Skip to main content

tv   BBC News  BBC News  June 19, 2023 11:00am-11:30am BST

11:00 am
the leader gives an outline of what the leader of the opposition has been saying about labour's plans for green energy, should they win the election next year. the former prime minister david cameron is set to give evidence shortly at the covid—19 public inquiry. it's the second week in the first phase of this inquiry, which is scrutinizing the uk's preparedness for a pandemic before covid hit in 2020, and looking at the government's decision—making in response to the outbreak. a number of high—level politicians and health officials are set to make an appearance this week for the inquiry. among them, we will hear from david cameron, the former prime minister. let's go live now to our health reporter, jim reed at the inquiry. david cameron is going to talk about the capabilities of the national health service prior to the onset of
11:01 am
the pandemic, for the simple reason that he was prime minister at the time. we are not hearing our correspondent. we will get some sound and we will come back to him shortly. just to be clear, the first week of the inquiry primarily focused on what the plans were in the event of a pandemic, and what the event of a pandemic, and what the balance was also between the advice from the advisers are advising the government at the time, and what emphasis was placed on what particular part of advice. the uk government was very keen to emphasise at the time that it was science led. this is david cameron, the former prime minister arriving at the inquiry. as we have said, he is going to be talking about the preparedness of the national health
11:02 am
service to cope with the pandemic. our correspondent... we can't hear him just yet. we will hear what david cameron is going to say. the important point here is that after the financial crisis there were significant cuts to the national health service, and the question now is, did they reduce the preparedness of the national health service to cope with the pandemic, and even worse, expose its staff to further risk? jim is with us now. he is outside the inquiry. what is david cameron going to say?— outside the inquiry. what is david cameron going to say? there is one line of rationing _ cameron going to say? there is one line of rationing that _ cameron going to say? there is one line of rationing that david - cameron going to say? there is one line of rationing that david cameron is likely to be asked. the british medical association issued a strongly worded statement criticising some of those policies in the decade before covid—19, saying that the so—called austerity policies, pressure on public health budgets might have left the national health service and social care
11:03 am
service badly exposed when covid—19 hit. we are expecting to see david cameron answer some of those criticisms today. he is likely to make the point as he has done in the past that was no choice but to make some of these decisions in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. and also in the past he has made the point that day—to—day nhs budgets were protected through that time. but it is one criticism, one line of questioning that he is likely to be asked today. a second line is also interesting, because in 2015 david cameron gave evidence to the g7 group of nations... i think we will now hear from david cameron. we are indeed, david cameron has just sat down in the inquiry. may i ask you to keep your voice up and speak— may i ask you to keep your voice up and speak into the microphone so that the _ and speak into the microphone so that the stenographer can hear you for the _ that the stenographer can hear you for the transcript. is your full name — for the transcript. is your full name david william donald cameron?
11:04 am
yes. name david william donald cameron? yes you _ name david william donald cameron? yes. you were leader of the conservative party and leader of the opposition— conservative party and leader of the opposition from 2005 until 2010, when _ opposition from 2005 until 2010, when you — opposition from 2005 until 2010, when you became prime minister of the united — when you became prime minister of the united kingdom, leading a coalition— the united kingdom, leading a coalition government with the liberat— coalition government with the liberal democrats with nick clegg as a deputy— liberal democrats with nick clegg as a deputy prime minister, and george osborne _ a deputy prime minister, and george osborne as_ a deputy prime minister, and george osborne as your chancellor. yes. to put that— osborne as your chancellor. yes. to put that in— osborne as your chancellor. yes. to put that in context, you became prime _ put that in context, you became prime minister in the wake of the 2008 _ prime minister in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and you remained _ 2008 global financial crisis and you remained prime minister in 2015, when _ remained prime minister in 2015, when the — remained prime minister in 2015, when the conservatives won the generai— when the conservatives won the general election, and you formed a conservative government. in 2016 you stood _ conservative government. in 2016 you stood down, _ conservative government. in 2016 you stood down, following the european union _ stood down, following the european union exit _ stood down, following the european union exit referendum result. your evidence _ union exit referendum result. your evidence this morning is going to fall under— evidence this morning is going to fall under four topics. first, evidence this morning is going to fall underfourtopics. first, the fall under four topics. first, the architecture fall underfourtopics. first, the architecture in place to deal with a large—scale emergency in 2010 and changes— large—scale emergency in 2010 and changes implemented during your time in office _
