tv BBC News Now BBC News November 20, 2023 2:00pm-2:31pm GMT
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between 2020 and february 2022, when the final restrictions in england were lifted. extracts from sir patrick's diary during his time in office have already been the subject of much of the inquiry�*s examination. one entry recorded that then—prime minister borisjohnson had referred to the treasury as the "pro—death squad" when he wanted the ministry to back him in arguing for a path to eased restrictions. sir patrick's evidence will be followed by england's chief medical officer, professor sir chris whitty, and his former deputy, sirjonathan van—tam, will also speak to the enquiry later this week. live now to our corrrespondent ellie price for more on the inquiry. just bring us up to speed with what was discussed this morning. we knew those diary entries _ was discussed this morning. we knew those diary entries that _ was discussed this morning. we knew those diary entries that sir— was discussed this morning. we knew those diary entries that sir patrick - those diary entries that sir patrick vallance made would be part of it, they have been over the last few weeks and they were today. one entry was put to him that he said boris
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johnson seemed to be bamboozled by the data and by graphs and didn't have a great grasp on the science and it was difficult to explain scientific concepts to. that it is interesting, given how much was made interesting, given how much was made in the run—up to lockdown, where the government explained that decisions were being made based on the science. a lot of questions today have been based on how did that happen in practice. if you don't necessarily understand the science, how sound are the political decisions being made. that is something i think we will hear more about. sir patrick vallance was being fair to borisjohnson, he said he remembered a call with with colleagues in different countries who said they all laughed when they had the same situation in all the countries and leaders often struggled with scientific concepts. that is an issue that will be looked
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at in—depth here. it wasn'tjust the politicians who didn't grass temperature science. we heard scientist themselves misunderstood how quickly the virus was spreading. sir patrick vallance said they didn't realise how quickly things were going on and we should have acted earlier. he said a lockdown may have been called a day or two early, but things were spiralling out of control.— early, but things were spiralling out of control. whilst this inquiry ma have out of control. whilst this inquiry may have criticism _ out of control. whilst this inquiry may have criticism of _ out of control. whilst this inquiry may have criticism of some - out of control. whilst this inquiry may have criticism of some of. out of control. whilst this inquiry| may have criticism of some of the key people involved, it is worth pointing out, no one will be found innocent or guilty for the role they played, it is a learning exercise? yes, i think that gets lost in the headlines. of course they can't make up headlines. of course they can't make up for the course of public
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humiliation if you like of politicians and advisors and officials and some of the things that were said in private a lot of the time that have come out and been embarrassing. it is port important to remember the point of the inquiry is to learn lessons. we are going to learn about the structures and whether they worked. today i think the big question is about whether the big question is about whether the government was following the science and what that meant and how it worked in practice. you get interjections from the chair, who will make suggestion and ask witnesses further information on it. i think we got a bit of that today as well. i i think we got a bit of that today as well. . . , i think we got a bit of that today as well. u, , i think we got a bit of that today aswell. , ., ,, as well. i can see dame baroness takin: as well. i can see dame baroness taking her— as well. i can see dame baroness taking her seat. _ as well. i can see dame baroness taking her seat. let's _ as well. i can see dame baroness taking her seat. let's cross - as well. i can see dame baroness taking her seat. let's cross to - as well. i can see dame baronessi taking her seat. let's cross to the inquiry for the latest. the question of the advice other than sage advice covering areas such
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as economics and societal issues and how that fed into policy makers, both privately and publicly and i want to ask you some questions about that topic and start by looking at another passage from ben warner's witness statement, something we asked him about when he gave evidence. if we lock at paragraph 309. he said: ifelt the biggest absence was the lack of economic modelling in decision—making. hmt, thatis modelling in decision—making. hmt, that is the treasury, has a strong set of policy officials but when it came to my interactions, ifound that hmt was limited when it came to special i specialists in science. his view was that this was an
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important gap in the larger picture. that may be very much the same point that you were making in one of your notes. if we can look at the schedule page 522. this is october 2021 entry. where you say: economic predictions hmt nearly back to normal. no evidence, pure dogma and wrong throughout. that may be a comment that is towards the frustrated late at night end of the spectrum. are you making the same point as mr warner was about the problems with economic advice feeding into decision—making? i agree that is probably the late—night frustration comment. but i did think there was a lack of
