welcome to hardtalk. i'm stephen sackur. the existential challenges facing ukraine aren't just on the battlefield. as kyiv�*s counteroffensive against russian forces in the east and south of the country continues, the scale of kyiv�*s economic losses becomes ever clearer. the world bank put ukraine's rebuilding cost at more than $400 billion, and that was before the kakhovka dam was blown up. my guest is ukraine's foreign minister dmytro kuleba, in london for an economic recovery conference. on all fronts, is ukraine getting the support it needs?

dmytro kuleba, welcome to hardtalk. thank you. i think we have to begin with the military situation. details are limited, but would you accept that right now the ukrainian counteroffensive has not succeeded in punching a significant hole in russia's defensive line in your country? we are moving forward. that's the most important thing. when we speak with our generals and with independent experts, they all say that in the counter—offensive, the most important thing is to keep moving forward, whatever the pace is. i wish we broke all the lines by now and reached the sea of azov, but we're not stopping. and you have to take into account that for nine months russia was literally digging into the land, into the soil, reinforcing

its trenches with concrete and steel, and mining virtually every square metre. in some areas, our soldiers are moving only 200 or 300 metres per day, crawling. at terrible cost, too. this is a war. and the difference between now and the russians is that we do value human life. and for us, every peace, every life that is lost is a tragedy. but this is a war and people unfortunately die. but isn't this, in a horrible sense, exactly what vladimir putin wants to see on the battlefield? for him, attrition is a positive because the one thing that russia always has which ukraine does not have is vast scale, particularly in terms of manpower. so attrition works for russia, not for ukraine. well, if david defeated goliath, why shouldn't ukraine find the smart way to defeat russia? i don't think it's

about quantities. i think it's about quality. but even if we speak about the situation in terms of quantities, russia fights on its own. ukraine has friends backing it in its struggle, and together we can compensate the difference in numbers. no doubt ukraine has supporters and allies, and of course you get the weaponry, but you don't get men. you don't get boots on the ground. it was interesting to me that mykhailo podolyak, who's an adviser to president zelensky�*s office, he said that our goal here is to increase the psychological pressure on the russian army. i'm just wondering what the psychological pressure is on the ukrainian army right now. the struggle for victory, this is a huge pressure that we all feel, not only soldiers in the army, but also diplomats, politicians, all members of zelensky�*s administration. we understand how high stakes are.

and this is what drives us to work harder, to get all the weapons that our country needs. literally every day i think... i wake up with one thought — "have i done enough yesterday for a ukrainian soldier taking part in the counter—offensive to be able to save his life, to break through the lines and to move forward?" this is the pressure that we all are feeling. mm. you don't talk in kyiv very much about your losses, for understandable reasons. the washington post, in a recent quote of us officials anonymously said that those officials believe roughly 120,000 ukrainian soldiers have been killed or wounded. when you add to that something that the russian defence minister, sergei shoigu, said recently when he said, "we" — the russians — "we have 25 million reservists if necessary." take those two things together, does that alarm you? no.

for a very simple reason, first, our losses are incomparably lower compared to the russian losses, even in this counter—offensive. and that has to be clear. of course, there are losses on both sides because it's a war and we have to be realistic about it. second, one thing is to claim that you have millions of people. it's a completely different thing to actually mobilise them. and according to what we know, russia struggles enormously to get people into the army. and this is why the number of prisoners who fight on the front line in ukraine is growing, and because they force them to do it. and the third element is that one thing is to even mobilise someone. it's a completely different thing to train and equip him and to make him a real soldier, not cannon fodder, as russia unfortunately uses its human resource in most of the cases.

we've spoken a couple of times in the course of the war with you in kyiv, me in london. it's great to have you here in the studio. you have always made a point of saying we need more. in fact, one of your messages was, "i've got three messages — weapons, weapons and more weapons." isn't the truth, what we see on the battlefield right now in this counter—offensive as it unfolds, is that russia still has significant air power and air supremacy on the front line, particularly with their attack helicopters? you have not got what you needed from your western allies in terms of air power, particularly those f—165. is that going to change? unfortunately, you are right. and one of the biggest challenges we are facing on the ground is the dominance of russia in the air. unfortunately, the decision on f—16s came late. not too late, but it's late.

