hello, i'm christian fraser. you're watching the context on bbc news. there's irresponsible rhetoric coming from russia. and that will not deter our support for ukraine. even putin doesn't know whether he can use nukes, or he can't. it depends on his emotions. we know that he's a very emotional man, and the decision to begin this war was also an emotional step. these changes are designed, i think, at the very least, - to put pressure on western leaders who will now - have to decide, is- putin bluffing or not?

1,000 days of war — have wejust entered a new more dangerous phase of the conflict? today, responding to ukraine's first use of the long—range american missiles, the russians have lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. we will discuss the risks and the course of the war. also tonight — the rural revolt. british farmers descend on whitehall, to protest a planned hike in inheritance tax. and are we soon to make a breakthrough in wave energy? an experiment that could unlock the ocean's potential, is now being trialled in the united states. we will speak to the scientists behind it. welcome to the programme. ukraine has fired us made missiles into russia for the very first time in this conflict — a move the russian defence ministry described as a major escalation. the attack on an arms depot in the bryansk region — that is an area northwest of kursk — comes two days

after the biden administration gave kyiv a green light to use their longer—range atacms. the russians says they shot down five of the six missiles that were fired. for several weeks, vladimir putin has warned there will be dire consequences for such an escalation. this morning, on the 1000th day of the conflict, the kremlin lowered its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. the new doctrine says an attack by a non—nuclear state, if supported by a nuclear power, would in future be treated as a joint assault on the russian state. 0ur moscow correspondent steve rosenburg sent this report. breaking news on russian tv — claims that ukraine had fired six american atacms missiles into russia's bryansk region, though no reports of casualties. the response from russian�*s foreign minister... ..sergei lavrov said the missile attack was a signal

that the west wants to escalate the conflict. but is this escalation by russia? published today, a kremlin decree lowering the nuclear threshold. russia now reserving the right to go nuclear, even if attacked by conventional weapons, if such an attack threatens russia's sovereignty or territorial integrity. president putin had promised changes to the nuclear doctrine weeks ago, a clear signal to europe and america not to let ukraine strike russia with long—range missiles. then an even clearer signal. russian nuclear exercises, a warning to the west not to cross russia's red lines. but the key question, in russia's war on ukraine, would vladimir putin use a nuclear weapon? i think it's quite serious because even putin doesn't know

whether he can use nukes or he can't. it depends on his emotions. we know that he's a very emotional man, and the decision to begin this war was also an emotional step. the lowering of the nuclear threshold does not mean that vladimir putin is about to press the nuclear button. these changes are designed, i think, at the very least to put pressure on western leaders who will now have to decide, is putin bluffing or not? earlier at the museum of victory, the kremlin kick started commemorations for next year's 80th anniversary of the end of world war ii. not a word was said here about the 1,000 days of russia's war in ukraine, a war which, for the kremlin, hasn't gone at all to plan, but which it remains determined to win. steve rosenberg,

bbc news, moscow. keir starmer has given his clearest signal yet that ukraine will be supplied with britain's storm shadow missiles. when asked whether they would be made available, the prime minister said kyiv "must have what it needs for as long as it needs." the storm shadow uses american technology for targeting but has only been used to this point within ukraine's internationally—recognised territory, that includes crimea. while refusing to set out a definitive position, it was nontheless clear from the prime ministers comments in rio this afternoon, that the british side is open to zelensky�*s requests. there's irresponsible rhetoric coming from russia, and that will not deter our support for ukraine. we're now on day 1,000 of that conflict — that's 1,000 days of russian aggression, 1,000 days of sacrifice in ukraine.

