too tough. the price cap proposition. is extreme because the g7, the clue is in the name, that is seven countries, | if you want a global price cap . there are another 188 countries you might have to consult. that's not going to - happen tomorrow, even if you were to agree — . india, china, they're not going to agree, actually- if you look across asia most countries are not - opted in to sanctions. just slightly up to mystic,

maybe this is a bit polly—ish, slightly optimistic. —— optimistic. this might be the crunch moment where a lot has to be done about the climate, just out of force of necessity. let's talk about that. i was very struck when i looked at the communique which came out on the last day of the g7, we were all trying to keep up with what they were saying in the various translations of the various leaders�*s speeches, but what schultz had got them to sign up to was commit to "end public support for the international fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, except in limited circumstances, clearly defined by each country". so, in other words... and ijust wonder, in that kind of context, is it surprising

you get the scepticism from the rest of the world? being told, "this is what you should do except when it gets a bit too painfulfor us..." the wto, to be fair, finally after 20 years agreed to end inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. we subsidise fossil fuels. it's insane, and that money could go towards supporting the energy transition, insulating houses, advancing renewables and so on. to be fair, the european union has a very comprehensive climate plan, which it has not resiled from. but you do get countries with some particular problem is beginning to wiggle. there was that argument at cop26 about phasing out coal rather than phasing out. japan making this point againjust recently. and japan is just having a really difficult time. —— phasing down rather than phasing _ —— phasing down rather than phasing out. indeed it is. it's a very short rainy season

followed by intense heat. everybody's facing a problem and coal is being extended quietly all over the place. even by green ministers in the german coalition. that is i think temporary, and you have to keep the lights on mostly. but not to abandon the longer term commitment. that's the irony of this — in one sense, it underlines for everyone what's happened with the russian war in ukraine, how we have to get off fossil fuels, but on the other hand it's allowing some, countries of the hook. particularly countries in eastern europe who are taking a very strong stance against russia. they can turn around to the european commission now and say they need to continue to use their coal plants because their oil and gas is under... it's allowing them to prolong the use of other fossil fuels. this could just be temporary, but that depends how long this war goes on. let's shift our focus from europe to china and the middle east, and particularly, the other big thing that happened in the 12

months since last g7, the pull—out from afghanistan. and it's as if afghanistan hasn't happened. nobody talked about it. even at nato or g7, which is a pretty damning admission, by its absense, of quite how dramatic it's been and nobody wants to talk about it. but the other thing was in terms of china. and this investment strategy, i wonder what you made of that? this commitment to provide money, £400 billion over a number of years, which seemed to be aimed at the road and belt problem. built and road. i put the wrong way round. it's easy to do. yeah, it's actually a slightly repainted and refurbished version of build back better world? _ bsw? as if we could forget.

it was only one g7 ago. great fanfare, "we're going to challenge belt "and road because china's a predatory lender and we are "transparent and all of that." but then nothing happened. so we're refurbishing it again, this policy, with a little more in it. and with some of those beneficiary countries invited to put the case to the g7 members at the summit. indonesia, argentina, india, etc. but none of it will mean anything unless it's delivered. and the problem about delivery is that chinese state owned enterprise can take a big risk in country x because it's got the state bank behind it, it has access to capital regardless of risk, and if the state owned enterprise goes belly up the state's going to bail it out, so actually it's the state that's taking the risk. our system doesn't allow that. you want private capital to go

in, it's looking around for who is the guarantor. it's looking around for a multilateral. and putting those deals together requires focus and consistency, which these big promises so far haven't had. bluntly, do you think, wearing your trade hat, that this is a good investment? in other words, is it going to get the influence that we seem to hope we will get and prevent china further extending its influence in latin america and africa and the caribbean? i think it may do. the big problem is, is it too late? the chinese have been going into these countries for some time. as you were just saying there, the eu and the western partners, they've a lot more checks and balances, more of a long—term investment. i was at a conference recently and some african leaders made the point, how long are we supposed to wait? when somebody�*s offering the money straight up, they don't see the advantage of waiting for the european money. and linking back to what you said there, about afghanistan, a lot of leaders in africa