11:05 am
changes implemented during your time in office. secondly, the state of pandemic— in office. secondly, the state of pandemic preparedness before and during _ pandemic preparedness before and during yourtenure. pandemic preparedness before and during your tenure. three, your concerns— during your tenure. three, your concerns around the world health organization. fourthly, the impact of austerity on the health and social— of austerity on the health and social care service and underlying heaith _ social care service and underlying health inequalities. first of all, please — health inequalities. first of all, please can we have on the screen you'it _ please can we have on the screen you'll witness statement, which. you'll witness statement, can please can we have on the screen you'll witness statement, can you confirm _ you'll witness statement, can you confirm please, mr cameron, that this is— confirm please, mr cameron, that this is your— confirm please, mr cameron, that this is your witness statement and it is made — this is your witness statement and it is made due to the best of your knowledge and belief. yes, it is. thank— knowledge and belief. yes, it is. thank you — knowledge and belief. yes, it is. thank you. for the record, knowledge and belief. yes, it is. thank you. forthe record, it knowledge and belief. yes, it is. thank you. for the record, it is assigned — thank you. for the record, it is assigned at— thank you. for the record, it is assigned at page 19, but that signature, we don't need to go to that _ signature, we don't need to go to that we — signature, we don't need to go to that. we can take that down, please. dealing _ that. we can take that down, please. dealing first — that. we can take that down, please. dealing first with the architect in place _ dealing first with the architect in place to — dealing first with the architect in place to deal with large—scale emergencies in 2010 and changes implemented during your time in
11:06 am
office _ implemented during your time in office. when you became prime minister— office. when you became prime minister in 2010, you tell us in your— minister in 2010, you tell us in your witness statement that in your opinion, _ your witness statement that in your opinion, the existing architecture to deal— opinion, the existing architecture to deal with large—scale emergencies such as _ to deal with large—scale emergencies such as pandemics derived in large part from _ such as pandemics derived in large part from the civil contingencies act of— part from the civil contingencies act of 2004, and since 2008 had included — act of 2004, and since 2008 had included the national risk assessment and the national risk register— assessment and the national risk register assessment. assessment and the national risk registerassessment. so assessment and the national risk register assessment. so by architecture, you mean framework including _ architecture, you mean framework including legislation. yes _ yes. but yes. but before yes. but before coming yes. but before coming into yes. but before coming into power, your sense — yes. but before coming into power, your sense whilst in opposition was that the _ your sense whilst in opposition was that the overall architecture for dealing — that the overall architecture for dealing with civil contingencies, such— dealing with civil contingencies, such as — dealing with civil contingencies, such as pandemics, and the national security— such as pandemics, and the national security machine more widely, could benefit _ security machine more widely, could benefit in _ security machine more widely, could benefit in your view from improvement. in what ways did you think— improvement. in what ways did you think it _ improvement. in what ways did you think it should be improved? i commissioned pauline neville jones, who had been head of the
11:07 am
joint intelligence committee to write a report on national security and foreign policy in opposition, and foreign policy in opposition, and one of the recommendations she made was to have a full on national security council, to have eight national security adviser, to have a national security adviser, to have a national security secretariat. the point was to first of all make sure that the whole government looked at these risks, and a second to make sure there was real ministerial oversight because the national security council would be chaired by the pro—minister. thirdly, to make sure it was strategic, thinking right across the board about all the risks, and also making sure it was a truly international so you looking at risk of terrorism, climate change, space weather, all sorts of things, but also things like pandemics. why i particular thought this was important was, well i think the civil contingencies act and the previous government have done a good job in this regard, i knew that
11:08 am