we have stood with ukraine from the start, and i've been doubling down in my clear message that we need to ensure that ukraine has what is needed for as long as it is needed to win this war against putin. what about the change of wording in that nuclear decree? the pentagon has just wording in that nuclear decree? the pentagon hasjust given their reaction to the situation in moscow. we their reaction to the situation in moscow— their reaction to the situation in moscow. we are not at war with russia. _ in moscow. we are not at war with russia, and _ in moscow. we are not at war with russia, and the - in moscow. we are not at war with russia, and the party - in moscow. we are not at war i with russia, and the party here that continues to escalate this war is russia. by bringing in anotherforeign country war is russia. by bringing in another foreign country into the battlefield, by bringing in over 11,000 dpr case holders into the fight, that is in escalatory action. and you've heard the national security advisers say yesterday that this administration told russia that if they escalated this conflict by deploying dpr k troops, we would help ukraine respond. again, the parts of

the war that's been escalated upon directly stem from russia's choice and decision to invade its sovereign neighbour. joining me is matthew schmidt, associate professor of national security and political science at university of new haven, an expert on defence and intelligence, russia and ukraine. thank you very much for being with us. you might�*ve heard andre kalashnikov in steve's report saying that he thinks this is quite serious, the pentagon clearly thinks it's an escalatory step — what do you make of the changes in the wording in that decree? i make of the changes in the wording in that decree? i think the wording — wording in that decree? i think the wording in _ wording in that decree? i think the wording in the _ wording in that decree? i think the wording in the decree - wording in that decree? i think| the wording in the decree make official what putin has been saying informally from the podium for some time. and i do agree that this is a concerning situation — but i'm not losing sleep over right now because, although vladimir putin is many, many things, at this point i don't think that he's illogical. and it's true that

in moments of heightened emotion, that might slip away from him — but it hasn't yet, and he risks a lot, he risks his global power if he draws in nato, because he'll lose his power of projection.- nato, because he'll lose his power of projection. power of pro'ection. since the cold power of pro'ection. since the cold war, _ power of projection. since the cold war, we've _ power of projection. since the cold war, we've sort - power of projection. since the cold war, we've sort of - cold war, we've sort of characterised nuclear weapons as a deterrent, everyone agrees not to use them. we seem to be in a wholly new domain now — we have these threats from russia and similar threats from north korea. it changes the atmosphere that's been in place for decades, and that unnerves people. for decades, and that unnerves ..eole, , for decades, and that unnerves n-eole. , ., , ., people. it absolutely does, and in the case _ people. it absolutely does, and in the case of _ people. it absolutely does, and in the case of russia, _ people. it absolutely does, and in the case of russia, it's - in the case of russia, it's sort of a return to the cold war, and in the case of north korea, it's a little bit different because kim is a true autocrat, there's not really an organisation around him to mediate his decision—making. putin is an autocrat too, but not like him — so i think we must remember that they are

interests with the political and economic, the business elites and senior military officers that i think would restrain putin and all but the very worst situations from using these weapons because their interests would be at risk if you use them and drew nato into the war directly. that's one consideration, the other is that they would be firing them at their near neighbourhood — how powerful are these tactical nukes that the russians would deploy, and what sort of fallout would there be if they were used? yes, so they are variable. you can build them for different yields. so you can build these things all the way up to a hiroshima style bomb, but most of them are designed, or the theory of their use is to use them against every troop concentrations, the idea was to use them against heavy nato troop concentrations of tens of thousands of divisions coming

through. so that's probably how he would use them. it of course would release radiation, there would release radiation, there would be fallout from the dust and debris, but they are not particularly designed to leave widespread, large—scale radioactivity. widespread, large-scale radioactivity.— widespread, large-scale radioactivity. widespread, large-scale radioactivi . , radioactivity. the point is, as ou've radioactivity. the point is, as you've already _ radioactivity. the point is, as you've already indicated, - you've already indicated, there's no such thing as a limited nuclear war, is there? no, absolutely not. and again, this puts us on an escalatory spiral if we see these weapons used. it really violates that red line that's been there since 1945 — and that would be new territory, we really don't know how modern leaders in the modern interconnected world would react to it.— would react to it. talk to me about the — would react to it. talk to me about the strike _ would react to it. talk to me about the strike earlier - would react to it. talk to me about the strike earlier this | about the strike earlier this morning, the first use of the attack comes — what do you see and that in the way ukrainians have used them? i and that in the way ukrainians have used them?— have used them? i think what ou will have used them? i think what you will see — have used them? i think what you will see with _ have used them? i think what you will see with the - have used them? i think what you will see with the atacms. have used them? i think what | you will see with the atacms is they are allowing them to hold

