forced to quit response before being forced to quit injune response before being forced to quit in june 2021. response before being forced to quit injune 2021. well, he is due to give evidence to lady hallett�*s inquiry injust give evidence to lady hallett�*s inquiry in just a few minutes�* time. in a written submission, he suggested the uk was not prepared for a covid pandemic. he is likely to face questions about issues that he was responsible for, including ppe provision, nhs staffing levels and planning to prepare care homes. ellie price is following

in terms of planning, rather than decisions, matt hancock was there in the middle of things, making decisions during the pandemic. i think it's really important to stress that this part of the inquiry is about decisions made in the run—up to the pandemic. in the months and years previous to it, rather than what happened on the 23rd of march, when the country was locked down. quite clearly, there is a lot of anger. i understand there are a number of protesters outside the inquiry. a lot of anger. matt hancock became the sort of figurehead for it, because he was a health secretary during a pandemic. health secretary during a pandemic. he resigned in 2021, after he broke his own social distancing rules because he kissed his aide, caught

on camera, or rather scandalous and embarrassing for him. for many, that became the end of a long line of mess ups, if you like. to some extent, matt hancock will be looking to put his own stamp on, defend his own personal reputation in all of this. , _, ., this. interest income in a written submission _ this. interest income in a written submission a _ this. interest income in a written submission a few _ this. interest income in a written submission a few moments - this. interest income in a written submission a few moments ago, | this. interest income in a written - submission a few moments ago, he's already said the uk was not prepared for a covid pandemic. it could be extremely damning, what he has to say, and really significant. figs extremely damning, what he has to say, and really significant. $5 i say, and really significant. as i sa , say, and really significant. as i say. he's _ say, and really significant. as i say. he's got _ say, and really significant. as i say. he's got no _ say, and really significant. as i say, he's got no reason - say, and really significant. as i say, he's got no reason to pull his punches. he was a health secretary, then he resigned. he is no longer a minister or a conservative mp and is standing down at the next general election. certainly no loyalty there. as i say, a real sense that he will want to clear his own name, because he, personally, came out very badly from all of this, or at least that is the perception. there are protesters outside. i spoke to them before he arrived, one said, i would not miss this for the world.

these are the moments that he feels he gets his chance to say what he thinks. this is about planning, this is about preparedness, not about the decisions made during. but there will be questions about ppe, was there sufficient stockpiling of ppe in the event of any pandemic, whether it be a flu pandemic or coronavirus pandemic, that is something we had from the royal couege something we had from the royal college of nurses yesterday. he said, no, there wasn't enough. there will be questions about the social care system, not necessarily the decision to send people from hospitals into social care settings, but were the decisions based on any blueprint, was there a government plan about what should happen to care homes in the event of a pandemic? i think also they will be questions about the state of the nhs in terms of its finances, in the run—up to the pandemic. that is something we heard an awful lot about in the last few weeks,

certainly something david cameron and george rose byrne were asked about, whether, following successive cuts both for the nhs, but also local authorities under different departments, whether the nhs was in a suitable state. sally davies said that staffing levels were not high enough, there were not enough intensive care beds. all of the big questions about the run—up to what happened are going to be the awkward ones that will be put to matt hancock. we have just seen some protesters, one of them being taken away by police, it looks like they have been arrested. itjust shows the passion, the anger for arrested. itjust shows the passion, the angerfor some, and the arrested. itjust shows the passion, the anger for some, and the emotion thatis the anger for some, and the emotion that is still so apparent, at the beginning of the inquiry we saw lots of families of those who lost loved ones outside, with photos of loved ones, saying, wejust want ones outside, with photos of loved ones, saying, we just want answers. that's very clear. the country very much needs answers. but this inquiry will take years?— will take years? that's a really important _ will take years? that's a really important point _ will take years? that's a really important point to _ will take years? that's a really important point to make, -

will take years? that's a really important point to make, this| will take years? that's a really. important point to make, this is will take years? that's a really - important point to make, this is the first part of the inquiry, it is expected to go on for several years, longer than even the pandemic took. so i think whether they get the answers they are looking for today, i suspect not, because it's going to be about the issue of preparedness, rather than decisions made at the time. real emotions running very high today. as i say, i spoke to the protesters, exactly that, they want their answers. today might not be their answers. today might not be the day to get all of them, but quite clearly, these politicians and civil servants, scientists are obviously being questioned over the last few weeks, this part of inquiry will go on for another couple of weeks. the inquiry itself will take years. but i think it's worth noting, actually, the next bit of it will be about political decisions made during a pandemic. that will be the really political and awkward stuff for the current government. although a number of the key players, borisjohnson and matt hancock, are no longer in post. but that will come in the autumn. the

evidence, the report, the bit that lady hallett, the chair, we'll think about all of this, it is expected to be published as the rest of the inquiry goes on. i think we should hear that probably by early next year. i've noticed her say a couple of times to a number of witnesses, this issue of whether there should have been a senior government minister in charge of resilience and planning, that was something that came up last week with oliver letwin, at a time in the cabinet office, he was in charge of planning. the suggestion being there should be somebody dedicated to that, he stays in post for the whole length of any parliament. a lot of the criticism has been in that both politicians and civil servants move around a lot, so a lot of the expertise is lost when it comes to planning and resilience, and all of these things we had not thought about yet, but need to be thought about yet, but need to be thought about in terms of pandemics. not just pandemics, all sorts of national emergencies. i think those are the sorts of issues that will probably come up out of it. the

other thing we have heard a lot about is whether ministers and civil servants, their eyes were taken off the ball because of brexit. there was a lot of no—deal brexit planning going on in 2018 and 2019. the criticism and suggestion has been that it did happen, because frankly it was the bigger risks, say civil servants, facing the country at a time. ., ~' ,, , . servants, facing the country at a time. . ~ ,, , . �*, time. thank you very much. let's cross over _ time. thank you very much. let's cross over to _ time. thank you very much. let's cross over to the _ time. thank you very much. let's cross over to the inquiry. - time. thank you very much. let's cross over to the inquiry. lady . cross over to the inquiry. lady hallett, the chair of the inquiry, has taken her seat. matt hancock has been sworn in. let's listen. {guild been sworn in. let's listen. could ou cive been sworn in. let's listen. could you give the _ been sworn in. let's listen. could you give the inquiry _ been sworn in. let's listen. could you give the inquiry your - been sworn in. let's listen. could you give the inquiry your full - been sworn in. let's listen. limit. you give the inquiry your full name? you give the inquiry yourfull name? my you give the inquiry yourfull name? my full name is matthewjohn david hancock _ my full name is matthewjohn david hancock. mr my full name is matthew john david hancock. ~ ., . ~ my full name is matthew john david hancock. ~ ., ., ~ my full name is matthew john david hancock. ~ ., ., ., hancock. mr hancock, thank you for attendin: hancock. mr hancock, thank you for attending today- — hancock. mr hancock, thank you for attending today. while _ hancock. mr hancock, thank you for attending today. while you - hancock. mr hancock, thank you for attending today. while you give - attending today. while you give evidence, could you please speak up, so that we may all hear you clearly, and also so that the stenographer can hear you for the purposes of the transcript. if i ask a question that is not clear, please don't hesitate

to ask me to repeat it. there will be a break in the course of the morning's evidence session. you have kindly provided a witness statement, dated the 20th of april of this year, is that right? that dated the 20th of april of this year, is that right?— dated the 20th of april of this year, is that right? that is right. could we have _ year, is that right? that is right. could we have on _ year, is that right? that is right. could we have on screen - year, is that right? that is right. could we have on screen 18285? j page 2a, i think is the last page. you will find on the 12th of may, therefore, it was accompanied by the usual statement of truth. mr hancock, you were paymaster general and ministerfor the hancock, you were paymaster general and minister for the cabinet office

between the 11th of may 2015 and july between the 11th of may 2015 and july 16. between the 11th of may 2015 and jul 16. , between the 11th of may 2015 and july16. yes. during that time, where you _ july16. yes. during that time, where you therefore _ july16. yes during that time, where you therefore responsible, ministerial lee, for an important part of this pandemic preparedness structure, namely the national security risk assessment process? yes, i was formally the junior minister responsible for that, both for the secret part and for the national risk register. i reported to oliver letwin and he, in practice, led on those areas. but nevertheless, i had junior oversight of them. is nevertheless, i had “unior oversight of them. . . nevertheless, i had “unior oversight ofthem. , ., , , , ., of them. is that because the senior minister in — of them. is that because the senior minister in that _ of them. is that because the senior minister in that regard _ of them. is that because the senior minister in that regard as - of them. is that because the senior minister in that regard as the - minister in that regard as the chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, which he was, and you were thejunior lancaster, which he was, and you were the junior ministerial colleague as minister for the cabinet office? i colleague as minister for the cabinet office?— colleague as minister for the cabinet office? i was effectively the number _ cabinet office? i was effectively the number two _ cabinet office? i was effectively the number two in _ cabinet office? i was effectively the number two in the - cabinet office? i was effectively

the number two in the cabinet l the number two in the cabinet office, yes. the number two in the cabinet office. yes-— the number two in the cabinet office, es. y., , _, office, yes. then, did you become secretary of _ office, yes. then, did you become secretary of state _ office, yes. then, did you become secretary of state at _ office, yes. then, did you become secretary of state at the _ office, yes. then, did you become i secretary of state at the department of health and social care between the 9th ofjuly 2018, when you took over from jeremy the 9th ofjuly 2018, when you took overfrom jeremy hunt the 9th ofjuly 2018, when you took over from jeremy hunt mp, and the 26th ofjune 2021 when you resign? yes. ., , ,., 26th ofjune 2021 when you resign? yes. ., , ,., ., yes. for the purposes of those who ma be yes. for the purposes of those who may be listening — yes. for the purposes of those who may be listening to _ yes. for the purposes of those who may be listening to mr _ yes. for the purposes of those who may be listening to mr hank's - may be listening to mr hank's evidence, i am going to make clear that your appearance today is obviously concerned with the discharge of your functions as a ministerfor discharge of your functions as a minister for the discharge of your functions as a ministerfor the cabinet discharge of your functions as a minister for the cabinet office, and as secretary of state in the department of health and social care, pre—pandemic. department of health and social care, pre-pandemic._ department of health and social care, pre—pandemic. yes. we are care, pre-pandemic. yes. we are concerned — care, pre-pandemic. yes. we are concerned today _ care, pre—pandemic. yes we are concerned today only care, pre—pandemic. ie3 we are concerned today only with the issues of emergency planning and preparedness. and so i may clear i will not be asking you questions about the detail of non—pharmaceutical interventions, lockdowns, the government response or the test and trace, or procurement, or ppe issues which

arose after the pandemic struck. they will come in later modules. they— they will come in later modules. they will— they will come in later modules. they will all be in later modules, particularly module two in the autumn, for which mr hancock has already provided a draft statement. epr pandemic planning. the functions of the secretary of state, mr hancock, in relation to pandemic planning are wide—ranging and complex, are they not? there is quite a lot to do concerned with in this field. , ~ ., , this field. yes. and that is in addition to _ this field. yes. and that is in addition to the _ this field. yes. and that is in addition to the very - this field. yes. and that is in addition to the very broad i addition to the very broad responsibilities overall as secretary of state.- responsibilities overall as secretary of state. you are responsible, _ secretary of state. you are responsible, or _ secretary of state. you are responsible, or were - secretary of state. you are - responsible, or were responsible come in broad terms, for health and social care, that includes, therefore, health protection, health

improvement, the health care systems, the social care systems, although that is largely in the hands of local authorities, and, most importantly, perhaps, the nhs. so it's a very wide brief indeed. i wouldn't say most importantly the nhs, i would say there are many, many areas of importance, and one of the challenges of the job is to try to put your attention to the most important areas. because it is so broad. it important areas. because it is so broad. . . . important areas. because it is so broad. , ., ., . v, important areas. because it is so broad. ., . ., ., broad. it is a vital function of the secretary of _ broad. it is a vital function of the secretary of state _ broad. it is a vital function of the secretary of state to _ broad. it is a vital function of the secretary of state to deal - broad. it is a vital function of the secretary of state to deal with i secretary of state to deal with health emergencies. absolutely. goina into health emergencies. absolutely. going into the _ health emergencies. absolutely. going into the job, _ health emergencies. absolutely. going into the job, i— health emergencies. absolutely. going into the job, i had - health emergencies. absolutely. going into the job, i had some . going into thejob, i had some experience, at a morejunior level, of dealing with crises and emergencies. so i took my responsibilities as the principal responder to a pandemic very seriously. responder to a pandemic very seriously-— responder to a pandemic very seriousl . , ., ., seriously. does dealing with health emergencies _ seriously. does dealing with health emergencies include _ seriously. does dealing with health emergencies include dealing - seriously. does dealing with health emergencies include dealing with l

emergencies include dealing with infectious diseases? yes. emergencies include dealing with infectious diseases?— emergencies include dealing with infectious diseases? yes, of course. and bein: infectious diseases? yes, of course. and being ready _ infectious diseases? yes, of course. and being ready to _ infectious diseases? yes, of course. and being ready to deal _ infectious diseases? yes, of course. and being ready to deal with - infectious diseases? yes, of course. and being ready to deal with them? | and being ready to deal with them? being ready to deal with the risk of infectious diseases?— infectious diseases? absolutely. when concerned _ infectious diseases? absolutely. when concerned in _ infectious diseases? absolutely. when concerned in the - infectious diseases? absolutely. when concerned in the field - infectious diseases? absolutely. when concerned in the field of l when concerned in the field of emergency preparedness, resilience, civil contingencies, where there is a health emergency, it is the department of health and social care thatis department of health and social care that is the lead government department. in effect, it is the department. in effect, it is the department in the driving seat? yes. department in the driving seat? yes, undersecretary _ department in the driving seat? yes, undersecretary of _ department in the driving seat? i;e3 undersecretary of state, i department in the driving seat? i;e:3 undersecretary of state, i felt keenly the responsibility, as essentially the lead responder in the first instance to those sort of health emergencies, and it was a part of my day—to—day work, because these emergencies happen from time to time. ~ ,, ,, . ., , .,

to time. were, when us secretary of state, risks — to time. were, when us secretary of state, risks prioritised _ to time. were, when us secretary of state, risks prioritised in _ to time. were, when us secretary of state, risks prioritised in any - to time. were, when us secretary of state, risks prioritised in any way? i state, risks prioritised in any way? or is there a grading system to prioritise those most important and serious risk from those that were less? . serious risk from those that were less? , ., _, , ., serious risk from those that were less? , ., .., , ., , less? yes, of course, that is absolutely — less? yes, of course, that is absolutely vital. _ less? yes, of course, that is absolutely vital. one - less? yes, of course, that is absolutely vital. one of - less? yes, of course, that is absolutely vital. one of the l absolutely vital. one of the challenges in the system as big as a health system is making sure the decisions are taken the right level. because if you escalated anything to the secretary of state, whoever they are, they would be completely overwhelmed. yet it is vital to escalate the things that need to be seen by the secretary of state to their desk. seen by the secretary of state to their desk-— seen by the secretary of state to their desk. ~ ., , ., . their desk. was influenza pandemic -rioritised their desk. was influenza pandemic prioritised as _ their desk. was influenza pandemic prioritised as a _ their desk. was influenza pandemic prioritised as a tier— their desk. was influenza pandemic prioritised as a tier1 _ their desk. was influenza pandemic prioritised as a tier1 riske? - their desk. was influenza pandemic prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, i prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, it was. i recall— prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, it was. i recall in _ prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, it was. i recall in my _ prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, it was. i recall in my first - prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, it was. i recall in my first day - prioritised as a tier1 riske? yes, it was. i recall in my first day i i it was. i recall in my first day i was given a briefing document about as big as this one. and one of the elements of it was making sure my responsibility, as the tier1 national responder, for pandemic

flu, and for other infectious diseases. i was already aware of this element of the role from my time at the cabinet office, but nevertheless it was properly and formally brought to my attention, and on day one i asked for more information on preparedness, because, having been involved in previous crises, for instance at the bank of england, before i went into politics, i knew that when things go wrong, things move quickly and you need to be as well—prepared as you can. fill need to be as well-prepared as you can. �* . need to be as well-prepared as you can. �* , ., can. at the highest level of the department. — can. at the highest level of the department, was _ can. at the highest level of the department, was there - can. at the highest level of the department, was there a - can. at the highest level of the department, was there a board can. at the highest level of the - department, was there a board known as the departmental board, which looked at the highest level on the major risks confronting the department?— major risks confronting the de artment? , ., ., major risks confronting the deartment? , ., ., ., department? yes, and the role of the departmental— department? yes, and the role of the departmental board _ department? yes, and the role of the departmental board was _ department? yes, and the role of the departmental board was to _ department? yes, and the role of the departmental board was to ensure . departmental board was to ensure that the department was structuring itself properly to deal with the different challenges that it faced.

may we have 23142, which is a copy of your department's then a high level risk register. for quarter three, 2019—20. level risk register. for quarter three, 2019-20. if level risk register. for quarter three, 2019—20. if you can go to the top of the page. we will see there the years 2019 — 20, quarterthree, high level we will see there the years 2019 — 20, quarter three, high level risk register. if you go to the far left—hand side of the page, there will be a number of road numbers. if you could scroll down, please, to row 11. there are two names in the column

second from the left, mr hancock, emma reid and clara sinton, both of whom have been witnesses before. the description, major national infectious disease outbreak in pandemic flu, and the risk identified, for self—evident reasons, is that the department fails to respond and mobilise adequately to a major national infectious disease hazard, such as pandemic flu or other novel infection. and the approach taken, the response on the behalf of the department, is in the next column, to manage the risk and likely domestic impact of a major pandemic flu or emerging infectious disease outbreak. so, the risk was identified in terms notjust of the pandemic being an influenza pandemic, but obviously the risk of an infectious disease outbreak, an emerging infectious disease outbreak. does its presence in that

chart, in that schedule, indicate the seriousness with which the department took the risk of a major infectious disease outbreak or pandemic flu? infectious disease outbreak or pandemic flu ?_ infectious disease outbreak or pandemic flu? yes. and the red ratin: pandemic flu? yes. and the red rating demonstrates _ pandemic flu? yes. and the red rating demonstrates that - pandemic flu? yes. and the red rating demonstrates that the i rating demonstrates that the significance of the impact of this, should it strike, could be very serious. and the day—to—day life of a health secretary involves being aware of and, from time to time, being involved in managing the response to potential infectious disease risks, which happen from time to time. and i set out in my statement that over the autumn of 2019, there was a potential flu outbreak, there was what is now known as m—pox outbreak, now known as monkeypox, and we were dealing

with the ebola outbreak in central africa. the principal responsibility was to make sure that we were prepared should ebola come to the uk. this war is not a theoretical exercise, it was part of the day—to—day job exercise, it was part of the day—to—dayjob of being health secretary. it day-to-day “ob of being health secreta . . . day-to-day “ob of being health secreta . ., , ., secretary. it was apparent from the document that, _ secretary. it was apparent from the document that, in _ secretary. it was apparent from the document that, in relation - secretary. it was apparent from the document that, in relation to i secretary. it was apparent from the document that, in relation to each. document that, in relation to each risk identified on the left of the schedule, a number of what is known as mitigations are put in place, in order to manage the risk. in other words, the department sets out in columns k, l and words, the department sets out in columns k, land n, in response words, the department sets out in columns k, l and n, in response to columns k, land n, in response to each columns k, l and n, in response to each risk, what the department is going to mitigate the risk, to ensure that either the risk does not eventuate and does not come to pass, or to manage the consequences of whatever it is that the risk amounts

to, what it brings about and how the consequences can be managed. do you happen to know why, in this risk register, there is no mitigation set out in respect of that row 11 risk? no, i don't know why those boxes are empty. but i do know that there was significant activity under way, both in the department and in public health england, to make sure that we were prepared, as prepared as then thought possible. i'll come onto that, because it's absolutely essential, that question. frankly, it was a regular occurrence to deal with these sorts of novel infectious diseases and threats. so, it was

something that happened all the time. do something that happened all the time. , ., something that happened all the time. i. something that happened all the time. ., , . ., time. do you recall any particular departmental— time. do you recall any particular departmental board, _ time. do you recall any particular departmental board, which i time. do you recall any particular i departmental board, which presumably attended, at which the row 11 risk of a major national infectious disease in pandemic flu was actively debated? ., disease in pandemic flu was actively debated? ila. do you have any debated? no. do you have any recollection _ debated? iif>v do you have any recollection of the debate surrounding this particular risk at departmental boards? obviously a great deal many points go across the secretary of state's desk, but do you have any personal recollection? i don't of the departmental board, but i also wouldn't have expected this to be debated at the departmental board, because the departmental board, because the departmental board, because the departmental board was focused on ensuring that there was appropriate resource in place for any of the different risks that the department faced. and ensuring that the department was set up to respond, not to do the responding itself.

