this is bbc news — the headlines... president biden has said americans must unite in opposition to "political violence" — saying democracy itself will be on the ballot paper in next week's mid—term elections. mr biden accused the former president donald trump, and his supporters, of undermining democracy and fuelling anger and violence. tokyo and seoul say north korea has fired three missiles amid heightening tension in the region. they said one of them was long—range. that prompted the japanese government to issue a rare emergency alert to residents to stay indoors. japan and south korea have both condemned pyongyang's actions. after ten days of peace talks, a surprise deal has been reached between the government of ethiopia and rebel forces

in tigray for a permanent cessation of hostilities. the two—year conflict has left hundreds of thousands dead, almost five million displaced, and a population on the brink of starvation. now on bbc news, it's time for hardtalk. welcome to hardtalk. i'm stephen sackur. winter is coming to europe and vladimir putin is hoping the battle lines in his war on ukraine will be frozen, buying him time to reinforce at the front while exposing ukrainians and all of europe to the reality of an energy crisis. the ukrainian armed forces have made gains in recent months, but can they go further and will kyiv�*s backers in the us and europe maintain their support? well, my guest is general ben hodges, former commander of the us army in europe.

could this winter be russia's friend? i'm going to start with something you said just last month. you said total restoration of all of ukraine's sovereign territory, including crimea, is inevitable. now, a few weeks on, do you still believe that? even more so. i think ukrainians have achieved irreversible momentum. the russians are losing in every facet of this war. so that's why they're resorting to things like going after energy infrastructure, doing what they can, exactly as you said in the lead—in,

to stretch this out in hopes that the west would lose the will to continue supporting ukraine. but it's not a small thing, is it? the way the russians are hitting civilian infrastructure, they are, as we speak, cutting power and heat to millions of people across ukraine. and it seems, despite the best efforts of ukrainian air defences, they can continue to do it. it sure looks that way right now, and certainly improving air and missile defence capabilities for the ukrainians should be the top priority for what we are all providing to ukraine. but this is notjust about ukrainians. about one and one half million ukrainians have returned to ukraine that left back in february. if russia continues to destroy the power grid, the energy infrastructure, it makes ukraine's cities uninhabitable during the wintertime. then you're going to see millions of ukrainians heading back into europe again during the winter. and that's exactly what putin and his associates in

the kremlin want to see. that's right. which is why the west needs to accelerate the delivery of air and missile defence capabilities to help ukraine stop russia from what it's doing. we'll get to future weapons supplies in a moment. butjust to think about the battlefield, and with your experience commanding the us army in europe, key officer in nato for years, you see the battlefield, and i'm just surprised that you are so optimistic that it can change radically within the next, say, six months. first, we've got winter, and, second, we've got russia mobilising hundreds of thousands of new fighters. surely that is going to be a factor. it is a factor. but we know from history that war is a test of will and it's a test of logistics. the ukrainians have demonstrated for the whole world to see they have superior will, both soldiers as well as their population. the russians have no will for this fight. otherwise half a million men, military—age males, would not have left russia to avoid becoming mobilised.

and we see so many different bits of evidence of russian soldiers that absolutely don't want to be there. yes, russia has mobilised... whether it's 200,000, 300,000, 400,000 people. they're not trained, they're not equipped. they're cannon fodder. this is part of russia's attempt, again, to just string this out. so in terms of real capability, i don't see any improved capability for russian forces. their logistics system is exhausted and now they've put another 200,000 or 300,000 troops as additional burden on that logistics system. and what about the notion that, as they put it, general winter will intervene, and, at least in the short run, through to march from, say, late november, will sort of freeze the conflict, because it'll be very difficult to make ground. yeah, i don't think i agree with the choice of the word freeze. no doubt weather will always have, even in modern warfare, will have an impact. but the image that most people probably have, of course, is the russian front during world war ii where

it was disastrous weather conditions that stopped the german advance. it's a different time now. tracked vehicles can move, still, even though the soil in southeastern ukraine when it gets wet, is a terrible consistency. tracked vehicles can still move. it is difficult for wheeled vehicles. i think the fact that ukraine is getting support from 50 different nations — they will continue to receive equipment, supplies, things necessary to fight in the wintertime. i would hate to be one of these newly mobilised russian privates that's going to show up without proper winter clothing, occupy a trench that's half full of water, and i'm surrounded by people that have been getting crushed by ukrainian forces. i like the ukrainians�* chances in this. i am very mindful that in february of this year it was quite clear the americans believed the russians would roll through ukraine in rapid time. i think the feeling in the cia was that zelensky probably had three or four days before he would be toppled.

