lancaster, one of those strange titles we have here in our government, which sort of means he was a cabinet minister for getting stuff done, the cabinet of his being the department that sort of helps coordinate things in cases, amongst other things, coordinate things in cases, amongst otherthings, in coordinate things in cases, amongst other things, in cases of national emergencies, like terror attacks, like pandemics. so, really, he was right in the thick of things, and obviously will face questions about how those decisions were made. i think there are three themes that welcome up. yesterday for example we heard from some of the metro mayors, we heard from andy burnham, the mayor of manchester, we heard from steve rotherham, from liverpool, and also from sadiq khan, the london mayor. basically the general theme there was that the local mayors felt that they were not listened to, that they were excluded from decision—making, and that basically they weren't able to give their input on how decisions were made and obviously that sort of thing would come through the cabinet office, michael gove's name came up, it was said that he did facilitate some

communication if you like but not enough was done. the other issue i think we will hear an awful lot about was obviously last week was a science week, we heard from some of the top scientists and again the general theme there seemed to be the scientists�* frustration with this government mantra of following the science which they said basically meant that scientists were used as scapegoats for controversial decisions that politicians were making. and then of course the general thing which has been bubbling along over the last few weeks has been the chaos and confusion right at the centre of government in downing street. a lot of that is to do with the personalities involved, and so i think we will be hearing more on all of that because michael gove really had a front row seat to all of it. and another big name that we are expecting to hear from this week, matt hancock, the former health secretary, of course, who has come in for a huge amount of criticism from those at the very heart of government during this inquiry, isn�*t he?

government during this inquiry, isn't he? ., , , ., , isn't he? 0h, absolutely. there has been scientists, _ isn't he? 0h, absolutely. there has been scientists, advisers, - been scientists, advisers, civil servants, other politicians, who have had their go at him, if you like, in terms of, again, criticising him for overpromising and under delivering. one is senior civil servant said that he was asked about, did he have a handle on things? and he gave the impression of a batsman, things? and he gave the impression ofa batsman, doing things? and he gave the impression of a batsman, doing a batsman�*s stance, and words to the effect of, you bowl them at me and i will hit them out of the park, or words to that effect, but that general sense of overconfidence. so i think obviously he is going to be questioned on all of that. of course he will say that these were extraordinary times and a lot of this with the benefit of hindsight, who would have acted differently? so i�*m sure he�*ll welcome out fighting, he is hardly pulling his punches in terms of defending, we saw him in the first module of this inquiry which was all about britain is preparing us for all of that, he was apologetic for the mistakes that were made but certainly was not

going to roll over to any criticism. and it is important to remind our viewers that this inquiry at this stage is not about apportioning blame, much as we do see quite a bit of finger—pointing and criticism, it is about trying to learn the lessons, should this happen again? no, i think it�*s really important to remember that because of course we hear all this explosive, fascinating stuff on the inner workings, the whatsapp messages, the private e—mails and diary entries where you really get the sense of people who wrote things down or send messages that they almost certainly did not intend for anybody to hear. and you really get down to the nitty—gritty of some of the choice language that is used often. and of course that has an impact and people in the court of public opinion obviously there is some, dare i say, jubilation for certain individuals, but the real idea behind this whole inquiry was to lessons, and baroness hallett, the chair of the inquiry, has always said that this is a case,

the next pandemic will be a case of when and not if, and so it is crucial that those lessons are learned, and that is questions of structure of government, how decisions were made, maybe different ways that they would be made in the future, how you could legislate in the future, so that, heaven forbid, it happen again, but hopefully we can make different decisions that would be better. find can make different decisions that would be better.— can make different decisions that would be better. and we are looking at baroness — would be better. and we are looking at baroness hallett, _ would be better. and we are looking at baroness hallett, the _ would be better. and we are looking at baroness hallett, the chair- would be better. and we are looking at baroness hallett, the chair of- at baroness hallett, the chair of this inquiry, michael gove has been sworn in. ~ . ., �* this inquiry, michael gove has been sworn in. ~ . ., ~ ., this inquiry, michael gove has been sworn in-— mr i this inquiry, michael gove has been i sworn in-— mr go. sworn in. michael andrew go. mr go, thank ou sworn in. michael andrew go. mr go, thank you for— sworn in. michael andrew go. mr go, thank you for your _ sworn in. michael andrew go. mr go, thank you for your provision - sworn in. michael andrew go. mr go, thank you for your provision of - sworn in. michael andrew go. mr go, thank you for your provision of a - thank you for your provision of a further witness statement in these proceedings, your statement of the 1st of september 2023 for the purposes of this module. i want to start, please, your evidence by asking you some questions about your past ministerial role. you were chancellor of the duchy of lancaster