it's an important distinction in terms of how the board operated, and what its job was. i was aware, from the day one brief onwards, of the work that was under way. so, there is no substantive reason that these boxes should be empty, and i think it would be wrong to read from this, which i don't recall myself, this implying that there was not work ongoing. as you can see from the other paperwork, there was. my question was to ask you whether you recollected what was being done in terms of was there a debate about, as you say, the processes that needed to be put into place? was there a debate about what needed to be set up to mitigate this risk at a departmental board level?- be set up to mitigate this risk at a departmental board level? there was at a departmental— departmental board level? there was at a departmental level. _ departmental board level? there was at a departmental level. not - departmental board level? there was at a departmental level. not from i departmental board level? there was j

at a departmental level. not from my recollection at the board. but i don't think the board would have been the normal place to have had such discussion.— been the normal place to have had such discussion. well, mr hancock, that cannot — such discussion. well, mr hancock, that cannot be _ such discussion. well, mr hancock, that cannot be right, _ such discussion. well, mr hancock, that cannot be right, because i such discussion. well, mr hancock, that cannot be right, because this l that cannot be right, because this is a schedule of the high level risks which were put before the departmental board. therefore, it must follow that these are risks and mitigations which are debated by the departmental board. that is what this chart shows. the departmental board. that is what this chart shows.— departmental board. that is what this chart shows. the purpose of the board was to — this chart shows. the purpose of the board was to ensure _ this chart shows. the purpose of the board was to ensure that _ this chart shows. the purpose of the board was to ensure that at - this chart shows. the purpose of the board was to ensure that at the i board was to ensure that at the apartment was doing what needed to happen, ratherthan apartment was doing what needed to happen, rather than to debate the substance of it. bill happen, rather than to debate the substance of it.— happen, rather than to debate the substance of it. all right. you have referred to — substance of it. all right. you have referred to the _ substance of it. all right. you have referred to the fact _ substance of it. all right. you have referred to the fact that _ substance of it. all right. you have referred to the fact that the - referred to the fact that the department of health and social care was the lead government department, when it comes to dealing with planning and preparedness for health emergency, and also in relation to the necessary response. as the secretary of state, what did you

understand that responsibility to consist of? what did lead government departments in the civil contingencies field mean to you? it means if that risk begins to materialise, it is the department's responsibility to act appropriately. also, before that stage, it is the department was not responsibility to have adequate surveillance to that sort of risk. and therefore, a secretary of state, it was my responsibility to ensure, as much as possible, given all the other pressures, that there was adequate oversight. bud pressures, that there was adequate oversi . ht. �* ., pressures, that there was adequate oversiuht. �* ., ., , oversight. and did that oversight com - rise oversight. and did that oversight comprise matters _ oversight. and did that oversight comprise matters such _ oversight. and did that oversight comprise matters such as - oversight. and did that oversight l comprise matters such as ensuring that the department played its proper part in the risk assessment process? proper part in the risk assessment rocess? . proper part in the risk assessment process? yes. owning, to use a

terrible phrase, _ process? yes. owning, to use a terrible phrase, the _ process? ie3 owning, to use a terrible phrase, the risks to which the department was responsible, dealing with capability, how to respond to risks eventuate in, contingency and emergency planning in response, again, to those risks, and building up the department's own resilience, how it would cope with the impact of one or more of these risks? . . the impact of one or more of these risks? , , ., ., ., ., risks? yes, bringing all of that to the attention _ risks? yes, bringing all of that to the attention of— risks? yes, bringing all of that to the attention of the _ risks? yes, bringing all of that to the attention of the rest - risks? yes, bringing all of that to the attention of the rest of- the attention of the rest of government, should action be needed elsewhere in government, in addition.- so, - elsewhere in government, in l addition.- so, focusing addition. indeed. so, focusing firstl , addition. indeed. so, focusing firstly. please _ addition. indeed. so, focusing firstly, please come _ addition. indeed. so, focusing firstly, please come on - addition. indeed. so, focusing firstly, please come on one i addition. indeed. so, focusing firstly, please come on one of| addition. indeed. so, focusing i firstly, please come on one of those areas, the risk assessment area, when you joined the department as secretary of state, he would not, i think, have been engaged in the sra process, the risk assessment process, the risk assessment process, because one was not produced until after he left office in 2019, when the processes were brought together. but do you recall

the detail of that process? do you recall specific debate about the contents of the 2019 cabinet office produced risk assessment? no, iwas no, i was not involved in the debates. there was an m'lady produced just before i joined debates. there was an m'lady produced just before ijoined the cabinet office. a significant piece of work had just been concluded. i was aware of and read those documents at the time, but then i was not aware of the next iteration of that work going on, and as you say, there was not a publication in that area for a number of years. in any case, the language in those documents, as they were revisited over the years, was essentially the

same. which is that of the category one, top risk was of a pandemic, influenza pandemic, and there was also a consideration of other infectious diseases and external threats. i know there has been significant discussion so far at the inquiry of the focus on influenza pandemic. i was told that the reason that was the category one risk is because it is the most likely pandemic. but, of course, we were aware of other infectious diseases, not least because we were actively involved in responding to ebola and, to a lesser extent, m—pox, and phe had responsibility for diseases which happen in smaller numbers, like legionnaires' disease. i was aware of it both in the work of the

production of risk assessments on the day—to—day work of the department. the day-to-day work of the department-— the day-to-day work of the department. the day-to-day work of the de artment. ~ , ., ., department. when you “oined the department. * department. when you “oined the department. you _ department. when you “oined the department, you were,i department. when you joined the department, you were, as - department. when you joined the department, you were, as you i department. when you joined the i department, you were, as you say, provided with... i think it is called a day one high—level briefing. bearwith called a day one high—level briefing. bear with me, called a day one high—level briefing. bearwith me, please. 18334 on the screen. this first briefing. bear with me, please. 18334 on the screen. this first day pack included a briefing from the permanent secretary, and a number of other senior officials in your department, and a number of documents. could we please have page one? and if you could highlight e, that was one of your areas you are briefed on, that was delivered by clara swinson, then a deputy... the director—general of one of the departments. page ten.

there is the section on global and public health. if you could scroll down the page, please. paragraph five. the main work areas in the group are, the first bullet point, emergency preparedness and health protection, director emma reed, this directory prepares for and response to emergencies including cobra and works on the government's prevent strategy. it practices for terrorist or other threats such as pandemic flu or a bowler, it ensures the delivery of national immunisation and screening programmes. it also runs a global health security programme, supporting middle and low—income countries. there was no reference there, in that first day briefing pack, to the level of risk that pandemic flu posed. there is no

reference to tier 1, the risks are identified, in relation to pandemic flu. where you provided, either on that day or later, with more detail concerning the risk that pandemic flu posed? did you in fact asked to be better briefed in relation to what the risks to the department were in relation to pandemic threat? yes. i rememberthis were in relation to pandemic threat? yes. i remember this document, were in relation to pandemic threat? yes. i rememberthis document, i remember reading it. on the first evening as health secretary, i wrote on this particular paragraph to say, more details, please. i was going to the document, working out which areas i need to focus on, because you have to choose what to focus on, and this was an area that i knew i needed to be a cross. 5a. and this was an area that i knew i needed to be a cross.— and this was an area that i knew i needed to be a cross. so, you called for more information _ needed to be a cross. so, you called for more information and _ needed to be a cross. so, you called for more information and a - needed to be a cross. so, you called for more information and a written i for more information and a written response was provided by i think

emma reed. introduction to emergency preparedness, resilience and response, and on that first page, we can see in paragraph one, a reference to the fact that the dhs sea, and conjunction with nhs england and public health england must provide a coordinated response to the challenge of risks set out in the national risk assessment, such as national hazards. that includes the risk of pandemic flu? yes. you can see references _ the risk of pandemic flu? yes. you can see references to _ the risk of pandemic flu? ie3 you can see references to the department coordinating health response to the incidents in salisbury and amesbury. emergency preparedness, above paragraph six, the civil contingencies act 2004 outlines the national response to civil

emergencies, establishing roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. there is than a reference to the division in the act, they buy vacation between category one and category two responders, and you were secretary of state were a category one responder. then paragraph seven, please. category one responders are required to carry out exercise and training of staff and emergency planning, the dhsc participates in a cross government programme of exercises and ministers will be invited to participate in tier1 exercises and cobra style meetings. you subsequently became aware of the fact that there had, in 2016, in october of that year, been an exercise, exercise cygnus, which was

an exercise designed to test the united kingdom systems to deal with pandemic influenza and there is obviously ample material to show that you became aware of exercise cygnus and it was an important part of your departmental functions. looking back, are you surprised that, in this more detailed briefing, there was no reference to the fact that just a year before, exercise cygnus had reported and in general terms had found that the plans and capabilities of the united kingdom were not sufficient to deal with the likely demands of a severe pandemic? with the likely demands of a severe tandemic? . . with the likely demands of a severe tandemic? ., , ., ., ., with the likely demands of a severe tandemic? ., , ., , ., pandemic? that is a good question, i do not know — pandemic? that is a good question, i do not know why _ pandemic? that is a good question, i do not know why that _ pandemic? that is a good question, i do not know why that is _ pandemic? that is a good question, i do not know why that is not - pandemic? that is a good question, i do not know why that is not written i do not know why that is not written here. i did... do not know why that is not written here. idid... i do not know why that is not written here. i did... iwas do not know why that is not written here. i did... i was aware, do not know why that is not written here. i did... iwas aware, became aware of exercise cygnus and the work that was being done to put its recommendations into action. i mean, there is a bigger challenge with

exercise cygnus, which perhaps we will come unto. {lii exercise cygnus, which perhaps we will come unto.— will come unto. of course. in your witness statement, _ will come unto. of course. in your witness statement, you _ will come unto. of course. in your witness statement, you say i will come unto. of course. in your witness statement, you say that l will come unto. of course. in your. witness statement, you say that you asked for further briefings to be prepared, having read this document. can you now recall what areas can send you and what areas you asked to be addressed by way of further briefing materials?— be addressed by way of further briefing materials? yes. i wanted to know about — briefing materials? yes. i wanted to know about the _ briefing materials? yes. i wanted to know about the department's - know about the department's preparation and its planning processes, and i asked... so i asked for further information based processes, and i asked... so i asked forfurther information based on this, and i think in august 2018, i continued to ask questions. for instance, one of the areas that i pushed hard on was the lack of uk domestic vaccine manufacturing,

given the importance of a vaccine to respond to any pandemic. and that was an area that i worked on intensively, up until the pandemic struck, and then obviously thereafter. so this was a programme of work for me which was... on which i iterated with the team, i kept asking more questions and had meetings on it, and the area that i focused on was on vaccine manufacturing and other points. alongside this, i was also assured that the uk was one of the best place to countries in the world for responding to a pandemic, and indeed in some areas categorised by the world health organization as the best place in the world. so just to give context to these, you know,

this interaction between may as the new secretary of state and my officials, at the same time, you haven't brought it up, but in one of the documents i got very early on, it stated clearly that we are well prepared. and that wasn't the civil servants' own assessment, that was the world health organization's assessment, and i know that mr hunt referred to that last week. when you become secretary of state, you think about the challenges in front of you. in my case, i had a background in technology, and the nhs desperately needed better technology, it needed more people, and we needed to be better at prevention of ill health across the board. of course, prevention of a pandemic is part of that, but there was also a huge focus on, for instance, obesity. itook was also a huge focus on, for instance, obesity. i took those as my three priorities, i continued the work and protection from these

threats, but it is important to focus, and you can understand that when you are assured by the leading global authority that the uk is the best prepared in the world, that is quite a significant reassurance. that turned out to be wrong. coming back to the internal _ that turned out to be wrong. coming back to the internal briefing, - back to the internal briefing, putting to one side what international authorities said about the united kingdom's position, you told us that there was therefore a debate with your civil servants about vaccines, that was one of the issues you asked about. when you were told, however, by your civil servants at the united kingdom was well prepared, what did they say when you asked them, as you presumably did, in what way are we prepared? presumably did, in what way are we re tared? . presumably did, in what way are we prepared? yes. what did they say about the prepared? ie3 what did they say about the various other parts of the

preparedness structure, stockpiles, diagnostic testing, plans for quarantining, shielding, orto deal with the impact of a pandemic or the supply of anti—virals, all of which are other aspects of the system of preparedness? what were you told? well, i was told that we had plans in these areas. so, for instance, and stockpiles, i was told that we had a very significant stockpile of ppe, and we did — the problem was that it was extremely hard to get it out fast enough when the crisis hit. i was told that we were good at developing tests, and indeed we were, we developed a test in the first few days after the genetic code of covid—19 was published. the problem was there was no plan in place to scale testing that had any... that we could execute. we had any... that we could execute. we had a stockpile of anti—virals for a

flu, but not for a coronavirus. on vaccines, i was concerned that we want in a strong enough position because we are reliant on manufacturing vaccines overseas, and i thought that in a pandemic scenario, force majeure would mean that it would be hard to get hold of vaccine doses if they were physically manufactured overseas, no matter what our contract said. so i insisted we pushed on domestic manufacture and sought the funding to deliver on that. i plan was already in early development to make that happen, so when each of these cases there was a plan, but the absolutely central plan till the problem with planning in the uk was that the doctrine was wrong. maybe i should set this out now. it is in my written statement. in my attitude,

the doctrine of the uk was to plan for the consequences of a disaster. can we buy enough body bags? where are we going to bury the dead? and that was completely wrong. of course, it is important to have that in case you fail to stop a pandemic. but central to pandemic planning needs to be, how do you stop the disaster from needs to be, how do you stop the disasterfrom happening in the needs to be, how do you stop the disaster from happening in the first place, how do you suppress the virus? and i need to put on the record, if i may, my lady, that my written statement, i have an update on my written statement, having continued to look through the documents... mr continued to look through the documents. . ._ continued to look through the documents... ~ ., ~ documents... mr hancock, we will return, if documents... mr hancock, we will return. if we _ documents... mr hancock, we will return, if we may, _ documents... mr hancock, we will return, if we may, to _ documents... mr hancock, we will return, if we may, to correcting i documents... mr hancock, we will. return, if we may, to correcting one or two parts of the statement later. i am aware that there were one or two areas that you want to say something more about in light of documentation which you have been provided with more recently. can i

bring you back, please, though, to be debate with your civil servants about the state of preparedness? yeah. , , ., about the state of preparedness? yeah. , i. ., ,, about the state of preparedness? yeah. , ., ,, ., about the state of preparedness? yeah. , about the state of preparedness? yeah. . yeah. did you observe to your civil servants, yeah. did you observe to your civil servants. or _ yeah. did you observe to your civil servants, or ask, _ yeah. did you observe to your civil servants, or ask, well, _ yeah. did you observe to your civil servants, or ask, well, there i yeah. did you observe to your civil servants, or ask, well, there is i yeah. did you observe to your civil servants, or ask, well, there is a l servants, or ask, well, there is a significant stockpile but it is only for flu? ~ , significant stockpile but it is only for flu? ~ ..,, ., for flu? well, in the case of ppe, the distinction _ for flu? well, in the case of ppe, the distinction between - for flu? well, in the case of ppe, the distinction between a - for flu? well, in the case of ppe, the distinction between a flu i the distinction between a flu pandemic and a coronavirus pandemic is really second—order. a respiratory disease pandemic requires very similar, or in many cases, the sign ppe, irrespective of virology. what matters is the characteristic of the virus. indeed. did ou characteristic of the virus. indeed. did you ask _ characteristic of the virus. indeed. did you ask whether _ characteristic of the virus. indeed. did you ask whether or _ characteristic of the virus. indeed. did you ask whether or not - characteristic of the virus. indeed. did you ask whether or not the i did you ask whether or not the stockpile about which you received assurances would be adequate for a non—influenza pandemic? i assurances would be adequate for a non-influenza pandemic?— non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether _ non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether i _ non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether i did _ non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether i did or _ non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether i did or not, i non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether i did or not, but l non-influenza pandemic? i don't recall whether i did or not, but i | recall whether i did or not, but i also know that if i had asked the

question, i hopefully would have been told it is adequate for other respiratory diseases as well, because indeed it was, because we used it. did because indeed it was, because we used it. , , ., because indeed it was, because we used it. , ., ., because indeed it was, because we usedit. ., ., used it. did you ask whether or not the anti-virals. .. _ used it. did you ask whether or not the anti-virals. .. yes. _ used it. did you ask whether or not the anti-virals. .. yes. in _ used it. did you ask whether or not the anti-virals. .. yes. in the i used it. did you ask whether or not the anti-virals... yes. in the main, the anti—virals... yes. in the main, a brand anti—viral called tamiflu, which was supplied and available in large quantities, whether that was suitable for a non—influenza pandemic? i suitable for a non-influenza pandemic?— suitable for a non-influenza tandemic? ., ., ~ ., pandemic? i do not know whether i was asked whether _ pandemic? i do not know whether i was asked whether i _ pandemic? i do not know whether i was asked whether i was _ pandemic? i do not know whether i was asked whether i was briefed, l pandemic? i do not know whether i i was asked whether i was briefed, but i was aware it was only useful against a flu, not a coronavirus. did you ask or were you made aware that the diagnostic testing which was in place was on a very small order, and of course was testing designed to deal with a limited, high consequence infectious disease, primarily one involving an outbreak in health settings? yes. primarily one involving an outbreak in health settings?— primarily one involving an outbreak in health settings? yes, i knew that the testint in health settings? yes, i knew that the testing system _ in health settings? yes, i knew that the testing system was _ in health settings? yes, i knew that the testing system was small, i in health settings? yes, i knew that the testing system was small, and l the testing system was small, and the testing system was small, and the reason that i explained the

flawed doctrine at this point is that by not preparing to stop a pandemic and, worse, by explicitly stating in the planning that it would not be possible to stop a pandemic, therefore a huge amount of other things that need to happen when you are trying to stop a pandemic didn't happen, and we had to build them from scratch when the pandemic struck. for instance, large scale testing did not exist, and large scale contact tracing did not exist because it was assumed that as soon as there was community transmission, it wouldn't be possible to stop the spread, and therefore what is the point in contact tracing? that was completely wrong, and in my view is the absolutely central lesson — of course, the difference between a flu