are saying, "look, we know "there's a huge war in ukraine, that we have conflicts "all over our continent all the time and why "isn't there the same level of interest?" we'll talk about food towards the end of the programme. let's talk a bit about china in the light of the hong kong anniversary. xijinping's interesting interpretation of recent history. isabel, remind us of how we got to the stage. the history of this — it wasn't british, we had it under a long lease. opium war, 1842, we get hong kong island. one of the most shameful events in british history. i i would not argue with that. that gave us hong kong island in perpetuity. but hong kong island is unsustainable on its own. we then later acquired kowloon, and in 1898 we acquired a 100—year lease on the new territories. that was coming to an end...

the new territories taken kowloon, hong kong island, and... that'sjust the mainland part of it. but from that mainland part, comes of the water, the energy. you can't survive on hong kong island without the back—up from the mainland. without that lease, it was clear that hong kong island was going to have to go back to china. so we began to negotiate. thatcher signed the joint declaration in 1985, as i remember. which was the one country, two systems principle which promised that for 50 years hong kong would stay pretty much internally as it was. that's due to run out in 2047. indeed. and the details of that were further negotiated in what's called the basic law, which is the hong kong mini—constitution, and that guaranteed rule of law, separation of powers, the liberties that hong kong had, with the promise that there would be a widening of the franchise and they would have a chance to elect the executive council. that was fine for the first

10—15 years, although it was being nibbled at. the trouble began when the chinese started to reform the school curriculum, which provokes students led byjoshua wong, then 14 or something, to protest. and from then on, it was a escalating series of attempts by china to impose controls and progressive resistance from hong kong, which ended up in the final year really quite viole nt confrontation. but after a year of very violent confrontation, which was a response to carrie lam, the then chief executive trying to impose an extradition law which would mean people from hong kong could be tried in china, a big problem, after a year of those very fierce confrontations there were some district elections, the lower level elections, and the opposition won 90% of the seats. so carrie lam's position, that she was defending the people of hong kong against these nasty opposition figures was completely

destroyed, and that's when the national security law comes in and that locks up the opposition, postpones the legislative elections which were due in a year's time. and now we have hong kong, which has lost its liberty and will be reduced to being another city in china. did you have any expectation, really, that these _ freedoms would last? it always seemed unrealistic, and we left not really very. honourably, kind of knowing that they'd had it. _ opinions varied, to be honest. at the beginning, i was relatively pessimistic. but then, for ten years, i thought i'd been wrong. i thought china needs hong kong because it was the goose that laid the golden egg. it wasn't actually doing any harm. hong kong was not damaging china. you get to the point of 2012, when xi jinping comes in, and the party is seriously

anxious about its own survival. and there's a list of things that the party regards as a threat to its continued survival — they include rule of law, freedom of the press, all of the things that hong kong had — and that's when you begin to see... is it at that point that we start to worry about taiwan? well, taiwan certainly starts to worry about taiwan, because the proposition for taiwan was going to be another version of one country, two systems. as it was in tibet, actually. the initial agreement in tibet allowed internal autonomy, all of the things that you see in hong kong, and that didn't last. so of course taiwan then thinks there is going to be no satisfactory resolution for them. and so, yes, that began a hostile situation. under xijinping, it's all happened in the last ten years or so. and that's why this concern about taiwan in particular.