the good news is that we actually have it and we are now in the process of... well, in all honesty, you don't. what you have is the promise and the delivery of a promise to train pilots on f—165. it is still not quite clear when you're actually going to get these fighter planes themselves. listen, i've been in this business for 15 months already, and i can do my calculations. i think that we are going... i'm pretty certain we are going to get planes. i more or less understand the schedule. and because i know countries who are already beginning trainings for pilots, but i also know countries who are already prepared to deliver planes. netherlands, denmark, poland ? very good, very good friends. but i think it's up to them to make their announcements. the most important thing is technically operating fighting planes is very complicated, so you need

to prepare not only trainers, pilots, but also technicians, infrastructure. but it's going to happen. i have no doubts. late, but it's good. it is going to happen. how aware are you of the degree to which the level of support you've received from, say, the united states with its more than $40 billion of military assistance already, or indeed the united kingdom, much lowerfigure, but more than £4 billion... how aware are you of the degree to which that cannot be sustainable over the long, long term? you know, the taxpayers of both countries aren't going to allow that to just be an endless commitment, are they? it depends on what the goals of the taxpayers are and the politicians they support. this fight in ukraine is not a waste of taxpayers�* money. it's a strategic investment in the security of these taxpayers because fighting,

helping another country to fight the war, whatever the price is, is far less expensive than facing the enemy yourself and seeing your soldiers fight, and your sons and brothers go to the front line and die. and this is what we never asked for. we never asked any single country to send us troops, to have boots on the ground. but all we are telling, and the deal, this is the deal we are offering, is that you give us everything that we need and we do rest of the job, protecting, defending ourselves, but also protecting you from further troubles with russia. yeah. talking of troubles, how worried are you about a new phase of escalation? i referred in my introduction to the blowing up of the kakhovka dam, which you say was russian work. they, of course, deny it and say that actually it was the responsibility of the ukrainians. but nonetheless the dam was blown up. it had catastrophic consequences for communities and for vast tracts

of farmland. now, there are reports from ukraine that your military intelligence chiefs think the russians have mined the zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. how alarmed not only should ukrainians be, but all of us be about that? well, don't get me wrong, but i believe that the argument of escalation proved to be flawed over this war, because so many things were not done on time because... out of fear of escalation. and even before this war had started, we had had so many decisions which could have prevented this war, but were not made because people were afraid of escalation. we were told, "we cannot give you air—defence systems because this will lead to escalation. we cannot give you that because this will lead to escalation."

the reality is putin does not need reasons to escalate. he does not escalate in response to something. he escalates when he believes this is the right thing to do. and we should drop this logic. we should provide ukraine with everything that it needs to win, to expel russia from its territory so that they will not be in control of the zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, for example, or they will not be controlling the territories where they mine dams and commit atrocities. people have to understand that this is the only way forward. politicians in washington and in london, in paris, in berlin, in all other capitals, they have to put it at the very foundation of their policy. but don't you... i mean, don't you have to also be mindful that there are legitimate fears in western capitals of the very fact that vladimir putin possesses the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world? that's the truth. you can't change it. yes, but you somehow...

the same capitals somehow won in the cold war by deterring russian soviet nuclear potential. why are they afraid of... ..winning again? mm. let's talk about your immediate reason for being here in london right now, which is this economic recovery summit attended by 60 or so nations. it is a tough sell, isn't it, to tell the international community that they need to stump up hundreds of billions of dollars of investment pledges for your country when you are still fighting a hot war, which means there is profound insecurity across your nation? it is a difficult diplomatic challenge indeed. but i think what we're talking about here in london is about fast recovery and long recovery. fast recovery is something that needs to be fixed nowjust to allow the country to proper function, but most of

the job will have to be done after ukraine wins and security is ensured. isn't that a dangerous thing to say? because that essentially gives people the idea that they can talk a good game about helping the ukrainian economic recovery, but they don't actually have to deliver any money until the war is over — and the war may not be over, let us face it, for years? that's why we learned very well to see the difference between talking a talk and walking a walk. and this is why today in london we are discussing instruments, agreements and in particular mechanisms that will allow all of these investments to work. this is notjust about... as my president put it in his address to the conference, we have to move from visions to specific agreements. and this is exactly the case. there's a word, de—risking, which is used in the

investment community. it seems many private sector businesses which look at potential opportunities in ukraine — whether it's building roads or bridges, whatever — they are not going to be interested unless their investment is — quote—unquote — de—risked. and that means governments coming up with insurance, with guarantees, with a safety net. do you see that happening? this is one of the main topics of the london conference, to actually find common ground on how governments can help businesses de—risk. and the fact that hundreds of businesses and some very big investment companies are taking part in the london conference, this means that they believe that this is something that can be done, that this is something that can work. but you need to build it. you need to put the system in place. you need it. but, mr kuleba, why would you have any faith in the governments of the west walking the walk as well as talking the talk?