and a coronavirus is important, but it is not nearly as important as getting the doctrine right so in future we are ready to suppress a pandemic, unless the costs of lockdown are greater than the cost that the pandemic would bring. perhaps we will return to the issue of the doctrinal arguments about lockdown is a little later. ii i of the doctrinal arguments about lockdown is a little later. ifi may come in the _ lockdown is a little later. ifi may come in the region _ lockdown is a little later. ifi may come in the region to _ lockdown is a little later. ifi may come in the region to bring i lockdown is a little later. ifi may come in the region to bring it i lockdown is a little later. ifi may come in the region to bring it up| come in the region to bring it up is because it had consequences in all the areas you set out — stockpiles, anti—virals, contact tracing and much more widely. anti-virals, contact tracing and much more widely.— anti-virals, contact tracing and much more widely. those were the acknowledged _ much more widely. those were the acknowledged failures _ much more widely. those were the acknowledged failures of _ much more widely. those were the acknowledged failures of the i acknowledged failures of the doctrinal path, but why, if you ask the questions which you say that you did about the fact that anti—virals and the stockpiles of anti—virals were only suitable for influenza, that the testing was limited and suitable for high consequence infectious disease in a health care

setting, that the ppe was designed for flu, setting, that the ppe was designed forflu, although it had application to hcids as well, and that there was no debate about the potential countermeasures, mandatory quarantining, shielding, the impact on education and the economy, if these were questions which were posed when you took office injuly 2018, why was the situation allowed to develop in which none of these matters were met, addressed, by the time you had to deal with the consequences of the pandemic in february 2020, when, as you have rightly said, you had to build, in all these areas, an entire system from scratch?— all these areas, an entire system from scratch? �* , c, , c, , , from scratch? because i was assured that the uk — from scratch? because i was assured that the uk planning _ from scratch? because i was assured that the uk planning was _ from scratch? because i was assured that the uk planning was among - from scratch? because i was assured that the uk planning was among the | that the uk planning was among the best and in some instances the best in the world, and of course with

hindsight i wish i had spent that short period of time as health secretary before the pandemic struck also changing the entire attitude to how we respond to a pandemic. one of the reasons i feel so strongly about the reasons i feel so strongly about the importance of this inquiry, and why i am so emotionally committed to making sure that it is a success, with full transparency and total brutal honesty in answering your questions to get to the bottom of this, is because of these huge error in the doctrine that the uk, and by the way the whole western world, had in how to tackle a pandemic. and

that flawed doctrine underpinned many of the problems that made it extremely difficult to respond, and if i may say so, i am profoundly sorry for the impact that had. i am profoundly sorry for each death that has occurred. and i also understand why, for some, it will be hard to take that apology from me. i understand that, i get it. but it is honest and heartfelt, and i am not very good at talking about my emotions and howl very good at talking about my emotions and how i feel, but that is honest and true, and all i can do is ensure that this inquiry gets to the bottom of it and that, for the future, we learn the right lessons so that we stop a pandemic in its tracks much, much earlier, and that

we have the systems in place ready to do that, because i'm worried that they are being dismantled as we speak. they are being dismantled as we seak. ~ . ., they are being dismantled as we seak. . ., they are being dismantled as we seak. ~ _, ., ., speak. well, we will come to that in a moment. — speak. well, we will come to that in a moment. mr _ speak. well, we will come to that in a moment, mr hancock. _ speak. well, we will come to that in a moment, mr hancock. so, - speak. well, we will come to that in a moment, mr hancock. so, with i speak. well, we will come to that in i a moment, mr hancock. so, with those words in mind, why, injuly 2018, when you are made aware of the lacunae in the system of preparedness, the absence of stockpiled ppe for non—influenza pandemic, the lack of anti—viral, the lack of contact tracing systems, why did you not pursue those issues in the following 18 months before the pandemic struck? the in the following 18 months before the pandemic struck?— in the following 18 months before the pandemic struck? the only answer i can cive the pandemic struck? the only answer i can give is — the pandemic struck? the only answer i can give is because _ the pandemic struck? the only answer i can give is because i _ the pandemic struck? the only answer i can give is because i was _ the pandemic struck? the only answer i can give is because i was assured - i can give is because i was assured that we had the best system in place in the world, and because this system was working towards an approach to pandemic response that

was wrong. that is why it was built that way. and that floor, that failure, went back years and years and was embedded in the entire system response. mr and was embedded in the entire system response.— and was embedded in the entire s stem resonse. ~ ., ~ ., system response. mr hancock, forgive me. that doctrinal _ system response. mr hancock, forgive me. that doctrinal error, _ system response. mr hancock, forgive me. that doctrinal error, to _ system response. mr hancock, forgive me. that doctrinal error, to which - me. that doctrinal error, to which will come in a moment explains why the position was as it was injuly 2018. my question to you, though, is, why, having been alerted to these serious issues, was more not done over the following 18 months? regardless of why you were in that position, regardless of why the department was in that position, regardless of the doctrinal foundation — why weren't those practical considerations not followed through?- practical considerations not followed through? practical considerations not followed throuuh? ~ ., , practical considerations not followed throuuh? ~ ., followed through? well, there was no recommendation _ followed through? well, there was no recommendation to _ followed through? well, there was no recommendation to resolve _ followed through? well, there was no recommendation to resolve those - recommendation to resolve those problems that i was aware of. there were recommendations to put in place

the [earnings from project cygnus, some of which were taken forward, i was assured there was a programme of work to put those in place, but there were no recommendation is to build a testing system that i was aware of, there were no recommendations to change the stockpile, although on that point, the stockpile was effectively transferable from one respiratory disease to another. these recommendations were not there because the system was geared towards how to clear up after a disaster, not you were the secretary of state. yes. it disaster, not you were the secretary of state- vee— of state. yes. it doesn't need a formal submission _ of state. yes. it doesn't need a formal submission from - of state. yes. it doesn't need a formal submission from civil i formal submission from civil servants for something to be done. if, in in the course of this debate, you said, where are the anti—virals for a non—influenza pandemic, where is the stockpile for a non—influenza

pandemic, where are the plans for mass testing, they wouldn't have said, secretary of state, we can't do anything about that, let's wait to see what the submissions are, you could have ordered it to be addressed and pursued and harried them until something was done. find them until something was done. and of course, them until something was done. and of course. had _ them until something was done. and of course. had i _ them until something was done. situc of course, had i known that them until something was done. 2.1c of course, had i known that i pandemic was about to strike, i would have done that. but this was an unprecedented pandemic, and nobody was to know. so all i can explain is that when you become the secretary of state, when you are the secretary of state, when you are the secretary of state, new in post, there are a significant number of recommendations of what needs to be changed. for instance, dame sally davies came into my office and said, we have to try to prevent ill health and tackle obesity, that is the number one problem facing the country. this was not regarded as a

number one problem that needed to be fixed, because we were regarded by external organisations that had been investigating our preparedness, we were regarded as one of the best in the world, that is the only answer i can give you, i know i have repeated it, but that is because it is true. the 2011 strategy to which you refer was the 2011 influenza strategy document, dealing, as it says, on its face, with the strategy for an influenza pandemic.— its face, with the strategy for an influenza pandemic. yes. there was onl ever influenza pandemic. yes. there was only ever one _ influenza pandemic. yes there was only ever one strategy document, wasn't there? that was it? that was the strategy — wasn't there? that was it? that was the strategy document _ wasn't there? that was it? that was the strategy document that - wasn't there? that was it? that was the strategy document that i - wasn't there? that was it? that was the strategy document that i was i the strategy document that i was aware of, of course there was a whole load of underpinning documents and further work, but that was the strategy, yes. find and further work, but that was the strategy. vee— strategy, yes. and that single stratea strategy, yes. and that single strategy document _ strategy, yes. and that single strategy document identified | strategy, yes. and that single l strategy document identified no

strategy document identified no strategy for a non—influenza pandemic, otherthan strategy for a non—influenza pandemic, other than the hope that they plan for an influenza pandemic could be modified to deal with a high consequence infectious disease that was not influenza. that high consequence infectious disease that was not influenza.— that was not influenza. that is ri . ht. that was not influenza. that is riuht. i that was not influenza. that is right. i would _ that was not influenza. that is right. i would also _ that was not influenza. that is right. i would also say - that was not influenza. that is right. i would also say that i that was not influenza. that is| right. i would also say that any pandemic, by its nature, is a novel disease. pandemic, by its nature, is a novel disease- and _ pandemic, by its nature, is a novel disease.- and so _ pandemic, by its nature, is a novel disease.- and so you i pandemic, by its nature, is a novel| disease.- and so you cannot disease. indeed. and so you cannot have a plan — disease. indeed. and so you cannot have a plan precisely _ disease. indeed. and so you cannot have a plan precisely for— disease. indeed. and so you cannot have a plan precisely for the - have a plan precisely for the disease that comes. the things that matter are how long is the incubation period, how transmissible is it, how does it transmit, and crucially, who does it affect more than others, what are the inequalities, the consequences of the disease? those are the factors that matter, and it would be far better to have a respiratory disease plan and a blood—borne pandemic disease plan and a vector, touch

bone disease plan, that was nonspecific about the virology of the pathogen, because what matters is how the thing is transmitted and how it affects people, as much as the underlying virology as well. in effect, the plan failed to provide for a range of scenarios. it focused too much upon an influenza pandemic, thatis too much upon an influenza pandemic, that is what it was called, and although there was a reference to the inherent unpredictability of respiratory viruses, there was no detail, was there, of how, given those inherent, unreliable characteristics of a respiratory virus, we could be hit by a none

influenza pandemic which had different characteristics to influenza but could be no less catastrophic?— influenza but could be no less catastrohic? ., ., , ., ., catastrophic? that was the floor, wasn't it? that _ catastrophic? that was the floor, wasn't it? that was _ catastrophic? that was the floor, wasn't it? that was not - catastrophic? that was the floor, wasn't it? that was not the i catastrophic? that was the floor, wasn't it? that was not the main | wasn't it? that was not the main flaw, that was a flaw. of course, that was a problem. however, we also knew there could be another infectious disease, and as i mentioned, we were dealing with a number of them, and i was cognisant of that. for instance, when we did the work on vaccine production, the plan that was put together was a pandemic disease vaccine plan, not an influenza pandemic vaccine plan. so we were cognisant of that, but i return to my central point, which is to say that the main problem was that it was a fluke plan and we ended up with a coronavirus pandemic

is, of course, a flaw, but it is not the central flaw. is, of course, a flaw, but it is not the centralflaw. if is, of course, a flaw, but it is not the central flaw. if we had is, of course, a flaw, but it is not the centralflaw. if we had had is, of course, a flaw, but it is not the central flaw. if we had had a flu pandemic, we would have had a massive problem because of the doctrinal failure of how to respond to it as well, that was a much bigger error across the western world, but a much bigger error, and it is absolutely central, and i know i keep stressing this point, but it is central to what we must learn as a country, that we have to be ready to hit a pandemic hard, that we have got to be able to take action, lockdown action if necessary that is wider, earlier, more stringent than feels comfortable at the time, and the failure to plan for that was a much biggerflaw in the failure to plan for that was a much bigger flaw in the strategy than the fact that it was targeted at the wrong disease. they were both major flaws in the strategy, where they not? major flaws in the strategy, where the not? ., ., .,

they not? you have identified now two ma'or they not? you have identified now two major flaws — they not? you have identified now two major flaws in _ they not? you have identified now two major flaws in that _ they not? you have identified now two major flaws in that strategy. | two major flaws in that strategy. the point i am trying to make is that the doctrinal flaw was the biggest by a long way, because if we had had a flu pandemic, we still would have had the problem of no plan in place for lockdown, no prep for how to do one, no work on how best to lock down with the least damage. i understand deeply the consequences of lockdown and a negative consequences for many, many people, many of which persist to this day. the problem that we faced was that the consequences of not locking down was much worse, and we need to be able to... i thinkjohn edmonds is excellent in his evidence, and gus o'donnell, saying we need to have a way to calibrate as early as possible, what with the damage be if we did not... mr hancock. _ damage be if we did not... mr hancock. i'm _ damage be if we did not... mr hancock, i'm going to pause you

there. the issue of lockdown is, as you know very well indeed, something for module two, and we are concerned now with your understanding pre—pandemic and what was being done pre—pandemic. may i please ask you to focus on the strategy document, which sets out at that time what the thinking was? i which sets out at that time what the thinking was?— which sets out at that time what the thinking was? i understand that, but if i 'ust thinking was? i understand that, but if i just may — thinking was? i understand that, but if i just may site... _ thinking was? i understand that, but if i just may site. .. mr— thinking was? i understand that, but if i just may site... mr hancock, i if i just may site... mr hancock, will ou if i just may site... mr hancock, will you allow— if i just may site... mr hancock, will you allow me _ if i just may site... mr hancock, will you allow me please, i if i just may site... mr hancock, will you allow me please, in i if i just may site... mr hancock, | will you allow me please, in this forum... it will you allow me please, in this forum... , ., ., , ., will you allow me please, in this forum- - -— i i forum... it is vitalto planning. i ask the questions. _ forum... it is vitalto planning. i ask the questions. of _ forum... it is vitalto planning. i ask the questions. of course! i forum... it is vitalto planning. i. ask the questions. of course! and the 2011 strategy _ ask the questions. of course! and the 2011 strategy was _ ask the questions. of course! and the 2011 strategy was never i ask the questions. of course! and i the 2011 strategy was never updated, was it? ., ., ~' the 2011 strategy was never updated, was it? ., ., ~ , ., was it? no. indeed, the work stream which was due _ was it? no. indeed, the work stream which was due to _ was it? no. indeed, the work stream which was due to be _ was it? no. indeed, the work stream which was due to be carried - was it? no. indeed, the work stream which was due to be carried out i was it? no. indeed, the work stream which was due to be carried out by i which was due to be carried out by the pandemic flu readiness board to update the strategy was itself caused, was it not? $5 update the strategy was itself caused, was it not? 2551 update the strategy was itself caused, was it not? as i understand it, es. caused, was it not? as i understand it. yes- yes- — caused, was it not? as i understand it, yes. yes. there _ caused, was it not? as i understand it, yes. yes. there has— caused, was it not? as i understand it, yes. yes. there has been - caused, was it not? as i understand

it, yes. yes. there has been ample| it, yes. yes. there has been ample evidence to — it, yes. yes. there has been ample evidence to show _ it, yes. yes. there has been ample evidence to show that _ it, yes. yes. there has been ample evidence to show that the - it, yes. yes. there has been ample evidence to show that the work i it, yes. yes. there has been ample| evidence to show that the work was not done to update this document, this strategy, because of the diversion of resources to the necessary preparations for a no deal eu exit. . , necessary preparations for a no deal eu exit. ., , _, . necessary preparations for a no deal euexit. ., , . i, necessary preparations for a no deal eu exit-_ were i eu exit. that is correct, yes. were ou told, eu exit. that is correct, yes. were you told. when _ eu exit. that is correct, yes. were you told, when us _ eu exit. that is correct, yes. were you told, when us secretary i eu exit. that is correct, yes. were you told, when us secretary of i you told, when us secretary of state, that the strategy was regarded as inaccurate and not up—to—date? regarded as inaccurate and not un-to-date?— regarded as inaccurate and not up-to-date? regarded as inaccurate and not u-to-date? ., ., ., ., ., ., up-to-date? no. not that i am aware, not that i recall. _ up-to-date? no. not that i am aware, not that i recall. on _ up-to-date? no. not that i am aware, not that i recall. on the _ up-to-date? no. not that i am aware, not that i recall. on the contrary, i not that i recall. on the contrary, we were told we were one of the best places in terms of preparation. share places in terms of preparation. are ou places in terms of preparation. are you surprised now that you were not informed that the strategy was deemed to be, and i quote the document from your own department, out of date, unfit for purpose? i was not aware of that, no. by i out of date, unfit for purpose? i i was not aware of that, no. by july of 2019,

was not aware of that, no. by july of 2019. an _ was not aware of that, no. by july of 2019, an arm's _ was not aware of that, no. by july of 2019, an arm's length - was not aware of that, no. by july of 2019, an arm's length body, i l of 2019, an arm's length body, i suppose one would call it, or a stakeholder, public health england, was stating in its own minutes that there had been no word from the dhsc on dhsc�*s pandemic strategy, so they were concerned. they had heard nothing from your department in relation to the updating of the strategy, because it was obviously a matter of very real concern. i strategy, because it was obviously a matter of very real concern.- matter of very real concern. i don't recall that — matter of very real concern. i don't recall that ever _ matter of very real concern. i don't recall that ever being _ matter of very real concern. i don't recall that ever being raised - matter of very real concern. i don't recall that ever being raised with l recall that ever being raised with me, and it highlights the problem of not having a body that was focused only on preparing to defend us against a pandemic since the health protection agency was abolished in 2012, and that was one of the reasons behind the organisational change i brought in later. mi change i brought in later. all ri . ht. change i brought in later. all right- the — change i brought in later. all right. the pandemic influenza preparedness board was another important part of the department's work, wasn't it? yes. what was its

main function, as you saw it? it was an official level— main function, as you saw it? it was an official level board _ main function, as you saw it? it was an official level board whose - main function, as you saw it? it was an official level board whose job, i an official level board whose job, effectively, was to put into place the conclusions of cygnus and to make sure we were as well—prepared as possible. make sure we were as well-prepared as possible-— as possible. when you became secretary of — as possible. when you became secretary of state, _ as possible. when you became| secretary of state, presumably as possible. when you became i secretary of state, presumably you were informed of the outcome of exercise cygnus and the fact that the then prime minister, theresa may, had ordered the setting up of the pandemic flu readiness board to put those recommendations into place? put those recommendations into lace? , ., ., place? yes, i found that reassuring, i had been — place? yes, i found that reassuring, i had been reassured _ place? yes, i found that reassuring, i had been reassured that _ i had been reassured that essentially everything was on hand because there was a structure, a resource structure to make it happen. $5 resource structure to make it ha en. �* , resource structure to make it ha..en_ �*, , resource structure to make it ha--en. a , ~ resource structure to make it hauen. �*, , ' ., happen. as it happens, mr hancock, man of happen. as it happens, mr hancock, many of the — happen. as it happens, mr hancock, many of the work _ happen. as it happens, mr hancock, many of the work streams _ happen. as it happens, mr hancock, many of the work streams which i happen. as it happens, mr hancock, many of the work streams which the | many of the work streams which the pandemic flu readiness board plans to carry out were, for reasons we have discussed, paused all ceased altogether. so when us secretary of

state, to what extent were you informed that the recommendations from exercise cygnus, about which you had been told, were not being implemented? —— when you were secretary of state. i implemented? -- when you were secretary of state.— implemented? -- when you were secretary of state. i don't know the answer to that _ secretary of state. i don't know the answer to that question, _ secretary of state. i don't know the answer to that question, i - secretary of state. i don't know the answer to that question, i take i secretary of state. i don't know the answer to that question, i take full| answer to that question, i take full responsibility for the fact that in the face of brexit and the threats that a disorganised brexit could do, we took resources across the department to focus on that thread, including away from pandemic preparedness planning. that was proposed to me by the home secretary and the chief medical officer, and i signed it off, i regarded the secretary of state's job not to run the department in terms of resource allocation, but to set the direction, but i signed off that decision. the thing is that you face a lot of risks and threats. but, mr

hancock, why didn't you say to your civil servants, this was a major exercise into the united kingdom's pandemic preparedness? it was one of the largest command exercises ever held, it made a number of important recommendations, 22 in fact in all, across the whole board of the united kingdom's plans and capabilities — and byjune 2020, after the pandemic had struck, of course, the dhsc acknowledged that of the 22 recommendations, eight had been fully addressed, six had been partially addressed, and work to address eight more was still ongoing. how could that have been missed? how could those recommendations not have been put into place? betweenjuly 2018 when

