that advice, of course, was not transparent in the same way that the sage advice was, would you agree? these weren't reflections of an hmt committee, the minutes of which were then condensed and published and made known to the world? yes, then condensed and published and made known to the world?- made known to the world? yes, i think that made known to the world? yes, i thinkthat is... — made known to the world? yes, i think that is. .. its _ made known to the world? yes, i think that is... its not _ made known to the world? yes, i think that is... its not quite - think that is... its not quite right. because hmt did publish a considerable amount of information. of underlying data. but the advice and the analysis which was given directly to downing street by hmt was never itself published, was it? i think that is entirely normal, but yes. the same goes for every department, by the way, including the department of health and everything else.— the department of health and everything else. yes, but we are examining _ everything else. yes, but we are examining this _ everything else. yes, but we are examining this issue _ everything else. yes, but we are examining this issue in - everything else. yes, but we are examining this issue in the - everything else. yes, but we are i examining this issue in the unique circumstances of the ultimate decision—making process of the prime minister, which was how to balance economic societal and other

considerations in a way which would command confidence and bring government and the public together. even with the precise advice not being published, there was considerable information in the public domain, put there by the hmt, but also by the government's independent forecasts. for over a decade now, the government has had an independent forecast so it doesn't markets own homework. —— doesn't markets own homework. —— doesn't markets own homework. —— doesn't mark its own homework. again, you had the imf, the oecd at investment banks.— investment banks. could you slow down a little _ investment banks. could you slow down a little bit. _ investment banks. could you slow down a little bit. i— investment banks. could you slow down a little bit. i was _ investment banks. could you slow down a little bit. i was taking - investment banks. could you slow down a little bit. i was taking your state to move _ down a little bit. i was taking your state to move on. _ down a little bit. i was taking your state to move on. i _ down a little bit. i was taking your| state to move on. i misinterpreted the signal. mi; state to move on. i misinterpreted the siunal. g ., ,

state to move on. i misinterpreted the siunal. y ., , ., the signal. my point would be that there was considerable _ the signal. my point would be that| there was considerable information about the economic impact on the economy in the public domain, not just from hmt, but many other independent expert bodies. so even if the specific advice on a micro point wasn't published, there was a lot of evidence out there. is it lot of evidence out there. is it ossible lot of evidence out there. is it possible that _ lot of evidence out there. is it possible that hmt— lot of evidence out there. is it possible that hmt could have published more? perhaps. you bemoan the absence of— published more? perhaps. you bemoan the absence of cost _ published more? perhaps. you bemoan the absence of cost benefit _ the absence of cost benefit calculations. you say that the basic requirement for every public health intervention, but this was never made, what did you mean by that? i think i'm just agreeing with something that was said, the cost benefit in a precise way wasn't done. you talk about it in our earlier conversation about march, when it was happening quickly. i mentioned the analysis, you told me not to mention it, but that would be an example of a cost benefit analysis. that has been used in other aspects of health care.

indeed, independent academics used it to evaluate the benefits and costs of the first lockdown. that was the broader point i was making. there was evidence at the beginning of the pandemic no pre—existing model of how a pandemic would affect the economy. there was no material showing what the estimated costs were likely to be, of course. in the course of the pandemic, did you instruct the treasury to start preparing cost benefit calculation is? those sort of analysis were not there? ., ., . is? those sort of analysis were not there? ., ., , ., ., is? those sort of analysis were not there? ., ., ., . ., ., there? that was more a function for there? that was more a function for the cabinet — there? that was more a function for the cabinet office _ there? that was more a function for the cabinet office and _ there? that was more a function for the cabinet office and the _ there? that was more a function for the cabinet office and the task - the cabinet office and the task force. you would expect the task force. you would expect the task force to do that over time, which is to synthesise the different things from different areas to try to bring them together. so that's really what them together. so that's really what the task force overtime is able to do a betterjob at. the

the task force overtime is able to do a betterjob at.— do a better 'ob at. the hmt is a wizard in do a betterjob at. the hmt is a wizard in the _ do a betterjob at. the hmt is a wizard in the field _ do a betterjob at. the hmt is a wizard in the field of— do a betterjob at. the hmt is a wizard in the field of fiscal - do a betterjob at. the hmt is a wizard in the field of fiscal and l wizard in the field of fiscal and economic matters and cost benefit analyses. you can't bemoan in the spectator on one hand the absence of any calculation along those lines, and then say that it is something you take the cabinet office to have done. why did the treasury not say the government would be hugely assisted by calculations that bring together the cost benefit thinking about future lockdown is, let's do it? �* , about future lockdown is, let's do it? ~ , ~ about future lockdown is, let's do it? �* , ~ , about future lockdown is, let's do it? , ~ it? because i think it is an incredible _ it? because i think it is an incredible difficult - it? because i think it is an incredible difficult thing i it? because i think it is an| incredible difficult thing to it? because i think it is an - incredible difficult thing to do. these are incredibly complex decisions. in any case, they are hard to quantify. many health decisions are trade—offs. how do you think about quantifying, we do it with drugs with that analysis, but it is very complexly the task force

