are going unheeded. the israeli pm identifies iran as the ultimate enemy, the puppet master, and a new strike against iran is expected very soon. what will iran do then? my guest is former iranian diplomat and nuclear negotiator seyed hossein mousavian. israel sees iran as weak and vulnerable. is that true? seyed hossein mousavian in princeton in the united states, welcome to hardtalk. thank you very much, steve.

now, mr mousavian, you know how the theocratic regime in iran works. you were a diplomat and a negotiator working inside that regime for years. how do you think they're feeling right now? do you think they are feeling rattled and vulnerable? steve, i really don't believe they feel rattled or weak or they are in an isolated situation. they maybe have a different perspective than you and many people they have in the west. they believe israel is in its most difficult and isolated situation, during the last decades. they believe the public opinion worldwide, even in the us, in europe, even inside israel, is against israeli invasion of gaza and lebanon.

they believe the muslim streets, arab countries, they are all now a pro—iranian position to defend palestinians, right? that's why they have a different point of view. but isn't the most practical impact of the war we've seen on multiple fronts that iran's allies — some call them proxies — from hamas in gaza to hezbollah, the most important proxy force in lebanon, they have been severely, very severely degraded already. so, steve, it was and it is exactly the same narrative we experienced in 1992 when seyyed abbas mousavi, the then hezbollah leader, was assassinated by israel. we have the same narrative. many people, they were

saying that by killing the hezbollah leader, hezbollah is going to be totally diminished. however, in 2006, some years later, israel was faced with a much more stronger hezbollah. even hezbollah could defeat israel in 2006. even again, israel experienced the same conflict with hezbollah in 2011 and was defeated. therefore, i really do not believe that... ..killing or assassinating a leader would eradicate the movement. iam afraid... first of all, i should say it has been a temporary, technical success for israel, there is no doubt. everyone understands israel has been successful to infiltrate within hezbollah and hamas.

israel has been successful to kill many leaders of hamas and hezbollah. this is clear, but this is short term, steve. if we have better... you talk about infiltration. i'm going to interrupt for a sec, if i may. you talk about infiltration, and there has been, clearly, intelligence penetration of iran by israel. the levels of suspicion and enmity are higher than ever. and i have to ask you this personal question, because your situation is very interesting. you're sitting here with me, talking from your office in princeton in the united states. and yet i'm very mindful you for years were an iranian ambassador in the foreign service. you then worked with the delegation at the nuclear negotiations up until, i believe, around 2005. you were inside the regime, then you fell out with them. you faced charges. you were accused of espionage. you left iran. you still face new criminal charges in iran if you

were ever to go back. and yet even in the united states, there are many republican congressmen who view you with suspicion as having links to a hostile power. so, simple question — whose side are you on? actually, steve, the main problem and the main issue is that we have radicals in iran, we have radicals in the us, we have radicals in israel. they are all practically in the same boat because they are looking for a hostile reaction from the other side. i mean, in israel, netanyahu is clear he's looking for expansion of the war, to go to a regional war, to drag iran and the us in a war. iranian radicals, they never liked rapprochement with the us. they never trusted the west. they were against the nuclear

deal, even when we were negotiating, they were suspicious of us. after i left iran, they were blaming minister zarif as a spy of the west. they were against the jcpoa, the nuclear deal. and we have the same radicals in the us, which they were against the nuclear deal, they were against direct negotiations between iran and the us. and everybody is after regime change in the other side, iran is looking... yeah, i'm not sure you've actually answered my question about where your loyalty lies. no, i—i'm coming exactly, steve, to your question. the reason we were attacked, i have been attacked by the radicals in the us and in iran is because we have been... i have been working constantly, before coming to the us and after coming to the us, for peace between iran and the us, peace between iran and the west, even

on a two—state solution to de—escalate tensions between iran and israel, and to bring a regional cooperation system in the persian gulf. this is not something which the radicals in tehran or in israel, or in the us, they like it. that's why they all blame me. all right. what we've already alluded to is extremely serious for iran. the former president, ahmadinejad, says that such is the israeli penetration of iranian intelligence, that even those tasked with the mission of rooting out israel's spies are probably spying for israel themselves. in this circumstance, how can the regime, up to the very top, trust any of its own institutions? you have the same situation, steve, in israel, because israelis also, they are afraid of iranian infiltration. you remember they arrested an israeli minister — every day, they say,