you took that post and 2020, when the chickens came home to roost? well, the answer to that question, there are two ways of answering that question. as a secretary of state, you have a limited set of resources, and you have to make sure that those resources are targeted at the threats that you face, and one of those risks was a disorganised brexit, and it was incumbent on the department to make sure that we were as well prepared for that as possible. as well prepared for that as possible-— as well prepared for that as possible. as well prepared for that as ossible. , , �* �* , ," possible. this is bbc news, it is 11 o'clock, possible. this is bbc news, it is 11 o'clock. you _ possible. this is bbc news, it is 11 o'clock. you are — possible. this is bbc news, it is 11 o'clock, you are watching - possible. this is bbc news, it is 11 l o'clock, you are watching continuing coverage of the covid inquiry, which is hearing evidence from the former health secretary, matt hancock. the problem with sickness as it did not spot the central point in pandemic planning. i have through those recommendations that were put in place and i'm not sure they would

have helped much when, as you say, the chickens came home to roost. sickness did not that we should be prepared to stop the spread of a pandemic. it made all sorts of recommendations as to how we should stop the worst—case scenario happening. therefore, iam not at all convinced that we would have been much better placed to face this pandemic, had all of those recommendations been put into place because there was a much bigger error. mi because there was a much bigger error. �* �* .,, error. all right. but those exercises _ error. all right. but those exercises take _ error. all right. but those exercises take place i error. all right. but those exercises take place for i error. all right. but those i exercises take place for good reason, do they not?- exercises take place for good reason, do they not? yes, but it still did not _ reason, do they not? yes, but it still did not spot _ reason, do they not? yes, but it still did not spot the _ reason, do they not? yes, but it still did not spot the main i reason, do they not? yes, but it i still did not spot the main problem. are they important matters, mr hancock? 0f hancock? of course. and were recommendations made as a result of that exercise? and did your department failed to implement those recommendations? i’m implement those recommendations? i'm not implement those recommendations? i�*11 not denying that. i'm explaining, firstly the different pressures that you have on resources, and brexit

was real and a pressure, and i'm also explaining the consequences of those decisions. i am trying to articulate that there was a much bigger problem in the central lesson that i think we need to learn. me that i think we need to learn. we will come to _ that i think we need to learn. we will come to that in a moment. the report into the exercise was not published, was it, injuly when it was reported? published, was it, in july when it was reported?— published, was it, injuly when it was reported? ihio. could we have 575 was reported? no. could we have 575 14. page two. you were asked in may 2020, after the pandemic had struck, whether or not you agreed that the report into

the exercise should be published. we can see the top left hand corner of the page. can see the top left hand corner of the nae. , can see the top left hand corner of the page. yes. and if you could scroll back _ the page. yes. and if you could scroll back out, _ the page. 1l:3 and if you could scroll back out, please. the the page. 1l; and if you could scroll back out, please. the issue identified was that a number of public parliamentary legal requests for the release of the report had been received. it was a pandemic exercise carried out in 2016 and to date we have declined to release this report based on a balanced assessment of public interest and you were invited to agree that the time has come for the publication of that report. yes. do you know why in general terms, why the decision was taken injuly 2017 not to publish the report and why this only came to you for a decision in may 2020? i

have no idea about the 2017 decision. i know where it came to a decision. i know where it came to a decision —— back to me for a decision —— back to me for a decision in 2020 and i support a publication. decision in 2020 and i support a publication-— decision in 2020 and i support a ublication. ., , publication. could we look, please, at -ae~ publication. could we look, please, at page four. _ publication. could we look, please, at page four, paragraphs _ publication. could we look, please, at page four, paragraphs eight i publication. could we look, please, at page four, paragraphs eight and| at page four, paragraphs eight and ten. thank you. "some projects had to be rescheduled in 2018 and 2019 due to competing priorities and civil contingencies." is that a partly concealed reference to the fact that work streams had to be stopped to deal with the necessary preparations for a no deal exit customer yes.— necessary preparations for a no deal exit customer yes. there were other civil contingencies. _ exit customer yes. there were other civil contingencies. for _ exit customer yes. there were other civil contingencies. for instance, i civil contingencies. for instance, there was a crisis of human body parts being left in hospital car parks that the civil contingencies team had to deal with. there were

various other civil contingencies in that period, so it is not purely a euphemism for brexit, it is an accurate description of the pressures on the team. mr hancock, this is a document _ pressures on the team. mr hancock, this is a document which _ pressures on the team. mr hancock, this is a document which is - pressures on the team. mr hancock, this is a document which is solely i this is a document which is solely concerned with the publication of the report and exercise cygnus which was itself only concerned with emergency preparedness for pandemic influenza. yes. the reference to some projects in paragraph eight is only a reference, isn't it, to the projects which came from exercise cygnus? projects which came from exercise c nus? :, , projects which came from exercise c nus? ., , . projects which came from exercise c nus? ., . i, projects which came from exercise cygnus?_ the i cygnus? that is correct, yes. the only reason _ cygnus? that is correct, yes. the only reason those _ cygnus? that is correct, yes. the only reason those projects - cygnus? that is correct, yes. the only reason those projects were l only reason those projects were rescheduled, by virtue of decisions by the pandemic preparedness influenza odds, the pandemic flu readiness board, and your own department, was because of the diversion of resources to deal with a new deal eu exit. l diversion of resources to deal with a new deal eu exit.— diversion of resources to deal with a new deal eu exit. i am explaining that the competing _ a new deal eu exit. i am explaining that the competing priorities - a new deal eu exit. i am explaining that the competing priorities in -

that the competing priorities in civil contingencies of course included that, but there are also other competing priorities. the context i'm trying to set to explain all of this is that in health you have a certain amount of resources, and you have a very broad set of risks. whilst it is vital that this inquiry uses hindsight to learn the lessons, we did not have that at the time, and we did not know that a pandemic was about to strike. {guild pandemic was about to strike. could we have, pandemic was about to strike. could we have. please. — pandemic was about to strike. could we have, please, the _ pandemic was about to strike. could we have, please, the bottom - pandemic was about to strike. could we have, please, the bottom of - pandemic was about to strike. could we have, please, the bottom of page five? communications and public confidence. "whilst this would not be a consideration for freedom of information purposes, it is if you are considering going beyond your legal duties. advice on communications is below. mitigation, thatis communications is below. mitigation, that is to say mitigation of damage donein that is to say mitigation of damage done in the public sphere by virtue of the communications, you should

note that while work is ongoing there are no major gaps in our implementation of lessons from exercise cygnus." that wasn't quite right, was it? i exercise cygnus." that wasn't quite right. was it?— right, was it? i think that the officials writing _ right, was it? i think that the officials writing this - right, was it? i think that the | officials writing this document right, was it? i think that the - officials writing this document have used the word "major" to explain that the central recommendations from exercise cygnus were implemented, for instance exercise cygnus recommended that we have a draft legal bill ready to go, and that proved to be incredibly important in the early response to the pandemic, and i made the point earlier that the inquiry would be wrong to conclude that because not every lesson from exercise cygnus had been implemented, that had every lesson been implemented, the response would have been that much better because exercise cygnus was flawed in its central assumption about how best to respond to a

pandemic. 50 about how best to respond to a pandemic— about how best to respond to a andemic. , ., ., » pandemic. so you have referred, mr hancock, pandemic. so you have referred, mr hancock. to — pandemic. so you have referred, mr hancock, to one _ pandemic. so you have referred, mr hancock, to one particular— pandemic. so you have referred, mr hancock, to one particular work - hancock, to one particular work stream, which was the drawing up of the draft pandemic bill. yes. justify your answer that there were no major gaps in our implementation from the lessons from exercise cygnus. what other work streams were completed, as far as you are aware, in addition to the drafting of a bill? ., , ., �* ., ., bill? completed? i don't have that -a erwork bill? completed? i don't have that paperwork to _ bill? completed? i don't have that paperwork to hand, _ bill? completed? i don't have that paperwork to hand, but _ bill? completed? i don't have that paperwork to hand, but i - bill? completed? i don't have that paperwork to hand, but i would i bill? completed? i don't have that paperwork to hand, but i would be very happy to supply it. page seven, lease. very happy to supply it. page seven, please. paragraph _ very happy to supply it. page seven, please. paragraph 15. _ very happy to supply it. page seven, please. paragraph 15. on— very happy to supply it. page seven, please. paragraph 15. on the - very happy to supply it. page seven, please. paragraph 15. on the 7th - very happy to supply it. page seven, please. paragraph 15. on the 7th of. please. paragraph 15. on the 7th of may, the guardian newspaper published the full report on its website with personal information redacted. this was alongside an article highlighted that there was no evidence recommendations from the report around social care preparedness had been acted on. that was right, wasn't it? yes. one of

the areas of the important work seems have which had not been concluded or even in part developed, was to do with the capacity of the aduu was to do with the capacity of the adult social care sector to be able to deal with. that's not quite right. to deal with. that's not quite riuht. ., , ., ., to deal with. that's not quite riuht. ., ., . a right. the demands of a pandemic. as art of the right. the demands of a pandemic. as part of the work— right. the demands of a pandemic. as part of the work ongoing _ right. the demands of a pandemic. as part of the work ongoing when - right. the demands of a pandemic. as part of the work ongoing when i - right. the demands of a pandemic. as part of the work ongoing when i was l part of the work ongoing when i was secretary of state, preparedness in social care was one of those work streams. yes. work was done in order to see whether or not the department could make it sell better informed as to the sheer number of people in the aduu the sheer number of people in the adult social care sector. work was done on producing some policy papers that would be of use to local authorities who, of course, are primarily responsible for the adult social care sector. but no work was donein social care sector. but no work was done in relation to preparing the individual care homes for the

necessary surge in numbers attendant upon a pandemic? lmark necessary surge in numbers attendant upon a pandemic?— upon a pandemic? work was done in the first two — upon a pandemic? work was done in the first two areas _ upon a pandemic? work was done in the first two areas you _ upon a pandemic? work was done in the first two areas you mention. - the first two areas you mention. this report, the article was inaccurate. however, the responsibility for ensuring preparedness in social care formally fell to local authorities, and there was work required of local authorities to put in place pandemic preparedness plans. when the pandemic struck, and i was told that local authorities were required to have pandemic preparedness plans, i asked to see them. my minister for social care, helen wakeley, found that there were only two, which she saw and reported to me them to be wholly inadequate. one of the

central challenges in social care is that whilst i have the title secretary of state for health and social care, the primary responsibility, legal responsible of tea, contractual responsibility for social care,. local councils. in a national crisis, this is a very significant problem because, as i put in my witness statement, i had the title, i was accountable, but i did not have the levers to act. we did not have the levers to act. we did not have the levers to act. we did not even have the data, and this is the work that was ongoing before the pandemic, which is why this statement from the guardian newspaper, reported from the guardian, is inaccurate. there was work i'm going to try to find out even the basics of the provision of social care. for instance, how many care homes are operating right now in the uk. that was a fact that we did not know at that time, and i'm glad to say now there is far better

data, but that was one of the work streams. you know, it was very important and that were continued. some work was done by the department to make itself better informed, in particular in relation to the numbers of persons in care homes, and the working arrangements of the aduu and the working arrangements of the adult social care sector. but the vital work directly concerned with the preparation of those care homes, which was part of the work stream, which was part of the work stream, which was part of the work stream, which was meant to be done by the pandemic flu readiness board, was not done, was it?— not done, was it? that's not... those two _ not done, was it? that's not... those two plans _ not done, was it? that's not... those two plans was _ not done, was it? that's not... those two plans was all- not done, was it? that's not... those two plans was all that i not done, was it? that's not... i those two plans was all that there was on the local authority site, and the surge planning in relation to the surge planning in relation to the adult social care sector fell far behind that done for the nhs. did it not? that work nevertheless

was done, and being done, and in fact, this discussion is an example of the challenge of why it is so hard for policy in social care when the accountability falls understandably to the secretary of state, but in this case pandemic preparedness was a legal responsible of tea at the local level, and whilst we at the health department could require that, the money from social care for central government goes through a different department. 50 the requirement to produce those so the requirement to produce those plans fell to the local authorities, and they were in very large part, not concluded before the pandemic struck. that is a major problem with how social care is run in this country. how social care is run in this country-—

how social care is run in this count . ., ., ., ., , country. the obligation to get ready did not country. the obligation to get ready did rrot rest — country. the obligation to get ready did not rest solely _ country. the obligation to get ready did not rest solely on _ country. the obligation to get ready did not rest solely on the _ country. the obligation to get ready did not rest solely on the local - did not rest solely on the local authority, did it? the obligation for the policy — authority, did it? the obligation for the policy rested _ authority, did it? the obligation for the policy rested with - authority, did it? the obligation for the policy rested with me. . authority, did it? the obligation l for the policy rested with me. the obligation for delivery in social care rested with local authorities because they contract individual care homes. the because they contract individual care homes-— care homes. the department of health and social care — care homes. the department of health and social care understood _ care homes. the department of health and social care understood that - care homes. the department of health and social care understood that an - and social care understood that an important line of work, a work stream to be carried out by the pandemic flu readiness board, and the pandemic influenza preparedness readiness board, was ensuring that the adult social care sector was ready, in terms of plans. what would they do in the event of a pandemic. and surge capacity. how would they physically cope with the impact of a catastrophic pandemic? yes. those were catastrophic pandemic? i'ezs those were obligations catastrophic pandemic? iezs those were obligations of catastrophic pandemic? iez3 those were obligations of the department of health and social care and they were not completed, were they? thea;r were not completed, were they? they were not completed, were they? they were to be were not completed, were they? tue: were to be delivered were not completed, were they? tue were to be delivered through were not completed, were they? tie1: were to be delivered through local authorities, which proved extremely difficult, and that is a structural

problem with how social care has been organised in this country since 1948. ., been organised in this country since 1948. . ._ , been organised in this country since 1948. . , ~ . 1948. that may be so, mr hancock, but it was a — 1948. that may be so, mr hancock, but it was a responsibility _ 1948. that may be so, mr hancock, but it was a responsibility that - 1948. that may be so, mr hancock, but it was a responsibility that the i but it was a responsibility that the department of health and social care was aware of otherwise it would not have directed that these work streams be drawn up at all. absolutely.— streams be drawn up at all. absolutel . ., ., ., absolutely. right. the national security council _ absolutely. right. the national security council contingencies l security council contingencies committee was the committee to which she referred earlier, the committee chaired by the then prime minister. he had ordered the setting up of the pandemic flu readiness board. yes. the terms of reference for that board required the secretary of state for health to report progress to the national security council t h r c committee on the work of the pandemic flu readiness board. could we have, please, to 27113. if rare pandemic flu readiness board. could we have, please, to 2743.— we have, please, to 27113. if we are auoin to we have, please, to 2743. if we are going to a — we have, please, to 2743. if we are going to a slightly _ we have, please, to 2743. if we are going to a slightly different -

going to a slightly different topicm _ going to a slightly different topic... we will take regular breaks because _ topic... we will take regular breaks because we — topic... we will take regular breaks because we have a brave stenographer who copes _ because we have a brave stenographer who copes with it all. i shall return — who copes with it all. i shall return at _ who copes with it all. i shall return at 1130. they - return at 1130. they are taking a break there at the coronavirus inquiry after matt hancock has been giving evidence for just over an hour. he arrived an hour and a half early. he was greeted by some protesters, some relatives of those who lost their lives in the covid pandemic. the section of the inquiry focusing on preparedness, those are the questions that he has been answering. let's take you through it if you are the things he has been saying. he said that a major government pandemic exercise was flawed. he said that it would be wrong to conclude that if every lesson had been implemented, the uk response would have been much better. this is from an exercise

called exercise cygnus, and this is about how to prepare for a pandemic. we also heard him say that focusing on flu was aptly not the central flaw. he said it was a doctrinal failure across the western world and he said we have to be ready to hit a pandemic hard, take lockdown action if necessary. that is wider, earlier and more stringent than feels comfortable at the time. a lot of people criticise him for the lockdown measures that were indeed in place, but many also supported him. let's listen to something else that he had to say. he said that resources were ta ken that he had to say. he said that resources were taken away from planning for a flu pandemic to focus on the threat of a no—deal brexit. i take full responsibility for the fact that in the face of brexit and the threat that a disorganised brexit could do, we took... resources were moved across the

department to focus on that threat, including away from pandemic preparedness planning. this was proposed to me by the permanent secretary and the cmo and i signed it. i regarded the secretary of state 's job not to run the department in terms of resource allocation, but to set the direction, but i signed off that decision. the thing is that you face a lot of risks and threats. well, mr hancock also apologised. he said "i am profoundly sorry for the impact that the uk 's attitude to the pandemic preparedness had and i'm sorry for each death that occurred. i understand why fulsome it would be hard to take that apology from me." he said the attitude of the uk towards a potential pandemic was completely wrong. i was assured that the uk planning was among the best, and in some

instances, the best in the world. of course, with hindsight, i wish i had spent that short period of time as health secretary before the pandemic struck also changing the entire attitude to how we respond to a pandemic. one of the reasons that i feel so strongly about the importance of this inquiry, and why i am so emotionally committed to making sure that it is a success with full transparency and total, brutal honesty in answering your questions to get to the bottom of this, is because of this huge error in the doctrine that the uk and, by the way, the whole western world

had, in how to tackle a pandemic. that flawed doctrine underpinned many of the problems that made it extremely difficult to respond. and if i may say so, i am profoundly sorry for the impact that had. i am profoundly sorry for each death that has occurred. matt hancock there, offering his heartfelt apologies. well, let's go to our correspondent ellie price, who is following all the developments in the newsroom for us. he was specifically asked about ppe, about testing, and vaccines. take he was specifically asked about ppe, about testing, and vaccines.- about testing, and vaccines. take us throuuh about testing, and vaccines. take us through that- _ about testing, and vaccines. take us through that- l— about testing, and vaccines. take us through that. i think _ about testing, and vaccines. take us through that. i think that _ about testing, and vaccines. take us through that. i think that apology i through that. i think that apology was really quite striking, wasn't it because _ was really quite striking, wasn't it because what it felt quite emotional, and i'm told he was actually— emotional, and i'm told he was actually directing it at some of the people _ actually directing it at some of the people in— actually directing it at some of the people in the public gallery, rather than the _ people in the public gallery, rather than the lawyer. he was looking at people _ than the lawyer. he was looking at people in— than the lawyer. he was looking at people in the public gallery, who were _ people in the public gallery, who were representing the bereaved

families — were representing the bereaved families. you know, quite striking stuff~ _ families. you know, quite striking stuff i_ families. you know, quite striking stuff. i think his point, the most interesting — stuff. i think his point, the most interesting thing so far this morning, it is this idea that it was not the _ morning, it is this idea that it was not the fact— morning, it is this idea that it was not the fact that there had been a lot of— not the fact that there had been a lot of flu — not the fact that there had been a lot of flu planning done, planning for a _ lot of flu planning done, planning for a flu _ lot of flu planning done, planning for a flu pandemic, that was necessarily wrong, although he conceded that they basically picked the wrong disease, but it was more that the _ the wrong disease, but it was more that the doctrine was wrong. he talked _ that the doctrine was wrong. he talked about the idea that the uk had been — talked about the idea that the uk had been planning for what would happen— had been planning for what would happen once something like this had happened. _ happen once something like this had happened, once a pandemic had hit, how to _ happened, once a pandemic had hit, how to find — happened, once a pandemic had hit, how to find enough body bags, where to bury— how to find enough body bags, where to bury the _ how to find enough body bags, where to bury the bodies, and he said more emphasis _ to bury the bodies, and he said more emphasis should have been made on trying _ emphasis should have been made on trying to— emphasis should have been made on trying to stop something like this happening. you know, he said that while _ happening. you know, he said that while we _ happening. you know, he said that while we did not have test and trace set up. _ while we did not have test and trace set up, because the idea of how to stop it _ set up, because the idea of how to stop it happening in the first place. — stop it happening in the first place. or— stop it happening in the first place, orat stop it happening in the first place, or at least slow it down, was not really considered. it was more the post—apocalyptic answers to the scenario. _ the post—apocalyptic answers to the scenario, ratherthan the post—apocalyptic answers to the scenario, rather than stopping it in its tracks — scenario, rather than stopping it in its tracks. he conceded that had test and — its tracks. he conceded that had test and chasing been set up more