between 24th july 2019 and 15th september 2021, between 24th july 2019 and 15th september2021, is between 24th july 2019 and 15th september 2021, is that correct? yes. �* , ., september 2021, is that correct? yes. �* ., september 2021, is that correct? yes. �* september 2021, is that correct? yes. ., ., yes. but you also held the post of minister for— yes. but you also held the post of minister for the _ yes. but you also held the post of minister for the cabinet _ yes. but you also held the post of minister for the cabinet office - minister for the cabinet office between 13th of february 2015 and september 2021, why did you feel both posts, why were you fulfilling both posts, why were you fulfilling both of those positions are? when i was first appointed _ both of those positions are? when i was first appointed as _ both of those positions are? when i was first appointed as chancellor i both of those positions are? when i was first appointed as chancellor of| was first appointed as chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, the prime minister made it clear my role at that time was to lead on preparations for brexit, and in particular, for preparations for a potential no deal scenario. it had been the case, i believed, and the prime ministers certainly believe, that preparations for brexit had not been made in the way that they should have been, and that was my sole focus during the time that i was chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, ctl, alone. after the

general election, the prime minister believed that government should be reconfigured, and he wanted to give me a slightly broader role, now of course that he enjoyed a majority and that a brexit deal had been secured in outline, and that broader role was to encompass looking at how the cabinet office might improve coordination of government policy, particularly but not exclusively with the devolved administration. was your appointment as minister for the cabinet office connected in anyway with the dawning realisation of the coronavirus crisis, which of course was beginning to make itself apparent? i course was beginning to make itself a- arent? ., �* , course was beginning to make itself apparent?_ you i apparent? i don't believe so. you therefore held _ apparent? i don't believe so. you therefore held two _ apparent? i don't believe so. you therefore held two ministerial- apparent? i don't believe so. you i therefore held two ministerial posts broadly connected with the workings of the cabinet office, and did that mean that you were broadly responsible, and you held the ministerial responsibility, for dealing with matters such as civil contingencies cover the resilience of government, with the response to civil emergencies, was that all

broadly within your brief? yes. but i had observed _ broadly within your brief? yes. but i had observed before _ broadly within your brief? yes. but i had observed before taking - broadly within your brief? yes. but i had observed before taking on . broadly within your brief? yes. but| i had observed before taking on this role and realised very quickly upon taking on this role that the way in which the cabinet office was configured was not, to my mind, appropriate for the type of pandemic that we faced and indeed the type of crisis that requires an effective whole of government response. i am auoin to whole of government response. i am going to ask — whole of government response. i am going to ask you _ whole of government response. i am going to ask you some questions about the cabinet office in a moment. before i do so, to conclude the question of your ministerial positions, then, on 15 september 2021, were you appointed for secretary of state for levelling up, housing and communities and also ministerfor housing and communities and also minister for intergovernmental relations, why were you appointed to both those positions? the relations, why were you appointed to both those positions?— both those positions? the prime minister recognised _ both those positions? the prime minister recognised that - both those positions? the prime| minister recognised that levelling up minister recognised that levelling up was a principal focus of domestic policy that had not in his view at that time had the focus and drive

devoted to it required. so, he strengthened the department which i took over previously, the ministry for housing, communities and, we had an additional permanent secretary who was appointed on a temporary basis, it may seem strange to have a temporary permanent secretary, but andi held injoint as in order to drive that activity. but intergovernmental relations, which had been excised from the cabinet office, was added, and i think the prime minister believed that it was a compliment to the work of levelling up across the whole united kingdom to have a minister responsible for coordination with the devolved administrations. find the devolved administrations. and what was the _ the devolved administrations. and what was the genesis of that ministerial position, ministerfor intergovernmental relations? had there been a review in fact before that time into united kingdom government union capability?

