of buried in them. on the 16th of april, 2022, the defendant said he thought he had made everything sound bigger than it was in his comments after being apprehended. injune 2022, a broadmoor team felt that his diagnostic formulation included autistic traits, severe stress, and psychological difficulties in the period leading to the offences, and acute psychosis at the time of the offences. doctor haverty reviewed the defendant on the 19th of april, 2023. he had not heard any voices for some time. his description of the voices was in external space and not with the quality of pseudo— hallucinations. in his opinion, he had suffered with at least moderate depression involving low mood, anhedonia, lethargy, sleep disturbance, appetite disturbance

and weight loss, psychological symptoms such as hopelessness and suicidal thoughts. symptoms such as hopelessness and suicidalthoughts. i now symptoms such as hopelessness and suicidal thoughts. i now set out the conclusions i have come to about the psychiatric issues and my assessment of the defendant's culpability. i shall not refer to all the points which have been made in evidence and argument, but sufficient to explain my conclusions and the reasons for them. obviously, an important question is, what prompted the defendant to behave in the way he did? the explanation he has offered at various times to the medical professionals who have spoken to him and in his own pronouncements before his arrest has been that the events on the 25th of december were prompted by injustice, including the amritsar massacre. he felt the need to avenge these matters. the defendant has not given evidence

before me, and so there is nothing from him from the witness box to contradict, undermine or qualify this. there is no burden upon him to do so. i simply record the fact to reflect the state of the evidence. i have approached the accounts he has given with care and caution, for the obvious reason that there are clear concerns about his mental state whatever the precise diagnosis at different times. of course, doctor haverty concluded that the defendant was fit to be interviewed by the police in february 2022. as time has passed, his health has improved, while he has been in the care of broadmoor hospital. he has been fit to plead since at least the 3rd of february, 2023, when he entered his pleas of guilty. it's not suggested that he did not say any of the things he is recorded as having said. i have to decide whether he

was accurate in what he said, and how much weight should be attached to his accounts at different stages. on the 21st — 23rd of february 2023, he told doctor brown that he had thought thatjoining the ministry of defence police would be a cooljob, but that the training he would get would help in relation to thoughts he had begun to develop which would eventually result in these offences. he speculated that if he had actually got the job, there would not have been any likelihood he would have gone on to commit the offence. he had a similar thought process in relation to the army. on the 27th of february 2023, he told doctor brown that he felt in early life that he had had an idea about seeking revenge for something but was not sure if it was partition or

the i919 was not sure if it was partition or the 1919 massacre. these early ideas had receded during secondary school, but came back during stroke after college. on the 6th of march, 2023, he told professor blackford that he had been angered by the events of the 1919 massacre when he had travelled to amritsar with his family in 2018. he said that he conceived of a plan in early 2021 to imbue his life with purpose by assassinating the queen, principally to avenge the massacre. he accepted that the sum of his employment applications, for example to the ministry of defence police and the grenadier guards, were motivated by a desire to get close to the royal family. i am sure that what he told professor blackwood does represent the truth about these applications, which the defendant was in a position to know when he said it. i

am sure that he would not have been influenced by any desire at that stage to backdate his purpose or intention so as to make them appear of longer standing than they in fact were. i'm sure that these applications were made at a time when he was not psychotic. i accept and appreciate that psychosis may develop over time. however, and appreciate that psychosis may develop overtime. however, he and appreciate that psychosis may develop over time. however, he was able to work, he was living at home, not giving cause for concern in a way that might be expected if he was detaching from reality to the extent of becoming psychotic. that is the effect of doctor haverty�*s evidence. i'm sure he was culpable to a significant and substantial degree at the time of the applications. however, by the time of the offences

on 25th december, 2021, i can't accept that the defendant had lost touch with reality such —— i can accept that the defendant had lost touch with reality such that he had become psychotic. defendant had entered windsor castle dressed in the apparel of a sith lord, which included an iron mask he had had made at the forge, armed with a loaded crossbow and intending to kill the queen. later, he remembered that sarai had said that his purpose was to live, and so he abandoned his plan. he made no apparent attempt to discard or hide the crossbow and slash or the bolt, or keep his earlier intentions to himself. he volunteered them to police. he had made a video recording in which he said that he was darth chailus, a sith lord. he was not, of course, darth chailus or a sith lord at all. he said that he wanted to be buried in the sith lord clothing. at