they were plain wrong about that. and then, of course, they pivoted and started sending significant arms supplies straight away. but isn't it possible, just as you overestimated russian strength in the run—up to the war, you perhaps now are underestimating putin's determination to keep this fight going and do whatever it takes to win. it's two different things. we did overestimate russian military. i, personally, grossly over—estimated russian military capabilities. i was so wrong about their army, navy, airforce. i remember talking to you back in 2016 in poland, and we talked a lot about putin's capabilities and how europe needed to ramp up its defences, because at that time you felt putin had a serious advantage on the eastern flank of nato. so maybe intelligence isn't so great, and it can work both ways, both in overestimation, but now maybe an underestimation. sure.

which is why you have to constantly revisit it and constantly challenge the assumptions — as i've reflected on, "how could i have been so wrong about russian capabilities? " you know, ifailed to fail to appreciate the depth of corruption and the effect the corruption would have on readiness and quality of parts, even though they had gone through this massive modernisation effort. i also failed to appreciate the lack of actual operational experience they had. i mean, i was thinking georgia, syria, africa, crimea, but actually it was only about 5% of the military that actually had experience. and then, of course, they don't exercise the way that we do, where you train to the point of failure and do all those things. all of that was exposed, beginning in february. now it's existential for putin. i think most people would agree putin cannot afford now to lose this war, because if he does, it's not that russia will disappear necessarily, but putin's regime might well disappear.

it could very well be the case. but, you know, dr timothy snyder, who's a guy that i really respect, he recently said, "yes, it's bad to lose in ukraine. it's much worse to lose in russia." and so i think at some point, people in the kremlin start thinking about regime survival. sure. but he, as you well know, has illegally annexed chunks of ukrainian territory and defines it now as sovereign russian territory. but i think when it comes down to it, that's not going to be where he falls on his sword. i think his survival is what's number one for himself. and so i think we, all of us, should maybe change the paradigm of how we think about, you know, "putin has to win in ukraine or we have to give him an off—ramp." not necessarily. at the end of the day, he'll kill or lose as many people as necessary to make sure he stays in power. and i think surviving inside russia will be his priority. isn't ukraine's fundamental vulnerability that it is, as of right now, still extraordinarily dependent

on western, us—led assistance? without a doubt. in fact, i would even say that ukraine's centre of gravity is american political support. that is going to be the key. now... that's a dangerous place to be. it is. particularly in the run—up to midterm elections. it is. quite possibly the house is going to go to the republican party. we know the speaker, the chief of the republican party in the house of representatives, kevin mccarthy, has said, "believe me, there will be no blank cheque for ukraine if we control the house." that's the political reality that may face ukraine in just a few weeks�* time. that's true, but i don't think it's as extreme as it sounds. this is the political season. of course, they're saying things that they need to, because i think basically they oppose whatever the biden administration does, regardless. i mean, we're talking about the so—called party of reagan is parroting kremlin talking points, which is bizarre for me. now, actually, over 70% of the american people support continuing to give weapons to ukraine, supporting ukraine.

so this is not a big political winner for the republicans to try and cut that off. and, of course, there have been zero blank cheques for ukraine. this... ithink... i'm less concerned about it now than i was, say, a few months ago. you might not call it a blank cheque, but i think the military assistance amounts to something over 25 billion usd, overall assistance to ukraine, if you include future commitments... you're familiar with how we produce bills and laws and that sort of thing. the bill, the latest bill that gave the largest amount of financial support from the united states had 700 and something lines in it, laying out... of the 700 lines, over 100 werejust lines about accountability, how do we account for everything. so there's no blank cheque. right. but it's notjust actually about the money. it's also about the weaponry and the degree to which america can keep up the supply of weapons over the next six months, year, maybe two years. who knows? it could be a long time. the reality is that