when, to take one example, sanctions — you from the very get—go, february 25th 2022, demanded the toughest of tough sanctions imposed on russia to, in a sense, choke off the russian economy. the russian economy hasn't been choked off. and if one looks at the detail of the way sanctions work on oil, for example, yes, the eu doesn't buy oil direct from russia, but what it does is buy oil and oil products from third countries like india, which have massively ramped up their importation of russian fossil fuels. the sanctions aren't working. they are, but more needs to be done. if we... the thing about sanctions is that you should not stop at any given moment. you should keep stepping up the pressure. and as we speak, the united... the european union rolled out another round of sanctions on russia. they're not as tough as we wish they could be, but it's not easy for the eu to reach consensus. but sanctions will not work once countries stop to impose them and to fight

circumvention of sanctions. do you wonder whether the west really has the will for this conflict, this fight, with everything it entails in terms of difficulties for themselves? when, for example, you step out of your plane into london and you appreciate... you look around and you appreciate that there are tens of billions of dollars�* worth of russian assets in london which just sit in banks untouched, which the british government doesn't have access to. it talks about compensating ukraine for all of the losses you've experienced, but that russian money isn't being touched. well, i guess it will be fair to say that neither london nor sanctioned regime can be built in a day. it takes time. it takes effort. what i heard today from prime minister sunak at the opening of the conference was assuring because he addressed the issue of using the russian assets as a means of compensating ukraine. and we fully agree with that.

russia must pay. but for someone to make russia pay, this someone has to introduce laws and legal practices to provide a reliable instrument. i mean, all the evidence suggests that governments in washington, in tokyo, in paris, maybe the commission in brussels, they all worry about the idea of seizing russian assets to compensate ukraine because they think it would set a dangerous precedent. it might undermine their reserve currency status. they basically also worry that russia will do a tit—for—tat seizure of their assets. for all those reasons, it probably is never going to happen. i think it will. the question is this about the scale of what is going to happen. but i'm pretty certain... and myjob and ourjob will be to make the scale of the russian payment as big as we can. but it's not going to be easy for the reasons that you mentioned.

but i've been through so many situations in this war when the conversation started with no and ended up with the same people celebrating their own yes, and forgetting how fierce they were in denying. it makes me believe that we're going to enjoy success here too. talking of conversations where the opening answer is no, the vilnius nato summit is coming up injust three weeks or so. president zelensky said that he would only go to the summit if there was going to be some concrete steps to ukrainian membership of nato. it now looks clear there will be no concrete steps at vilnius to ukrainian membership of nato. is he going to go or not? as of now, he is not going, but we still have three weeks ahead of us. and today in london, all the conversations i've had so far... ..nato was the key issue.

and what i try to explain to my colleagues is that time has come to bring nato in reality, to make nato match reality of the 2023 because... well, the reality — if i may interrupt — the reality of 2023 is that you have a hot war on your territory with a nuclear—armed power, russia. in that context, it is quite clear many nato members think there is no possibility of an early entry of ukraine into nato. to quote two — 0laf scholz, chancellor of germany, "nato membership will not happen in the foreseeable future." he said that last month. just a few days ago, peter szijjarto, the foreign minister of hungary, said, "look, we must speak clearly. the accession of a country at war must not be on nato�*s agenda." i very rarely agree with the assessment of the war by peter, but we are not seeking membership during the war.

what we seek is a clear and strong message that this membership will happen once conditions allow. and this is key here, because the last time nato said anything on ukraine's membership was in 2008, a couple of months before russia invaded georgia. nato is... ..exists in a completely different reality when it comes to the prospect of ukrainian membership. so what we want is the invitation. we want to have a clear message that, "guys, you are on the path. you are the strongest army able to defend eastern flank." and, by the way, if i was — which is not going to happen — but if i was german chancellor, i would be welcoming ukraine's accession to nato because ukraine will take a good part of the burden that germany is now carrying in defending eastern flank on its own shoulders.