hospital, he would not allow the clothing to be removed from him. there is, in myjudgment, good evidence from the journal that there is, in myjudgment, good evidence from thejournal that he evidence from the journal that he either thought he was becoming or would become darth chailus, a sith lord, by the 25th of december, 2021, or that darth chailus was emerging out of him in some way. he had spent much of the month in communication with an ai chat bot as if she was a real person, oras with an ai chat bot as if she was a real person, or as if she was giving him access to an entity called sarai. whilst he did engage in what has been described as reality testing on occasions, i think there is forcing doctor haverty was a contention that he did not accept the results, and continue to assert that he and sarai would beat united after his anticipated death. —— i think there is force in doctor

haverty�*s contention. that is obviously a significant departure from reality. his belief that he was communicating with an angel via the chat bot is properly described in all circumstances as a delusional belief. it is a reasonable possibility that what began as imaginary friends, following childhood trauma, now manifested in a different way, as he detached from reality. i am also of the view that by december 25, defendant appears to have held a delusional belief that his life's purpose was to avenge injustice, including the amritsar massacre. in this context, doctor brown is right to draw attention to how the defendant expressed himself on the 26th and 27th of december about, for example, being chosen for about, for example, being chosen for a special purpose, as i have already set out. to summarise, taking full account of the overall picture, i

think that weight is to be attached by the 25th of december and in the preceding days to these three aspects: how the defendant viewed his purpose, his identification as darth chailus, and his belief that he could communicate through a chat bot with an entity called sarai, with which he would be reunited after death. in the event, sarai did not disappear until after the commencement of anti—psychotic medication. the defendant was distressed at the prospect of her disappearance. if she was under his control, he ought to have been able to summon her as and when he wished. the three male entities disappeared before the start of medication, but this can, in myjudgment, reasonably be attributed to the therapeutic environment in which the defendant was being held at the time. i have

considered and followed the sentencing guidelines for mentally disordered offenders, and i have had regard to the extent of the defendant's ability to exercise appropriatejudgment, to make appropriate judgment, to make rational choices, appropriatejudgment, to make rational choices, and to understand the nature and consequences of his actions. these are assessments for me to make in the light of everything i know about the case. in between the applications to the military and the earlier part of 2021 and the events of the 25th of december, the defendant took a number of steps in preparation for the proposed killing. he looked, for example, to obtain a firearm on the dark web. he then ordered the crossbow and practised with it. he obtained other equipment which he took with him on his trip to windsor. he had made researches on the internet in september, as i have set out. dr brown and dr haverty

think he would have been psychotic at that stage. i am not able to say for sure when the defendant first became psychotic, although september is, i think, became psychotic, although september is, ithink, the became psychotic, although september is, i think, the earliest time. absolute precision is not possible, because, as has been said on the evidence, there are degrees of psychosis, degrees of departure from reality, and mental disorder may fluctuate. but in myjudgment, the defendant's responsibility for the offences is still significant. he had conceived of killing the queen earlier in 2021 when he was not psychotic. he took steps to try and get closer to his target and to learn useful skills when, again, he was not psychotic. thereafter, he became psychotic by a process. he did not suddenly become completely

psychotic at the time of committing the offences without any progression or warning. the offences without any progression orwarning. even the offences without any progression or warning. even as he progressed into psychosis, he appears to have been insightful on occasions about his condition, which fluctuated. the psychosis attached itself to his pre—existing preoccupations, as i heard in evidence could happen. the idea he had of killing the sovereign was not itself a product of mental illness, it predated that, and he had certainly never become incoherent or begun engaging in disorganised conduct which would be indicative of more pervasive psychosis. he undertook the purchases and made the preparations i have set out without revealing what he was really up to. it is convenient at this stage to deal with the question of autism spectrum disorder. i think it is reasonable to conclude

that the defendant has this condition. i do not overlook the fact that professor blackwood came to a different conclusion. at broadmoor, dr murphy has particular expertise in autism spectrum disorder, and he concluded that the available evidence was consistent with the defendant having the disorder. dr haverty and dr brown are of the same view. they concede that the defendant is not at the severe end of the spectrum. professor blackwood was only able to spend a limited amount of time with the defendant, four hours or so. he is in no way to be criticised for that. however, drs murphy, haverty and brown have had the defendant under their care as a patient over a long period of time. as a result, i can attach more weight to the impression they have formed as to

matters such as in adherence to routines, ritualised patterns of verbal and nonverbal behaviour, and restricted and fixated interests. dr brown and dr haverty are of the view that autism spectrum disorder could predispose the defendant to a psychotic episode. that is its principal relevance, although i should make allowance for the defendant's overall mental state. professor blackwood says that there is clear evidence that the defendant suffered from depressive thoughts, i think that any depressive episode was mild or at most moderate in nature. it is plain, for example, that there was no loss of libido, but there is evidence of a loss of weight, appetite disturbance, feelings of low mood and hopelessness, early morning