prime ministers are always in danger of being pulled into the short term, rather than the long term, and having a national security council that you chair and a national security adviser, and having as part of that looking at the danger of things like pandemics, it would make sure you did focus on those long—term things. that was the point of the reform. i think it worked. i liked the way the national security council and the adviser worked, and the time the prime minister spent on that stuff because it had a good structure. �* that stuff because it had a good structure. . , ., , that stuff because it had a good structure. �* , ., , .,, structure. and you implement those recommendations _ structure. and you implement those recommendations as _ structure. and you implement those recommendations as soon _ structure. and you implement those recommendations as soon as - structure. and you implement those recommendations as soon as you i structure. and you implement those i recommendations as soon as you came into office _ recommendations as soon as you came into office. . �* , ~ into office. that's right. we were into office. that's right. we were in the middle _ into office. that's right. we were in the middle of _ into office. that's right. we were in the middle of the _ into office. that's right. we were in the middle of the afghan - into office. that's right. we were i in the middle of the afghan conflict and i thought, for instance, we would handle that conflict better if we had a whole government approach and if the national security council could address the challenges, and
11:09 am
you would have round the table all the relevant people, whether it was the relevant people, whether it was the defence secretary, the aid secretary, the energy secretary, home secretary and the pro—minister. —— prime minister. while of course prime ministers are powerful because they are prime ministers, they don't have a department of the same way that other ministers do, and having the national security adviser and the national security adviser and the national security secretariat working for you and bringing together the whole of government to address these challenges, i thought god politicians involved at the highest level and the right level to make sure this was being looked at properly. 50 make sure this was being looked at ”roerl . ., make sure this was being looked at n-roerl, ., ., ., ., make sure this was being looked at n-roerl. ., ., ., ., ,, . , properly. so a national security council as _ properly. so a national security council as you _ properly. so a national security council as you described, - properly. so a national security - council as you described, supported by national security secretariat, and a _ by national security secretariat, and a national security adviser. that's— and a national security adviser. that's right, and the national security adviser had deputies, one of whom was mostly concerned with intelligence and terrorism and
11:10 am
security, and the other more with foreign policy. but specifically, part of the job of the national security advisor, together with the national risk register and the national security secretariat, was to look at all potential risks. it is important that we did make a health pandemic a tier1 risk, so it was looking across the risks and deciding which one was most likely and which we need to prepare for the most. this pressure always to look at the most pressing risk, the terrorism risk of the most dangerous risk or the most immediate risk you need to balance that with making sure you are looking at all the risks, including ones that might not occur next month or next year, but might occur at some stage. that is why i think this reform was important. i'm not saying these things were not looked at before, of course they were, but this embedded in the system prime ministerial
11:11 am
leadership and political oversight and a whole government approach. thank you. the risk of a future pandemic— thank you. the risk of a future pandemic was, as you have made reference — pandemic was, as you have made reference to, prioritised as a tier 1 risk, _ reference to, prioritised as a tier 1 risk, and — reference to, prioritised as a tier 1 risk, and remained as such, did it not, _ 1 risk, and remained as such, did it not, throughout your time in office? one of— not, throughout your time in office? one of the _ not, throughout your time in office? one of the highest risks that the united _ one of the highest risks that the united kingdom faced. and although you tell— united kingdom faced. and although you tell us in paragraph 12 of your report— you tell us in paragraph 12 of your report that — you tell us in paragraph 12 of your report that it was a pandemic that was prioritised as a tier1 risk, in fact it _ was prioritised as a tier1 risk, in fact it was — was prioritised as a tier1 risk, in fact it was more discreet than that. it fact it was more discreet than that. it was _ fact it was more discreet than that. it was an— fact it was more discreet than that. it was an influenza pandemic, wasn't it? ., �* , , , it was an influenza pandemic, wasn't it? ., a , , it was an influenza pandemic, wasn't it? ,, it? that's right. this is may be caettin it? that's right. this is may be getting ahead _ it? that's right. this is may be getting ahead of _ it? that's right. this is may be getting ahead of myself, - it? that's right. this is may be getting ahead of myself, but l it? that's right. this is may be - getting ahead of myself, but when i look at all of this and read all the papers and thought so much about what subsequently happened and the horrors of the covid—19 pandemic, and let me say that the massive sympathy i feel for all of those who
11:12 am
