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managed to get into hospital which was where he died, is that a - managed to get into hospital which was where he died, is that a family friend _ was where he died, is that a family friend who — was where he died, is that a family friend who was _ was where he died, is that a family friend who was a _ was where he died, is that a family friend who was a doctor— was where he died, is that a family friend who was a doctor coached i was where he died, is that a familyi friend who was a doctor coached us on what _ friend who was a doctor coached us on what to— friend who was a doctor coached us on what to say— friend who was a doctor coached us on what to say to _ friend who was a doctor coached us on what to say to get _ friend who was a doctor coached us on what to say to get medical- on what to say to get medical attention— on what to say to get medical attention and _ on what to say to get medical attention and when _ on what to say to get medical attention and when the - on what to say to get medical- attention and when the paramedics came _ attention and when the paramedics came they— attention and when the paramedics came they took _ attention and when the paramedics came they took him _ attention and when the paramedics came they took him straight - attention and when the paramedics came they took him straight to - came they took him straight to hospital— came they took him straight to hospital and _ came they took him straight to hospital and two— came they took him straight to hospital and two days - came they took him straight to hospital and two days later- came they took him straight to hospital and two days later he| came they took him straight to - hospital and two days later he was on a it is mid—day and humid here in our health editor has literally come out of the reading of the report and what does the report say? well, as has been widely _ what does the report say? well, as has been widely predicted - what does the report say? well, as has been widely predicted it - what does the report say? well, as has been widely predicted it has i has been widely predicted it has been a damning indictment of the uk's lack of preparedness ahead of

the coronavirus pandemic which struck in january 2020 and the coronavirus pandemic which struck injanuary 2020 and this refers to the uk government and the devolved administrations. baroness hallett, the chair, does say in her report that health and social care, civil service, scientists and advisers had battled the pandemic and at the uk was spared the worst but from that moment on she goes on to set out a catalogue of failings and say there must be radical reform and say there must be radical reform and quotes, never again can a disease that lead to so many deaths. she says that the uk was ill—prepared for dealing with a catastrophic emergency let alone a covid pandemic. the uk lacked resilience and there had been a slowdown in health improvement and wider health inequalities, public health services were close to capacity and these were all factors that contributed to the uk's lack of resilience. and quotes, had the uk

been better prepared and resilient then some of the financial and human costs may have been avoided. so, basically, there is a whole list of different aspects to this, whether it is a failure to have a joined up planning, she said it was very dissipated throughout numerous different departments and there was a lack of coordinated thinking. she calls for pretty widespread reforms. calling for a radical simplification for emergency preparedness and a new approach to risk assessment and crucially, a new uk—wide approach to the development of strategy which just use of the jargon here, away from the need department model. up until 2020, a lead department was always assigned in the event of a major emergency thread and in this case it was the department of health. she is basically saying that for future health. she is basically saying that forfuture pandemic health. she is basically saying that for future pandemic planning health. she is basically saying that forfuture pandemic planning it should not be the debate pattern of health on its own it should be a uk

wide setup in the cabinet office. so there was lots to digest here and certainly, the families, the covid bereaved families group will look at these failings identified by baroness hallett and her conclusion that the human cost could have been lowered with better planning as really, they will be relieved that she said that whilst being devastated that resulted in so many deaths and loss of lives. adore devastated that resulted in so many deaths and loss of lives.— deaths and loss of lives. are you surrised deaths and loss of lives. are you surprised that _ deaths and loss of lives. are you surprised that her _ deaths and loss of lives. are you surprised that her conclusions i deaths and loss of lives. are you | surprised that her conclusions are so damning? yes surprised that her conclusions are so damning?— so damning? yes because you sometimes — so damning? yes because you sometimes respect _ so damning? yes because you sometimes respect delay - so damning? yes because you sometimes respect delay mayj so damning? yes because you - sometimes respect delay may expect sometimes respect delay may expect some damning reports and she's not actually apportioning individual blame to politicians or scientific advisers but there is nothing really highlighted as a great success in all of this. i think there is no comfort for anyone who is in government or a scientific adviser,