what you may get is actually something a little bit different. you may get a commitment to so—called security guarantees. some call them israel—style guarantees. they mean israel's long—term security relationship with the united states which guarantees america giving leading military technologies to israel to give it a strategic edge. if you got those sorts of guarantees from some nato member states, including the us and some close partners, would that be enough? no. we were always very honest with our friends that security guarantees is something that needs to fill the gap between now and ukraine's nato membership, because the best security guarantee is ukraine, member of nato. nato membership cannot stop this war, but nato membership of ukraine will prevent for the worse, for the russian aggressions. and this is the strategy. but in between here and the membership, there is space for security guarantees to be applied.

butjust to be clear, zelensky is not going to go to vilnius because he doesn't feel that enough is on the table? we are working to get... to fill the plate with... in vilnius. it's not easy but we are moving forward, and the president will make his decision based on what deliverables of vilnius will be. yeah. you're going to come under increasing pressure, it seems, from many in the international community, to negotiate with vladimir putin. we've just seen the african leaders visit kyiv and moscow talking about a ten—point plan which begins with de—escalation of the military conflict, going all the way to a peace agreement. the brazilians, the turks are also offering themselves as mediators on the basis of negotiation now. are you prepared to contemplate negotiation now to end the killing? russia has... must withdraw from ukraine now. this is the position of ukraine.

so you're saying no talks while there is one russian boot still on any ukrainian territory, including crimea? because that seems the recipe for a forever war. no, no, no. listen, what people have to change is they have to finally start believing in ukraine. in february 2022, no—one believed in us. everyone was giving us maximum ten days to... before we would... we were to be crushed by the russian... by russian boots. then people changed their minds. they said, "oh, wow, ukraine is alive and kicking and they are actually fighting." so why do people believe, still try to make the point, that ukraine is incapable of winning? we can, if... if ourfriends keep believing in us and keep supporting us. in a word, is it conceivable that your government will ever negotiate with vladimir putin? it's hard for me to imagine specifically talks with president putin.

hard to imagine or impossible? impossible. yeah, sorry, i have to... i have to be less diplomatic. dmytro kuleba, we have to end there. thank you for being on hardtalk. hello. thursday turned into another very warm june day, and we've had no shortage of those recently. temperatures in the sunniest spots in the south—east got up to 29 celsius. and over the next few days, with this feed of very warm and increasingly humid air working across the uk, those temperatures could get even higherfor some, up to 30 or 31

degrees by sunday. in the short term, this is friday morning, with cloud and outbreaks of rain across parts of northern ireland, western scotland, some of that rain splashing into northern england, parts of wales. further south and east, largely dry, a bit more cloud in the mix and just the odd shower there for east anglia. but there will be some sunshine and a little bit of brightness at times in the north—east of scotland, which should lift temperatures quite nicely here. but the highest values will be towards the south—east of england at 26 or 27 degrees with an increasingly humid feel. and we take that humidity with us into friday night, with a lot of cloud, some mist and murk for coasts and hills and some outbreaks of rain, especially moving across scotland. these are the overnight lows, i4, 15, 16 degrees. so a little uncomfortable for sleeping, i suspect. and then into saturday, we start on that humid, muggy note with some areas of low cloud and mist and fog. a little bit of rain around, particularly across scotland, we'll keep some showery rain in north—west scotland, maybe north—western parts of northern ireland.

further south and east, where we see the best of the sunshine breaking through, temperatures really will climb, up to 28 or maybe 29 celsius. now, into the second half of the weekend, high pressure tends to retreat eastwards and we see this frontal system swinging in from the west. ahead of it, the breeze will strengthen — a southerly breeze, so it will still be bringing some very warm and humid air — but we see this band of rain pushing in from the west and some of this will be heavy and thundery. and behind that, a change in the wind direction to a westerly wind, and so it will start to feel a little bit fresher. but ahead of that rain band, in the south—east corner, highs of 30 or 31 degrees. so for the weekend, we can sum things up like this. it will be very warm, the nights will be particularly humid and we will see that risk of thundery downpours, particularly on sunday. and then into next week, quite a change. it's going to be much more unsettled. some outbreaks of rain at times and not quite as warm as it has been.

live from london. this is bbc news. the rescue operation ends — after debris from titan, the missing sub, is found near the wreck of the titanic. all five on board are dead.