absolutely. conducted by lord dunlop, andrew dunlop, originally commissioned when theresa may was by minister and of course the experience during covid reinforced the need for us to have a more coherent approach towards sharing information and coordinating policy across the whole united kingdom. in broad terms, did your appointment to secretary of state for levelling up and as ministerfor and as minister for intergovernmental and as ministerfor intergovernmental relations mean that you were less involved in decision—making relating to covid from that date of appointment, 15th september 2021?— from that date of appointment, 15th september 2021? yes. alright. from that date of appointment, 15th september2021? yes. alright. coming september 2021? yes. alright. coming back to the september2021? yes alright. coming back to the cabinet office. the inquiry has heard evidence and particularly in the context of module one, to the effect that the cabinet office performs a vital role at the heart of government in liaising between other government departments, synthesising the response of government, in brokering

if you like the affairs of government between its various multifaceted parts. there has been an abundance of evidence in this module, mr gove, to the effect that over and above perhaps the degree of expected chaos or confusion in the face of an unprecedented crisis, the cabinet office was largely dysfunctional, and that is a word that has been used by mr cummings, ijy that has been used by mr cummings, by mark sedwill, the former cabinet secretary, the former deputy cabinet secretary, the former deputy cabinet secretary helen mcnamara and others. how, as you see it, and you had been a ministerfor cabinet how, as you see it, and you had been a minister for cabinet office for some time, how was that position allowed to develop a? for some time, how was that position allowed to develop a?— some time, how was that position allowed to develop a? for a variety of reasons- — allowed to develop a? for a variety of reasons- i _ allowed to develop a? for a variety of reasons. i think— allowed to develop a? for a variety of reasons. i think the _ allowed to develop a? for a variety of reasons. i think the first - allowed to develop a? for a variety of reasons. i think the first thing i of reasons. i think the first thing is that the inherent structure of the cabinet office was flawed.

normally, the lead minister, the secretary of state, is responsible for everything that happens in his department, or her department, and answerable to the house of commons, accountable for what happens there. but the cabinet office is different. there is much within the cabinet office that is not within the purview and not within the control of whoever happens to be the lead cabinet office minister, chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, minister for the cabinet office, or whatever. so, there are significant parts of the cabinet office that answer to the cabinet office that answer to the cabinet office that answer to the cabinet secretary or to the prime minister, rather than to the lead ministerfor the cabinet lead minister for the cabinet office. lead ministerfor the cabinet office. and as helen mcnamara points out in paragraph 22 of her evidence, she says that injuly 2019, she had been given clear instructions by the prime minister and his team that following the de facto deputy prime

minister model, which some attribute the role of cdl to be in, was not the role of cdl to be in, was not the intention behind appointing mr gove into the cabinet office, my teens and i should be clear that our ministerial accountability flowed through the prime minister. —— my teams. and i think even though helen was talking about the particular circumstances under which i was appointed, it was a feature of the way in which the cabinet office work that various secretariat, they have a national—security secretariat and so on, worked to the prime minister. ministerial, to whom should the inquiry look in terms of accountability for the state into which the cabinet office descended prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic? prior to the onset of the coronavirus andemic? ~ ., coronavirus pandemic? well, i would take two steps _ coronavirus pandemic? well, i would take two steps back. _ coronavirus pandemic? well, i would take two steps back. i _ coronavirus pandemic? well, i would take two steps back. i think - coronavirus pandemic? well, i would take two steps back. i think my - take two steps back. i think my point would be that the cabinet office, in and of itself, over many years, has operated in a way which is not as effective as it should be