which raises... perhaps admirable that liz truss should talk tough about taiwan being supported... no, it's not admirable. it's pathetic. - it sounds absurd. little england strutting about saying... - she was saying in the times today, "the uk will not rest| until hong kong gets back its freedoms." i nonsense. but that's the question i raise. whether, in a sense, you can sabre rattle but you have got to have something... is hong kong unfortunately an example of us not being able to follow through on our promises? and therefore, why would taiwan take our promises seriously? we were directly involved because we were the signatory of an international treaty and we were meant to guarantee hong kong's freedom. the united states plays that role in taiwan. actually, it's worse. liz truss talking about supplying arms to taiwan —

guess who we've actually supplied arms to? we have supplied the chinese navy with radar equipment despite there being an embargo imposed after tiananmen. and very fine military socks from china. i went to visit the factory a few years ago and i was given two pairs, which i declared. it's notjust liz truss. joe biden, the president of the united states, during his trip to japan in may, also suggested that the us would go in militarily if needed. and the white house then went to clarify. he's done that three times. crosstalk the analogy is, and what came out of the nato summit, because for the first time china was mentioned as a challenge in their big blue print. even hong kong made it into the g7 communique. exactly. the analogy everyone was talking about there, is china going to be the next russia, could there be an invasion the way there was with russia and ukraine. it makes it more sense forjoe biden to say it. |

the chinese cann't be certainl what the americans might do. the chinese can't be certain. what the americans might do. who knows who will be - the next american president, what kind of lunatic it might be, or not? _ they can't predict how - the americans would behave if they did invade taiwan. so that makes some sense. to have liz truss| strutting about... there are many ways the chinese can recover taiwan, and the most expensive and uncertain is actually to launch an armed invasion. were they to do that, however, you should look to japan where the american bases in japan would have to be taken out, and japan is rather conscious of this and is now getting over its dislike of being a nuclear power. fumio kishida, the new japanese. .. not a member of nato. but clearly had some influence on that communique. if there were to be an assault on taiwan by china, japan is absolutely in the firing line. and when biden visited japan, the chinese and russians did

a joint fly—over of the sea ofjapan, just to say, "hey, guys, we're here." that's the other fear, this chinese—russia alliance. china has been trying to tread a line there. at the un, it protects russia all the time. and stoltenberg, the nato chief, said this explicit right in madrid. an alliance that was set up as a bulwark against russia has found its mojo again because it's faced with a russian war, but yet it is now talking about china on the other side of the world. that has huge ramifications. for what's supposed to be a defensive alliance. i mean, whether that isjust a warning. but that sense that people feel, appeasement, that people took their eye off the ball with russia, now the question is if the same is happening in china. they didn't equate them. the threat they said china posed was a threat to the functioning of the global system, not a military threat. one of the last messages from the g7 was the need

for resilient democracies, and boy do we need them now. suzanne lynch, polly toynbee and isabel hilton, thank you all very much. excuse this, they were looking for intelligent life. that's it for dateline london for this week. laughter we're back the same time next week. hello there. some signs and showers sums up the weather for the weekend. —— sunshine. will turn out to be quite heavy and thundery, but should be sunny spells in between. the reason for unsettled weather is low pressure close by to our

shores, series of weak weather fronts across the countries. it will start dry and sunny across the southeast, but into the afternoon, it'll be pretty widespread and some of them will be heavy, breezy in the north and west of scotland, where temperatures will struggle around 13—16 degrees, but warmer further south. sunday, the showers faded away and we'll see further showers pushing to scotland and northern ireland. clear spells further south, temperatures 9-12. further south, temperatures 9—12. high pressure want to filled in, so here, it's going to be turning a bit warmer and thundery are, but always cloudy and cooler further north.

welcome to bbc news. iam rich i am rich preston. our top stories: in eastern ukraine, further fighting for control of this a chance, the ukrainian army rejects russia's claims they have encircled the city. the united nations corsicana libya as anti—government protests continue, but demonstrators say they will not give up. —— the united nations calls for calm. a council of taliban elders because of the world to recognise the taliban and sanctions. the biggest ever london pride. more than1 million people take to the streets as it marks its 50th anniversary. and getting fiery under the lights at wimbledon. the match one player described as a circus.