lost loved ones and the suffering people have felt, and the importance of this inquiry to get to the bottom of this inquiry to get to the bottom of decisions that were made, decision that could have been made, and the preparations for the future, this is the thing i keep coming back to. the pandemic was a tier1 risk. pandemics were looked at, but there was this former chief medical officer sally davies said, it was a group thing. more time was spent on pandemic flu and the dangers of pandemic flu and the dangers of pandemic flu, ratherthan pandemic flu and the dangers of pandemic flu, rather than on pandemic, potential pandemics of other more respiratory diseases like covid—19 turned out to be. this is so important because so many consequences followed from that. i have been sort of wrestling with, you know, buti have been sort of wrestling with, you know, but i think the
11:13 am
architecture was good. the national security council, the adviser, the risk register and also this new security risk assessment, which was perhaps a bit more dynamic. but that's where i keep coming back to. so much time was spent on the pandemic influenza, which was seen as the greatest danger. we did have bad years for flu, so as the greatest danger. we did have bad years forflu, so it as the greatest danger. we did have bad years for flu, so it was a big danger but why won't more questions asked about what turned out to be the pandemic that we faced? it is hard to answer why that is the case and i'm sure this inquiry will spend and i'm sure this inquiry will spend a lot of time on that.— a lot of time on that. yes. during our a lot of time on that. yes. during your time — a lot of time on that. yes. during your time in _ a lot of time on that. yes. during your time in office _ a lot of time on that. yes. during your time in office there - a lot of time on that. yes. during your time in office there were - your time in office there were several— your time in office there were several outbreaks of other coronavirus across the world stop this inquiry— coronavirus across the world stop this inquiry has heard about muttibie _ this inquiry has heard about multiple outbreaks of sars. that is a coronavirus. i would like to put on to— a coronavirus. i would like to put on to screen— a coronavirus. i would like to put on to screen the following document. this is— on to screen the following document.
11:14 am
this is a _ on to screen the following document. this is a note — on to screen the following document. this is a note of a meeting of experts, _ this is a note of a meeting of experts, including professor mark wall house at the university of edinburgh, and also dame sally davies — edinburgh, and also dame sally davies. could we go to page two, biease _ davies. could we go to page two, please. underthe heading "clearand present— please. underthe heading "clearand present danger", if we can highlight the third _ present danger", if we can highlight the third paragraph. including the severe _ the third paragraph. including the severe respiratory infection sars, we note _ severe respiratory infection sars, we note that although there are not currently _ we note that although there are not currently vaccines against human coronavirus, there are vaccines against — coronavirus, there are vaccines against animal coronavirus. this was against animal coronavirus. this was a note _ against animal coronavirus. this was a note from — against animal coronavirus. this was a note from a — against animal coronavirus. this was a note from a meeting in march 2015 when _ a note from a meeting in march 2015 when you _ a note from a meeting in march 2015 when you are still in office, a meeting _ when you are still in office, a meeting chaired by the former chief medicai— meeting chaired by the former chief medical officer dame sally davies to whom _ medical officer dame sally davies to whom you have just made reference. do you _ whom you have just made reference. do you remember if this assessment of coronavirus as posing a clear and present— of coronavirus as posing a clear and present danger was brought to your
11:15 am
attention— present danger was brought to your attention in march 2015? i�*m present danger was brought to your attention in march 2015?— attention in march 2015? i'm afraid i don't attention in march 2015? i'm afraid i don't recall— attention in march 2015? i'm afraid i don't recall a _ attention in march 2015? i'm afraid i don't recall a specific— i don't recall a specific conversation, but, and it is difficult, this, because you are trying to remember conversations you had or didn't have so many years ago, and of course before this inquiry, i read all of this documentation. in the documentation, and the government did look at these diseases and there was operation alice in 2016, which i'm sure we will come to, but i don't remember this specific conversation. i would say my relationship with the chief medical officer was very strong and we met regularly and because of the experience with ebola, i think this was a government and a prime minister that was very concerned about potential pandemics and dangerous pathogens and things like antimicrobial resistance and all the
11:16 am
rest of it. we were back then thinking about it but it still comes back to this issue me on why so much time was spent on a flu pandemic and not so much on these others. though the the mers was looking at a specific condition. you mentioned ebola and you _ specific condition. you mentioned ebola and you were _ specific condition. you mentioned ebola and you were alive - specific condition. you mentioned ebola and you were alive to - specific condition. you mentioned ebola and you were alive to the i ebola and you were alive to the dangers — ebola and you were alive to the dangers that that disease or a similar— dangers that that disease or a similar disease with high transmissibility and mortality rates posed. _ transmissibility and mortality rates osed, ,., , transmissibility and mortality rates osed, , ., , posed, sorry to interrupt, the point about ebola — posed, sorry to interrupt, the point about ebola is _ posed, sorry to interrupt, the point about ebola is it's _ posed, sorry to interrupt, the point about ebola is it's less _ about ebola is it's less transmissible but highly lethal, and i think, so we've been looking at pandemic flu, we had a plan for that