for the effective delivery of government policy, both business as usual and also in response to crises. in the first module, we touched on the lead department model for responding to crises, and there is much merit in that for many of the crises that government faces. an animal health emergency or flooding emergency are best handled using the expertise that defra, for example, has. but when we�*re dealing with a whole system crisis of the kind that covid clearly was, then the lead departmental model is not adequate for that. we had an approach, the cabinet office had an approach, which i fear ceded to much responsibility to lead government

departments and did not mean the assumption of sufficient responsibility at the centre, and we can see that in the way in which the civil contingencies secretariat believed that it was supposed to respond it was not occupying, i believe their space and it did not exercise the authority that it should have done across government, partly because of the lead department model. that is a issue of government that had not been addressed and which i believe this inquiry is seeking to address. can i return to the _ inquiry is seeking to address. can i return to the structural— inquiry is seeking to address. can i return to the structural position in a moment? my question was in fact directed at the nature of the cabinet office itself, rather than structural issues which may have arisen between itself and other government departments, in particular the response of government in the face of a whole government in the face of a whole government crisis. the cabinet office itself has been described as dysfunctional, bloated, too many senior levels, too many director

generals, a degree of duplication and confusion, a huge number of communications and engagement stuff, and so on. that is a facet of the cabinet office itself, not any other lead governor department. why do you think that the cabinet office came to be in such a state?— think that the cabinet office came to be in such a state? well, again, the cabinet — to be in such a state? well, again, the cabinet office _ to be in such a state? well, again, the cabinet office acquired - the cabinet office acquired additional responsibility is before and during my time there. there was and during my time there. there was a tendency, there has been a tendency, amongst successive prime ministers, to shove into the cabinet office responsibilities that do not appear to fit conveniently or easily elsewhere, at different times, different prime ministers have used the cabinet office, for example, to lead on drugs policy or on policy towards charities and the third sector. so, it becomes a sort of

mary poppins bag into which different prime ministers will shout things that they believe require to be dealt with by the government�*s nanny, as it were. and it�*s also the case that the cabinet office, under previous ministers, had acquired responsibility, which i believe is right, for ensuring that various cross government functions, procurement, communications and buildings and so on, were administered more effectively. and on many of those occasions, as the cabinet office grew, as its responsibilities grew, what did we do not have was the drains that exercised to look and to focus on what exactly should be done through the cabinet office and what should be done through other government departments and what should be done in no 10. and when i assumed responsibility for the whole of the cabinet office in the middle of

february and in early march, i believed that we needed to change the way in which it operated and i made my views clear to the prime minister, to the cabinet secretary and to those working for the prime minister, that we needed to reform the way in which the cabinet office operated. the way in which the cabinet office 0 erated. �* ., ~ the way in which the cabinet office oerated. �* ., ~ ,., the way in which the cabinet office oerated. �* ., ~ �* operated. again, mr gove, you've referred to _ operated. again, mr gove, you've referred to the _ operated. again, mr gove, you've referred to the areas _ operated. again, mr gove, you've referred to the areas for - operated. again, mr gove, you've referred to the areas for which - operated. again, mr gove, you've| referred to the areas for which the cabinet office became responsible and to the structural system around it. what it not apparent to you, particularly when you became minister for the cabinet office, that in terms of personnel, in terms of its working arrangements, in terms of its ability to function, there were very serious concerns revolving around the nature of the cabinet office? fin revolving around the nature of the cabinet office?— revolving around the nature of the cabinet office? on the question of personnel. — cabinet office? on the question of personnel. i _ cabinet office? on the question of personnel, i would _ cabinet office? on the question of personnel, i would gently - cabinet office? on the question of personnel, i would gently push - cabinet office? on the question of i personnel, i would gently push back. i think that the cabinet office had some of the finest civil servants in whitehall working within it, and overall, i was and continue to be impressed by many of those who work