going back a decade or two, she goes right back to the sars outbreak in asia in 2003 and said then that it was clear to officials that the uk needed to develop more contact tracing and to be more ready to think about quarantine and isolation measures. the fact that from 2003 onwards there were opportunities to work out how to deal with the coronavirus i'm going to stop you there because the baroness hallett is about to speak so let's see what she had to say. is about to speak so let's see what she had to say-— she had to say. today i published the first report _ she had to say. today i published the first report of _ she had to say. today i published the first report of the _ she had to say. today i published the first report of the uk - she had to say. today i published | the first report of the uk covid-19 the first report of the uk covid—i9 family following the hearings that took place injune and july last year. further reports will be published by the inquiry in due course. however, this report was produced and published first because it addresses some of the most immediate issues. in particular, state of the uk central structures and procedures for pandemic

emergency preparedness, resilience and response. in essence, where we ready? if not, why not? what can be done to ensure that next time we are far better prepared? there will be a next time. the expert evidence suggests that it is not a question of if another pandemic will strike but when. the evidence is overwhelmingly to the effect that another pandemic, potentially one thatis another pandemic, potentially one that is even more transmissible and lethal, is likely to occur in their near to medium future. that means that the uk will again face a pandemic, that unless we are better prepared, it will bring with it immense suffering and huge financial cost and the most vulnerable in society will suffer the most. in 2019, it was widely believed in the united kingdom and abroad that the

uk was not only properly prepared but was one of the best prepared countries in the world to respond to a pandemic. this belief was dangerously mistaken. in reality, the uk was ill—prepared for dealing with the whole system civil emergency of a pandemic let alone the coronavirus pandemic that actually struck. in 2020, the uk lacked resilience. going into the pandemic there had been a slowdown in health improvement and health inequalities had widened. high pre—existing levels of heart disease, diabetes, respiratory illness and obesity and general level of ill health and health inequalities meant that the uk was more vulnerable. public services are particularly health and social care were running close to if not beyond capacity in normal times. at the

same time, our national system for civil emergencies and for building preparedness suffered from several significant flaws. the uk prepared for the wrong pandemic. the significant risk of influenza pandemic had long been considered, written about, and planned for. however, that preparedness was inadequate for a global pandemic of the kind that struck. the institutions and structures responsible for emergency planning were labyrinth in in their complicity. there were fatal strategic flaws underpinning the assessment of the risk faced by the uk, how those risks and their consequences could be managed and prevented from worsening and how the state should respond. to give but one vitally important example, one of the first lines of defence to a

pandemic is containment. and this requires a system of test, traced, and isolate that can be rapidly scaled up to meet the demands of a major outbreak. this did not exist in the united kingdom when the covid—i9 pandemic struck. the uk government sold pandemic strategy from 2011 was outdated and lacked adaptability. it was never in fact properly tested. the uk government neither applied it, properly tested. the uk government neitherapplied it, nor properly tested. the uk government neither applied it, nor adapted it, and the doctrine that underpinned it was ultimately abandoned. as was the 2011 strategy itself. i have no hesitation in concluding that the processes, planning, and policy, of the civil contingency structures across the united kingdom failed the citizens of all four nations. there were serious errors on the part of

the state, and serious flaws in our civil emergency systems. this cannot be allowed to happen again. the inquiry�*s module one report recommends fundamental reform didn't perform in the united kingdom government preparedness for whole system civil emergencies. i make ten far—reaching recommendations concerning the system of civil emergencies. the central recommendations in summary are... a radical simplification of the civil emergency preparedness and resilience systems. this includes rationalising and streamlining current bureaucracy and providing for better and simpler ministerial and official structures and leadership. a new approach to risk assessment. this provides for a better and more comprehensive

evaluation of a wider range of actual risks. a new uk—wide approach to the development of strategy, which it learns lessons from the past and from regular civil emergency exercises and takes proper account of existing inequalities and vulnerabilities. better data collection and sharing in advance of future pandemics. and the commissioning of a wider range of research projects. the holding of a uk wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years and the publication of the outcome. the bringing in of external expertise from outside government and the civil services to challenge orthodoxy and guard against the acute problem of groupthink. lastly, and most importantly, the creation of a single independent statutory