on to the kursk area longer, and sort of shape the battlefield on the expectation that some sort of settlement is coming. it gives them some more leverage if they can get in the harms way with their infantry to hold the russian territory longer and longer, which is really against the kremlin. matthew, always good to talk to you, things are coming on the programme. you, things are coming on the programme-— you, things are coming on the rotramme. ~ , programme. might prayer as your cash my pleasure. _ joining us now is alina frolova, former deputy minister of defence of ukraine. how does the change in nuclear doctrine change things for you? for ukrainians, it's changed nothing because russia even before was stating in their doctrine that they can use missiles if they see a threat

to their national interests. from now on, they have made a more concrete, but it's actually changed nothing. we know that the only way to go with russia is with force, and they won't react with force. but if you demonstrate weakness, they will react with more escalation. so for us, it changes nothing, and the warning is no more. within the united states, _ warning is no more. within the united states, within - warning is no more. within the united states, within the - united states, within the public perspective in the united states, clearly they will see that ukraine is fighting a nuclear state, its an asymmetric war, people in america might think you can never win?— america might think you can never win? actually, most of our partners _ never win? actually, most of our partners saw _ never win? actually, most of our partners saw that - never win? actually, most of our partners saw that we - never win? actually, most of our partners saw that we can j our partners saw that we can hold on from 24 february, 22 into, and we're still here. we

still exist as a state and keep most of our borders, we still fight and still have intention to fight —— 2022. these are some kinds of questions from our partners on each and every stage of this war, but we know that we can win and we have demonstrated that. i don't think, frankly saying, the american public will have much decision—making in our political circles. the general public actually demonstrates emotional support, public actually demonstrates emotionalsupport, but the emotional support, but the politicians, emotionalsupport, but the politicians, those who make the decisions about whether to provide assistance or not. the foreian provide assistance or not. the foreign ministry _ provide assistance or not. the foreign ministry said yesterday that the use of the atacms would be a game changer, his words — what do you see in the way they were used this morning, and what do you expect in the way they'll be used into the future?— the future? there is no game chanuer

the future? there is no game changer in — the future? there is no game changer in this _ the future? there is no game changer in this war. - the future? there is no game changer in this war. i - the future? there is no game changer in this war. i mean, l changer in this war. i mean, this is like a concentration of the capabilities, this is a game changer. and unfortunately, we cannot fight on equipment that will make a substantial change now. everything depends on the number of atacms we possess now, everything depends from other possible limitations we have. so we need to gain capability and use them in accordance with strategic plan. this is what can win the war. no war can be one by one missile orjet, or one unit — it should be a strategy, ukraine has some kind of strategy, but the problem is our partners in most cases don't have their vision or strategy of whether they want to win this war. i strategy of whether they want to win this war.— to win this war. i think you're ”ointin to win this war. i think you're pointing to — to win this war. i think you're pointing to the _ to win this war. i think you're pointing to the fact _ to win this war. i think you're pointing to the fact that - pointing to the fact that there's a finite supply of these weapons, so their use will need to be strategic — is that what you're saying? absolutely, yes. we should have

a plan in this operation, for a future force operation. the one missile won't make a difference, but the strategic plan will. difference, but the strategic plan will. do difference, but the strategic ian will. , . , ., difference, but the strategic lanwill. . _ plan will. do put much store by the reports _ plan will. do put much store by the reports from _ plan will. do put much store by the reports from the _ the reports from the russian ministry of defence that they were shot down on this occasion? 0r were shot down on this occasion? or do you have intelligence that would differ? well, i have is they don't have intelligence, i'mjust well, i have is they don't have intelligence, i'm just reliant on the open sources —— i obviously don't have intelligence. but what we see is that russia really has a problem with its economy, supplies, and logistic routes. today we had a few official claims from the economic block, like the head of the national bank, that they are not capable to manage the most of the critical economic problems in the shortest period. so i think that totally, all the efforts which are done by our partners

— we need to be stronger and one step ahead, and we need to last longer than russians in this war to win this war. matthew schmidt seemed to suggest that the use of the atacms would give ukrainians an option when it comes to the negotiation. i know you advised now on security matters, but do you see an end that could work? i don't think that putin is ready to negotiate now — he actually didn't change his requirements from the beginning of the war,