there. and it was certainly the case that one of the additional responsibilities that the cabinet office had, as we mentioned earlier, from july, was preparing for the uk's from july, was preparing for the uk�*s departure from the european union. during that time, some of the civil servants, union. during that time, some of the civilservants, both union. during that time, some of the civil servants, both who were there and who joined, civil servants, both who were there and whojoined, were among some of the finest public servants that this country has. i would not blame them i think the dysfunction in the cabinet office was a consequence of two things. responsibilities being addedin two things. responsibilities being added in a piecemeal and cumulative way, without strategic thought being given to how the cabinet office would discharge all of those. and a related failure to think strategically about how the centre of government should be reconfigured.— of government should be reconfigured. of government should be reconfiaured. ., , , ., reconfigured. regardless of whether the cause was _ reconfigured. regardless of whether the cause was a _ reconfigured. regardless of whether the cause was a systemic _ reconfigured. regardless of whether the cause was a systemic one, - reconfigured. regardless of whether the cause was a systemic one, a -

the cause was a systemic one, a structural one, a problem with the cabinet office in blunt terms being given to much to do, the reality in terms of the impact was very serious, was it not?- terms of the impact was very serious, was it not? terms of the impact was very - serious, was it not?- the serious, was it not? oh, yes. the government _ serious, was it not? oh, yes. the government body _ serious, was it not? oh, yes. the government body responsible - serious, was it not? oh, yes. the government body responsible for| government body responsible for synthesising government in the face of this crisis was largely, as it must have seemed to you, not fit for purpose in february, march, april, may of 2020?— purpose in february, march, april, ma of2020? , ~ ., ., may of 2020? yes. and i want to take this opportunity. _ may of 2020? yes. and i want to take this opportunity. if— may of 2020? yes. and i want to take this opportunity. if i — may of 2020? yes. and i want to take this opportunity, ifi may, _ may of 2020? yes. and i want to take this opportunity, ifi may, my- this opportunity, if i may, my lady, to apologise to the victims who endured so much pain, the families who endured so much loss as a result of the mistakes that were made by government. in response to the pandemic. and as a minister responsible for the cabinet office and who was also close to many of the decisions that were made, i must take my share of responsibility for that. politicians are human beings, we�*re fallible, we make mistakes and

we�*re fallible, we make mistakes and we make errors, and i�*m sure that the inquiry will have an opportunity to look in detail at many of the errors i am others made. but i also want to stress that i am those with whom i worked were also seeking at every point, in circumstances where every point, in circumstances where every decision was difficult and every decision was difficult and every course was bad, to make those decisions that we felt we could in order to try to deal with an unprecedented virus and a remarkable assault on the institutions of the country. assault on the institutions of the count . ., ., , ., , country. could we have, please, the reort country. could we have, please, the report from — country. could we have, please, the report from helen _ country. could we have, please, the report from helen mcnamara - country. could we have, please, the report from helen mcnamara on - country. could we have, please, thej report from helen mcnamara on the screen, 136755? mr gove, you will be very familiar with this document. yes. it very familiar with this document. yes. . ., very familiar with this document. yes. , ., ., .

yes. it is a document about which helen mcnamara _ yes. it is a document about which helen mcnamara herself, - yes. it is a document about which i helen mcnamara herself, someone i yes. it is a document about which - helen mcnamara herself, someone i am sure you would describe as being one of our finest public servants... absolutely. of our finest public servants... absolutely-— of our finest public servants... absolutel . ., :: :: absolutely. provided in may 2020. the tenor of— absolutely. provided in may 2020. the tenor of this _ absolutely. provided in may 2020. the tenor of this document, - absolutely. provided in may 2020. the tenor of this document, mr . absolutely. provided in may 2020. i the tenor of this document, mr gove, is that, not in terms of the structural responsible of these of the cabinet office, but in terms of its output, in terms of the personnel, in terms of the culture, in terms of what it was actually able to do, there were very serious problems. the culture was not getting the best from people, there was powerlessness, there was bad behaviour from was powerlessness, there was bad behaviourfrom leaders, too much politics, the talking over ofjunior women, she says, too many cabinet office senior leaders, which means they can�*t take decisions without consulting others, superhero culture. the cabinet office has fallen out of shape. those are damning observations, are they not?

