voice—over: this is bbc news. we'll have the headlines and all the main news stories for you at the top of the hour, straight after this programme. welcome to hardtalk with me, zeinab badawi. the conflict that broke out in april between two rival generals in sudan has created a humanitarian crisis. civilians have borne the brunt of the violence, with hundreds, perhaps thousands, losing their lives. more than four and a half million have been forced to flee their homes, health care is scarce, water and power supplies are intermittent, and there are food shortages everywhere. sudan is in the grip of a war that shows no signs of ending, as general al—burhan, the army chief and de facto president, is locked in a battle with the commander

of the paramilitary rapid support force, general dagalo — better known as hemedti — who was his former ally. my guest is one of sudan's most distinguished diplomats, nureldin satti, who was ambassador to washington until last year. did the transitional civilian government which he represented let down the people of sudan, allowing the current horrors to be unleashed? nureldin satti in nairobi, welcome to hardtalk. the united nations humanitarian chief, martin griffiths, has described sudan as "a place of great terror".

give us a brief overview on how bad the situation is across the country for civilians. the situation is really bad. it's dramatic in the sense that, as you just mentioned, more than four million, you know, were displaced within the country. there have been reports about gang rape, about mass killings, cleansing, you know, ethnic cleansing in darfur, forced evacuation of homes by the rsf in khartoum, and, really, the majority, i would say, of the sudanese population now exposed to a looming, you know, famine because of the imminent failure of the agricultural campaign for this year. you mentioned the ethnic cleansing in darfur, in the west of sudan, which, of course, has been no stranger to conflict. 300,000 people died there when the conflict broke out

at the beginning of the century in 2003. but now, apparently, there is systematic killing, routinized and systematic destruction of cities like el geneina in west darfur. to what extent is the current conflict exacerbating existing ones such as the conflict in darfur? no, it's exasperating it because it's spreading, you know. it was in darfur before and the two areas of south kordofan and blue nile. and now, of course, the whole of sudan is threatened by a civil war. if this war does not end, you know, in the nearfuture, i mean, in the coming weeks, there is the risk of it spreading and turning into a generalised civil war. so that's a very strong statement to make, to say that sudan could descend into a civil war. but to what extent is this people against people? i mean, we have seen the conflict as one that really involves this immense rivalry

between two generals. well, yes, because, you know, the two generals insist that they are not going, you know, to end this war. they want to fight to the finish. and they are now recruiting heavily among the civilian situation. and tribal issues are, you know, coming back to the fore, and that... we fear that this, you know, will cause, really, a kind of regionalised warfare in sudan, in which civilians against civilians are going to be fighting. you also mentioned in your brief overview at the start, you said that there has been gang rape. and i want to tell you what arif noor, the director of save the children fund in sudan, says — "sexual violence continues to be used as a tool "to terrorise women and children in sudan, "with children as young as 12 being targeted." to what extent does that really indicate to you that there

is a complete breakdown in law and order, when you see there are some reports of women and girls being raped in public? there is a complete breakdown of law and order in sudan. there is no doubt about that, because the military, you know, do not care for the security of the people — on both sides, i would say, but particularly on the rsf side. the police has disappeared as they, you know, dissolved away. we do not know where the police force is and nobody�*s caring for law and order in the sudan. so it's a kind of, you know... ..i would say a lawlessness situation which is completely out of hand. do we know who is really behind the atrocities? because there are scores of videos doing the rounds on social media — i myself have seen many. and with some attesting to atrocities by the rapid support force, the rsf, others saying, "this is the sudanese armed forces," there is a propaganda war being waged at the same time. can we really know

who is responsible? well, it's not easy, of course, to know exactly, unless we have an independent kind of investigation. but, you know, all the elements point to the fact that the rsf is responsible for some of the worst violations in this war, whether in khartoum or in darfur, or in other localities. there is no doubt about that. of course, when i spoke to general hemedti in a radio interview in april this year, he denies that his forces are behind any of these atrocities. butjust who do you think has the upper hand in this conflict — general al—burhan of the sudan armed forces or general hemedti of the rsf? it's very difficult for me sitting here to make this assessment, to be categoric about who is prevailing. but, of course, we know that the rsf is controlling, you know, areas, strategic

areas of khartoum and around khartoum, and that they are controlling, you know, areas in darfur also, and that the army does not seem to be able to dislodge them from where they are now, particularly from khartoum. do you know what are the main drivers behind the conflict? i mean, we are all told that under the framework agreement, the paramilitary rapid support force should have been absorbed into one unified national army, but perhaps there was some foot—dragging on the part of general hemedti. what do you see as the main causes? well, the main causes, i take this back to the military coup, in which they connived together to overthrow the civilian government and refusing handover to that civilian government. i see the root cause is in the fact that both of them refused.