11:17 am
and we wrote about sars virus and mers, ebola comes along which is not that transmissible but highly deadly so the question i keep coming back to is why weren't more questions asked about something that was highly transmissible, into it with massive levels of asymptomatic transmission, which was lethal but at a lower level than either mers or ebola. and i don't have an answer to that question but that's clearly where the gap was. eyre that question but that's clearly where the gap was.— that question but that's clearly where the gap was. are so concerned for ou where the gap was. are so concerned for you about — where the gap was. are so concerned for you about the _ where the gap was. are so concerned for you about the ebola _ where the gap was. are so concerned for you about the ebola crisis, - where the gap was. are so concerned for you about the ebola crisis, you i for you about the ebola crisis, you created _ for you about the ebola crisis, you created a — for you about the ebola crisis, you created a new body, the national security— created a new body, the national security council threats, hazards and resilience contingency committee. i and resilience contingency committee.— and resilience contingency committee. ,, ., , ., committee. i think that predated ebola, but committee. i think that predated ebola. but i _ committee. i think that predated ebola, but i may _ committee. i think that predated ebola, but i may be... _
11:18 am
committee. i think that predated ebola, but i may be... i- committee. i think that predated ebola, but i may be... ithink- committee. i think that predated ebola, but i may be... i think inl ebola, but i may be... ithink in our ebola, but i may be... ithink in your witness— ebola, but i may be... ithink in your witness statements - ebola, but i may be... ithink in your witness statements you i ebola, but i may be... i think in| your witness statements you tell ebola, but i may be... i think in i your witness statements you tell us it was _ your witness statements you tell us it was formulated partly as a result of the _ it was formulated partly as a result of the ebola crisis. in addition to which, _ of the ebola crisis. in addition to which, you — of the ebola crisis. in addition to which, you also formed a horizon scanning — which, you also formed a horizon scanning committee. both of which were run— scanning committee. both of which were run by— scanning committee. both of which were run by oliver letwin, and oiiver— were run by oliver letwin, and oliver letwin, as you say in your statements, your resilience minister in many— statements, your resilience minister in many ways. why did you think it was necessary to establish the threats— was necessary to establish the threats committee and a horizon scanning — threats committee and a horizon scanning department? i threats committee and a horizon scanning department?— threats committee and a horizon scanning department? i thought the threats committee _ scanning department? i thought the threats committee was _ scanning department? i thought the threats committee was set - scanning department? i thought the threats committee was set up i scanning department? i thought the | threats committee was set up before ebola but i have to check that. the reason for that was, as i said earlier, clothes and national security council was going to spend a lot of time on terrorism, security, afghanistan, libya and syria and things like that, so i thought it was important to make
11:19 am
sure that the national security secretariat and the politicians in the government spent time on hazards, threats, things like pandemics and other such things that were less immediate and current but otherwise you spend all your time on the other things. that's why thrc was set up. oliver was a very competent minister and had been in office and set national security council so i knew he'd to a great job in running that. and after ebola, he suggested, and i think the letter to me as any bundle... flan ebola, he suggested, and i think the letter to me as any bundle... can we ut that letter to me as any bundle... can we put that on — letter to me as any bundle... can we put that on screen, _ letter to me as any bundle... can we put that on screen, please? - letter to me as any bundle... can we put that on screen, please? this i letter to me as any bundle... can we put that on screen, please? this is l put that on screen, please? this is the contingency is forward look at, because _ the contingency is forward look at, because the threats committee, as you explain in your statements, had
11:20 am