yes, they are, and helen�*s broader evidence points to the way in which, as she says, the cabinet office is not elastic, it was moved into a particular shape as a result of some of the successive responsibility is that i mentioned earlier. so, the overall structure of the cabinet office was not such that it could perform as it should come as any government department should, when faced with the crisis. some of the behaviour that helen quite rightly points out and calls out is i think a regrettable feature of one of our failures to effectively and at an early stage change the way in which the cabinet office work, and as i mentioned earlier, there were a variety of changes that i wished to make, including some that i did

make, including some that i did make, to personnel, which were intended to address some not all of the concerns that helen rightly raises. ., ,., ., the concerns that helen rightly raises. ., ., ., ., raises. right at the bottom of that first -a~e raises. right at the bottom of that first page there — raises. right at the bottom of that first page there are _ raises. right at the bottom of that first page there are these - raises. right at the bottom of that| first page there are these words... sense that cabinet office has lost its way in making the whitehall machine work for no 10, and then over the page... not synthesising departments or leveraging machine. that is a fairly broad observation, of course, but it may be thought to be an obvious one. if it had appeared to helen mcnamara that in this very general sense, the cabinet office was failing in its primary role of leveraging the government machine, that must have been apparent to you from being chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, which of course is a related cabinet of his ministerial role, and certainly from february 20, 2020 when you became cabinet ministerfor 20, 2020 when you became cabinet minister for the 20, 2020 when you became cabinet ministerfor the cabinet 20, 2020 when you became cabinet minister for the cabinet office.

yes. ~ ., , ., ., minister for the cabinet office. yes. ~ ., , yes. what did you do yourself in february. _ yes. what did you do yourself in february, march, _ yes. what did you do yourself in february, march, april, - yes. what did you do yourself in february, march, april, to i yes. what did you do yourself in i february, march, april, to address the concerns which you appear to have shared?— the concerns which you appear to have shared? well, the first thing is that when _ have shared? well, the first thing is that when i _ have shared? well, the first thing is that when i was _ have shared? well, the first thing is that when i was chancellor i have shared? well, the first thing is that when i was chancellor of i have shared? well, the first thing l is that when i was chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, solely, as i mentioned earlier, my focus was on brexit preparations, and again we discussed in the inquiry the extent to which i believe that those helped us to prepare for some assuming responsibility for the whole of the cabinet office, i sought to try to wrestle it into shape and i, both with my private office and also with the new permanent secretary alex chisholm, made a series of recommendations as to how things should and might change, improving its analytical function, changing the way in which reporting lines operated... but if i may, one of the things that i found while i was there, and even as the situation with covid was looming on

the horizon, was that i discovered during the course of those early weeks that there were parts of the cabinet office and ways in which the cabinet office and ways in which the cabinet office and ways in which the cabinet office operated that were shielded, almost, from my scrutiny and intervention. a case in point occurred when, on the 3rd of march, i believe, i had to answer an urgent question about the resignation of the permanent secretary at the home office and the consequences for the position of the then home secretary dame priti patel. i was preparing, as the minister accountable to go into the house of commons to answer the question, when shortly before i went in, i was told, didn�*t know beforehand, that there was an inquiry going on as to whether or not the then home secretary had breached the ministerial code. that inquiry was supervised by the propriety and ethics team within the cabinet office, who do a peerless

job, but i wasn�*t aware of that at all. so, a key element in the cabinet office, a key team, was shielded from my scrutiny and my ability to both know what was going on and then ask questions about its effectiveness, at various different times in the run—up to that, and afterwards, i sought, times in the run—up to that, and afterwards, isought, by times in the run—up to that, and afterwards, i sought, by talking to no 10 and making clear my frustrations, that we needed to fundamentally alter how the cabinet office work. and indeed i expressed my views including two dominic cummings, sometimes in very direct terms, about the need for change and reform in the way in which the cabinet office operated. find reform in the way in which the cabinet office operated. and mr gove we will look in — cabinet office operated. and mr gove we will look in due _ cabinet office operated. and mr gove we will look in due course _ cabinet office operated. and mr gove we will look in due course at - cabinet office operated. and mr gove we will look in due course at many i we will look in due course at many of the suggestions that you made in relation to reform of the cabinet office structure. but again, why did