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transparency on the economic side and it was difficult to know exactly what modelling had been done and what modelling had been done and what input there had been to various assertions and comments made. that made it difficult, of course it wasn't publicly available either. that created i think an imbalance, where the science advice was there for everybody to see. the economic advice wasn't and it wasn't obvious what it was based upon. and it therefore unduly weighted the science advice and created a problem with how decisions were made. i did suggest an economic advice group similar to sage was set up and we had one meeting, bit wasn't pursued. we will look at some documents, but before we do that, i think what your describing is if you like two different problems, albeit perhaps come from the same route, one is,
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which we can all see, there was an imbalance in terms of public perception, because on the one hand sage minutes were being published. so as you say, an imbalance there and that led to the public perception that you've described. but there is a second issue which i want to press you on, which is was itjust an imbalance publicly, or there a lack of defirnlt si in deficiency in the advice the decision makers were receiving. i can't comment on what they were receiving, because i don't know what they were receiving. there was in my opinion a lack of seeing that the basis for decisions and assertions made at meetings, so in a meeting where the question of rising numbers
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of infections was being discussed, there was very little that i saw that said that the economists had understood that rising infections alone were enough to cause problems for the economy and a lot of emphasis on why interventions were negative to the economy and quite difficult for me to see what the works were behind that and why that was the case. so i didn't see evidence of a very strong analytical basis, but it may have been there, but i just basis, but it may have been there, but ijust never saw it. basis, but it may have been there, but i just never saw it.— but i 'ust never saw it. when you talk but i just never saw it. when you talk of no — but i just never saw it. when you talk of no evidence _ but i just never saw it. when you talk of no evidence here, - but i just never saw it. when you talk of no evidence here, pure i talk of no evidence here, pure dogma, that seems to suggest that you thought it wasn't there? i did think it the _ you thought it wasn't there? i did think it the wasn't _ you thought it wasn't there? i c c think it the wasn't there. you thought it wasn't there? i did think it the wasn't there. that, i you thought it wasn't there? i did | think it the wasn't there. that, as ou sa , think it the wasn't there. that, as you say. perhaps _ think it the wasn't there. that, as you say. perhaps is _ think it the wasn't there. that, as you say, perhaps is one _ think it the wasn't there. that, as you say, perhaps is one of- think it the wasn't there. that, as | you say, perhaps is one of reasons why you suggested an economic sage? yes, i wasn't even necessarily suggesting an economic sage, i thought an external body would be helpful and that is what i was
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getting from various academic economists who felt that would be helpful. economists who felt that would be helful. �* , economists who felt that would be helful. h ., ., ~' economists who felt that would be helful. �*, ., ., ~ ., economists who felt that would be helful. �*, ., ., ., helpful. let's look at an e-mail that is 235- _ helpful. let's look at an e-mail that is 235. dated _ helpful. let's look at an e-mail that is 235. dated 5th - helpful. let's look at an e-mail that is 235. dated 5th june - helpful. let's look at an e-mail l that is 235. dated 5th june 2020. helpful. let's look at an e-mail - that is 235. dated 5th june 2020. it that is 235. dated 5thjune 2020. it is an internal treasury e—mail. it describes a meeting at which you were present. i think in fact this may have been a meeting that you were... convened or were instrumental in organising. we have asked mr warner and this e—mail as well. you refer in your witness statement to having convened a meeting, do you think this was it? i wasn't sure reading this whether it wasn't sure reading this whether it was that meeting, but it was probably in or around this time. we see the official recording what had taken place and it was at no 10 and chaired by mr warner. i think we
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know that you were there? shtgdin chaired by mr warner. i think we know that you were there? again i wasn't quite _ know that you were there? again i wasn't quite clear— know that you were there? again i wasn't quite clear from _ know that you were there? again i wasn't quite clear from this - know that you were there? again i i wasn't quite clear from this whether i was at this meeting or not. it refers to a follow up with me. i certainly don't think ben warner would have been chairing a meeting that i organised. i think that was probably a separate meeting, because it was chaired by possibly claire. if we look at the bottom of the page we can see another e—mail, this one, which seems to have been in the run—up to the meeting and you are one of the copy, we see chief scientific adviser.— scientific adviser. that i was involved with _ scientific adviser. that i was involved with for _ scientific adviser. that i was involved with for sure. - scientific adviser. that i was involved with for sure. it - scientific adviser. that i was i involved with for sure. it looks like perhaps — involved with for sure. it looks like perhaps you _ involved with for sure. it looks like perhaps you were - involved with for sure. it looks like perhaps you were there? l involved with for sure. it looks - like perhaps you were there? let's not worry too much about that. i want to is you about the substance of miss lombardelli's e—mail. the