body, responsible for whole system preparedness and response. it will consult widely, for example, with experts in the field of preparedness and the voluntary, community and social sector. and provide strategic advice to government. some of the core participants have suggested that i make many more recommendations than the ten i have made. i am recommendations than the ten i have made. lam indebted recommendations than the ten i have made. i am indebted to them for their assistance. however, the inquiry team and i have identified what i consider to be the most ten most significant recommendation which i believe can be amended swiftly and at reasonable cost. and, if in plenty together, could make a real difference to preparedness and resilience of the united kingdom. each of the recommendations in this first report is important in its own right. but in my view, all of the

recommendations must be implemented in order to produce the changes that are necessary. i welcome commitments made by leading politicians to consider carefully, and i expect implement, the recommendations made by inquiries such as this one. i intend to monitor progress. and i have asked the inquiry team to liaise closely with the relevant government departments and bodies. i will expect each organisation that is responsible for implementing my recommendation is to set out within six months how it plans to respond. i emphasise that many of the other issues of real concern to members of the public will be examined more fully in later modules of this inquiry. more reports and recommendations will follow. they include reports and recommendations related to the core political and

administrative decision making across the united kingdom, the impact of the covid—i9 pandemic on the health and health systems in the four nations of the united kingdom, the adequacy, supply, and distribution of ppe, the use of dna chase notices, vaccines and therapeutics, test trace and isolate policies, procurement, the economic response from all four governments, the impact on children and young people, and the impact on the population of the uk more widely. unless the lessons are learned, and fundamental change is implemented, the human and financial costs and sacrifice of the covid—i9 pandemic will have been in vain. the harrowing accounts of loss and grief

given by the bereaved witnesses and others who have suffered during the pandemic serve to remind us why there must be radical reform. thank you. that was baroness hallett presenting her first report into the covid—i9 inquiry and boy what a damning report it is. she says the government failed its citizens on covid by planning for the wrong pandemic, she said we were dangerously mistaken that we were prepared, in fact, we were ill—prepared for emergencies let alone at the coronavirus pandemic. she said we prepared for the wrong pandemic and you heard her talk about how they needed to be urgent

and fundamental reform of the way that the uk plans for emergency. she made it ten recommendations, joining me again is our health editor hugh pym, just listening to baroness hallett there it really brought home to you how stark her language was, you know, the government failed its citizens on covid by planning for the wrong pandemic.— citizens on covid by planning for the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the lanuuuae, the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the language. as — the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the language. as you _ the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the language. as you say. _ the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the language, as you say, it _ the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the language, as you say, it is _ the wrong pandemic. yes, i think the language, as you say, it is very - language, as you say, it is very striking. she is pulling no punches here, she is not going to attribute blame at this stage to individuals but it's a systemwide thing and she says that it is ministers, officials, scientists, advises collectively not acting in the uk's best interest. as you said, failing the uk's citizens. and planning for the uk's citizens. and planning for the wrong pandemic we had always heard in evidence before that they were all these contingency exercises

that focused on flu but she really sets out that there was this mindset, groupthink as she calls it, that flu was going to be the main challenge but the thing about flu was that the assumption that if it suddenly took hold, there was the experience of swine flu in 2009 which was not nearly as bad as expected but if it did take hold it would spread rapidly that a vaccine would spread rapidly that a vaccine would be developed quite quickly and they would be anti—viral drugs. but they would be anti—viral drugs. but the policy that was developed just sort of assumed it would take hold and dealt with the consequences, in other words, and dealt with the consequences, in otherwords, how and dealt with the consequences, in other words, how to deal with hundreds of thousands of deaths. rather than in the planning phase working out how to stop it spreading in the first place. the wrong pandemic, flu, was highlighted, it should have been more geared to looking at well at the coronavirus aspect because they had sars in 2003 in some asian countries and other

coronavirus murders in 2015, 2016. these had different threats and risks and a higher mortality rate. and opportunities to plan for those eventualities weren't taken. —— the mers virus of 20152016. i think this is a striking endorsement of what they always suspected that people were just not properly prevented come february 2020. i should say this is module one of a long—running inquiry which looks at preparedness. it has not even got onto the issues of what the uk government and the devolved nations did from march onwards, all of those e—mails and whatsapp messages, the conduct of borisjohnson and dominic cummings and nicola sturgeon and all the politicians, that will come in module two and the hearings are finished there but we won't get that report until next year. based on this one, i think you can expect with module two there will be some