this revelatory understanding about the state of the cabinet office not occur whilst you were chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, that is to say, betweenjuly the duchy of lancaster, that is to say, between july 2019 and the duchy of lancaster, that is to say, betweenjuly 2019 and february 2020? it must have become apparent to you... 2020? it must have become apparent to ou. .. ~ 2020? it must have become apparent to you... mm. while you discharge that important _ to you... iin while you discharge that important responsibility that the governor department for which you were at least indirectly responsible, was failing? well, the first thing is _ responsible, was failing? well, the first thing is that _ responsible, was failing? well, the first thing is that my _ first thing is that my responsibility as a cdl was to make sure that the inadequate preparation is that we had made for our departure from the european union work laptop, and that was the principal focus of my work, it meant enlisting additional people from outside the cabinet office to come in, already i was aware that in one area, a central area of my responsibility, government was not configured as it should be. i was,

during that time, increasingly aware of some of the inherent dysfunction within the cabinet office, but it was only when i assumed full responsibility as mco that it became clear to me quite how dysfunctional the structure of the organisation was. and as i mentioned earlier, there were parts of the cabinet office that, perhaps rightly, considered themselves not to be responsible to or accountable to or indeed anyone who was cdl or mco. and i used to refer to parts of the cabinet office as the dark side of the moon. because they were obscured from my gaze. ii the moon. because they were obscured from my gaze-— from my gaze. if you were increasingly _ from my gaze. if you were increasingly aware, - from my gaze. if you were increasingly aware, as i from my gaze. if you werej increasingly aware, as you from my gaze. if you were i increasingly aware, as you say from my gaze. if you were - increasingly aware, as you say you were, why did you take no steps prior to march 2020 to address the problem? i prior to march 2020 to address the roblem? ., . prior to march 2020 to address the roblem? ., , ., prior to march 2020 to address the roblem? .,, ., , ,., ., , prior to march 2020 to address the roblem? .,, ., , ., , ~ problem? i was appointed to be mco i think on 13th — problem? i was appointed to be mco i think on 13th february _ problem? i was appointed to be mco i think on 13th february and _ problem? i was appointed to be mco i think on 13th february and i _ problem? i was appointed to be mco i

think on 13th february and i think i think on 13th february and i think within weeks i was making clear to no 10 and others... i within weeks i was making clear to no 10 and others. . ._ no 10 and others... i mean, i apologise. — no 10 and others... i mean, i apologise, between - no 10 and others... i mean, i apologise, between july i no 10 and others... i mean, i apologise, between july 1919 | no 10 and others... i mean, i i apologise, between july 1919 when apologise, betweenjuly 1919 when you apologise, betweenjuly1919 when you were chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, and march 2020, when you had your feet under the table of that new ministerial responsibility? again it is a feature of cabinet government that you can make observation to the prime minister and two others about the weaknesses that you discern in other parts of government, but there are delineations of responsibility. did you make those observations between july did you make those observations betweenjuly1919 and did you make those observations between july 1919 and july 2020. i made some observations informally about some features of how the government was operating, but at that time i was prioritising what i

consider to be the role and mission the prime minister had given me and which i believed was absolutely critical. so, as i arrived as minister for critical. so, as i arrived as ministerfor the critical. so, as i arrived as minister for the cabinet office alongside being the chancellor of the duchy of lancaster, i had concerns that i wanted to familiarise myself with the shape and structure in greater detail before then making recommendations for change. normally in previous cabinet role when i have arrived in departments that i believed it needed to be changed, i have taken a couple of months before instituting what some of those changes are because i wanted to make sure that i properly understood why things are the way they are before then arguing for change. when i arrived at the cabinet office it was rather quicker. there is a principle in politics, a principal of chesterton is fats. sometimes the existence of a particular institution or protocol

seems irrational,