when it comes to some of the key equipment — just take one example — the 155mm howitzers that have been given to ukraine — the us barely has any more to give, and it actually is struggling to replenish the ammunition, the shells for these guns. this is a reality which both ukraine and the united states have to wrestle with. this is a problem. for the last 20 years in iraq and afghanistan, it was a different kind of conflict, and all of us were modernising and producing to be able to fight in that sort of a conflict. i don't know that we... i certainly didn't anticipate that we would be doing what we're doing now. the amount of artillery ammunition, the amount of precision weapons being expended, dwarfs whatever we used in the last 20 years. so, yes, we have to address that. this is part of it... it's part of the deterrent. i want to tap into your experience. the himars you know, multiple launch rocket systems, the javelin missiles, the stinger missiles, the howitzers. .. how much more can the us give?

well, i would say the question is, how fast can we increase production? but then you're talking years, because once you're talking about future production, you're not sending that any time soon. well, i would say that secretary austin has already started work with various parts of the defence industry that manufacture those things that are being consumed at a very high rate. and, yes, i mean, this is a part of deterrence. we have to be willing to invest in the ammunition, notjust in the systems. and, of course, it's not just the united states. germany, france, uk, others. absolutely. you live in germany at the moment. you know that there's a political element to this in germany and other countries across the european union. there is evidence from opinion polls, from mass protests on the streets of cities like prague, that europeans want their governments to focus front and centre on the cost of living crisis, on soaring energy prices. and they are not, many of them, keen to see their government spend billions of euros propping up ukraine's military.

well, defence spending in the czech republic is not necessarily about propping up ukraine. it's about the contribution of the czech republic to nato. and actually the protests that happened in prague after the pro—kremlin protest was much larger. so i actually believe that the majority of europeans understand what's at stake. what about the germans? because you live there now. it's your home. when you look at 0laf scholz�*s government and their failure to send, for example, the leopard tanks to ukraine, their unwillingness to give whatever they can to kyiv and its struggle against putin, what do you make of that? germany has not moved as quickly, obviously, as i would have liked, and as president biden would have liked. but let's be clear. 70... more than 70% of germans favour giving more weapons to ukraine

to continue the support. so that should provide political cover for an spd—led german government. the actual amount of what germany provides, they are third behind just the us and uk, so way ahead of what france provides, norway and other wealthy european countries. they're just terrible at explaining what they're doing. the mixed messages that come out of berlin, frankly, make it hard for people to understand and recognise what germany is doing. germany is not confident in itself yet about how to be a leader in europe. do you think nato comes out of this looking unified or maybe not quite so much? i'm thinking, for example, of turkey, turkey's position on... at the moment, being extremely awkward to the accession of finland and sweden, something which of course putin doesn't want to see, but which would strengthen nato�*s northern and eastern flank. do you see fragmentation intensifying in nato? no, the opposite, actually. look... turkey — i lived in

izmir for two years. i love that country, the culture, the history. but they're maddening at times. they're maddening? yeah. and they're going to squeeze everything that... president erdogan, who has a big election coming up in a few months, is going to squeeze everything he can out of this before turkey agrees to sweden and finland joining the alliance. i'm sure that's going to happen. and right now i think president erdogan is probably more unhappy with the president of the russian federation who cancelled this green deal just the other day on the occasion of turkey's national day. and this was one of the biggest diplomatic accomplishments by the erdogan regime in many years. so i think he's probably more unhappy with the kremlin than he is with any of the rest of us. look, the alliance, you know... from the history of alliances and coalitions, nobody�*s been more successful. of course, they're always hard. all the other 29 nations complain about the united states all the time. and this is the nature of alliances. but there's a reason that countries are in a queue

wanting to join the alliance. you have set out what i guess i would call a maximalist vision of what this war must bring. you say it must end with russians forced out of every inch of ukrainian territory, and you're quite clear that has to include crimea — ie, total victory for ukraine. that is not the way the biden administration sees it, is it? unfortunately not, at least in terms of what they say. now, i would... i have probably supported 95% of everything that the administration has said and done, except for this one part where they can't seem to say, "we want ukraine to win." but this isn't a small percentage difference. this is huge, because it's about the endgame. it's about how this conflict ends. because at some point it must end. you're saying it seems that it can only end with total ukrainian victory. the administration, it seems,