easily. _ test and chasing been set up more easily. had — test and chasing been set up more easily, had there been a blueprint for it. _ easily, had there been a blueprint for it. it _ easily, had there been a blueprint for it, it obvious he would have helped — for it, it obvious he would have helped what happened in reality. yes and he helped what happened in reality. and he was helped what happened in reality. ie3 and he was talking about ppe as well, saying that he was told by officials in his department, that the uk had a very significant stockpile of ppe. the problem was that it was hard to get out. there was a whole issue that anybody who lived through that time will remember around ppe, accessing it, about making sure that medical staff, people in care homes, could access that protective equipment, and theyjust couldn't, could they? i think this was the point. we have heard _ i think this was the point. we have heard this — i think this was the point. we have heard this throughout the inquiry, that on— heard this throughout the inquiry, that on paper there was enough ppe, but quite _ that on paper there was enough ppe, but quite clearly that was not spread — but quite clearly that was not spread around the country properly. people _ spread around the country properly. people in _ spread around the country properly. people in nhs front lines, hospitals, or in care homes could not get _ hospitals, or in care homes could not get holds a bit. on paper perhaps. _ not get holds a bit. on paper perhaps, the government thought they had enough, but quite clearly, anecdotally as we heard through the pandemic— anecdotally as we heard through the pandemic and since, there were tragic— pandemic and since, there were tragic tales of nurses turning up with bin — tragic tales of nurses turning up with bin liners to wrap around

themselves, and that sort of thing. this was— themselves, and that sort of thing. this was part of the point he was trying _ this was part of the point he was trying to— this was part of the point he was trying to make, that as health secretary— trying to make, that as health secretary he had been assured by not only his _ secretary he had been assured by not only his civil— secretary he had been assured by not only his civil servants, but he also mentioned — only his civil servants, but he also mentioned the world health organization that rated the uk as very well— organization that rated the uk as very well prepared in the possibility of a pandemic hitting, whatever— possibility of a pandemic hitting, whatever that pandemic may have been, _ whatever that pandemic may have been. so — whatever that pandemic may have been, so he basically took the wrong reassurance — been, so he basically took the wrong reassurance that britain was ready. and it _ reassurance that britain was ready. and it goes — reassurance that britain was ready. and it goes back to some of the suggestions that have been made over the last— suggestions that have been made over the last couple of weeks, that ministers did not ask the right questions because they thought they already— questions because they thought they already had the answers. clearly, that is— already had the answers. clearly, that is the — already had the answers. clearly, that is the point of this inquiry, to get— that is the point of this inquiry, to get to — that is the point of this inquiry, to get to grips with what those questions were, and indeed what lessons _ questions were, and indeed what lessons could be learnt for next time _ lessons could be learnt for next time that _ lessons could be learnt for next time. that is something that matt hancock— time. that is something that matt hancock said today. he said in a very— hancock said today. he said in a very emotional way, that's what he really— very emotional way, that's what he really wanted to get to grips with himself— really wanted to get to grips with himself so that lessons could be learnt _ himself so that lessons could be learnt. . .. ., , , himself so that lessons could be learnt. . .. , , , learnt. yes, and he has been pushed a lot by the —

learnt. yes, and he has been pushed a lot by the casey — learnt. yes, and he has been pushed a lot by the casey asking _ learnt. yes, and he has been pushed a lot by the casey asking the - a lot by the casey asking the questions, asking why he didn't ask officials where the anti—virals for a non—flu pandemic were. it's not easy questioning that he is facing here. 3 . ,., easy questioning that he is facing here. 3 ., easy questioning that he is facing here. 3 . i. ., ., easy questioning that he is facing here. 3.. .. .. . here. absolute you not, no. we were not expeeting — here. absolute you not, no. we were not expecting that. _ here. absolute you not, no. we were not expecting that. again, _ here. absolute you not, no. we were not expecting that. again, just - here. absolute you not, no. we were not expecting that. again, just to - not expecting that. again, just to remind _ not expecting that. again, just to remind you, and i'm sorry if i keep going— remind you, and i'm sorry if i keep going on— remind you, and i'm sorry if i keep going on about it, but this is a part— going on about it, but this is a part of— going on about it, but this is a part of the _ going on about it, but this is a part of the pandemic inquiry that is about— part of the pandemic inquiry that is about preparedness. actually, there were times — about preparedness. actually, there were times where matt hancock seem to veer— were times where matt hancock seem to veer into— were times where matt hancock seem to veer into some of the decisions made _ to veer into some of the decisions made during the pandemic and we will hear more _ made during the pandemic and we will hear more about that later in the year. _ hear more about that later in the year, and that is something the legal— year, and that is something the legal counsel for the inquiry pulled him back— legal counsel for the inquiry pulled him back on, if you like, because matt— him back on, if you like, because matt hancock clearly owes some of the accusations that have been levelled — the accusations that have been levelled at him. but he has been facing _ levelled at him. but he has been facing hard questions about how these _ facing hard questions about how these preparations were made, and i think there _ these preparations were made, and i think there has been a lot made of those _ think there has been a lot made of those questions being answered. he also said _ those questions being answered. he also said that when he came into the post in— also said that when he came into the post in 2018 — also said that when he came into the post in 2018 as health secretary he was handed a document which said,

here is— was handed a document which said, here is the — was handed a document which said, here is the pandemic plan. he said here is the pandemic plan. he said he then— here is the pandemic plan. he said he then asked for more details on that, _ he then asked for more details on that, but— he then asked for more details on that, but at— he then asked for more details on that, but at the time the big priorities— that, but at the time the big priorities were not pandemic planning. they were the issues of obesity— planning. they were the issues of obesity in — planning. they were the issues of obesity in the population, of technology, of short staffing, how they needed to be more doctors and nurses— they needed to be more doctors and nurses recruited. that's a long—term issue _ nurses recruited. that's a long—term issue because it takes several years to train— issue because it takes several years to train up— issue because it takes several years to train up a — issue because it takes several years to train up a doctor. pandemic planning — to train up a doctor. pandemic planning was clearly a priority, he said, _ planning was clearly a priority, he said. but— planning was clearly a priority, he said, but not the top priority. his argument — said, but not the top priority. his argument was that there were other priorities— argument was that there were other priorities that he had to take hold of as— priorities that he had to take hold of as the — priorities that he had to take hold of as the health secretary. yes, he did say when _ of as the health secretary. yes, he did say when he — of as the health secretary. yes, he did say when he received _ of as the health secretary. yes, he did say when he received the - did say when he received the document he asked for more details. he said this was an area "i knew i needed to be across". take us back to when he arrived about one and a half hours before the inquiry. he was confronted by some relatives of those who lost their loved ones, wasn't he?—

those who lost their loved ones, wasn't he? . .. , wasn't he? yes. there were a number of --eole wasn't he? yes. there were a number of people who — wasn't he? yes. there were a number of people who turned _ wasn't he? yes. there were a number of people who turned up, _ wasn't he? yes. there were a number of people who turned up, who - wasn't he? yes. there were a number of people who turned up, who had - of people who turned up, who had been _ of people who turned up, who had been waiting for him to arrive. i spoke _ been waiting for him to arrive. i spoke to— been waiting for him to arrive. i spoke to them before he went in and they talked _ spoke to them before he went in and they talked about, i asked why they were here, — they talked about, i asked why they were here, they were from the bereaved — were here, they were from the bereaved families campaign group, and they— bereaved families campaign group, and they said they would not have missed _ and they said they would not have missed it — and they said they would not have missed it for the world. they can really— missed it for the world. they can really want — missed it for the world. they can really want answers from him. it was all very— really want answers from him. it was all very polite actually. there was shouting — all very polite actually. there was shouting afterwards. in fact, i understand a protester was arrested at one _ understand a protester was arrested at one point. clearly, some high emotion— at one point. clearly, some high emotion going on both in and outside the inquiry_ emotion going on both in and outside the inquiry today. protesters feeling — the inquiry today. protesters feeling that it is worthwhile being there. _ feeling that it is worthwhile being there. of— feeling that it is worthwhile being there, of course. just feeling that it is worthwhile being there, of course.— feeling that it is worthwhile being there, of course. just remind us why he became — there, of course. just remind us why he became such _ there, of course. just remind us why he became such a _ there, of course. just remind us why he became such a divisive _ there, of course. just remind us why he became such a divisive figure, . he became such a divisive figure, and why he had to quit from role. he was the health secretary from 2018, as we _ was the health secretary from 2018, as we have _ was the health secretary from 2018, as we have discussed, so in the years— as we have discussed, so in the years running up to the pandemic of course _ years running up to the pandemic of course a _ years running up to the pandemic of course a public figure during the pandemic, — course a public figure during the pandemic, he regularly hosted those daily covid _ pandemic, he regularly hosted those daily covid briefings. and then he resigned — daily covid briefings. and then he resigned injune 2021 because he

broke _ resigned injune 2021 because he broke his — resigned injune 2021 because he broke his own social distancing rules— broke his own social distancing rules because he was caught kissing his own _ rules because he was caught kissing his own age, and that was all caught on camera — his own age, and that was all caught on camera. terribly embarrassing. —— mike— on camera. terribly embarrassing. —— mike ade _ on camera. terribly embarrassing. —— mike ade. making those decisions about— mike ade. making those decisions about lockdown, because he had been the public— about lockdown, because he had been the public face of it, if you like, apart— the public face of it, if you like, apart from _ the public face of it, if you like, apart from boris johnson, the public face of it, if you like, apart from borisjohnson, it the public face of it, if you like, apart from boris johnson, it was embarrassing for him and for the government. and then you may remember— government. and then you may remember he appeared on i'm a celebrity. — remember he appeared on i'm a celebrity, and many people thought that was— celebrity, and many people thought that was tone deaf to some of the things— that was tone deaf to some of the things that had been going on. if that was— things that had been going on. if that was his attempt to try and salvage — that was his attempt to try and salvage his reputation, it wasn't necessarily a terribly sensible way of going _ necessarily a terribly sensible way of going about it. it's worth remembering, he is not a minister any more. — remembering, he is not a minister any more, he's not even a conservative mp any more because he was expelled from the party, and he is not _ was expelled from the party, and he is not standing at the next general election _ is not standing at the next general election. they're certainly no political _ election. they're certainly no political loyalty left today. i think — political loyalty left today. i think probably, if i am being honest. _ think probably, if i am being honest, this is going to be about him salvaging his own reputation, his own _ him salvaging his own reputation, his own personal reputation. like it

or not. _ his own personal reputation. like it or not. he — his own personal reputation. like it or not, he was most certainly seen as one _ or not, he was most certainly seen as one of— or not, he was most certainly seen as one of the — or not, he was most certainly seen as one of the key figures, the key bogeyman. — as one of the key figures, the key bogeyman, if you like, in the covid pandemic, — bogeyman, if you like, in the covid pandemic, and the government 's reaction _ pandemic, and the government 's reaction to— pandemic, and the government 's reaction to it. but let me remind you one — reaction to it. but let me remind you one more time, this part of the inquiry— you one more time, this part of the inquiry is _ you one more time, this part of the inquiry is about preparedness, so not those — inquiry is about preparedness, so not those decisions made during the pandemic, _ not those decisions made during the pandemic, but the decisions made in the run-up — pandemic, but the decisions made in the run—up. that's why we are talking — the run—up. that's why we are talking about flu pandemic planning and all— talking about flu pandemic planning and all these plans that civil servants _ and all these plans that civil servants came up with, and whether they were _ servants came up with, and whether they were sufficient. quite clearly, even _ they were sufficient. quite clearly, even he _ they were sufficient. quite clearly, even he would admit, they were not, in the _ even he would admit, they were not, in the run-up— even he would admit, they were not, in the run—up to the pandemic. and in the run-up to the pandemic. and remind us who _ in the run—up to the pandemic. jifuc remind us who we in the run—up to the pandemic. 3:13. remind us who we have been in the run—up to the pandemic. 3.13. remind us who we have been hearing from over the past few weeks because there are other high—profile politicians as well that we have been hearing from. the former prime minister, david cameron, the former chancellor, george osborne. so this is really trying to look back some years about how prepared the country was, the nhs was, notjust in the immediate months but over quite a few years. immediate months but over quite a few ears. . �* . immediate months but over quite a few ears. . �*. .. . few years. yes, it's not 'ust about the preparedness h few years. yes, it's not 'ust about the preparedness in _ few years. yes, it's notjust about the preparedness in terms - few years. yes, it's notjust about the preparedness in terms of- few years. yes, it's notjust about - the preparedness in terms of whether

there was— the preparedness in terms of whether there was enough ppe and what weather— there was enough ppe and what weather blueprints in terms of planning _ weather blueprints in terms of planning. one of the big question is asked _ planning. one of the big question is asked of— planning. one of the big question is asked of david cameron and his former— asked of david cameron and his former chancellor, george osborne, was about— former chancellor, george osborne, was about the state of the nhs, the state of— was about the state of the nhs, the state of the finances. a lot of criticism _ state of the finances. a lot of criticism levelled at them about economic— criticism levelled at them about economic decisions they made in the so-called _ economic decisions they made in the so—called austerity of cuts. cuts not just — so—called austerity of cuts. cuts not just to — so—called austerity of cuts. cuts not just to the nhs but also local authority— not just to the nhs but also local authority budgets and other departments, and how that all played into whether the health service and public _ into whether the health service and public health more generally was prepared, and how it coped with the pandemic _ prepared, and how it coped with the pandemic. of course, the conservative argument that cameron and osborne made is that they needed to make _ and osborne made is that they needed to make those cuts to strengthen the economy _ to make those cuts to strengthen the economy. they argue that the uk economy— economy. they argue that the uk economy was strong going into the pandemic, — economy was strong going into the pandemic, and that is why things like the _ pandemic, and that is why things like the thurlow scheme were able to happen _ like the thurlow scheme were able to happen because the economy could cope with _ happen because the economy could cope with it. —— furlough. there has been _ cope with it. —— furlough. there has been plenty— cope with it. —— furlough. there has been plenty of criticism. we heard

from _ been plenty of criticism. we heard from the _ been plenty of criticism. we heard from the former chief medical officer— from the former chief medical officer last week who said staffing numbers _ officer last week who said staffing numbers are down, nurses and doctors. — numbers are down, nurses and doctors, there were not even enough critical— doctors, there were not even enough critical in _ doctors, there were not even enough critical in intensive care beds available, _ critical in intensive care beds available, and really, everything was depleted, if you like. we also heard _ was depleted, if you like. we also heard from — was depleted, if you like. we also heard from academics who said the same _ heard from academics who said the same thing. and yesterday we heard from the _ same thing. and yesterday we heard from the royal college of nursing, who said _ from the royal college of nursing, who said they went into the pandemic with 50,000 to a few nurses and they should _ with 50,000 to a few nurses and they should have _ with 50,000 to a few nurses and they should have been more nurses recruited _ should have been more nurses recruited. there is a lot of politics _ recruited. there is a lot of politics going on. this is notjust about— politics going on. this is notjust about whether any civil servant has gone _ about whether any civil servant has gone through the plan of what could happen, _ gone through the plan of what could happen, this was also the state of the finances and all of those things matt hancock was involved in both the strategic planning but also the wider_ the strategic planning but also the wider political decisions about finances — wider political decisions about finances in the health service. thank— finances in the health service. thank you _ our health reporter at the inquiry said she has been told that a couple of people whose relatives died during the pandemic held up their pictures of matt hancock as he said

he was sorry for the impact it had had to. they said they had been expecting an apology, but apparently he was unconvincing. the covid inquiry was launched by boris johnson in may 2021. it covers decision—making during the pandemic and at the time mrjohnson said all aspects of the pandemic response would be under the microscope. it is being charged by baroness heather hallett, crossbench peer. she led the inquest into the 77 london bombings. such inquiries respond to public concern about events. it has the power to make people appear as witnesses and can demand evidence. no one will be found guilty or innocent —— or innocent, but conclusions will be published. inquirers make recommendations, of —— although they do not have to be

adopted. david cameron, the former prime minister, has been one who appeared last week. let's remind ourselves of what he had to say. that is why this inquiry is so important. i have tried to be as frank as i can come as open as i can about the things my government did that helped put in place the right architecture for looking at these threats, the horizon scanning, the units we put in place, the exercises undertaken, but have also tried to be frank about the things that were missed and the thing i struggle with is why they were missed because it was not asking questions about asymptomatic transmission that might appear.

asymptomatic transmission that might a- ear. . .. .. .., asymptomatic transmission that might auear. . .. .. .. asymptomatic transmission that might an ear. . .. .. .. .. .. .. appear. others have also appeared at the inuui , appear. others have also appeared at the inquiry, including _ appear. others have also appeared at the inquiry, including sir— appear. others have also appeared at the inquiry, including sir chris - the inquiry, including sir chris whitty, the chief medical adviser during the pandemic, and his predecessor. the during the pandemic, and his predecessor.— during the pandemic, and his predecessor. during the pandemic, and his redecessor. . . .. .. predecessor. the possibility of a lockdown itself _ predecessor. the possibility of a lockdown itself was _ predecessor. the possibility of a lockdown itself was neither - predecessor. the possibility of a - lockdown itself was neither foreseen or planned for. that lockdown itself was neither foreseen or planned for-— or planned for. that is the reality. it was true. _ or planned for. that is the reality. it was true, that _ or planned for. that is the reality. it was true, that failure _ or planned for. that is the reality. it was true, that failure in - or planned for. that is the reality. it was true, that failure in the - it was true, that failure in the context— it was true, that failure in the context of— it was true, that failure in the context of planning for pandemic is one of— context of planning for pandemic is one of more notable failures in this strategic— one of more notable failures in this strategic planning. | one of more notable failures in this strategic planning.— strategic planning. i still... all ri . ht, strategic planning. i still... all right. i'm _ strategic planning. i still... all right. i'm sorry _ strategic planning. i still... all right, i'm sorry we _ strategic planning. i still... all right, i'm sorry we didn't - strategic planning. i still... all right, i'm sorry we didn't plan | strategic planning. i still... all. right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for that _ right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for that i_ right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for that i would _ right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for that. iwould prefer— right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for that. i would prefer to— right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for that. i would prefer to have - right, i'm sorry we didn't plan for. that. i would prefer to have planned to not _ that. i would prefer to have planned to not get _ that. i would prefer to have planned to not get us— that. i would prefer to have planned to not get us to _ that. i would prefer to have planned to not get us to that _ that. i would prefer to have planned to not get us to that stage, - that. i would prefer to have planned to not get us to that stage, but - that. i would prefer to have planned to not get us to that stage, but we i to not get us to that stage, but we didn't— to not get us to that stage, but we didn't recognise _ to not get us to that stage, but we didn't recognise that _ to not get us to that stage, but we didn't recognise that it _ to not get us to that stage, but we didn't recognise that it could, - didn't recognise that it could, something _ didn't recognise that it could, something could _ didn't recognise that it could, something could get - didn't recognise that it could, something could get to - didn't recognise that it could, something could get to that i didn't recognise that it could, - something could get to that stage and how— something could get to that stage and how we — something could get to that stage and how we would _ something could get to that stage and how we would manage - something could get to that stage and how we would manage it. - something could get to that stagel and how we would manage it. matt

hancock has _ and how we would manage it. matt hancock has said _ and how we would manage it. hancock has said this and how we would manage it. 13131131 hancock has said this morning and how we would manage it.- hancock has said this morning that on his first day as health secretary he was briefed that he was responsible for working on any potential flu responsible for working on any potentialflu pandemic responsible for working on any potential flu pandemic and responsible for working on any potentialflu pandemic and other infectious diseases. i potential flu pandemic and other infectious diseases.— potential flu pandemic and other infectious diseases. i know there has been significant _ infectious diseases. i know there has been significant discussion . infectious diseases. i know there | has been significant discussion so far at the has been significant discussion so farat the inquiry has been significant discussion so far at the inquiry of the focus on influenza pandemic. iwas far at the inquiry of the focus on influenza pandemic. i was told that the reason that was the category one risk is because it is the most likely pandemic, but of course we were aware of other infectious diseases, not least because we were actively involved in responding to ebola and to a lesser extent em parks and p h e had a day to day responsibility for other infectious diseases that tend to happen in much smaller numbers, like legionnaires' disease. i was aware of it both from the work and the ball production of those risk assessments and in the day—to—day work of the department.