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discussions felt familiar and they want to deliver the same level of virus control at lower economic cost. then this, there was a general conclusion by economists that the economics is not being considered enough. and the desire for a place to thing this and three options. an economic sage, a single model and lastly something more informal. the says, the economists obviously killed the single model. pausing there, we have heard some evidence from members of spyem about early steps that were taken during the pandemic to try and bring together economic and epidemiological
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modelling. the flavour of their evidence was this was something that should be pursued. do you know why it would be that economists are... don't take kindly to this idea and what is your view about whether this is the something that should be pursued in the future?- is the something that should be pursued in the future? well, i would like to deal— pursued in the future? well, i would like to deal with _ pursued in the future? well, i would like to deal with that _ pursued in the future? well, i would like to deal with that in _ pursued in the future? well, i would like to deal with that in two - pursued in the future? well, i would like to deal with that in two parts. i like to deal with that in two parts. i think that there should be in the uk a, an academic centre for pandemic preparedness. such a centre should be very multidisciplinary and in such a centre i can imagine how economists, mathematical modellers, social scientists could get together and work out whether there is a way of modelling this. so i agree it is worth exploring. on the question of whether there should be an economic sage, i think there is a grave danger in having a group that tries to integrate the thing that is a
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ministerial tradeoff decision and one that is an important democratic area. so i would not be in favour of having an integrated single model for the reason it tends to put out the answer, which it can't possibly do, and given what i know about the uncertainty in infection disease modelling, i suspect there would be one all mighty uncertainty that came out at the end of it. i one all mighty uncertainty that came out at the end of it.— out at the end of it. i think what out at the end of it. i think what ou are out at the end of it. i think what you are saying _ out at the end of it. i think what you are saying is _ out at the end of it. i think what you are saying is as _ out at the end of it. i think what you are saying is as far- out at the end of it. i think what you are saying is as far as - out at the end of it. i think what you are saying is as far as the i you are saying is as far as the modelling is concerned, that is something that could and should be pursued to see whether it is possible. pursued to see whether it is possible-— pursued to see whether it is possible.- and - pursued to see whether it is possible. yes. and certainly the evidence we _ possible. jazz and certainly the evidence we heard from possible. 123 and certainly the evidence we heard from the modellers was that if that is to be pursued then i think their phrase it should be done between pandemics rather than during a pandemic. and that may be take us back to the type of institution or academic body you
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described. switching focus to the sage idea, i think what you have said is you're against the idea of adding an economic strand to the existing sage. adding an economic strand to the existing sage-— adding an economic strand to the existing sage. yes. what about separately _ existing sage. 123 what about separately having a separate body similar to the existing sage which is more focussed on economics, which may have been the suggestion here. i think that sounds sensible and it is one thing i would support, but and i want to put an important caveat, i'm not in treasury, i don't understand the things they have got and maybe they have similar advisory mechanisms going on. on the face of it i would be in favour of an economic sage type activity. you said in your _ economic sage type activity. you said in your statement you were in favour two years ago or three years ago when it was discussed at the
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time. the messaging, in the e—mail, this is an option that would be taken forward. we can see it says it was agreed ben warner would follow up was agreed ben warner would follow up with with individuals, including you. what did happen to this idea back no 202? were steps take on the try and establish an economic sage? i think simon case pulled together a meeting at my suggestion, which may have been following this with economists to try and see whether that would work. but there was no take—up after wards. i think there was a single meeting and no follow up was a single meeting and no follow up and i don't know what happened to this within treasury, claire lombadelli could answer this. you said the traesch _ lombadelli could answer this. you said the traesch did not want to follow up the idea?—