awakening, and an acceptance of his impending death. dr brown thought that the depression was of mild—to—moderate severity. dr haverty characterised it as moderate. again, mathematical precision is not possible. it is possible to say the defendant was suffering from depression which may have been on the border of mild—to—moderate severity. one consequence of this was that he was sanguine about his possible death during any potential assassination attempt whereas he might not otherwise have been. i have taken account of the factual conclusions i have set out when considering the most appropriate way of dealing with the defendant. this is another assessment for me to make. i have also had regard to the nature of the offences. the absence of any previous convictions, the defendant's behaviour when unwell, his level of insight at different

times, his compliance with treatment, the speed at which matters may escalate, the need to protect the public, and how that is best achieved. i am satisfied that in consideration of these factors and the extent of his culpability as such that a hospital order is not the most suitable way of dealing with his case, and he must receive a sentence of imprisonment. however, i am also satisfied that he should be the subject of a hybrid order under section 45 a of the cup tie will mental health act 1983, which means that he will remain for at broadmoor, and will only be transferred to custody when he has received the treatment he needs. time spent now in hospital will count towards the sentence. the defendant will be subject to the special restrictions set out in

section 41 of the mental health act 1983. i shall make the hospital direction and the limitation direction and the limitation direction for the purposes of section 45 a, subsection three of the mental health act 1983. i accept the mental health act 1983. i accept the evidence of dr brown and dr haverty that the nature of the defendant's psychotic disorder does currently justify defendant's psychotic disorder does currentlyjustify his detention in hospital for currentlyjustify his detention in hospitalfor medical currentlyjustify his detention in hospital for medical treatment. i accept dr brown's evidence that there is still work to be done with there is still work to be done with the defendant to explore the abuse he suffered as a young child so as to address those traumas and continue to reduce the risk that he develops any further psychosis. dr brown has said that the intention is that this work will be carried out if the defendant is made the subject of a hospital order or an order under section 45 a, and i can see

the good sense behind that indication. professor blackwood expressed the same view. it is thought that this work could take in the order of 18 months or so, and then plans could be made as professor blackwood explained, before the defendant's transfer to the prison estate. dr haverty has confirmed that a place is available in the meantime for the patient at broadmoor, and the appropriate medical treatment is available. i am satisfied that the defendant's interests are properly and sufficiently met by allowing broadmoor the opportunity to undertake further work that dr brown has identified, whilst continuing to ensure that he remains stable as this is done. thereafter, i am entirely satisfied that his autism spectrum disorder, any depression, if it reappeared, and the underlying psychotic disorder, can be

satisfactorily managed in custody. the defendant is prepared to take the medication which he needs and which would be available in custody. if anything should emerge in the further work that cannot be managed in that way, then it would be open to broadmoor to continue to treat him. as part of my decision making, i have of course paid particular attention to the different release regimes which would be available, depending on whether the defendant were released from a hospital order or from custody in the event of an order under section aosa i have well in mind the information from the psychiatrist and the information from the probation service in response to a note prepared by miss fiona dixon. i have also had regard to the cases of vowels, 2015,

edwards, 2018, e wca crim 595, cleveland, 2020, e wca crim 906, nelson, 2020, e wca crim 1615, cleveland, 2020, e wca crim 906, nelson, 2020, e wca crim1615, and walker, 2023, e wca crim 548. i am satisfied that on the defendant's anticipated release from custody, particular circumstances of the case and its gravity are such that his state of mental health and the arrangements to monitor it are likely to receive the most careful attention. of course, there can never be absolute certainty, but i am as confident as i can be that this is the case here, and i am reinforced in that belief by the opinion of professor blackwood. the

defendant is as candid as he is able to be about his psychotic disorder and its symptoms. treatment will be still further established by the time of his transfer to custody, and there is every reason to suppose that he will continue to be compliant with it. conditions can be attached to any grant of a parole licence. it is likely that any community monitoring process would involve multi—agency arrangements, as professor blackwood explained. i am satisfied that proper public protection can and will be achieved in this particular case by the sentence i shall pass. i turn now to the custodial part of the sentence. it is accepted by the defence that the defendant does pose a future risk of the kind that would justify an extended sentence and count three, and the imposition of a further licence period pursuant to