matt hancock there. they are taking a short break. we were expecting them to be back back now, but they haven'tjust them to be back back now, but they haven't just yet that we can see, although there are some documents being shown. we will return to that and matt hancock surfaced giving the rest of his evidence. he said the pandemic plan that he received when he became health secretary was too focused on deaths and the consequences of a disaster rather than stopping any virus, so really about the number of body bags and where people might be buried. he said that he was profoundly sorry for each death. he understood it would be hard to take an apology from him and he looked directly into those who were there, the eyes of those who were there, the eyes of those who were there, the relatives of those who lost their lives. they have not resumed giving evidence. let's listen back in.

on page two, please... paragraphs five and six, roles and responsibilities of members. the membership of the board is intended to reflect the breadth of the consequences of a pandemic. members of the board... he held a minute of silence and the russian _ he held a minute of silence and the russian national anthem was played afterwards. the russian defence minister. — afterwards. the russian defence minister, against whom the wagner leader— minister, against whom the wagner leader has— minister, against whom the wagner leader has campaigned so vigorously, was also _ leader has campaigned so vigorously, was also present at the event and from _ was also present at the event and from a _ was also present at the event and from a more general point of view,

yevgeny— from a more general point of view, yevgeny prigozhin seems to be very awarem _ yevgeny prigozhin seems to be very awarem he — yevgeny prigozhin seems to be very aware... he gave an address to the nation _ aware... he gave an address to the nation last— aware... he gave an address to the nation last night then he held this event in _ nation last night then he held this event in the kremlin which is very unusuat — event in the kremlin which is very unusual. reports from russia say that he _ unusual. reports from russia say that he is— unusual. reports from russia say that he is going to speak to reporters from kremlin —controlled media _ reporters from kremlin —controlled media this — reporters from kremlin —controlled media this evening. it looks like the russian president has embarked on a massive campaign to restore his authority _ on a massive campaign to restore his authori . . .. . .. .. . .. authority. restore his authority and ark in authority. restore his authority and park in front _ authority. restore his authority and park in front and _ authority. restore his authority and park in front and centre _ authority. restore his authority and park in front and centre to - authority. restore his authority and park in front and centre to seize - park in front and centre to seize back the narrative, because we know his wagner troops, in all the headlines last week, leaving president putin somewhat weakened. this he would assume is his effort

to seize control of the story once again. to seize control of the story once aaain. 3 . ... . to seize control of the story once aaain. 3.. . 3 .. again. absolutely. at the moment there is a lot _ again. absolutely. at the moment there is a lot of _ again. absolutely. at the moment there is a lot of uncertainty - again. absolutely. at the moment there is a lot of uncertainty about| there is a lot of uncertainty about what exactly is going to happen to wachner mercenaries, whether they will go to belarus, as suggested by the russian president, or whether they willjoin the russian military, which is also something that the president wants, or whether they are going to remain a highly dangerous rogue elements inside russia. due to hea with rogue elements inside russia. due to heavy with us- _ rogue elements inside russia. due to heavy with us- -- _ rogue elements inside russia. due to heavy with us. -- good _ rogue elements inside russia. due to heavy with us. -- good to _ rogue elements inside russia. due to heavy with us. -- good to have - rogue elements inside russia. due to heavy with us. -- good to have you . heavy with us. —— good to have you with us. we can now return to the covid inquiry, where matt hancock is continuing to give his evidence. the attendance continuing to give his evidence. t1e attendance of continuing to give his evidence. tue attendance of ministers and the department of health was determined

by whether they were invited. mr hancock, your own department's committee, the board, which you co-chaired — committee, the board, which you co—chaired with the cabinet office, knew— co—chaired with the cabinet office, knew full— co—chaired with the cabinet office, knew full well that you were expected to report to the authority with updates on the work of the board — with updates on the work of the board can— with updates on the work of the board. can you think of any reason why you _ board. can you think of any reason why you didn't attend those meetings, why you weren't told about the meetings, why you weren't informed — the meetings, why you weren't informed of the expectation that you attend _ informed of the expectation that you attend those meetings? the informed of the expectation that you attend those meetings?— attend those meetings? the only explanation _ attend those meetings? the only explanation l _ attend those meetings? the only explanation i can _ attend those meetings? the only explanation i can give _ attend those meetings? the only explanation i can give is - attend those meetings? the only explanation i can give is that - attend those meetings? the only explanation i can give is that the | explanation i can give is that the team faced as significance number of different threats and challenges and they choose during the relatively short period i was secretary of state for the pandemic to focus on other issues that they felt to be

appropriate. my experience in government, but the secretary of state for health and social care board, and before, was that the officials who handle and who are responsible for the national security council and its subcommittees are exceptionally diligent, extremely hard—working and have the highest integrity and that goes for all of the officials i work within the department of health and social care. all i can say is they would have known and it would have been incumbent on them to consider all threats and make decisions as to the agenda according to what is necessary. the agenda according to what is necessary-— necessary. this is a document relatinu necessary. this is a document relating to _ necessary. this is a document relating to the _ necessary. this is a document relating to the official - relating to the official

subcommittee. it is dated the 19th of december 2018, so after you took office _ of december 2018, so after you took office in _ of december 2018, so after you took office injuly of december 2018, so after you took office in july 2018. of december 2018, so after you took office injuly 2018. if of december 2018, so after you took office in july 2018. if we of december 2018, so after you took office injuly 2018. if we go of december 2018, so after you took office in july 2018. if we go to page — office in july 2018. if we go to page three. paragraph two. eu exit planning _ page three. paragraph two. eu exit planning. the cabinet office updated members _ planning. the cabinet office updated members on the civil contingency secretary— members on the civil contingency secretary at, prioritisation work in preparedness for the eu exit. cts stressed — preparedness for the eu exit. cts stressed the capacity will be maintained to continue normal preparedness activities and ensuring that part _ preparedness activities and ensuring that part two is refined if required. in discussion, members raised _ required. in discussion, members raised the — required. in discussion, members raised the following points. a sportive — raised the following points. a sportive normal —— as part of normal preparedness, would crisis my new management continue? some

departments still wish to provide feedback and then there was the debate _ feedback and then there was the debate about whether hostile state activities _ debate about whether hostile state activities exercises continue. the chair— activities exercises continue. the chair said — activities exercises continue. the chair said that britons could continue _ chair said that britons could continue following a move to the operational mode of the eu exit planning — operational mode of the eu exit planning. so, in the autumn and winter— planning. so, in the autumn and winterof— planning. so, in the autumn and winter of 2018, overa planning. so, in the autumn and winter of 2018, over a year before the pandemic struck, at this officials _ the pandemic struck, at this officials meeting of the national security— officials meeting of the national security council committee there was debate _ security council committee there was debate about the fact that the eu exit planning was starting to have an impact— exit planning was starting to have an impact on preparedness planning because _ an impact on preparedness planning because of— an impact on preparedness planning because of the prioritisation of work— because of the prioritisation of work and — because of the prioritisation of work and there is a clear reference thereto _ work and there is a clear reference thereto ministers being briefed as to what— thereto ministers being briefed as to what levels of business as usual

activities _ to what levels of business as usual activities would continue, notwithstanding the necessary prioritisation of the work towards a new deal— prioritisation of the work towards a new deal eu exit. when were you briefed _ new deal eu exit. when were you briefed in — new deal eu exit. when were you briefed in the autumn and winter of 2018 as _ briefed in the autumn and winter of 2018 as to— briefed in the autumn and winter of 2018 as to what was coming? of 2018 as to what was coming? ot course 2018 as to what was coming? course i was 2018 as to what was coming? of course i was aware that brexit was a significant part of the national debate and in the department we needed to be prepared for it. that briefing was ongoing. as we discussed earlier, there was a moment at which we had to move resources on shall prepare for that. in the summer i think of 2019. we did that within the department. the plans were drawn up by the team and

i signed them off. i returned to my broader point, which is the professionalism and diligence with which the civil service team looked at all of the different challenges and threats that were faced was exemplary. and threats that were faced was exemplary-— and threats that were faced was exemplary. this is a memo from within your _ exemplary. this is a memo from within your department - exemplary. this is a memo from within your department to - exemplary. this is a memo from - within your department to professor chris whitty, the current cmo, who you know _ chris whitty, the current cmo, who you know very well. i think it was a former— you know very well. i think it was a former departmental chief scientific adviser— former departmental chief scientific adviser in _ former departmental chief scientific adviser in the department. correct. it is dated _ adviser in the department. correct. it is dated the 27th of march 2019. it is dated the 27th of march 2019. it concerns — it is dated the 27th of march 2019. it concerns the reallocation of work — it concerns the reallocation of work. paragraph one, you are aware that following reorganisation and re—prioritisation of work due to eu no-deal_ re—prioritisation of work due to eu

no—deal planning, infectious disease policy— no—deal planning, infectious disease policy has _ no—deal planning, infectious disease policy has made to your portfolio of responsibility on a temporary basis. paragraph— responsibility on a temporary basis. paragraph three, what is this? that is the executive _ paragraph three, what is this? trust is the executive committee chaired by the permanent secretary. that is the committee that effectively runs the committee that effectively runs the department on an executive basis. �* . . . the department on an executive basis. . . . .. the department on an executive basis. �* . . . .. .. the department on an executive basis. ... . basis. but sub'ect to a supervisory board? ves. — basis. but subject to a supervisory board? yes, and _ basis. but subject to a supervisory board? yes, and working - basis. but subject to a supervisory board? yes, and working to - board? yes, and working to ministerial _ board? yes, and working to ministerial priorities - board? yes, and working to ministerial priorities and . ministerial priorities and decisions.— ministerial priorities and decisions. . .. ., decisions. they agreed that the department _ decisions. they agreed that the department would _ decisions. they agreed that the department would need - decisions. they agreed that the department would need to - decisions. they agreed that the department would need to do l decisions. they agreed that the i department would need to do less work in _ department would need to do less work in some areas in order to free up work in some areas in order to free up resource — work in some areas in order to free up resource for eu exit preparations. our range of work was agreed _ preparations. our range of work was agreed that— preparations. our range of work was agreed that would be scaled back or pause _ agreed that would be scaled back or pause before this policy area transferred across to you. annex i summarises — transferred across to you. annex i summarises the work areas that are continuing _ summarises the work areas that are continuing and those of which are on hold _ continuing and those of which are on hold so _ continuing and those of which are on hold so this— continuing and those of which are on hold. so this paragraph makes plain that at—

hold. so this paragraph makes plain that at the _ hold. so this paragraph makes plain that at the highest level in your department, subject only to the supervisory review of the board and yourself, _ supervisory review of the board and yourself, notjust that supervisory review of the board and yourself, not just that there was a prioritisation across government in favour— prioritisation across government in favour of— prioritisation across government in favour of eu exit work, but that a range _ favour of eu exit work, but that a range of— favour of eu exit work, but that a range of work related to pan flu would _ range of work related to pan flu would be — range of work related to pan flu would be paused. that was a policy decision— would be paused. that was a policy decision of— would be paused. that was a policy decision of great significance, was it? it— decision of great significance, was it? .. . ., decision of great significance, was it? .. _ decision of great significance, was it? _ .. it? it was a policy decision i would rue it? it was a policy decision i would query whether _ it? it was a policy decision i would query whether it _ it? it was a policy decision i would query whether it had _ it? it was a policy decision i would query whether it had great - query whether it had great significance. as you can see from the numbers on this page, the numbers of people working in this area, the numbers of movement is small and my second observation is that this work was following the wrong approach and i'm not sure it would have been any use in the pandemic. that is myjudgment from

having been the man, the person in the hot seat when the pandemic struck. d0 the hot seat when the pandemic struck. . .. .. struck. do you recall that debate? yes, i recalled _ struck. do you recall that debate? yes, i recalled the _ struck. do you recall that debate? yes, i recalled the debate - struck. do you recall that debate? | yes, i recalled the debate because struck. do you recall that debate? i yes, i recalled the debate because i discussed _ yes, i recalled the debate because i discussed with the permanent secretary because what he was responsible for the running of the department, he would then check with me that _ department, he would then check with me that i _ department, he would then check with me that i was content with the proposal— me that i was content with the proposal he put together and there were many other areas of work that had to— were many other areas of work that had to be _ were many other areas of work that had to be stopped in order to prepare — had to be stopped in order to prepare for brexit, as well. there were _ prepare for brexit, as well. there were a _ prepare for brexit, as well. there were a series of areas.— prepare for brexit, as well. there were a series of areas. sure you are aware of the — were a series of areas. sure you are aware of the summer _ were a series of areas. sure you are aware of the summer have - were a series of areas. sure you are aware of the summer have to - were a series of areas. sure you are aware of the summer have to be - aware of the summer have to be scaled back imposed?— aware of the summer have to be scaled back imposed? yes. i wasn't enthusiastic — scaled back imposed? yes. i wasn't enthusiastic about _ scaled back imposed? yes. i wasn't enthusiastic about it _ scaled back imposed? yes. i wasn't enthusiastic about it but _ scaled back imposed? yes. i wasn't enthusiastic about it but i _ scaled back imposed? yes. i wasn't enthusiastic about it but i sounded | enthusiastic about it but i sounded off and _ enthusiastic about it but i sounded off and the reason was the overall reshaping — off and the reason was the overall reshaping of the department because we had _ reshaping of the department because we had a _ reshaping of the department because we had a very real and material threats — we had a very real and material threats should add disorganised brexit— threats should add disorganised brexit happen that we needed to be

prepared _ brexit happen that we needed to be prepared for. it comes back to the point _ prepared for. it comes back to the point about— prepared for. it comes back to the point about context, that there are many _ point about context, that there are many bad — point about context, that there are many bad things that you have to prepare _ many bad things that you have to prepare for when you're in the health— prepare for when you're in the health department.— prepare for when you're in the health department. moving forward eiuht health department. moving forward eight months _ health department. moving forward eight months to _ health department. moving forward eight months to november- health department. moving forward eight months to november 2019, l health department. moving forward i eight months to november 2019, the eve of the pandemic. the minutes for the pandemic flu readiness board, the pandemic flu readiness board, the pandemic flu readiness board has not met since november 2018 due to read prioritisation to plan for potential new deal eu brexit. so the sole cross government body set up by direction of the prime minister did not meet at all, did it? between november 2018 and the 27th of november 2018 and the 27th of november 2019. that november 2018 and the 27th of november 2019.— november 2018 and the 27th of november 2019. that is what this -a er november 2019. that is what this paper says- _ november 2019. that is what this paper says- were _ november 2019. that is what this paper says. were you _ november 2019. that is what this paper says. were you aware, - november 2019. that is what this paper says. were you aware, mrl paper says. were you aware, mr hancock that — paper says. were you aware, mr hancock that for _ paper says. were you aware, mr hancock that for a _ paper says. were you aware, mr hancock that for a whole - paper says. were you aware, mr hancock that for a whole year i paper says. were you aware, mr hancock that for a whole year of| paper says. were you aware, mr i hancock that for a whole year of the board did not even make? i do

hancock that for a whole year of the board did not even make?— board did not even make? i do not recall being _ board did not even make? i do not recall being aware _ board did not even make? i do not recall being aware of _ board did not even make? i do not recall being aware of that, - board did not even make? i do not recall being aware of that, no. i board did not even make? i do not recall being aware of that, no. but i __ recall being aware of that, no. but i -- but— recall being aware of that, no. but i -- but i _ recall being aware of that, no. but i -- but i do— recall being aware of that, no. but i —— but i do know that work under the board — i —— but i do know that work under the board because my guidance continued, because i was engaged with some — continued, because i was engaged with some of the work, as we have discussed — with some of the work, as we have discussed, especially but not only on vaccine — discussed, especially but not only on vaccine manufacturing. page five, -araara-h on vaccine manufacturing. page five, paragraph seven _ on vaccine manufacturing. page five, paragraph seven dates. _ on vaccine manufacturing. page five, paragraph seven dates. the - on vaccine manufacturing. page five, paragraph seven dates. the pfr i on vaccine manufacturing. page five, paragraph seven dates. the pfr bay| paragraph seven dates. the pfr bay have committed to meet every six to eight weeks until the key outputs of the work programme are delivered. it is proposed that in 2028 meets every three months. this will ensure that progress can be communicated to key planning partners through updated documentation where appropriate. 50 it was understood, wasn't it that although it had committed to meet every six to eight weeks, the failure to meet for a whole year doubt very far short of what it had apparently committed itself to

doing? apparently committed itself to doinu ? .. apparently committed itself to doinr? .. . apparently committed itself to doin 1 ? .. . .. apparently committed itself to doinu? .. . .. . .. doing? that is what i understand from reading _ doing? that is what i understand from reading these _ doing? that is what i understand from reading these papers, i doing? that is what i understand | from reading these papers, yeah. doing? that is what i understand i from reading these papers, yeah. it from reading these papers, yeah. [i says from reading these papers, yeah. says nhs from reading these papers, yeah. it says nhs thrc, it should be nhc thrc. the board reports on progress to the nsc thrc, the board, the subcommittee that she cannot recall attending. they were not updated in the year to march 2019. so it didn't notjust not meet, it wasn't even updated at the end of year two, march 2019, the second full year of its operation. was it?— its operation. was it? evidently, from reading _ its operation. was it? evidently, from reading these _ its operation. was it? evidently, from reading these papers. i i its operation. was it? evidently, i from reading these papers. i wasn't from reading these papers. iwasn't aware _ from reading these papers. iwasn't aware of— from reading these papers. iwasn't aware of these papers at the time. after— aware of these papers at the time. after the _ aware of these papers at the time.