"we have arrested iranian spy." we have... you have the same situation in the us. you read every day american newspapers, that iran has infiltrated american media or institutions, or they have arrested iranian spies. this is a game exactly in all sides. this is not only one side. who do you think is more interested in further escalation of the direct conflict between israel and iran right now? is it israel, or is it iran? because, let us be honest, we are pretty much 100% sure that in the coming days, israel will launch a new direct strike on iran. i think we now have a better understanding about the iranian situation. we have president pezeshkian as president. the policy of president pezeshkian is to reduce tension with the region,

to reduce tension with the us, to even go for a new nuclear deal, to give assurances to the international community that iran is not after a nuclear bomb... but with the greatest respect, mr mousavian, you know that the new president is not really calling the shots. they are being called by the supreme leader, ali khamenei, and the associated hardliners who are close to him. steve, everyone now understands this is public, that pezeshkian could be successful to be... as the iranian new president, because of this support of the iranian supreme leader. he publicly said, "without the supreme leader's support, "i could never be qualified." supreme leader khamenei described mr pezeshkian�*s talk of reaching out with a new dialogue to the united states as "deluded." no, hold on.

the leader has never trusted the us. it is true. the supreme leader is the ultimate decision—maker. this is true. the leader has always been pessimistic about direct negotiations with the us, and any agreement with the us. this is true. but we could never agree on jcpoa without the consent of the iranian supreme leader, number one. iran implemented fully, completely, without zero failure, the jcpoa for a full three years. it could never happen because thejcpoa has the most comprehensive verification measures during the history of nonproliferation — they had access to everything, it was an open nuclear programme, all iaea cameras, inspectors, they were there. therefore, it was impossible forfull, complete, correct implementation of the jcpoa

without the consent and the satisfaction of the iranian supreme leader. now, when president trump withdrew, then we had a conservative administration led by the late president raisi. he also publicly said, "i am ready to come back tojcpoa, as is." he would never say something like this without the consent of the iranian supreme leader. well, i promise you, we'll come back... yeah, we'll come back to consider the future of this jcpoa agreement in a moment. but before we get there, we have to stick with what might happen next. now, there are signals — nothing more than signals — but signals that israel is not going to launch strikes directly at iran's nuclear facilities, that they seem, at the moment, according to the sources, coming out of israel, inclined to attack

energy infrastructure and military targets inside iran. if that's what happens, what will the iranian response be? you can be sure iran would respond at the same level. i mean, iranians, they showed, steve, patience, strategic patience after haniyeh's assassination. it's very important to understand why we are getting escalations. the us approached iran after haniyeh's assassination and asked iran to restrain. the us allies from qatar, 0man, egypt, saudi arabia, they all approached iran — "please show restraint and do not respond, "because the ceasefire negotiations, led by the us, "qatar and egypt is at the final stages." iran, historically — i mean, this was really unprecedented —

iran restrained for two months, steve, and did not respond to israel on assassination. and then, if i may — we don't have so much time, so let's be as concise as we can, if i may — what happened then was that iran launched more than 180 ballistic missiles into israel. you have always advocated restraint. you have told the iranian government, in your words, "not to fall into a trap being laid by netanyahu." do you think they are in the process of falling into a trap? steve, put yourself in the shoes of iranian decision—makers. after haniyeh, you accepted american and us allies�* invitations to show restraint. you restrain for two months, strategic patience, and israel escalated... ..killed the other iranian military commanders, killed 16 leaders of

hezbollah, attacked lebanon. and iranians, they were feeling with restraint and not reciprocation and retaliation. israelis have become more aggressive, and they are escalating more and more and more. what would you do if you were in the shoes of iranian decision—makers? that's what i mean — they showed restraint. while they were showing restraint, israelis, they were escalating the tensions, attacking, killing, terror, invasion of lebanon... but my point is, will they show restraint again if israel does, as expected, strike iran very soon? i don't believe so. it depends really to the extent of the israeli attack. mm. if it would be limited, i think iranians they would tolerate. but if it is substantive or important, iranians, they would show with a more they would show with a more strong attack, compared to the strong attack, compared to the previous one, i mean, iran... previous one, i mean, iran... right, ok, i got that. right, ok, i got that.