you know, on the one side, the armed forces refusing any attempts for restructuring and, you know, getting out of politics and, you know, relinquishing whatever, you know, assets, financial assets and companies they are controlling. 0n the other side, the rapid support forces, their refusal, you know, to be disbanded and to be integrated in the army. and they requested quite a long period of time of ten years. so, for me, both sides are responsible for this, and they have to really be accountable for that. but, of course, the rsf seems to be more accountable in the sense they seem to refuse to be integrated into the army. but to be fair, i cannot, sitting here — as i said — make a categoricaljudgment about exactly what happened... all right. ..in sudan. when i spoke to general hemedti in a radio interview in april,

he said this to me — "personally, i do not have a problem "with general abdel fattah al—burhan. "we are actually fighting the terrorists, "the remnants of the previous government." he said that burhan is too weak to move specifically against the islamists in the army and in the establishment in sudan, and that he is basically in hock to them. does he have a point? well, there are reports that the islamists in the army and their militias, which was formed under al—bashir�*s regime, are responsible for triggering the conflict in the first place, and they are now fanning the flames of war. there are these reports, and they seem to be more or less confirmed that this is happening. and if this is the case, we have to look into that and see exactly how we are going to deal with this situation. well, how can you deal with this situation?

for example, it is said that abdel fattah al—sisi, the president of egypt, would not countenance in any way having the islamists back in power in neighbouring sudan. well, it's not only sisi, president sisi, who is calling for that. we in the civilian movement in sudan, we do not want the islamist regime of al—bashir and his acolytes to come back to power. and that's the reason why this revolution in sudan has taken place... yeah, but you don't have an army. abdel fattah al—sisi in egypt does. could you see him perhaps intervening militarily to prevent any retaking of power by the islamists? this is really farfetched. ithink we... i cannot envisage a scenario in which the egyptian army would intervene in sudan. all right. you have written a book in the past on...the failures of the sudanese elites — have let down the people.

you're a member of the sudanese elite. does that include yourself? well, i wrote this book because... actually... ..as early as 2013, i wrote a book about the failures of the sudanese elite. i called it... indistinct ..for the failuresl of those who are empowered to do something but are not doing it... yeah, but that's you. isn't that you? because there you were, the first sudanese ambassador to washington in nearly a quarter of a century, representing the civilian transitional government. so, in retrospect now, do you count yourself amongst those sudanese elites who has failed the people? yes, i do. of course i do. well, i share the responsibility of failure, there's no doubt about that, because i was part of that government. but there are others who bear more responsibility than me. out of washington, i think i helped in assisting sudan to do a number of things —

you know, being removed, for example, from the list of countries harbouring and supporting terrorism and triggering, you know, normalising relations with the us and other countries in the international community and helping sudan to start the hipc process, which is, you know, the debt forgiveness, you know, process. well, that's what we have been able to achieve. but there is much that we have not been able to achieve. you over—promised and under—delivered. yes, sudan was removed from the list of states that sponsor terrorism by donald trump, as president, at the end of 2020 — but that was always on the books, as it were. but you didn't really, as ambassador, manage to unlock much more than that. you didn't manage to get any kind of financial dividend for the revolution in sudan, did you? well, i did, in a sense. it was not only me, of course, i was part of a system. you know, the ambassador has an important role, of course, in bilateral

relations, but he or she is not the only one who take decisions. well, actually, we did get quite a sizeable sum of funds, you know, which was promised but was not delivered to date. and the other issues were still to come. you know, before the military coup, the imf and world bank, joined together, were promising to, you know, by this year have been, you know... ..would have delivered to sudan not less than $2 billion and $700 million were promised, but were not, you know, released. so, there was, i admit, there was some slowness, you know, in the process, but was not only dependent on me, i would say. yeah, of course it wasn't dependent on you, but you did represent this transitional civilian government, of which abdalla hamdok was the prime minister appointed in august 2019, and he said injanuary 2020, "the sudanese model,