a six-month — you explain in your statements, had a six—month forward look, a much shorter— a six—month forward look, a much shorter term — a six—month forward look, a much shorter term than compared to the nationai— shorter term than compared to the national risk register, which was five years. — national risk register, which was five years, and this is one of the updates— five years, and this is one of the updates which, is the man in charge of the _ updates which, is the man in charge of the threats committee, he would -ive of the threats committee, he would give to— of the threats committee, he would give to you — of the threats committee, he would give to you. can we look at page 22, paragraph _ give to you. can we look at page 22, paragraph 6.2? we'll come onto the letter— paragraph 6.2? we'll come onto the letter in _ paragraph 6.2? we'll come onto the letter in a _ paragraph 6.2? we'll come onto the letter in a moment. paragraph 6.2, we can— letter in a moment. paragraph 6.2, we can see — letter in a moment. paragraph 6.2, we can see here an outbreak of a novel— we can see here an outbreak of a novel strain — we can see here an outbreak of a novel strain of an infectious disease _ novel strain of an infectious disease causing a serious illness, excluding — disease causing a serious illness, excluding pandemics, it is raised within— excluding pandemics, it is raised within this — excluding pandemics, it is raised within this forward look. who tells you here _ within this forward look. who tells you here that the risk of an emerging infection becoming prominent is always present, particular— prominent is always present, particular the interface between animals— particular the interface between animals and humans, i.e zoonotic infections — animals and humans, i.e zoonotic infections. globally there are three
11:21 am
main _ infections. globally there are three main areas — infections. globally there are three main areas of concern, the ongoing threat _ main areas of concern, the ongoing threat of— main areas of concern, the ongoing threat of mers in eastern asia, avian— threat of mers in eastern asia, avian influenza in egypt and the epidemic— avian influenza in egypt and the epidemic of ebola virus disease in west— epidemic of ebola virus disease in west africa. we can take that down and can— west africa. we can take that down and can we — west africa. we can take that down and can we go to the letter you made mention— and can we go to the letter you made mention of. _ and can we go to the letter you made mention of, mr cameron, this was a letter— mention of, mr cameron, this was a letter sent— mention of, mr cameron, this was a letter sent to — mention of, mr cameron, this was a letter sent to you by oliver letwin the following year. can see it is dated _ the following year. can see it is dated the — the following year. can see it is dated the 22nd of march 2016, and we can read _ dated the 22nd of march 2016, and we can read through this together. it's title's _ can read through this together. it's title's horizon scanning for international health risks. this like ebola _ international health risks. this like ebola and zika virus can cause many— like ebola and zika virus can cause many risks— like ebola and zika virus can cause many risks to national security, i have _ many risks to national security, i have therefore as the secretariat to develop a _ have therefore as the secretariat to develop a new scanning system for international health risks, this is the horizon scanning group. the results — the horizon scanning group. the results of— the horizon scanning group. the results of this have been agreed
11:22 am
with all— results of this have been agreed with all relevant departments and endorsed — with all relevant departments and endorsed by the chief medical officer — endorsed by the chief medical officer. i'm confident the new system — officer. i'm confident the new system will enable ministers to spot major— system will enable ministers to spot major emerging diseases across the world, _ major emerging diseases across the world, understand the direct risks to the _ world, understand the direct risks to the uk, — world, understand the direct risks to the uk, british nationals and broto- — to the uk, british nationals and proto— british interest in affected countries, — proto— british interest in affected countries, and receive expert advice on clear— countries, and receive expert advice on clear responses and mitigation arrangements. a month a report will be issued _ arrangements. a month a report will be issued to— arrangements. a month a report will be issued to the health secretary, the international development secretary and me. this will outline key international health risks, departmental risk management. i have asked _ departmental risk management. i have asked the _ departmental risk management. i have asked the chief medical officer to approve _ asked the chief medical officer to approve each monthly report before it is issued — approve each monthly report before it is issued and attached as an example — it is issued and attached as an example of the report for your reference. to avoid this becoming 'ust reference. to avoid this becoming just business as usual, i suggest rather— just business as usual, i suggest rather than sending these reports each month to the committee, i shall write whenever officials flagged a health _ write whenever officials flagged a health risk of particular concern. he then — health risk of particular concern. he then goes on to talk about
11:23 am