very revealing and awkward findings from baroness hallett. late very revealing and awkward findings from baroness hallett.— very revealing and awkward findings from baroness hallett. we should say that the covid — from baroness hallett. we should say that the covid inquiry _ from baroness hallett. we should say that the covid inquiry is _ from baroness hallett. we should say that the covid inquiry is likely to - that the covid inquiry is likely to go on until 2026 because there are a lot of modules. i was interested in when she talked about what should happen now and how they needed to be change otherwise all of those lives that were lost would be in vain. so what is she recommending that should happen? the what is she recommending that should ha en? ~ , , happen? the key thing, there is uuite a happen? the key thing, there is quite a lot— happen? the key thing, there is quite a lot of— happen? the key thing, there is quite a lot ofjargon _ happen? the key thing, there is quite a lot ofjargon here - happen? the key thing, there is quite a lot ofjargon here but. happen? the key thing, there is l quite a lot of jargon here but that quite a lot ofjargon here but that it should be a joined up, uk government and devolved nations are structured because one of the weaknesses she identifies is that health devolved so that the devolved administrations had to come up with their own planning but also it was a uk government wide issue on so many aspects here so she is saying that this should be addressed. she actually says that personally she wants to monitor over the next year what the responses are to some of her recommendations. she will... she

is hinting that she will come out and make criticisms if they are not followed. she goes into issues like better systems of data collection, holding a uk wide pandemic response exercise, bringing external expertise in from outside government, a new approach to risk assessment, all of this sort of stuff. so, ithink assessment, all of this sort of stuff. so, i think that a uk wide government, scotland, wales, northern ireland, administrations government, beyond notice, she is saying, that i'm going to look at how you respond to this report. this is a ublic how you respond to this report. this is a public inquiry and she has made recommendations but they are not legally binding, the governments do not have to follow through on what she is saying, do they? that not have to follow through on what she is saying, do they?— she is saying, do they? that is correct. she is saying, do they? that is correct- it _ she is saying, do they? that is correct. it is _ she is saying, do they? that is correct. it is up _ she is saying, do they? that is correct. it is up to _ she is saying, do they? that is l correct. it is up to governments, ministers and officials now. to think about this and respond to it. but the other fairly stark thread in this report is the fact that there will be another pandemic. and what baroness hallett wanted to avoid was waiting until 2026 before putting

all of her findings out. she wanted to get this module one out now on preparedness so that governments, ministers, and officials could take action because of the strong likelihood of another pandemic at some stage. and i think you can take the message from her and this report that she is very worried that preparedness is still not right. and a lot of work needs to be done on it because of the threats that are out there. do because of the threats that are out there. ,, ~ because of the threats that are out there. i. ~ . , , there. do you think that is why erha -s there. do you think that is why perhaps her— there. do you think that is why perhaps her language - there. do you think that is why perhaps her language is - there. do you think that is why perhaps her language is so - there. do you think that is why i perhaps her language is so strong there. do you think that is why - perhaps her language is so strong in this report? i perhaps her language is so strong in this re ort? ~ . perhaps her language is so strong in this report?— this report? i think what comes across could... _ this report? i think what comes across could... she _ this report? i think what comes across could... she heard - this report? i think what comes - across could... she heard evidence from nearly 70 witnesses and they included ministers, officials, and sciences. a lot of fairly technical stuff. i sort of sense of frustration, she talks about this labyrinthine system, diffused, disorganised, lots of different committees and the sort of frustration that with all of these different important and respected people in there that they could not