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said the traesch did not want to follow up the idea? yes. we have an ifg reort follow up the idea? yes. we have an ifg report puts _ follow up the idea? 123 we have an ifg report puts the position more strongly and said they understood that the treasury vetoed this proposal. is that something that you can speak to? i proposal. is that something that you can speak to?— can speak to? i don't think i was aware there _ can speak to? i don't think i was aware there was _ can speak to? i don't think i was aware there was a _ can speak to? i don't think i was aware there was a veto. - can speak to? i don't think i was aware there was a veto. i - can speak to? i don't think i was aware there was a veto. i was i can speak to? i don't think i was i aware there was a veto. i was aware nobody wanted to do it. but i don't know whether it got as far as concrete written proposal and somebody said no. {line concrete written proposal and somebody said no.— concrete written proposal and somebody said no. one of the ossible somebody said no. one of the possible criticisms _ somebody said no. one of the possible criticisms of - somebody said no. one of the possible criticisms of this i somebody said no. one of the i possible criticisms of this approach that would involve setting up a new bodyis that would involve setting up a new body is that one might then say, well if we have a economic sage, and epidemiological sage, why not a sociological sage and you have too many bodies. do you think that would have any force? i many bodies. do you think that would have any force?— have any force? i think, a lot of social science _ have any force? i think, a lot of
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social science was _ have any force? i think, a lot of social science was included i have any force? i think, a lot of social science was included on i have any force? i think, a lot of i social science was included on sage and would be included on the economics sage as well. and i certainly asked the british academy to do a piece of work injune 2020 looking at the covid decade and trying to understand the ramifications. i think you're right it is oo risk that i end up with a plethora of these things, but that one and the science one seems like a sensible approach, providing treasury want it and will make it work. otherwise it will be not effectiveches == work. otherwise it will be not effectiveches— work. otherwise it will be not effectiveches -- effective. you mentioned _ effectiveches -- effective. you mentioned the _ effectiveches -- effective. you mentioned the academic i effectiveches -- effective. you | mentioned the academic centre effectiveches -- effective. you i mentioned the academic centre for pandemic preparedness. is there anything else you want to say about that in terms of what it would cover address and might be set snup up? several address and might be set snup in?
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several universities are providing work and a single centre would work very well in the uk. and it could look at all the things that you would like to have looked at in normal times to make the input more effective during a pandemic. that could include everything from evaluating the effects of npis, which one work and which didn't, what would you do differently, smart npiers, oo different approaches to viral detection systems and ways to understand viruses. it should be a broad activity and should draw on existing groups rather than necessarily bring everybody into something that is only working on that. then you have a huge amount of expertise brought into an area of focussing on pandemics and oxford and liverpool and others suggested doing this and i'm a strong supporter of the idea that it would be useful. ~ ., .,
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be useful. would it involve government _ be useful. would it involve government funding? it i be useful. would it involve i government funding? it would be useful. would it involve - government funding? it would and i think it should — government funding? it would and i think it should involve _ government funding? it would and i think it should involve uk _ government funding? it would and i think it should involve uk hss, i think it should involve uk hss, because that is the body with the responsibility for this area and one of the things that i observed during this pandemic was the public health england didn't have the strong connections and science base that was needed. it had some strong ones, but it wasn't as robust as it should have been through that time. through no fault of their. but there was inadequate funding and links to various academic groups. let inadequate funding and links to various academic groups. let me move on to another— various academic groups. let me move on to another subject, _ various academic groups. let me move on to another subject, although - various academic groups. let me move on to another subject, although it i on to another subject, although it is related, which is a sort of structural sage question of how the advice, which is generated within sage and the sub committees, it communicated to ministers. there are perhaps two linked issues. one is by
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what means is that advice communicated? and the other is to whom or to what body should it be communicated. it may be that we need to bear in mind a the distinction between the typical short—term emergencies for which the cobra system was designed and the type of mohammad pandemic that we are addressing. in that first category of case, i think we can can see that the existing system worked well. you have sage. it discusses issues that it is asked to discuss. it can produce a minute and then the chair of sage, you or another, can convey that information in a fairly straight forward way to a cobra