after the pandemic struck come on the 15th of january 2020... after the pandemic struck come on the 15th ofjanuary 2020... pandemic influenza board updates. last updated the 15th of january 2020. the health care work screen, progress is slow for a number of reasons. community care, progress on the community health care site has slowed for a number of reasons. then over the page, please. slowed for a number of reasons. then overthe page, please. further down the page. excess deaths, that was one of the work streams in which work was completed, wasn't it? you referred earlier in your evidence that you were aware there was a work

stream in which work was done. iadmit stream in which work was done. work was done, stream in which work was done. work was done. i'm — stream in which work was done. work was done, i'm not _ stream in which work was done. work was done, i'm not sure _ stream in which work was done. work was done, i'm not sure whether it was done, i'm not sure whether it was completed because we had to do further— was completed because we had to do further work on it when the pandemic struck _ further work on it when the pandemic struck i— further work on it when the pandemic struck i was— further work on it when the pandemic struck. i was pausing to recollect correctly — struck. i was pausing to recollect correctl . struck. i was pausing to recollect correctl. .. . .. correctly. over the page. sector resilience- _ correctly. over the page. sector resilience. there _ correctly. over the page. sector resilience. there has _ correctly. over the page. sector resilience. there has been i correctly. over the page. sector resilience. there has been no i resilience. there has been no further work on this work stream. it was agreed that the chairing of the business checklist should be posed as a result to communicate other risks, including eu exit. what is sector resilience?— sector resilience? that there is resilience. _ sector resilience? that there is resilience, especially _ sector resilience? that there is resilience, especially over i sector resilience? that there is l resilience, especially over supply chains _ resilience, especially over supply chains. which sectors? in this case pharmaceutical in particular, but also non—pharmaceutical goods required — also non—pharmaceutical goods required for the health and social care board sector. health and social care board sector. health and social care board _ care board sector. health and social care board sectors. within the department that would have been their purview. department that would have been their purview-— their purview. yes. crosscutting enablers. _ their purview. yes. crosscutting enablers. all— their purview. yes. crosscutting enablers, all england _

their purview. yes. crosscutting enablers, all england clauses i enablers, all england clauses complete including an explanatory note. is that a reference to the drafting of the bill to which he made reference earlier? it appears so. that made reference earlier? it appears so- that is — made reference earlier? it appears so. that is what _ made reference earlier? it appears so. that is what four _ made reference earlier? it appears so. that is what four nations i made reference earlier? it appears so. that is what four nations bill i so. that is what four nations bill was used — so. that is what four nations bill was used as shorthand. that appears so. was used as shorthand. that appears so~ 0n— was used as shorthand. that appears so on the _ was used as shorthand. that appears so. on the previous one, number four. _ so. on the previous one, number four, the — so. on the previous one, number four, the work that was intended to be prepared for a new deal brexit was be prepared fora new deal brexit was itself— be prepared for a new deal brexit was itself important, incredibly important, when it came to the pandemic _ important, when it came to the pandemic. this paper doesn't quite capture _ pandemic. this paper doesn't quite capture it — pandemic. this paper doesn't quite capture it. it captures the planning. is capture it. it captures the planning-— capture it. it captures the ”lannin. . .. .. . ., planning. is that a reference to the fact that work _ planning. is that a reference to the fact that work was _ planning. is that a reference to the fact that work was done _ planning. is that a reference to the fact that work was done on - planning. is that a reference to the | fact that work was done on securing and safeguarding medicinal supply chains to deal with a new deal eu brexit? correct. but that issue of supply chains, mr hancock, was just

one of a very much larger number of areas in which work was required across the health sector and the aduu across the health sector and the adult social care sector? not unimportant, but it was just one of the areas, wasn't it, where work is required? i the areas, wasn't it, where work is reuuired? .. �* . ~ required? i wouldn't put it like that. required? i wouldn't put it like that- the _ required? i wouldn't put it like that. the way _ required? i wouldn't put it like that. the way i _ required? i wouldn't put it like that. the way i would - required? i wouldn't put it like that. the way i would say i required? i wouldn't put it like that. the way i would say it i required? i wouldn't put it like that. the way i would say it is| required? i wouldn't put it like i that. the way i would say it is the work— that. the way i would say it is the work done — that. the way i would say it is the work done for a new deal brexit on supply— work done for a new deal brexit on supply chains for medicines was the difference _ supply chains for medicines was the difference between running out of medicines in the peak of the pandemic and not running out. we came _ pandemic and not running out. we came extremely close, within hours of running _ came extremely close, within hours of running out of medicines for intensive — of running out of medicines for intensive care during the pandemic. it wasn't _ intensive care during the pandemic. it wasn't widely reported at the time _ it wasn't widely reported at the time i— it wasn't widely reported at the time. i think the only reason that we didn't— time. i think the only reason that we didn't run out is because of the work— we didn't run out is because of the work that— we didn't run out is because of the work that steve oldfield and his team _ work that steve oldfield and his team did, which they did during 2019 in preparation for a new deal brexit. — in preparation for a new deal

brexit, but became extremely useful in saving _ brexit, but became extremely useful in saving lives during the pandemic. at the _ in saving lives during the pandemic. at the point— in saving lives during the pandemic. at the point of which the pandemic struck _ at the point of which the pandemic struck, because of the new deal brexit— struck, because of the new deal brexit work, we knew more about the pharmaceutical supply chain in the uk than _ pharmaceutical supply chain in the uk than at — pharmaceutical supply chain in the uk than at any time in history and we had _ uk than at any time in history and we had relationships with the pharmaceutical suppliers and the data to _ pharmaceutical suppliers and the data to know exactly who had what's available _ data to know exactly who had what's available and where. and the extent of that _ available and where. and the extent of that information was the difference between running out and not running out of drugs in intensive _ not running out of drugs in intensive care in the pandemic. that of course _ intensive care in the pandemic. that of course wasn't the intention of the work. — of course wasn't the intention of the work, but it was the consequence of the _ the work, but it was the consequence of the work. — the work, but it was the consequence of the work, so when it comes to the question— of the work, so when it comes to the question of— of the work, so when it comes to the question of the overall impact of brexit. _ question of the overall impact of brexit, absolutely the paperwork is very clear _ brexit, absolutely the paperwork is very clear that some of the preparation work was stopped and the snow -- _ preparation work was stopped and the snow -- a _ preparation work was stopped and the snow —— a small number of people were _ snow —— a small number of people were moved — snow —— a small number of people were moved off that work. on the other— were moved off that work. on the other hand —

were moved off that work. on the other hand, we were better prepared in terms _ other hand, we were better prepared in terms of— other hand, we were better prepared in terms of supply chains. who knows the overall— in terms of supply chains. who knows the overall impact and which of those _ the overall impact and which of those balances in the scales is greater? — those balances in the scales is greater? i'm afraid it is impossible to know _ greater? i'm afraid it is impossible to know istr— greater? i'm afraid it is impossible to know. ~ .. . .. to know. mr hancock, whilst that may well be right — to know. mr hancock, whilst that may well be right that _ to know. mr hancock, whilst that may well be right that there _ to know. mr hancock, whilst that may well be right that there was _ well be right that there was valuable work done in an important area of preparation, the medicinal supply chains, this chart, in particular rule for, sector resilience, makes plain that across this wave of the health care and social adult social care sectors, important other areas of work, of which there were many more than the single issue of medicinal supply chains, were posed or interrupted. that is the point, isn't it? that is one point, — that is the point, isn't it? that is one point, i— that is the point, isn't it? that is one point, iagree. but the that is the point, isn't it? that is one point, i agree. but the further point _ one point, i agree. but the further point is _ one point, i agree. but the further point is of— one point, i agree. but the further point is of significance, which is

the most — point is of significance, which is the most significant, and it is impossible to know whether one was more _ impossible to know whether one was more significant than the other. than _ more significant than the other. than the — more significant than the other. than the others.— than the others. whether the reduction _ than the others. whether the reduction in _ than the others. whether the reduction in the _ than the others. whether the reduction in the number i than the others. whether the reduction in the number of i than the others. whether the i reduction in the number of people as demonstrated by the paperwork on pandemic— demonstrated by the paperwork on pandemic preparedness, whether the negative _ pandemic preparedness, whether the negative impact of that is outweighed or is not outweighed by the positive impact of the supply chain— the positive impact of the supply chain planning. the number of activities — chain planning. the number of activities is not as important as their— activities is not as important as their consequence. because operational sickness, which was guiding — operational sickness, which was guiding this work, itself was flawed in conception, i'm not convinced that there — in conception, i'm not convinced that there would have been that much help, that there would have been that much help. even— that there would have been that much help, even if all of these things were _ help, even if all of these things were done. of course it would have been _ were done. of course it would have been death— were done. of course it would have been death —— been better if they had. _ been death —— been better if they had but — been death —— been better if they had but i — been death —— been better if they had, but i have no idea how helpful they would — had, but i have no idea how helpful they would have been. what

had, but i have no idea how helpful they would have been.— had, but i have no idea how helpful they would have been. what you told that the pf they would have been. what you told that the pr abi — they would have been. what you told that the pr abi had _ they would have been. what you told that the pr abi had not _ they would have been. what you told that the pr abi had not met - they would have been. what you told that the pf abi had not met for i they would have been. what you told that the pf abi had not met for a i that the pf abi had not met for a year and that, as this document shows, byjanuary of year and that, as this document shows, by january of 2020, year and that, as this document shows, byjanuary of 2020, in a number of important areas, work had caused. i number of important areas, work had caused. . . number of important areas, work had caused. .. .. number of important areas, work had caused. .. . .. .. ., number of important areas, work had caused. .. . .. .. .. caused. i was aware that some work-out _ caused. i was aware that some work-out post. _ caused. i was aware that some work-out post. i— caused. i was aware that some work-out post. i don't - caused. i was aware that some work-out post. i don't recall i work—out post. i don't recall knowing _ work—out post. i don't recall knowing that the board had not met. the pandemic influenza preparedness board, you referred to it earlier, do you recall that it was in the nature of that board does not work to prepare annually our risk register setting out in the field of influenza preparedness, what the greatest risks where? do influenza preparedness, what the greatest risks where?— influenza preparedness, what the greatest risks where? do you recall that? i don't— greatest risks where? do you recall that? i don't recall— greatest risks where? do you recall that? i don't recall that, _ greatest risks where? do you recall that? i don't recall that, but- greatest risks where? do you recall that? i don't recall that, but i'm i that? i don't recall that, but i'm not surprised. from one year to another— not surprised. from one year to another i — not surprised. from one year to another i doubt it would have changed _ another i doubt it would have changed much. again, it was the central— changed much. again, it was the central failing of that sort of risk register— central failing of that sort of risk register was not to learn the lessons _ register was not to learn the lessons from sars, as was discussed,

and i have _ lessons from sars, as was discussed, and i have made clear in my submission, not to have the right plan to— submission, not to have the right plan to deal with the pandemic. would _ plan to deal with the pandemic. would you agree that in 2016 the risk register for that central the hsc led board showed our risk that supplies a facemasks, respirators and gloves could be below the optimum requirement in the event of a pandemic and that the health and social care board systems would be unable to cope with an extreme surge in demand due to a pandemic. i ideas in demand due to a pandemic. i was not aware of — in demand due to a pandemic. i was not aware of that, _ in demand due to a pandemic. i was not aware of that, no. _ in demand due to a pandemic. i was not aware of that, no. in _ in demand due to a pandemic. i was not aware of that, no. in 2017, i not aware of that, no. in 2017, countermeasures _ not aware of that, no. in 2017, countermeasures were i not aware of that, no. in 2017, countermeasures were still i not aware of that, no. in 2017, countermeasures were still a l not aware of that, no. in 2017, i countermeasures were still a risk issue, the supply of facemasks and gloves could be below the optimum requirement and an extreme surge was still an identified risk, that is 2017? . ._ still an identified risk, that is 2017? . ~, 2017? yes, ifi may say so. my recollection _ 2017? yes, ifi may say so. my recollection was _ 2017? yes, ifi may say so. my recollection was being - 2017? yes, if i may say so. my l recollection was being reassured that we — recollection was being reassured that we had a huge stockpile ppe. a

pause _ that we had a huge stockpile ppe. a pause because it is possible to write _ pause because it is possible to write it — pause because it is possible to write it was below the optimum because — write it was below the optimum because the optimum could be an enormous — because the optimum could be an enormous quantity, which is exactly what we _ enormous quantity, which is exactly what we needed. it can be perfectly true to— what we needed. it can be perfectly true to say— what we needed. it can be perfectly true to say it is below the optimum and at _ true to say it is below the optimum and at the — true to say it is below the optimum and at the same time reassured that it is huge _ and at the same time reassured that it is huge. the and at the same time reassured that it is hue. .. .. .. it is huge. the health and social care board _ it is huge. the health and social care board system _ it is huge. the health and social care board system may - it is huge. the health and social care board system may be i it is huge. the health and social. care board system may be unable it is huge. the health and social- care board system may be unable to cope with an extreme surge in demand. that was an identified risk in the register in 2017. by 2018 to 24th of september, the following risks were still being identified. issues with facemasks, respirators, gloves, below the optimum requirement. plans for the surge that would be required in the health and social care board systems were not fully tested. there was a risk in relation to the health and social care board systems being unable to copein care board systems being unable to cope in the event of a pandemic. and that risk remains. so for 2.5 years

those risks, having been identified by the board, were not mitigated by virtue of being addressed. they remain, did they not? they did and we had to deal with him with a materialised.— with a materialised. indeed, but that was a _ with a materialised. indeed, but that was a programme - with a materialised. indeed, but that was a programme led i with a materialised. indeed, but that was a programme led by i with a materialised. indeed, but. that was a programme led by your department. 50 the next question is, how can that have been allowed to happen with the inevitable consequence, mr hancock, that you yourself had to deal with the consequences?— yourself had to deal with the consequences? yourself had to deal with the conseauences? . 3 . ... . consequences? yes. absolutely. the inabili to consequences? yes. absolutely. the inability to get _ consequences? yes. absolutely. the inability to get the _ consequences? yes. absolutely. the inability to get the ppe _ consequences? yes. absolutely. the inability to get the ppe out _ consequences? yes. absolutely. the inability to get the ppe out fast i inability to get the ppe out fast enough was a very significant problem. one recommendation for the future is that every health and social care setting should be required to have its own stockpile of ppe, and that should be paid for by the government because in the

early days getting it out fast enough when there was a sudden increase in demand, just as explained there, that was incredibly difficult. so yes, i totally accept that. 3 . .. that. and the pandemic influenza preparedness— that. and the pandemic influenza preparedness paper _ that. and the pandemic influenza preparedness paper dated i that. and the pandemic influenza l preparedness paper dated october 2019 on the eve of the pandemic... page one, paragraph one. the paper reminded the board of the re—prioritisation that took place at the end of 2018 and set out areas of work that continued and new priorities that arose. paragraph three. there is a reference to an annex. perhaps we could look at that, please. it is at the end.

if you could go back up to the start of the annex, thank you. thank you. annex a. and flu programme re—prioritisation at the end of 2018. work areas, pan flu bill, that's a reference to the draft bill to which you referred. permanent secretary meetings on pamphlet continue. permanent secretary written updates. quarterly finance meetings continue. moral and ethical advisory group membership and recruitment. uk pandemic influenza strategy refresh. health care search largely complete.

devolved administration engagement to develop plans outstanding. adult social care stop largely complete for the pandemic flu readiness board, but cmo actions outstanding. the frb paper on the updating stop. comms. benchmark readiness internationally. engagement in clinical countermeasures board. bhd clinical countermeasures board. and so on. clinical countermeasures board. and so on- yes- — so on. yes. were you told of the extent and nature of the stop categories? well, i am absolutely accountable for it because i am accountable for everything that happened in the department. i would also, though, ask you to consider each of these in detail is because it comes to the point we discussed earlier on significance. for instance, the moral and ethical advisory group existed, it had membership when the

pandemic struck, so further membership and recruitment was not a consideration that would have made a material difference to planning for the pandemic. the influenza strategy refresh, that was a 2011 document, that would only have been significant if that refresh had completely change strategy that the western world was following that was regarded as by the who as best in class. is regarded as by the who as best in class. . .. . ., . regarded as by the who as best in class. . .. . .. . . class. is that the strategy in which ou state class. is that the strategy in which you state in _ class. is that the strategy in which you state in your _ class. is that the strategy in which you state in your witness - class. is that the strategy in which i you state in your witness statement that for the purposes of pandemic planning was woefully inadequate? woefully inadequate and i don't think a refresh would have changed that because all of the independent external advice, the world health organization advice, indeed the international health regulations stated that we should not have locked oz. in fact in 2017 a document said the evidence is not

strong enough to warrant advocating legislative restrictions. this is where i need to add to what i have written in my written statement because i thought at the time it was simply an oversight not to consider locked oz. in fact, it was a specific decision. a document in may 2018, "it will not be possible to halt the spread of a new pandemic". that was the attitude. it was the doctrine, and it was wrong. that refresh would have made very little difference. health care surge was largely complete. the final action there is on involvement of the da since health care is devolved, that would have been not a terribly important area. adult social care largely complete. i'm not exactly sure what the cmo action outstanding is. my point is about materiality...

may i pause you there to ask you some more questions about adult social care. of course, yes. in your statement you refer to the fact that one of the major problems with the department supervision of the adult social care sector was the lack of policy levers. social care sector was the lack of policy levers-— social care sector was the lack of policy levers. yes. which would enable the _ policy levers. yes. which would enable the department to enact... but this is not what this is refracting. i but this is not what this is refracting— but this is not what this is refractinu. .. .. .. . .. refracting. i want to ask you whether or _ refracting. i want to ask you whether or not _ refracting. i want to ask you whether or not you - refracting. i want to ask you whether or not you can i refracting. i want to ask you whether or not you can say i refracting. i want to ask you i whether or not you can say that the aduu whether or not you can say that the adult social care sector was well prepared for a pandemic when the department had no means of finding out whether or not they had the right plans in place, whether local authorities had planned sufficiently, let alone had any numbers of how many in the care sector. the department have no visibility on whether or not the aduu visibility on whether or not the adult social care sector was prepared at all. it wasn't within your ability.