actually come up with a system that would have prepared for the sort of coronavirus threat that was there and which struck in the form of the pandemic. and which struck in the form of the andemic. ., ., and which struck in the form of the andemic. ., . _, , pandemic. you have covered this riaht pandemic. you have covered this right from _ pandemic. you have covered this right from the — pandemic. you have covered this right from the start, _ pandemic. you have covered this right from the start, hue, - pandemic. you have covered this right from the start, hue, we - right from the start, hue, we rememberfrom the covid pandemic, i'm just interested in how you feel reading what the baroness has said today. i reading what the baroness has said toda . ., ., , , reading what the baroness has said toda. ., , ., reading what the baroness has said toda . . , ., . , today. i always thought that this was one of— today. i always thought that this was one of the _ today. i always thought that this was one of the most _ today. i always thought that this was one of the most important l today. i always thought that this - was one of the most important module because although it does not involve all the headline stuff about whatsapp messages and downing street parties and so on it, it has always struck me as really important to know why in january 2020, this thing appeared, the virus appeared, not much was known about it, fair enough, but they did not seem to be any planning or action. the whole of february went by and then suddenly in march deaths took off and lockdown suddenly emerged. what was going on before then that had always occurred to me has been vitally important to all of this and we have

got here are really fascinating and important account of what did and did not happen in the run—up to 2020. because the whole thing was chaotic and health care and social care workers felt unprotected, lack of ppe, all of that, that will come in future modules as well so how did it happen that it appeared to catch governments and ministers completely wrong—footed with mac hugh, i will let you go for the money because we are going to get some more reaction for the money. are going to get some more reaction forthe money-— for the money. thank you for this damnin: for the money. thank you for this damning report- _ for the money. thank you for this damning report. over— for the money. thank you for this damning report. over 200 - for the money. thank you for this damning report. over 200 paces| for the money. thank you for this i damning report. over 200 paces in the whole report and joining us now is rosa hodgkin who is a resilience expert in the institute for government. rosa, thank you very much, you look at central government, we have heard from hugh, how groupthink in government affected the pandemic, what do you make of what baroness hallett has said? i make of what baroness hallett has said? ~ ., make of what baroness hallett has said? ~' . . said? i think in general that it really chimes _ said? i think in general that it really chimes with _ said? i think in general that it really chimes with what - said? i think in general that it really chimes with what our i said? i think in general that it - really chimes with what our research has shown. in terms of the issues

that she has identified and also some of the solution is that she has proposed. particularly i was interested proposing in an independent advisory body and that is something that we had suggested. partly to deal with the kind of lack of external scrutiny of planning, so, one thing that we saw in the lead up to the pandemic is there was not really enough focus on the plans that were in place and whether they were ready for this kind of event. before it happened. you tend to get a lot of scrutiny after these kinds of events have happened and where you really need is actually before when those plans are being made. yes, it is about the fact that you can have a plan but you are not quite sure where it is going to go and you need that information, do you think that now the government will take on these recommendations that baroness hallett is making and crucially, how difficult will that

be to have a uk wide plan for civil emergencies and another pandemic? yes, i should say that i have not actually seen the text of the report yet so i do not know the detail of exactly what she is proposing will stop the previous government did make some improvements already on the back of the obvious issues that emerged during the pandemic. so, they separated out the team in cabinet office that was responsible for both preparation and crisis response so that those two functions are two different teams, which was i think is really important. because in the lead up to the pandemic you saw that team that was supposed to be responsible for preparedness also being pulled into responding to brexit, planning for no—deal brexit, and so you are constantly getting people who should be planning hold on short—term crises. i think in terms of how easy they are going to be to implement, it's difficult to say without having seen the full

recommendations. i think that there is, whatever kind of plans and systems you have in place, i think there is always a wider question which is around incentives and also culture. so, the incentives to focus on events that might not happen and if you're a politician properly won't happen in the time that you're in office can be quite limited. also, for officials, the incentives to develop the skills haven't been really in place up till now so it has not been a skill set that has been valued so there is not very much incentive to develop those skills as a civil servant. and also, you need a kind of culture of this being important and being a priority, obviously, you're always being challenged by other short—term issues and resources are scarce and it is a difficult sell using those resources on something that might not happen so you really need a bit of a culture shift where this is seen as a really important thing and a priority. ithink