is the right place to bring together aspects of it. they seconded ten people to the task. the particular to help with all of this. again, with a rough action on all of this for the future, if someone has developed a better way to integrate these things. i'm not sure it is that straightforward. we shouldn't pretend that you can reduce all these things to a simple number that these things to a simple number that the prime minister can look at and make a decision based on. i the prime minister can look at and make a decision based on.- make a decision based on. i don't think anybody _ make a decision based on. i don't think anybody has _ make a decision based on. i don't think anybody has suggested - make a decision based on. i don't| think anybody has suggested that. can be looked at the winter strategy briefly, and september, october? the winter strategy document of the 19th

of september made plain that the infection was spreading rapidly, the seven day average of confirmed cases had risen from 1077 in mid—august to 3598 to the 19th of september. it was only sharply upward trajectory and there are references to what the hospital admissions are likely to be of no further measures are implemented. as a general and i'm sure you would accept this position, the treasury brief you, and we can see a briefing for a covid strategy on the 21st of september, to propose a circuit breaker. that is what was being discussed. on the basis that the treasury feared that a circuit breaker of two or three weeks wouldn't itself be enough if that was the route that would be pursued, and also there was a risk that if it was only two or three weeks, the

government might find itself in the awful position of coming out of a circuit breaker while the number of deaths is coming in the wrong direction. there were good arguments made against a circuit breaker. you made against a circuit breaker. you made them, did you not? i was made against a circuit breaker. you made them, did you not? i was never articular made them, did you not? i was never particular persuaded _ made them, did you not? i was never particular persuaded by _ made them, did you not? i was never particular persuaded by the _ made them, did you not? i was never particular persuaded by the circuit - particular persuaded by the circuit breaker, as others weren't. that particular persuaded by the circuit breaker, as others weren't. at the meetin: breaker, as others weren't. at the meeting on _ breaker, as others weren't. at the meeting on the — breaker, as others weren't. at the meeting on the 21st _ breaker, as others weren't. at the meeting on the 21st of— breaker, as others weren't. at the | meeting on the 21st of september, and also at cobra, you showed statistics of how a circuit breaker would hit hospitality sector incredible hard with consequential damage to its runnable workforce. in the course of sir chris witty�*s evidence, he said this, in response to a question, had their perhaps been a circuit breaker in september

and perhaps a tier level system introduced earlier and had time to work over a long period of time, width there have remained the possibility that the second lockdown would not be as long? he said yes, as most people would agree that is the case. so there were clear signs that there arguments were very finely balanced in terms of damage to the economy and the number of deaths. ., , , deaths. indeed. it was finely balanced- — deaths. indeed. it was finely balanced. it _ deaths. indeed. it was finely balanced. it was _ deaths. indeed. it was finely balanced. it was also - deaths. indeed. it was finely balanced. it was also the - deaths. indeed. it was finely l balanced. it was also the case deaths. indeed. it was finely - balanced. it was also the case that says themselves and said that the evidence based on which to judge the effectiveness and harms associated with different interventions was weak at that moment in time, and that policymakers would have to

consider a whole range of impacts alongside the epidemiological impacts. that was the context of the discussion at the time, even from the medical and scientific advisers and the kind of things they were saying. the chief medical officer in october said that he didn't think a nationalfirebreak was october said that he didn't think a national firebreak was the right policy and that was a month after the deliberations that we are talking about at the end of september. talking about at the end of september-— talking about at the end of se tember. ., , ., ., september. there was a meeting on the 20th of september _ september. there was a meeting on the 20th of september in _ september. there was a meeting on the 20th of september in downing l the 20th of september in downing street or chequers, i can't recall where, where the prime minister met with, you will recall because you were there, professors edmonds and maclean and others. did you reflect upon why that meeting was being called, given the government's stated position that it would follow