thinks that they will have to be at some point a compromise, that concessions will be made by both sides. and it may well be that the concessions involve some sort of deal over crimea. who knows? are you saying that sort of a resolution to this war would, in your view, be a danger to the united states, to western interests? it would only guarantee that there will be more conflict. i mean, if we look at how the kremlin has behaved over the past almost 20 years, you know, they see that we lose interest after a period of time, and then they keep coming. i mean, from georgia, crimea... they saw... theyjumped over the american red line in syria and they see that we lose interest. well, with respect, they probably drew most of a lesson from afghanistan, where, i recall, the last time i spoke to you, you actually supported joe biden�*s withdrawal from afghanistan. and i dare say, according to your own logic there, vladimir putin looked at that and saw that as a sign

of american weakness. of course he did. so why did you support it? for sure. well, because at the time, president biden�*s decision to withdraw was something... i think it was a situation that he inherited. he would have had to undo so many different things to go back in there and preserve what we thought we had accomplished in afghanistan. look, four administrations own responsibility for our failed effort in afghanistan, because we never clearly identified the end state, and we never required american people to pay taxes for it. and so because of that, we allowed it to kind of drift over almost 20 years. and so, of course, i was disappointed and humiliated the way it ended, the way the afghan forces collapsed. when i was there in 2009 and �*10, i thought, "we're winning." i mean, i could see so much progress. the difference with the context is huge, because afghanistan may well, in the end, have been a negative experience for the united states. but now we're talking

about a conflict with vladimir putin, who, of course, has the biggest nuclear arsenal, alongside the us, in the entire world. and that is something which barack 0bama and others have talked about, saying, you know, "we have to be very clear here. we do not want to get into the sort of escalation that leads to a world war." your approach, the maximalist approach, makes that more likely. i don't agree with that at all. i think that we have overestimated the possibility of russia escalating. i mean, think about where we were in february. there were people that were concerned that if we gave ukraine stingers, shoulder—fired anti—aircraft system, that if a russian helicopter was shot down by an american—made stinger employed by a ukrainian soldier, that they might escalate. that seems ridiculous now, but that's where it was. and so with every increase in capability that's been provided, russia, they haven't escalated, because they can't escalate. those nuclear weapons that they have, of course we take that seriously, but those weapons are

only effective as long as they don't use them. once they use them, then they're done, because the biden administration... they might be done. we might be done. no, that's not going to happen. it's not going to happen. the biden administration has made it clear that there will be catastrophic consequences for russia if they use any sort of nuclear weapon. and i think the people, at general staff, they know that, they understand that. and so this is why i think it is so unlikely that that would happen. you are now post being one of the top generals in the united states. you're a think—tanker, a security consultant. you travel the world. does it worry you, that in many parts of the world, it seems vladimir putin's message, that this is a war against american imperialism, it's a war against western hegemony, that message strikes a chord in many different countries across this world? yeah, it does. i think in africa, parts of the middle east or asia... and let's face it, china, which has just been defined in the most recent pentagon defence strategy review, as the fundamental, most important threat

to the united states. the chinese, if you have to line them up anywhere in this conflict, they are sympathetic to vladimir putin. i think actually the chinese are very angry at vladimir putin right now. he woke up nato. he woke up the united states. he's got us all talking about improving, increasing production of weapons. the alliance, i think, is closer now than we've been in many years. and there's been an energising of our capabilities and intelligence capabilities. and europe is waking up, so that if — if — the united states ever got into a conflict in china, i think that europe is waking up to its responsibilities... you say if. actually, you also kind of say when, because not so long ago, when we chatted about the possibility of military conflict between the us and china, you said it could come within five years. do you think the united states, what you've seen over the last six months, and we've discussed some of the weapons supply and logistics challenges that