implementation in april. were you concerned — implementation in april. were you concerned that, rather than you this as an _ concerned that, rather than you this as an example, these bodies which you set— as an example, these bodies which you set up. — as an example, these bodies which you set up, extending pandemic preparedness to a whole government procedure, _ preparedness to a whole government procedure, that what this was doing was encouraging working in a silo so that fewer— was encouraging working in a silo so that fewer people rather than larger departments were going to be involved? ., ., ., ., ~ involved? no, not at all. ithink this was an _ involved? no, not at all. ithink this was an excellent _ involved? no, not at all. ithink this was an excellent idea i involved? no, not at all. ithink this was an excellent idea of. involved? no, not at all. ithink this was an excellent idea of allj involved? no, not at all. i think. this was an excellent idea of all of her�*s and i think it came out of ebola because, we will come onto the world health organization, i don't think there is time the information coming out of the who about ebola and this was oliver saying, let's have our own horizon scanning to look across the globe for emerging problems in the next one that comes across is the zika virus and this
11:24 am
horizon scanning unit spots are quite quickly. i think this was us saying we can make the national security architecture works even better if we look for novel pathogens comes on the tracks and i think that was a thoroughly good thing. i don't know what happened to this organisation after i left it whether it continued, but i think this is a good idea and i don't think it was in a silo at all. m think it was in a silo at all. i'd like to ask — think it was in a silo at all. i'd like to ask you some questions about pacing _ like to ask you some questions about pacing mr— like to ask you some questions about pacing mr letwin in charge. in your witness _ pacing mr letwin in charge. in your witness statements, you say, in terms _ witness statements, you say, in terms of— witness statements, you say, in terms of oversight want to resilience planning i found that civil servants were good at enumerating risks, orto get civil servants were good at enumerating risks, or to get the right— enumerating risks, or to get the right order, however, to get following action, identity is a very strong _ following action, identity is a very strong ministers in the cabinet office — strong ministers in the cabinet office. say that in addition to 0liver— office. say that in addition to oliver letwin, your so had francis mauled. — oliver letwin, your so had francis mauled. but— oliver letwin, your so had francis mauled, but very senior and experienced ministers, driving change — experienced ministers, driving change in _ experienced ministers, driving change in action on those fronts ——
11:25 am
francis— change in action on those fronts —— francis modes. may be suggested by others _ francis modes. may be suggested by others to— francis modes. may be suggested by others to this inquiry that rather than _ others to this inquiry that rather than having a minister in charge resilience, — than having a minister in charge resilience, there should be an independent assessor, someone independent assessor, someone independent of government responsible for resilience that might— responsible for resilience that might be an expert and might be able to dedicate _ might be an expert and might be able to dedicate him or herself full—time to dedicate him or herself full—time to be _ to dedicate him or herself full—time to be role _ to dedicate him or herself full—time to be role and effectively be beyond the civil— to be role and effectively be beyond the civil service. what's your view is that, _ the civil service. what's your view is that, mr— the civil service. what's your view is that, mr cameron? | the civil service. what's your view is that, mr cameron?— the civil service. what's your view is that, mr cameron? i don't think there are alternatives, _ is that, mr cameron? i don't think there are alternatives, the - is that, mr cameron? i don't think there are alternatives, the should| there are alternatives, the should be compliments. i had the national security adviser and his deputies, butidea security adviser and his deputies, but idea of having someone equivalent to that in charge of resilience is an excellent idea and i think the government themselves have suggested that. i would personally keep that within the national security council architecture. but then you do need a minister to take responsibility for two reasons —
11:26 am
one, otherwise, it there's a danger that ministers are in the cabinet table think that threats, hassles and resilience is taken care of someone else, by a civil servant. and the second is that in not anyway to denigrate the incredible work civil servants too but i think ministers often come at these problems on a committee asking the question, here's with the information, what are we going to do, what is the outcome of this meeting, what will we do that is different? ifind that meeting, what will we do that is different? i find that chairing cobra as often as i did, that is what the prime minister or another politician brings, is that heroes all the information, but what's the action, what will be to? i think it would be a mistake to park resilience at the official level and not have senior politicians, including the prime minister and the national security council discussing it. for instance, when we take the
11:27 am