the signs by which a presumed limit its own chief medical officers and governmental scientific advisor? i wasn't responsible for organising the meeting, so i guess whoever organised it would be the person to ask. did organised it would be the person to ask. , , ., , , , , ask. did you express views in the meetin: ask. did you express views in the meeting in _ ask. did you express views in the meeting in support _ ask. did you express views in the meeting in support of _ ask. did you express views in the meeting in support of one - ask. did you express views in the meeting in support of one which l ask. did you express views in the i meeting in support of one which was essentially that there was no requirement for there to be a lockdown, and that in the general schemes of things, it would be an overreaction, massively damaging and not epidemiologically required? we not epidemiologically required? , were wanting to listen to a range of views, some domestic and one from sweden, as you mention. you views, some domestic and one from sweden, as you mention.— sweden, as you mention. you must have asked — sweden, as you mention. you must have asked yourself _ sweden, as you mention. you must have asked yourself on _ sweden, as you mention. you must have asked yourself on a _ have asked yourself on a particularly intense time, why am i

attending this meeting to hear the views of scientists who were outside the range of the consensus of evidential advice that was being received from sage? it evidential advice that was being received from sage?— evidential advice that was being received from sage? it didn't strike me as odd and _ received from sage? it didn't strike me as odd and entirely _ received from sage? it didn't strike me as odd and entirely reasonable | me as odd and entirely reasonable for the prime minister to seek a diversity of opinion as he is coming to make opinions was not a question for him, really, more than me. i was invited to a meeting and i intended that meeting. there is nothing wrong with hearing from a range of people. that is a healthy process. there is long evidence of behavioural psychology about people getting into groupthink and the prime wanting to get out of consensus views. there is nothing inherently wrong with that. i'm not suggesting that it was wrong to seek that advice, i'm merely asking you where the or not you wondered why you had been asked to attend, alongside that scientific

advice from the spectrum from which it derived. you didn't think about it? ., all it derived. you didn't think about it? he. all right. the tier system, it? no. all right. the tier system, we can deal— it? iio all right. the tier system, we can deal with this briefly because it is obvious that there are a number of meetings in front of them. there are health and economic arguments and then, following that day, perhaps that night or the next day, perhaps that night or the next day, the cabinet secretary briefed officials that you and the prime and had agreed that the government would seek to negotiate the restrictions, which were a necessary part of the tier process. mr which were a necessary part of the tier process-— which were a necessary part of the tier process. mr hancock has said in evidence that _ tier process. mr hancock has said in evidence that he _ tier process. mr hancock has said in evidence that he knew— tier process. mr hancock has said in evidence that he knew at _ tier process. mr hancock has said in evidence that he knew at the - tier process. mr hancock has said in

evidence that he knew at the time l tier process. mr hancock has said in | evidence that he knew at the time of the announcement of the tiered system in october that it wouldn't work. ~ ., ., . system in october that it wouldn't work. ~ ., ., work. what was your view as to the erfihood work. what was your view as to the likelihood that — work. what was your view as to the likelihood that this _ work. what was your view as to the likelihood that this tier _ work. what was your view as to the likelihood that this tier system, - likelihood that this tier system, which to remind ourselves, of course, was imposed from that oath of october and required these detailed local negotiations to take place. did you have a view on it? well, the general consensus, i think, amongst our medical and scientific advisers going into the autumn was that a local approach was the right approach. you can see that in this age minutes consistently from the end ofjune. i remember the chief medical officer at the beginning of october or september making the point that the national outbreak in the first wave had been an exception to the pattern across europe, when italy and spain in

particular had see more localised outbreaks who stop in the minutes it is recorded that it is possible that the second way would be localised. again, even once we ended up going into a second... the previous year actually, from the 10th of november, the cmo's view was that introducing the cmo's view was that introducing the tiered system after the national measures seemed rational. i think the strong point of view of everybody was that a local approach was sensible to try. he thought that even after we went into a national lockdown. he referred to the sage minutes but by october and the time of the introduction of the thia system the cmo in the gcse have made it absolutely plain that this would simply not suffice to reduce the are below one and the onlyjustified

route was a more stringent circuit breaker or lockdown. the position had changed had it not by october? in the minutes of the 20th of october cabinet meeting the cmo was recorded as saying the country is split into three broad categories and this justifies three tiers of local alert level. bud and thisjustifies three tiers of local alert level.— local alert level. and in that meetin: local alert level. and in that meeting and _ local alert level. and in that meeting and on _ local alert level. and in that meeting and on the - local alert level. and in that meeting and on the 11th - local alert level. and in that meeting and on the 11th of l local alert level. and in that - meeting and on the 11th of october he made it plain that epidemiologically there was a very high risk of the thia system would not work to bring are below one. you are aware of that? {lin not work to bring are below one. you are aware of that?— are aware of that? on the 20th of october he _ are aware of that? on the 20th of october he said _ are aware of that? on the 20th of october he said justified - are aware of that? on the 20th of october he said justified the - october he said justified the governments approach of three tiers. and even after the national lockdown he said it would be entirely rational to reintroduce the tiering system. it goes to the point that the principle of a tiered system is one which had wide support