i need to tap into your i need to tap into your knowledge of the nuclear knowledge of the nuclear programme in iran because, programme in iran because, as i said, going back as i said, going back to the early 2000s, to the early 2000s, you were an important part you were an important part of the delegation involved of the delegation involved in nuclear talks under in nuclear talks under the auspices of the iaea. the auspices of the iaea. there is a great deal there is a great deal of debate about whether — of debate about whether — if israel were to strike if israel were to strike at the nuclear capacity at the nuclear capacity because they know very well, of iran — whether iran of iran — whether iran would try to rush to weaponise would try to rush to weaponise its nuclear capacity. its nuclear capacity. there is talk that iran there is talk that iran could do that within could do that within a couple of weeks. a couple of weeks. there are other nuclear there are other nuclear experts who say that's experts who say that's misreading the situation. misreading the situation. yes, they have 60% yes, they have 60% enriched uranium. enriched uranium. yes, they could quickly yes, they could quickly enrich it more, to 90%. enrich it more, to 90%. but it would still take but it would still take them a year and more them a year and more to fully weaponise. to fully weaponise. what do you believe what do you believe the truth is? first of all, i don't believe israel would attack iranian nuclearfacilities,

the truth is? i mean, iran as a nuclear threshold state is the result

of president trump's withdrawal from the jcpoa. now, if israel attacks, now, if israel attacks, you would have a nuclear state you would have a nuclear state iran, not a nuclear threshold state. iran, not a nuclear threshold state. yeah, and how long — just yeah, and how long — just give me the very brief answer — give me the very brief answer — how long do you believe it how long do you believe it would take to jump from where would take to jump from where iran is today to being iran is today to being an actual weaponised, an actual weaponised, nuclear—armed state? nuclear—armed state? i'm not a nuclear... i'm not a nuclear... ..i mean, scientist ..i mean, scientist to know exactly the time. to know exactly the time. but to my understanding, steve, with economic sanctions but to my understanding, steve, it doesn't matter whether this it doesn't matter whether this would take two weeks or one would take two weeks or one month, or two months. month, or two months. you can say goodbye you can say goodbye to a peaceful iranian nuclear to a peaceful iranian nuclear programme if iran is attacked. programme if iran is attacked. leave aside an israeli attack leave aside an israeli attack on the nuclear facilities, on the nuclear facilities, it seems within the next year, it seems within the next year, something crucial something crucial is going to happen. is going to happen. the europeans, who were party the europeans, who were party to thejcpoa, have to make to thejcpoa, have to make a big decision about whether to a big decision about whether to reimpose full sanctions reimpose full sanctions by the october of 2025. by the october of 2025. there's some talk there's some talk that if they do that, that if they do that,

following the united states, following the united states, with economic sanctions

that's why what the europeans are doing, what the americans are doing, if they are going to escalate the sanctions, i don't believe this would lead iran to weaponise, nuclear weaponisation. but what has already happened? more pressure from the western countries, or iran has pushed iran more toward the eastern bloc. all right. you've just accused israel of genocide in the midst of that answer. it's incumbent on me to point out that the word is refuted entirely by israel, and that the international court ofjustice is deliberating on exactly whether the standards around the genocide convention can be applied to what israel has done in gaza. so let's leave that on one side. let's talk about legitimacy and authority of the iranian government inside its own country. it's just a simple question. you now are, in effect,

in exile from iran. do you still have family there? yes, i do. do they tell you the scale of the economic crisis? i mean, we're looking at inflation which has been spiralling for years. we're looking at a cost—of—living crisis. we're looking at so many iranians living with the reality of poverty, and... which...the latest figures i've seen amounts to 30% of the entire population. and we're seeing, on the streets, strikes, we're seeing protests, people saying "we will not go on living like this." it's a profound problem, isn't it? see, steve, it is a problem, no—one can deny. everyone understands iran has a severe economic problem. everyone understands the iranian national currency has depreciated dramatically. everyone understands the inflation.