national security risk assessments, that assessment came to national security council. i can't remember the date of the meeting but remember sitting round the table to pit it with the secretary of state for home affairs and and all the rest, which risks should be aware, have we got this right? by that very act you are getting people who don't think everyday about pandemic preparedness and other things that can happen to focus on those things, as well as the and whatever.— focus on those things, as well as the and whatever. you've is point where you _ the and whatever. you've is point where you chose _ the and whatever. you've is point where you chose oliver— the and whatever. you've is point where you chose oliver letwin i the and whatever. you've is pointl where you chose oliver letwin and the qualities he had to be placed in the qualities he had to be placed in the shoes— the qualities he had to be placed in the shoes of effectively the resilience minister. and you would of course — resilience minister. and you would of course expect him as resilience minister— of course expect him as resilience minister to — of course expect him as resilience minister to deal with the threat which _ minister to deal with the threat which had been already assessed as a tier1 threats, pandemic. i would 'ust tier1 threats, pandemic. i would just like — tier1 threats, pandemic. i would just like to — tier1 threats, pandemic. i would just like to look at mr letwin's
11:28 am
witness — just like to look at mr letwin's witness statement. and can we go, please, _ witness statement. and can we go, please, it— witness statement. and can we go, please, it to — witness statement. and can we go, please, it to page two and highlight the first— please, it to page two and highlight the first part of paragraph six, down — the first part of paragraph six, down to— the first part of paragraph six, down to and including the words " much _ down to and including the words " much less— down to and including the words " much less well prepared", about half way down _ much less well prepared", about half way down. can we zoom in and highlight— way down. can we zoom in and highlight that? thank you. he says, during _ highlight that? thank you. he says, during this — highlight that? thank you. he says, during this period i was not directly— during this period i was not directly involved in planning for the government's response to pandemic influenza in the uk. in retrospect, it may seem surprising that my— retrospect, it may seem surprising that my resilience reviews did not cover— that my resilience reviews did not cover this — that my resilience reviews did not cover this issue, given the fact that— cover this issue, given the fact that pandemic influenza was ranked hi-h that pandemic influenza was ranked high both— that pandemic influenza was ranked high both in terms of impact and likelihood — high both in terms of impact and likelihood on the national risk register~ _ likelihood on the national risk register. the reason was that i was attention being focused on this issue by the line department a wasre
11:29 am
informed _ register. the reason was that i was informed by— register. the reason was that i was informed by cabinet office officials register. the reason was that i was informed _ register. the reason was that i was informed by— register. the reason was that i was informed by cabinet office officials when _ informed by cabinet office officials when _ informed by cabinet office officials when i _ informed by cabinet office officials when i initiated the resilience when i _ informed by cabinet office officials when i initiated the resilience review— review— when i initiated the resilience review process in 2012 that when i initiated the resilience review process in 2012 that unusually large amount of attention unusually large amount of attention had already been focused on this had already been focused on this particular— had already been focused on this particular threat because of its particular— had already been focused on this particular threat because of its position— position— particular threat because of its position in the national risk particular threat because of its position in the national risk register~ _ register~ _ position in the national risk register. that as a results, the uk position in the national risk register. that as a results, the uk was particularly well prepared to was particularly well prepared to deal with— was particularly well prepared to deal with pandemic influenza, that deal with— was particularly well prepared to deal with pandemic influenza, that the department of health is the department of health is preparing to carry out a major preparing to carry out a major exercise — preparing to carry out a major exercise to test our national exercise — preparing to carry out a major exercise to test our national capabilities in the face of pandemic capabilities in the face of pandemic influenza _ capabilities in the face of pandemic influenza and that my time therefore influenza _ capabilities in the face of pandemic influenza and that my time therefore would _ influenza and that my time therefore would be _ influenza and that my time therefore would be better spent examining would _ influenza and that my time therefore would be _ influenza and that my time therefore would be better spent examining other— would be better spent examining other health system risks for which departments may be less well prepared. and can we go to the next paragraph _ prepared. and can we go to the next paragraph and highlight paragraph seven— paragraph and highlight paragraph seven please? reflecting on that, mr letwin _ seven please? reflecting on that, mr letwin goes on to say, i now believe, — letwin goes on to say, i now believe, however, if it might have been _ believe, however, if it might have been helpful if i had delved into the pandemic influence risk myself. notwithstanding the amount of attention being focused on this
11:30 am
issue _ attention being focused on this issue by— attention being focused on this issue by the line department and the

56 Views

info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on