ukraine has presented to the united states, is the united states in any position to countenance possible confrontation with china, over taiwan, for example, and active confrontation with russia over ukraine? well, that will be a real challenge, because some of the weapons that are needed for ukraine would also be needed in the indo—pacific region. however, the vast majority of our navy, airforce, those kinds of capabilities, you don't have to take from one to put in the other. the american contribution in europe is actually not terribly significant in terms of overall size and capabilities. so it's not either/or, but it would put a burden on allies and on intelligence resources... it sure would. ..and obviously, financial resources, and especially the disruption of economies. this is why i think china is actually very unhappy with the kremlin. they are not providing anything. there's not rockets coming from china or... no, but they can sit on the sidelines and watch

as america expends the vast amounts of material and money on ukraine. and they can consider this — that actually the us defence budget is already extraordinarily high. it's at over $800 billion a year. many folks reckon that if they're to be serious in the us about confronting china militarily, it's got to go over a trillion a year — trillion dollars a year on defence. america isn't ready for that, is it? well, i think america is ready to defend democracy and to ensure that the international order from which we have prospered so much remains in effect, and we're not willing to allow china or russia or others just to run roughshod over law, international law, international agreements. so, that's what this is about. right. and when you try and project that power, i mean, obviously speaking personally, but projecting it on behalf of the united states, do you think the world really takes that seriously any more? that you have the strength to back those words with actions? not by ourselves. i mean, this is why my president has invested so much

time and effort into rebuilding nato, or the american relationship with our nato allies, rebuilding the relationship with the european union. we continue to focus on the relationship between the united states and the united kingdom because we don't have enough. we've never had enough to do it by ourselves. and so we know that all of our best and most reliable allies are in europe, as well as canada and australia. and we have to end there. ben hodges, it's been a pleasure to have you in the studio. thank you very much. thank you, stephen. hello. there was a stormy end to wednesday — low pressure sweeping rain and gales

across the uk. as we move into thursday, though, we'll see some improvements, with some sunshine around. one or two showers, but it will stay quite wet in the south—east as the overnight rain band lingers. and you can see here on the pressure chart, eventually it'll wriggle away as we move into thursday afternoon, but this new area of low pressure will bring increasing showers to the south—west quadrant of the country, along with strengthening winds. you notice the blue hue there on the temperature map. it will feel cooler across the northern half of the country throughout the day today. so a wet, damp morning across the south—east. eventually that should clear away into the afternoon. elsewhere, plenty of sunshine around. one or two showers. most of the showers affecting wales and the south—west of england, with increasing winds here, particularly through the channel. but it will be a blustery day across the southern half of the country. winds slightly lighter further north — that is away from the far north of scotland, and temperatures ten, 11 degrees in the north, at around 12 or 13 in the south, so it will

feel cooler for all. but a ridge of high pressure starts to build in early on friday, so winds veering to a more northerly direction and it will be quite cold. temperatures down to freezing across some northern areas and a bit of mist and fog too. so here it is — ridge of high pressure building in across the country for friday before more low pressure arrives for the weekend. any early showers will clear away from the far south early through friday, and then it's bright, plenty of sunshine around. a chilly start, mind you. temperatures rising a little bit through the day. a few showers still across northern scotland, but most places dry. 11 to 13 or 1a degrees across the south. so the weekend is looking unsettled. we've got more low pressure working its way in off the atlantic. that's going to bring rain and gales at times. it looks like one frontal system will cross the country on saturday, though. it will tend to weaken as it pushes towards the eastern side of the country,

then it's blustery showers, strong winds into sunday and this front bringing some wet weather once again to the south—east corner, so quite a mixed bag through the weekend. like i mentioned, it's wet in the west, showers further east, and then a little bit drier in the north on sunday. very wet across the south—east.

this is bbc news — i'm sally bundock with the latest headlines for viewers in the uk and around the world. five years after the manchester arena bombing an official report is expected to make serious criticisms of the emergency service response. a feeling of guilt, well, maybe if i did something even so small, you know, you can hold your head up high, but to stand there and then do nothing all that time, it was embarrassing, shameful. the united states condemns attempts by north korea to fire a long range intercontinental ballistic missile towards japan. a new climate report says temperatures in europe have

been going up by more than twice the global average. with the us midterm elections fast approaching —