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meeting and both those issues are addressed. the difficulties come from the pressure put on that system ljy from the pressure put on that system by the larger scale and the much longer duration of this pandemic. before i go on, do you agree that those are the issues?— before i go on, do you agree that those are the issues? yes. so startin: those are the issues? yes. so starting with _ those are the issues? yes. so starting with the _ those are the issues? 123 so starting with the question of the means by which the advice is communicated, several witnesses who have given evidence have commented on the great pressure that was put on the great pressure that was put on you and professor whitty as the conduit for advice from sage to decision—makers. all of them i hasten to add endorsed your hard work and ability to undertake that task. but they said that both
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because of the enormous amount of work that was being done by sage and all the sub committees that were under it, and the duration, that in fact it was really an enormous it is a it can, perhaps too big a task to expect the two of you to be that very narrow point of connection in terms of explaining and passing on that advice orally to decision—makers? what are your comments on that? i decision-makers? what are your comments on that?— decision-makers? what are your comments on that? i think you have to have a point _ comments on that? i think you have to have a point of _ comments on that? i think you have to have a point of connection - comments on that? i think you have to have a point of connection from i to have a point of connection from sage, which is one or two people, into the system. you have to build trust within whitehall and have trust within whitehall and have trust within whitehall and have trust within the cabinet office and haveit trust within the cabinet office and have it clear who people turn to and you need a docking point on the other side that can receive the advice. on occasion it is useful to have a broader group. we had teach
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ins that took place in cabinet office and we had up to 170 people coming to listen to things. that is useful. i think we had at least one meeting where a number of dissenting scientists got together and spoke directly to the prime minister in a small group. i have to say i don't think he found that particularly helpful, other than to realise it was difficult to work out what to do with these dissenting voices. i think it is not practical to assume that you can have groups of scientists just pitching up to talk to the prime minister or the cabinet secretary without some structure around it. ithink secretary without some structure around it. i think we could have benefitted from an occasional step back meeting. and this is something i did during peacetime, where we bring in scientists to speak to the prime minister on a particular topic to give him a chance to ask
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questions that perhaps he might not want to ask in a bigger grouchlt i think —— group. bit but it is difficult. i think -- group. bit but it is difficult-— think -- group. bit but it is difficult. . , �* , , ., difficult. i wasn't suggesting an alternative, _ difficult. i wasn't suggesting an alternative, i— difficult. i wasn't suggesting an alternative, i was _ difficult. i wasn't suggesting an alternative, i was asking i difficult. i wasn't suggesting an alternative, i was asking if- difficult. i wasn't suggesting an| alternative, i was asking if there was one. i think your broad answer is that more orless the system that existed at the time ought to carry on. just to press you on that, we have already noted that we as a country were lucky that the do individuals who were occupying the two posts of chief medical officer and government chief scientific adviser were so well squalled by their experience —— well qualified ljy their experience —— well qualified by their experience and training to deal with the pandemic. if one imagines another pandemic where the
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cmo and the gsa are not special i wases in epidemics, but come from different specialisms, would that be an extra problem in these individuals bearing the weight of conveying sage advice. i individuals bearing the weight of conveying sage advice.— individuals bearing the weight of conveying sage advice. i think the smo will always _ conveying sage advice. i think the smo will always be _ conveying sage advice. i think the smo will always be an _ conveying sage advice. i think the smo will always be an expert i conveying sage advice. i think the smo will always be an expert in i conveying sage advice. i think the i smo will always be an expert in this area and have around him or her a group of people who understand this, which is why the lead government department does have some importance to it. so i don't have concerns there. i think it is likely that the gsa wouldn't and that has advantages and disadvantages. what the gsa would need to do would be to make sure that they have the right advice around them, so they can undertake that function. but i suspect there would be more weight on the cmo's shoulders in that sort of situation and it may be that one of deputy