but the reality is that iran has been experiencing two—digit inflation for about a0 years. the reality is that always... yeah, pretty much as long as the theocratic regime has been in control — and it's not evenjust about the impoverishment of the iranian population. arguably, the anger is even higher — certainly amongst women, but also many men, too — in iran because of the repression of women and girls inside the country. the woman, life, freedom movement has been pushed largely off the streets because of severe repression, but it hasn't gone away. these are weaknesses in the relationship between the government and the people that are going to be exposed, aren't they? see, steve, despite all of these problems, if iran is threatened, it doesn't matter if the people are not satisfied with the economic situation, orfreedom, or not. radicals, conservatives, the people, poors, medium

class, higher class — they would all be united to defend their country and the existence of iran, and integrity of iran, and sovereignty of iran... do you really believe that? i'm just looking at the words of a fellow exile, vahid beheshti — now he's an opposition leader in exile, much more an opponent of the regime than you are — he says this. "the iranian regime is weak. "it is now a paper tiger. "90% of the iranian people are against the regime. "if the americans and their allies hit the regime, "the people of iran will rise up and finish the job." steve, if you go back, you would see the same statements from the western side, from israelis, from iranian radical opposition, from americans 20 years ago, 30 years ago, a0 years ago. the narrative of pushing iran, sanctioning iran, pressuring iran would lead to the collapse

of the iranian governance system, or islamic republic of iran, has been going on for 30, a0 years. all has failed, steve. every sanction has been imposed, tonnes of sanctions, for a0 years. but what is the western complaint today? they are complaining that iran is the most influential regional actor in the region. if it was supposed, iran, to be weakened, why does iran regionally now have influence in syria, in lebanon, in iraq, in yemen — all what you say? mm. i mean, it is not really the reality. we need to understand the reality. the reality is that, yes, iran has been damaged. yes, the iranian economy is in a difficult situation. but iranian, i mean, role and stability is much more powerful than the time iraq invaded iran during eight years war, after 30 years.

yeah. sorry to stop you there, but we are out of time. but, seyed hossein mousavian, it's been a pleasure to have you on hardtalk. thank you. hello there. plenty of clear skies across england and wales have given our weather watchers the chance to see the hunter's moon, the third supermoon of the year so far. this was darlington a little earlier on, but the clear skies are quite widespread across england and wales, and the supermoon can be seen as far south as hampshire as well. we have got more cloud the further north and west, with strengthening winds ahead of this weather front that's going to arrive during the morning rush hour, but with those clear skies, because it's been so wetjust recently, fog is forming and some of it will be quite dense in places for the early morning rush hour or the journey to school.

so that fog will lift away during the morning, and central and eastern england, along with eastern scotland, will keep some sunny spells throughout the afternoon. out to the west, some showery rain and strengthening winds with gusts close to a0 miles an hour. but with the sunshine, we still have some pleasant warmth with highs of 17 degrees. now, the rain could turn quite heavy through northern ireland, particularly on the back edge of that, and the same, too, for western scotland. some torrential bursts of rain not out of the question, accompanied by gusts of winds close to 70 miles an hour. perhaps eastern scotland will stay dry for most of the afternoon — top temperatures here of around 13 degrees. but that weather front but that weather front will continue to push will continue to push its way steadily eastwards its way steadily eastwards during the early hours during the early hours of saturday morning, of saturday morning, and still quite windy with it and still quite windy with it as well, although the as well, although the strongest of the winds strongest of the winds slowly easing down. slowly easing down. so we start off saturday so we start off saturday morning with rain down through morning with rain down through the spine of the country — the spine of the country — fairly light and patchy as it fairly light and patchy as it continues to push its way continues to push its way slowly east, and it may take most of the day to clear away. but behind it, sunny spells

and a few scattered showers for most of us on saturday afternoon, and temperatures from 12—17 degrees, so still above the average really for this stage in october. slowly east, and it may take as we move out of saturday, though, into sunday we could see more of a significant area of low pressure. plenty of isobars squeezing to the southern flank of that low. it could bring some gales or severe gales, and it may well become the first named storm of the season, so keep abreast of the forecast on sunday — some wet and significantly windy weather due to sweep its way north and east. and once it does so, well, for england and wales, we'll see some quieter weather into next week. it stays unsettled further north.

hello, i'm sumi somaskanda. israel says it has killed the leader of hamas, yahya sinwar, the man widely believed to be behind the october 7th attacks. dna tests confirmed the 61—year—old died along with with two other hamas members during an israeli ground operation in the southern city of rafah on wednesday. one of israel's top targets, officials hold sinwar responsible for organising and directing the worst—ever attack on the country.about 1200 people were killed and more than 250 were taken hostage. the family members of two israeli hostages held in gaza have told the bbc — sinwar�*s death is a "brief window of opportunity" for benjamin netanyahu's government to negotiate the return of the hostages. here is the israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu speaking after the confirmation of sinwar�*s death. this is a milestone in taking

down the evil