prepared at all. it wasn't within your ability-— your ability. that's not my contention. _ your ability. that's not my contention. my _ your ability. that's not my contention. my contention your ability. that's not my i contention. my contention is your ability. that's not my - contention. my contention is that this action he would not have solved that. the cmo could not have solved the problems in terms of oversight of the adult social care sector. it was much bigger than that. what was the name of your department? i haste the name of your department? i have already talked — the name of your department? i have already talked about _ the name of your department? i have already talked about this. _ the name of your department? i have already talked about this. it - the name of your department? i have already talked about this. it is - the name of your department? i have already talked about this. it is the - already talked about this. it is the department of health and social care, and yet the legal responsibilities are with local authorities, and we had a programme, authorities, and we had a programme, a separate programme of work under way that did not stop because of brexit planning that was accelerated by the new prime minister in summer 2019 of reform of adult social care. we had ongoing work to get better data that was continued in this process. adult social care desperately needs reform. it needs more support, it need more resilience, and ifeel more support, it need more resilience, and i feel very strongly, as does the current chancellor of the exchequer, who has been clear about that, not only when he was in myjob, but in his current

job. my contention is that whatever the cmo actions outstanding were here, they would not have solved the huge challenges of adult social care in this country, which requires significant improvement and work. by significant improvement and work. el: january 2020, did the department have in place, the department of social care have in place, a single coherent plan to identify vulnerable service users across the country? that is to say, how many people are in the care sector? ho. in the care sector? no. did it have _ in the care sector? no. did it have a _ in the care sector? no. did it have a central. in the care sector? no. i did it have a central plan in the care sector? no. - did it have a central plan for sharing of data between private and public care providers and emergency responders, in order to be able to better prepare them all for a pandemic? something along those lines was being developed but it was definitely not in place. was there a single national guidance for preparedness in the adult social care sector? the

for preparedness in the adult social care sector?— care sector? the guidance went throuuh care sector? the guidance went through local — care sector? the guidance went through local authorities - care sector? the guidance went through local authorities and i care sector? the guidance went through local authorities and so there was not a single one, no. did all the local resilience forums have plans in place on the local authority level for dealing with the impact of a catastrophic pandemic on the elderly? no they were required to, but only two had done the work. was the department of health and social care able to verify the extent of the pandemic preparedness planning that was being done by local authorities? no, we didn't have a policy levers to do so, despite having the name social care in the title. did the department of social care put in place a national standard by which the plans from local authorities could be gauged? no. in relation to those local resilience forums, did the department to prepare in fact a pandemic flu standard? at the latter

end of 2019, which for the very first time obliged local resilience to compare their plans a national standard for influenza pandemic planning. well, yes is the answer. it is. i suppose what that demonstrates, because that came into place later in 2019, it is my central contention in 2019, it is my central contention in this area which is that the system for how the run adult social care is flawed. there was work on going to try to resolve it. that included work directly related to pandemic planning, but it was in nowhere near good enough shape and it meant that, as the person trying to solve this problem with a disease that self evidently impacted on older people most, we were in an incredibly difficult position to do so when the pandemic struck, and despite the enormous hard work of everybody in that sector and in the

department in relation to adult social care, it was very, very difficult early on. and that is in part because this planning was ongoing, but the systems in this country for managing adult social care are not good enough, and that reform work was under way but it still has not been completed. so drawing some of these threads together, please, mr hancock, would you accept the following propositions. firstly, there was a long—standing bias within the department of health and social care as to —— as the risk owner of the pandemic influenza risk and as the author of that strategy which you described as woefully inadequate, in favour of influenza, a failure to pay sufficient regard to the risk,

admittedly a lesser risk, of another different catastrophic illness question mark it would have been better, yes, if the plans had been for a generic respiratory disease because what matters is the characteristic of the novel virus. indeed. proposition two. there was a failure to think through properly the risks of a non—influenza pandemic. due to the inherent unpredictability of viral respiratory pathogens and their characteristics, as you say, transmission rate, high or stuttering. incubation period long or short. viral loads, great or less. whether viruses congregate in the upper or lower respiratory tract. what if they may have been, because those other characteristics were simply not thought about

enough, the real risk of a disease with catastrophic consequences was not adequately thought about either. i would not put it like that. i think there is an irony here. the irony is that one of the major problems we had early on, which i'm sure we will come to, was the fact that covid has a symptomatic transmission. you are watching bbc news and our continuing coverage of the covert inquiry —— the covid inquiry. the who assumption was that this was not possible and till april 2020. the reason i'm saying this is that a flue plan assumes a symptomatic transmission. indeed. there are some ways in which the flue plan was more appropriate as a planning document than a generic document, or indeed a document that had been written to

consider the impact of one of the then known coronavirus, because that plan, a coronavirus pandemic plan would have assumed no asymptomatic transmission. this underpins my point that of course it would have been better to plan for a generic respiratory disease and that is what we should do in future. however, planning forflu did have we should do in future. however, planning for flu did have some benefits and it brings me back to my central contention that, whilst this was an error, it was in no way the biggest error. and it is notjust that there were two errors in the core plan, you know, flu rather than coronavirus, and rom doctrine, the error of the flawed doctrine was significantly bigger than the error of targeting a flu rather than a coronavirus pandemic. j of targeting a flu rather than a coronavirus pandemic.- of targeting a flu rather than a coronavirus pandemic. i don't need to trouble you _ coronavirus pandemic. i don't need to trouble you about _ coronavirus pandemic. i don't need to trouble you about degrees - coronavirus pandemic. i don't need to trouble you about degrees of. to trouble you about degrees of failure. we will come on to

identifying the various propositions. yes. the third issue you just touched upon, which is that approaching the risk assessment simply failed to identify a sufficiently broad range of scenarios, and as you know, the risk assessment process has been rewritten thanks in the name to a report from the royal academy of engineering. report from the royal academy of engineering-— engineering. yes, and there is an irony there _ engineering. yes, and there is an irony there which _ engineering. yes, and there is an irony there which is _ engineering. yes, and there is an irony there which is that - engineering. yes, and there is an irony there which is that we - engineering. yes, and there is an irony there which is that we were | irony there which is that we were dealing with a live ebola irony there which is that we were dealing with alive ebola epidemic with the potential threat that would come to this country as a pandemic, and yet at the same time the paperwork was all focused on a flu pandemic. the theory written down in these strategies was actually not what was playing out in the day—to—day practice of infectious disease management that we were undertaking as a department. but mr hancock, is notjust a question of irony, is it? these failings materially hampered the uk

's ability to prevent death. the central failing _ 's ability to prevent death. the central failing that hampered the response of the uk, common with the rest of the western world, was the refusal and the explicit decision that it would not be possible to halt the spread of a new pandemic. that is wrong, and that is at the centre of the failure of preparation. i know that because i was the person responsible, the category one responder, when this pandemic struck. all of the other considerations are small. important but small, compared to the colossal scale of failure in the assumption that it will not be possible. and the lack of ambition in the assumption that you can't stop the spread of a disease. we can. imagine if this disease had tragically killed children as much as it did old people, and may be transmitted twice as easily as covid—i9. would it then be possible to halt the

spread? of course it would. we would do whatever it took. and that is where we got to. but we got there far, far too slowly because none of the preparation included any thinking around that. and the preparation included any thinking around that. and that is my fourth proposition. _ thinking around that. and that is my fourth proposition. it _ thinking around that. and that is my fourth proposition. it is _ thinking around that. and that is my fourth proposition. it is the - thinking around that. and that is my fourth proposition. it is the one - fourth proposition. it is the one that finds a place at the front of your witness statement, it is that there was a failure, a complete systemic failure, to think about how to prevent catastrophic consequences arising at all, as opposed to how to manage catastrophic consequences which were assumed to result. j which were assumed to result. i could not agree more, and it is an absolute tragedy. number five. there was an associated failure to think about countermeasures because, of course, flu has a shorter incubation period.

it is symptomatic. there are antivirus, vaccines available. there was therefore a failure to think about, in the way that other countries are particular in the far east had done, countermeasures, such as mandatory quarantine. shielding. social restrictions. yes. border control. there was, as you say, a complete lack of imagination. yes, i had to overall the —— overall the initial advice not to quarantine people coming back from wuhan. it was written into the international health regulations that you should not close borders. this was not a uk problem, it was a who problem and the world health organization, of all people, should have learnt the lessons from mers and sars. so we had diligent hard—working team is working on this pandemic preparedness, but there was an absolutely central doctrinal failure in the response of the uk and almost

every other western country. find every other western country. and number six. _ every other western country. situc number six, coming to the government particularly through the cabinet office and the d hse, there was a failure to implement in a general sense the recommendations from the various earlier exercises because a majority of them were simply not implemented, for good or ill, at the time the pandemic struck, and actions and work streams which were identified as being necessary in the field of pandemic preparedness, were not carried through to fruition. while that is true, my evidence to you is on a materiality of what really mattered when the pandemic struck, and as we saw when we went through that list on the screen, those work streams that were stopped, i couldn't identify any of them that would have made a material impact, had another year 's work been done on them. we got halfway

through them, and what i put that down to is the team prioritising within the resources that were available to do the things that really mattered, and the thing that was most useful to me when the pandemic struck was making sure we had a piece of legislation ready to get onto the statute book. there is a lesson there as well, which is we need a new piece of legislation both full civil contingencies, and we need an update to the 1984 public health act. i'm very happy to give further evidence on what is needed there. but my point is, i think the team were working very hard to try to do the things that were the most material in terms of preparation. what everybody missed in the western world was that lockdown was going to be necessary, and that is why i am stressing this point so much because it is the single most important thing we can learn as a country. mr

thing we can learn as a country. m' hancock thing we can learn as a country. m hancock said, "i couldn't identify any of the work seems i could make a material impact". was not one of the work streams at the need to identify data numbers, the planning for the number of people in the adult social care sector who would be affected by a pandemic, and the planning for the required surge capacity which would be required in the event of a pandemic? are you saying... that work continued... _ pandemic? are you saying... that work continued... did _ pandemic? are you saying... that work continued... did it _ pandemic? are you saying... that work continued... did it get - work continued... did it get completed _ work continued... did it get completed by _ work continued... did it get completed by the _ work continued... did it get completed by the time - work continued... did it get completed by the time of. work continued... did it get l completed by the time of the pandemic? it completed by the time of the pandemic?— completed by the time of the andemic? �* _, , pandemic? it didn't get completed but the work _ pandemic? it didn't get completed but the work continued. _ pandemic? it didn't get completed but the work continued. did - pandemic? it didn't get completed but the work continued. did a - pandemic? it didn't get completed but the work continued. did a fully develo ed but the work continued. did a fully developed plan — but the work continued. did a fully developed plan for _ but the work continued. did a fully developed plan for surge - but the work continued. did a fully developed plan for surge capacityl but the work continued. did a fully l developed plan for surge capacity in the adult social care sector put in place by the 1st of january 2020? no. your question originally to which i responded was, what the work being done but it had not been completed, no. there is a difference

between doing work and completing work. , . ' . between doing work and completing work. , . , . , work. there is a difference between -alannin work. there is a difference between planning something _ work. there is a difference between planning something and _ work. there is a difference between planning something and not - work. there is a difference between planning something and not even i planning something and not even completing the plan so that the work can't be done. was the planning complete to allow the surge capacity to be developed? i am complete to allow the surge capacity to be developed?— to be developed? i am very happy to look further — to be developed? i am very happy to look further into _ to be developed? i am very happy to look further into the _ to be developed? i am very happy to look further into the paperwork - to be developed? i am very happy to look further into the paperwork and l look further into the paperwork and write to you on that point. my point was a more strategic one about what really matters in terms of protecting lives in the future, and that's why i am at pains to stress it. , .. . . , that's why i am at pains to stress it. there were significant areas of preparation _ it. there were significant areas of preparation overlooked _ it. there were significant areas of preparation overlooked or - it. there were significant areas of preparation overlooked or not - preparation overlooked or not progressed. would you agree? absolutely. were the nation 's preparations for a pandemic of this nature good enough? no. enough? no-- enough? no. ~ enough? no. . ., enough? no. was there a serious inadeua no. was there a serious inadequacy of preparation _ no. was there a serious inadequacy of preparation for _ no. was there a serious inadequacy of preparation for a _ no. was there a serious inadequacy of preparation for a pandemic- no. was there a serious inadequacy| of preparation for a pandemic health emergency? yes. preparing for this tier1 of a catastrophic health emergency was at

the core of your own department 's functions. ~ ., , ., . functions. would you agree? yes. and as secretary state, you bet ministerial responsibility for that calamitous state of affairs, do you not? i calamitous state of affairs, do you not? , . calamitous state of affairs, do you not? ,. , _ calamitous state of affairs, do you not? ., ., calamitous state of affairs, do you not? ,. . ., . not? i bear responsibly tea for all the thin u s not? i bear responsibly tea for all the things that _ not? i bear responsibly tea for all the things that happened, - not? i bear responsibly tea for all the things that happened, not - not? i bear responsibly tea for all. the things that happened, not only in my department, but also the agencies that reported to me as secretary of state. you will, no doubt, have given a great deal of thought, and it is evident from your evidence today, mr hancock, as to how to make things better. , hancock, as to how to make things better-- you — hancock, as to how to make things better. yes. you have mentioned many toda in better. yes. you have mentioned many today in the — better. yes. you have mentioned many today in the course of evidence. are you aware of some of the matter is that so oliver letwin spoke about when he gave evidence? yes. do you agree that there is a need for a formal system of training for ministers and civil servants in civil contingencies?— ministers and civil servants in civil contingencies? yes, another irony here _ civil contingencies? yes, another irony here is _ civil contingencies? yes, another irony here is that _ civil contingencies? yes, another irony here is that i _ civil contingencies? yes, another irony here is that i was _ civil contingencies? yes, another irony here is that i was in - civil contingencies? yes, another irony here is that i was in the - irony here is that i was in the process of putting one in place when the pandemic struck, and we stopped at work because the pandemic became

overwhelming. is there a case for a cabinet minister to be appointed to be in sole charge of epi are? yes. minister to be appointed to be in sole charge of epi are? yes, across government. _ sole charge of epi are? yes, across government, and _ sole charge of epi are? yes, across government, and then _ sole charge of epi are? yes, across government, and then the - sole charge of epi are? yes, across i government, and then the responsible 80s of lead government departments would need to report into that minister who would then act on behalf of the prime minister. that is effectively the job that oliver letwin did when he was in office. 50 letwin did when he was in office. sr there needs to be a head of resilience at the head of the structure, a civil servant, who will then report cabinet minister. yes, one subtlety that is important is that it would be a mistake if such a structure took away the sense and the feeling of accountability for an individual department. what you wouldn't want izzy department thinking, oh well, the cabinet office has got that covered. you need the department to still feel that it need the department to still feel thatitis need the department to still feel that it is accountable and held to account by the cabinet office, rather than replaced by the cabinet office, which would be suboptimal.

i'm not following. what would you suggest _ i'm not following. what would you suggest would _ i'm not following. what would you suggest would be _ i'm not following. what would you suggest would be different - i'm not following. what would you suggest would be different from . i'm not following. what would you i suggest would be different from the present— suggest would be different from the present system? _ suggest would be different from the present system? is _ suggest would be different from the present system?— present system? as we had when oliver letwin _ present system? as we had when oliver letwin was _ present system? as we had when oliver letwin was in _ present system? as we had when oliver letwin was in post, - present system? as we had when oliver letwin was in post, you - present system? as we had when i oliver letwin was in post, you would have a minister responsible for resilience across the board, and for challenging the different resilience plans that came up, and obviously that would require an official structure underneath her or him, and the key point is that needs to be like a red team effort, as has been discussed, ratherthan like a red team effort, as has been discussed, rather than letting the department off the hook for the areas for which they are responsible.— areas for which they are resonsible. ~ ., , ., . . responsible. would you have that minister solely _ responsible. would you have that minister solely responsible i responsible. would you have that minister solely responsible for i minister solely responsible for resilience _ minister solely responsible for resilience question _ minister solely responsible for resilience question mark- minister solely responsible for resilience question mark i've i minister solely responsible for- resilience question mark i've heard that cabinet — resilience question mark i've heard that cabinet office _ resilience question mark i've heard that cabinet office ministers - resilience question mark i've heard that cabinet office ministers get i that cabinet office ministers get quite _ that cabinet office ministers get quite a — that cabinet office ministers get quite a large _ that cabinet office ministers get quite a large portfolio _ that cabinet office ministers get quite a large portfolio on - quite a large portfolio on occasions _ quite a large portfolio on occasions.— quite a large portfolio on occasions. . ., ., quite a large portfolio on occasions. , ., ., , occasions. yes, whether or not they attended cabinet, _ occasions. yes, whether or not they attended cabinet, what _ occasions. yes, whether or not they attended cabinet, what mattered i occasions. yes, whether or not they attended cabinet, what mattered is| attended cabinet, what mattered is in practice whether they had the ear of the prime minister. you could easily make it the person was in my old cabinet officejob easily make it the person was in my old cabinet office job as number two, so long as they had a direct

line to the prime minister when it mattered. is line to the prime minister when it mattered. . ., line to the prime minister when it mattered. , ., . , ., line to the prime minister when it mattered. , ., ., , ., ., mattered. is there now a case for an independent. _ mattered. is there now a case for an independent, perhaps _ mattered. is there now a case for an independent, perhaps statutory i independent, perhaps statutory resilience academy, or some such body, to warn, advise, guide, in relation to epi are, train, organise exercises, and make sure that recommendations and actions are properly implemented? yes. recommendations and actions are properly implemented?— recommendations and actions are properly implemented? yes. i think there is value _ properly implemented? yes. i think there is value in _ properly implemented? yes. i think there is value in that. _ properly implemented? yes. i think there is value in that. you - properly implemented? yes. i think there is value in that. you would i there is value in that. you would not want to take away from the individual responsibility of the area to concern. let me give you an example. we now once again have a body whose sole response ability is preparing britain to be resilient to health, external health threats, and dame jenny health, external health threats, and damejenny harris is an excellent chief executive. he would not want such a body to replace it or make them feel less accountable. i want jenny and whoever is in herjob to wake up every morning worrying about

the next pandemic and what needs to be put in place. you can, of course, supplemented that with better resilience training at the centre as well, but you must not take away from the real burning accountability of the person in thatjob. and also, one of the recommendations was that these people would make recommendations in terms of allocation of budget. there has busily been a discussion of the impact of budgets in the last couple of weeks. it is notjust about impact of budgets in the last couple of weeks. it is not just about the total quantum budget, it is about how to spend. in this country this year we spent £53 billion on physical military defence. the core budget is £450 million. that is less than 1%. and yet over 220,000 people died of covid—19 so far. the impact

on the health and well—being of the nation, of health protection, is an order of magnitude bigger than as currently represented in the budget. the idea that we spend over £50 billion on defence and under £500 million on the budget is completely indefensible. i million on the budget is completely indefensible.— million on the budget is completely indefensible. . , . , ., . indefensible. i was asking you about a eneral indefensible. i was asking you about a general resilience _ indefensible. i was asking you about a general resilience capacity - indefensible. i was asking you about a general resilience capacity and i a general resilience capacity and you responded by reference to the uk health security agency. that is of course involved with health emergencies, as were you. absolutely, so it is worth having it across the board as well. i intended to ask ou across the board as well. i intended to ask you whether _ across the board as well. i intended to ask you whether there _ across the board as well. i intended to ask you whether there is - across the board as well. i intended to ask you whether there is a i across the board as well. i intended to ask you whether there is a case | to ask you whether there is a case for the resilience academy to deal with civil contingencies, for example a collapse in critical national infrastructure, or a cyber attack, orsome national infrastructure, or a cyber attack, or some other mass event or catastrophe which could before our nation. it is now beyond time, is it

not? it nation. it is now beyond time, is it not? . nation. it is now beyond time, is it not? , , , ., nation. it is now beyond time, is it not? , , . not? it is beyond time. the reason i ot into not? it is beyond time. the reason i got into budget _ not? it is beyond time. the reason i got into budget is _ not? it is beyond time. the reason i got into budget is because - not? it is beyond time. the reason i got into budget is because it - not? it is beyond time. the reason i got into budget is because it is i got into budget is because it is only a central body which can also make recommendations in terms of allocation between different departments. as a departmental help the megahit you can't do that. yes. instead a case _ the megahit you can't do that. yes. instead a case for _ the megahit you can't do that. yes. instead a case for a _ the megahit you can't do that. is; instead a case for a fundamental rethink on this whole cca 2004 structure, and the lead government departments model? i don't want to that is stronger at holding that accountabilit�* model? i don't to departments model? i don't want to intrude into module two issues, but intrude into module two issues, but obviously, when dealing with a obviously, when dealing with a national crisis, it is beyond the national crisis, it is beyond the ability of a single department to be ability of a single department to be able to cope because, of course, all able to cope because, of course, all national crises by definition will national crises by definition will have an impact, a range of impacts have an impact, a range of impacts across government. across government. i support government department i support government department structure because she need somebody structure because she need somebody who feels accountable for looking who feels accountable for looking out that threat all of the time, but out that threat all of the time, but you then need a system in the centre you then need a system in the centre thatis thatis you then need a system in the centre that is stronger at holding that you then need a system in the centre that is stronger at holding that

accountability, feet accountability, feet to the fire, but the coordination element of it when you get to a massive crisis goes up to the