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kmos or the other people in that sphere would accept up as well. —— step up as well. i sphere would accept up as well. -- step up as well-— step up as well. i focussed on the first art step up as well. i focussed on the first part of _ step up as well. i focussed on the first part of equation _ step up as well. i focussed on the first part of equation in _ step up as well. i focussed on the first part of equation in terms i step up as well. i focussed on the first part of equation in terms of i first part of equation in terms of what is the condue conduit. and the other end which you referred to as the docking point. it is right although at the start of the pandemic you were conventionally feeding into cobra, once the cobra meeting ceased to take place regularly, you were then providing advice to range of committees, whether it was covid s, to dashboard meetings, the covid task force and so on. do you think that that there is a need to be clearer about your term the docking point for sage advice? i term the docking point for sage advice? ., ~' term the docking point for sage advice? ., ~ ., , , advice? i do. i think it was very clear when _
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advice? i do. i think it was very clear when it _ advice? i do. i think it was very clear when it was _ advice? i do. i think it was very clear when it was ccs, - advice? i do. i think it was very clear when it was ccs, the i clear when it was ccs, the secretariat for kobe cobra, it then became unclear and it became clear when simon case led the task force and it narrowed down to a more sensible system and that improved over time in terms of them being able to ask better questions and frame them more appropriately. there needs to be a system that swings into action immediately in the case of a pandemic that says, here is a structure that will stay constant and it is properly pop lated with people who can look at the operational needs that come out of that and have enough scientific understanding and data analysis understanding and data analysis understanding to absorb the evidence and understand the imply xagss. s —— imply xagss. and understand the imply xagss. s -- imply xagss— imply xagss. would that be an exanded imply xagss. would that be an expanded ccs _ imply xagss. would that be an expanded ccs or _ imply xagss. would that be an expanded ccs or something i imply xagss. would that be an - expanded ccs or something different? it is easiest to build off things
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that are used routinely, rather than stand up something that is special for one event. so i think build being it from some expanded ccs, which is then exercised regularly in other forms, which is then exercised regularly in otherforms, but knowing which is then exercised regularly in other forms, but knowing thaur that you are going to have to increase the scale dramatically at the time of an event would probably work. in the sage system, we have in the development plan come up with the idea of reservists who could be brought in and would always be aware of what was going on and they could be brought in to expand capabilities and it may be something like that would work inside the cabinet office. . 1' would work inside the cabinet office. ., ~' , ., would work inside the cabinet office. ., ,, i. ., would work inside the cabinet office. ., ,, office. thank you. let me ask you about one — office. thank you. let me ask you about one other, _ office. thank you. let me ask you about one other, a _ office. thank you. let me ask you about one other, a discreet i office. thank you. let me ask you about one other, a discreet point, about one other, a discreet point, about press conferences. can we look at perhaps 235. we of course all
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remember your appearance? at perhaps 235. we of course all rememberyourappearance? i at perhaps 235. we of course all remember your appearance? i don't have anything _ remember your appearance? i don't have anything on — remember your appearance? i don't have anything on my _ remember your appearance? i don't have anything on my screen. - remember your appearance? i don't have anything on my screen. we i remember your appearance? i don't i have anything on my screen. we have confidence that _ have anything on my screen. we have confidence that it _ have anything on my screen. we have confidence that it is _ have anything on my screen. we have confidence that it is coming. - have anything on my screen. we have confidence that it is coming. there i confidence that it is coming. there it is. we all remember the press conferences at which you and sir chris whitty were regular, albeit not permanent attenders. in this paragraph of your statement, you say, we can see here, picking up the second line, this was not a role that you sought, but you were asked to do it and you did. the question i want to ask is whether looking back over the whole run of the couple of years when you undertook this it is this it is task you think it was a
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role you could fill without blurring that line between your independent role to give advice and the government's role in setting policy and announcing it? i think it would be very helpful to have others doing it as well, and we said that at the time, so economists, people from the nhs, others to make sure that the operational side was properly covered. in terms of the blurred line, a lot has been written about this, people have strong views in both directions. my view is, it was helpful for us to stand up and deliver the evidence as we saw it and the outputs from sage. it was unhelpful when questions became overtly policy driven and political, which is inevitable in a press conference, and that word best, whichever minister we were with when they took the questions, i think it
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