based on the solid partnership between "the civil and military components, is advancing "steadily towards building and providing a solid experience "to the region and the rest of the world." he — you — got it completely wrong, didn't you? well, not exactly. i mean, what hamdok said was right in the context in which he found himself at the time. but that was, of course, reversed by the military. we cannot, you know... ..count hamdok, you know, responsible for the actions of others, if the military have decided... no. but my point is, you and he, and all the rest of the senior people in the government — and you, as i say, as the most senior diplomat in that government — perhaps

misplaced your trust in the military. you all had a joint civilian military transition of 39 months, with the military in control for the first 21 months. i want to put to you what professor sharath srinivasan from the university of cambridge here in england says. he said, "the power of collective civic action "was halted in its tracks. "the balance of power was now heavily tilted "towards technocratic and security elites, "not the popular revolution." you were part of a group of people who stole the revolution from the people, in a sense. well, i think this is a little bit too much. we did not steal the revolution from the people. we did our best in order to transform that revolution into policies and into cooperation, plans and processes and programmes with the international community. but i admit there have been failures on our side. there's no doubt about that. we have not used sufficiently the power of the street to tilt

the balance of power, as you said, in the favour of the civilians. i admit that, yes, i do. yes, it's a shame. cos, i mean, the point that i was making from professor srinivasan is that if the power—sharing agreement locked—in the armed actors�* grip on authority — and economic gain, for that matter — for a time, then there are few incentives for them to move on from it. and, therefore, what has happened in sudan could hardly have come as a surprise. well, yes, of course... the issue is not the power—sharing agreement that gave them the right to monopolise things. it is the decision they have taken themselves in order to do that. the power—sharing agreement, i think, in hindsight, i think it was... if implemented correctly in an convenient manner, it would have allowed us to move forward in the transition.

but it was the military who decided to go against it and who violated that agreement. but do you think you could have given them cover for what they were doing? because after the coup, which was approved by hemedti and al—burhan in october 2021, when abdalla hamdok was removed, a few weeks later, he struck a political agreement to rejoin the transitional government. protesters took to the streets. 60 people, nearly 60 people were killed. and so injanuary 2022, he resigns again. that's when you also left your post as ambassador. with hindsight, ambassador nureldin satti, was it wise for you to have given the military another chance? well, i left before that. i left the day that... a few hours after the coup, and i was one, you know, among the first to denounce the coup. so, i was not part of that.

abdalla hamdok, though, did go back into government. are you saying that he was wrong to have done that, to have gone back into the transitional government? you can hardly say that he was, he was wrong, but he... that was a last ditch — as they say in common english — attempt for him to try and correct the situation. but, you know, the military, again, you know, went against that agreement and did not implement it the way they should have done. all right. so, where do we go from here, nureldin satti? because i want to put to you what a senior western diplomatic source has told me, that there is a sense that the un special envoy to sudan, volker perthes, is not gaining sufficiently strong support from the un for his mission to try to get some kind of ceasefire and settlement in sudan — does that ring true with you?

it's difficult for me to comment on that. i cannot really make a judgment to what kind of support he was getting. but as someone who has been in his position, in burundi a long time ago, i would say that a special envoy usually gets all the support he needs from the headquarters. that's what happens, actually. but i cannot make a judgment on that. all right. the us ambassador to sudan, john godfrey, has said that the belligerents, ie hemedti and al—burhan, who have demonstrated they are not fit to govern, must end the conflict and transfer power to a civilian transitional government. is there any point, from where we are now, in engaging with either of these two generals to try to get some negotiated settlement? or do we just say, "you two have got to get out "of the picture, both of you"?

well, i agree that they are not fit to govern. but of course, i do not know of any way of getting rid of armed people, you know, armed with the army or otherwise, without talking to them in one way or another. so, they have to remain part of the picture, even though as the international crisis group, icg, has said, "these two deeply discredited belligerents "would be unpalatable to many sudanese." you're saying there has to be some kind of agreement between them in order for sudan to move forward, and they remain in the picture? i'm not saying that. i'm not saying that at all. and i'm saying... all that i am saying is that we should find a way to engage them in order to stop the war, and for us to reinforce our position as civilians in order to be able to move forward. but we cannot do that without silencing the guns. and in order to silence the guns, you know, we need

to talk to them, probably not in a direct manner, through proxy talks. thejeddah process is ongoing, and maybe it needs to be a little bit reinforced. who can be the most effective mediator? well, i don't see one mediator being effective in this condition, in sudan, to create the sufficient leverage, i think that a number... we have now three, i would say, axes, or three poles of mediation. the uae got one half injeddah, saudi—us one, and we have the neighbours of sudan one. they have to harmonise their positions, they have to come together in order to agree on exactly how they can create a joint leverage in order to stop this war. all right. the uk foreign minister, andrew mitchell, has said that britain will make sure