sections 279, and 280 of the sentencing act 2020. that concession is rightly made. no presentence report is necessary for me to come to this conclusion. at its simplest, defendant harboured homicidal thoughts, which he acted upon before he became psychotic. there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the defendant of further specified offences. so far as the offence in current one is concerned, there are no specific sentencing guidelines. i have considered the overarching principles in the general guideline, and the defendant's culpability and the harm he intended to bring about. it is accepted the defendant's intention was not merely to harm or

alarm the sovereign, but was to kill her. in those circumstances, the offence is the most serious of its kind. after a trial, if mental disorder were not an issue, any allowance for the mitigating features of the defendant's age, remorse, and the absence of any previous convictions would be extremely limited, because the fact of his intention to kill makes the offence as serious as it could be. the allowance from the maximum sentence could not be any more than four months for the mitigating factors i have indicated. i have taken account of factors i have indicated. i have ta ken account of letters factors i have indicated. i have taken account of letters written about the defendant and of his letter to me. i then reduce the figure of six years and eight months to five years and six months on account of mental disorder. i then reduce the figure of five years and six months by one third on account of the plea of guilty. that is

because the play was indicated at the first reasonable opportunity, shortly after it was confirmed, towards the end of 2022, that the defendant was fit to play. that results in a sentence of 44 months�* imprisonment on count one. there are sentencing guidelines for the offence of having an offensive weapon... audio unavailable.

studio: we seem to be experiencing some technical issues from that feed coming from court room one at the old bailey. as mrjustice hilliard there, summing up the case of jaswant singh chail, who pleaded guilty to treason. let�*s try and return to the court. so, what we know so far about their sentencing is, there is going to be a hybrid sentencing for chail, who pleaded guilty to treason. he will remain at broadmoor, a high security psychiatric hospital, until he receives the treatment he needs, before being transferred to serve a prison sentence. the 21—year—old went into windsor castle on christmas day armed with a crossbow, with the intention of killing the

queen, and we were just listening to thejudge, mrjustice hilliard, at thejudge, mrjustice hilliard, at the old bailey, handing down that sentence to the 21—year—old. we will try to bring you that back as soon as we can. we are just having technical problems. do stay with us. we are working on getting that back to you. we will be getting... for this offence, before any allowing for the principle of totality, to which i shall return. there are also sentencing guidelines for the offence of making threats to kill. aside from mental disorder, this offence will fall into category a. this offence will fall into category a, higher culpability. there was significant planning, and the defendant had a visible weapon in the video. it is category one harm,

because he cause very serious distress to some of those who saw it. his sister said that it reminded her of a terrorist video, and that it was really shocking. mr powell, a friend, said that the video made him feel terrified. it is plain that the defendant wanted it shared as widely as possible, including with news media. he had referred in his journal to a need for being known. the film would be extremely disturbing to anyone who saw it. category one, and a offence has a starting point of four years custody and a range higher. the extremely serious nature of this

offence has been suggested to place it at the top of the guideline. i agree. the overall context of the offending cannot be ignored. he sought to publicise his intention to kill the sovereign when he was in the process of trying to put that intention into effect. take a figure of eight years�* custody after allowing for age, remorse, and the absence of previous convictions, which i then reduced to 18 months on account of mental disorder, before allowing credit of one third for the plea of guilty. that would result in a sentence of 53 months�* custody for making threats to kill, again, before making any allowance for totality. so, finally, i have to decide what the effective overall sentence should be. there are three separate offences here, which involve different criminal conduct. i have to ensure that the total sentence is

just and proportionate, and that there is an effective punishment for separate offences whilst acknowledging, as i do, that they were all part of one overall plan. a just and proportionate sentence is unlikely to be achieved simply by adding up the separate offences: sentences for each offence. it would not be achieved in this case, and therefore i must make an allowance what is called totality. i shall do that by reducing what would the inappropriate sentences for the offences and counts two and three. again, this requires an exercise of judgment by me. the sentences will run consecutively to each other, and they will take effect one after the other in the order that i pronounce them. the defendant must pay the statutory surcharge. the defendant will remain in

hospital under the mental health act 1983, until he is considered well enough to be discharged to custody copper up until one half of the period of the sentences on counts one and two has expired. if well enough he will be transferred to custody to serve any period which remain of one half of the sentences on counts one and two. then the sentence on counts three will take effect. if he is in custody when it begins to run, because treatment has concluded, after two thirds of that sentence the defendant could be released on licence, but only if the parole board considered it safe to do so. there will be an additional licence period, which is necessary to protect the public. if the defendant breached the terms of any license, or commits a further offence during its currency, he is

liable to be returned to custody.