seen as a really important thing and a priority. i think that whatever changes you make to those systems, that's kind of key to actually make change. that's kind of key to actually make chance. �* ., that's kind of key to actually make chance. . ., that's kind of key to actually make chance. �* ., ,, ~' that's kind of key to actually make chance. �* ., i. ~ . that's kind of key to actually make chance. . ., ~ . change. and do you think that can ha en in change. and do you think that can happen in government? _ change. and do you think that can happen in government? i - change. and do you think that can happen in government? i think. change. and do you think that can happen in government? i think itl happen in government? i think it could. ithink— happen in government? i think it could. i think it's _ happen in government? i think it could. i think it's really - could. i think it's really challenging. we have seen that countries around the world have really struggled with this. those little incentives are deep—rooted and pretty entrenched but there are definitely things that you could do to help that. you could change the incentive structures to mean that having skills around preparedness and resilience is a good thing for civil servants to have on their cv that that helps with getting promoted, help to get people more focused on this. you can also make it clearer who in terms of senior civil servants and ministers is responsible for failures civil servants and ministers is responsible forfailures in preparedness, to try and incentivise making sure that you are prepared, i

do also think that there is a role for... obviously, we have seen those changes in the cabinet office to separate out preparedness and response and that is really beneficial but it is really important that those teams are well resourced to make sure those departments are actually doing that planning. and that those plans are being translated into action. because we have heard quite a lot of discussion about all of the plan was for flu and that was clearly an issue but flew plans did for example mention the possibility of school closures, the possibility of needing economic support for people who are going to be out of work, and that did not mean that either department for education or treasury had planned for those eventualities. so there are definitely things you could do to help even if those cultural incentives are a challenge. rosa hodgkin, for the moment thank you very much, we are getting

reaction down here at the inquiry and i was interested that baroness hallett said that the harrowing accounts of loss remind us why reform is needed and joining me now is representative of the bereaved families, thank you very much for joining us on bbc news. i wonder if i could get your initial reaction to what baroness hallett has said? i what baroness hallett has said? i think the families were first of what baroness hallett has said? i think the families were first of all pleased to hear the recognition of the immense loss and the deaths that took place and were pleased on the whole to see the recommendations. many of them accepted their family admissions, there are a lot of requests from the families that weren't invented but on the whole it is a good solid basis for starting. it must be hard to hear the word that the government failed its citizens on covid by planning for the wrong pandemic. and citizens on covid by planning for the wrong pandemic. and planning ineffectively _ the wrong pandemic. and planning ineffectively for _ the wrong pandemic. and planning ineffectively for the _ the wrong pandemic. and planning ineffectively for the wrong - ineffectively for the wrong pandemic, she recognised that the preparedness was just not there at

all. i mean, i don't know if i can say all. i mean, i don't know ifi can saj ., , ., , , say expletive on tv but it was “ust the appalling — say expletive on tv but it was “ust the appalling system i say expletive on tv but it wasjust the appalling system preparedness| the appalling system preparedness and the faults were not recognised at any level even in evidence for the most part by government representatives. what would you like to see and what the families want to see now because we have been saying that this is only the first part of the covid inquiry report and just on how we were prepared there will be many more going forward, what would you like to see now happen?— you like to see now happen? although it is “ust the you like to see now happen? although it is just the first _ you like to see now happen? although it isjust the first part, _ you like to see now happen? although it isjust the first part, it _ you like to see now happen? although it isjust the first part, it is _ you like to see now happen? although it isjust the first part, it is by - it is just the first part, it is by far and away the most important part. if you're prepared for something then at the steps follow onceit something then at the steps follow once it arrives. i think this is, we have to recognise the importance of this particular report. looking ahead, baroness hallett has made a recommendation as to committees being established within a time period of 12 months and she said this morning that she will be calling ministers to come to see her

to explain what has been done. i think that is crucial. so often inquiries make recommendations that they get put on a book shelf and nothing is done, they need to be monitored. even if they are not being invented a good reason easily given to the inquiry. on this report we are looking forward to that. late we are looking forward to that. we have heard these recommendations, but we have also said is a public inquiry so legally the government do not have to implement them. but i assume that you are hopeful that the new government will take on everything on board that she has said? in everything on board that she has said? . ., ., , . said? in addition we would be asking the government _ said? in addition we would be asking the government to _ said? in addition we would be asking the government to take _ said? in addition we would be asking the government to take on _ said? in addition we would be asking the government to take on things . the government to take on things that he has not said. for instance, she has not addressed racial inequalities, she has not spoken about the impact of austerity, the need for further investment so we will be picking up on her points. as you say, her points are not decisive, it is not what the government decides that matters. —— it is what the government decides that matters.. just

it is what the government decides that matters- -_