that the utter disregard for the sudanese people that has been shown in this wholly unjustified war, that people will be held accountable. the uk will do all in its power to ensure there are credible investigations and accountability, however long it takes. if you hold them accountable, it's easy to say, but hard to do. and what would be the incentive for these two generals to go to the negotiating table if they think they might be taken off in due course to the international criminal court? the issue of accountability has been with us for quite a long time, and it's because of impunity that we have not been able to make any progress in sudan. from personal experience, and from what i gather from other countries — some of which i have worked, like burundi, for example, and i am familiar with rwanda and other situations — there is always a tension between peace and accountability, and we have to find the right balance between the two. full accountability cannot be achieved at the same time of silencing the guns. but we should never lose

sight of the importance of accountability, and that major crimes should be accounted for. finally and briefly, nureldin satti, what should be done? what can be done to get sudan back on track and to end the ghastly horrors? what's can be done? of course, we have to double our efforts, as sudanese, as civil society, working with our regional partners and international partners, and in order to find a pathway for peace in our country. we cannot do it alone. but the sudanese have to play their part in that, whether it is civil society, whether it's the armed groups, whether it's the saf, the rsf... saf, i mean sudanese

armed forces. the rsf, rapid support forces. and all of us have to work together in order to put our country on the right track. otherwise, we will bear the consequences. are you optimistic that the war will end any time soon? iam. i am optimistic that the war will end, and that we are going to play our part in it. ambassador nureldin satti, in nairobi, thank you very much indeed for coming on hardtalk. thank you very much. good morning. well, with the change of month, once again, we're likely to see a change of weather fortunes.

high pressure is going to build as we head into the weekend and for the first week of september. yes, we'll see some early morning mist and fog first thing but on the whole, for most of us, it will be dry, sunny and increasingly warm. ahead of that, though, we've still got to get rid of this messy—looking weather front that's going to produce some low cloud and some drizzle first thing in the morning, particularly through northern ireland, scottish borders, down into the north of england. now, to the north of that, clear skies and a chilly start but sunny start for scotland. to the south of that, a cloudy start but the cloud will thin and break and a few scattered showers break out. one or two of those could be quite hefty. top temperatures generally between 17 and 22 celsius. now, as we move into the weekend, we are likely to see that frontal system easing away and the high pressure starts to build from the west. we could start off with a little bit of patchy low cloud, mist and fog across central and eastern england. clearer skies further north here.

single figures to start off our saturday. so, that mist will take its time to clear away but on the whole, it's all about high pressure. a weak weather front will bring some breezier and wetter conditions to the north but with lighter winds first thing in the morning, it could start off a little bit murky and disappointing. it won't be long, though, before we see some sunshine breaking through and the warmth starts to build. so, as we go into saturday, yes, a grey start for some. more sunshine further north and west. this weather front trying to push in but really, not making too much of an impression for the first half of the weekend. as we go through the afternoon, there'll be some decent sunny spells and temperatures will start to climb, 23 or 2a degrees — that's into the mid 70s fahrenheit. now, as we move out of saturday into sunday, there's that weatherfront, bringing some breezier conditions and rain to the far north—west but on the whole, sunday will be a dry day with plenty of sunshine coming through and a degree or so warmer by the middle part of the afternoon — mid 20s quite possible across central

and southern parts of england. warmer still as we go through the week ahead — in fact, some places could see temperatures into the high 20s by the middle part of the week. take care.

live from london, this is bbc news. two far—right proud boys militia have been sentenced to long prison terms for storming the us capitol building in january 2021. if your president tells you, your country has been stolen, the country the people fought and died for, people are trying to take your boat from you, how

are you supposed to react to that? south africa's president stresses the inner city housing problems and describes the fire in johannesburg as a "wake—up call". concerns grow over the public consultation to close nearly all england's railway station ticket offices. and australia pushes to lead the world on ending the use of thick plastic shopping bags and mass balloon releases. hello. iam i am victoria valentine. a court has sentenced two members of the far—right proud boys militia to long prison terms for storming the us capitol building injanuary 202i. joseph biggs, a former leader of the proud boys, was given 17 years — one of the longest sentences among the hundreds convicted for the capitol attack. prosecutors say biggs was a key figure in the organised