>> from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." >> all 28 ministers concluded a meeting in brussels today, the

first time they've met since the of crimera. they have ordered draft measures on sanctions. by nato'sned secretary-general. i'm pleased to have them on the program. is good to have you back. >> you're welcome. >> tell me what you mean when you say that nato suspends all practical cooperation with russia and that it means certainly that no more business as usual. can you elaborate? >> we have decided to suspend have you back. >> you're welcome. >> tell me what you mean when you say that nato suspends all practical cooperation with russia and that it means certainly that no more business as usual. can you elaborate? >> we have decided to suspend

all political and military and practical operation with russia as a response to russia's illegal military action in ukraine, so it means that a number practical operation with russia as a response to russia's illegal military action in ukraine, so it means that a number of cooperation projects with russia will be suspended. some of them will be continued but without the participation of russia. >> you're waiting or russia to withdraw troops from the ukraine border, of them will be continud but without the participation of russia. >> you're waiting or russia to withdraw troops from the ukraine border,, when you spec that to happen? >> is difficult to speak about expectations because we have seen a very determined russian action in crimea. we urge russia. we want them to engage in a

constructive dialogue sooner rather than later. >> do you believe that they will withdraw troops from the border? have they given you any indication that they will? >> no indication whatsoever. we have no information that can confirm this information. what we are witnessing is a very massive russian military buildup along the ukrainian border and we have no indication that they have started a withdrawal. >> what else can nato do? >> well, we are focused on the defense of our allies. defense is a core why wer nato, which is have decided to enhance our collective defense. we have enhance policing in the three baltic states. deployed aircraft to

improve surveillance over poland. you have seen more of a naval presence in the black sea. now we are exploring how we could possibly further strengthen collective defense. >> what might that include? an updateght include and further development of our defense plans. it might include enhanced exercises and update and further development of our defense plans. it might include enhanced exercises and also appropriate deployments. >> do you believe the russians are listening? >> i do believe they are listening. i think they have no doubt that nato allies are strongly determined to provide effective defense and protection of our allies and deployed that impliea deterrent effect in itself. time when there was a withdrawal from nato, some people even questioning its mission and its relevance.

you think that this action by the russians will revitalize nato? >> no doubt. have seennato nations now with their own eyes how to have the is world's strongest ensure effecte defense and protection. ensure effective defense and protection. people -- you have seen people in our newer member states express a gratitude that they actually joined our lives some years ago. thise president said that

is not the beginning of the cold war. to have the world's strongest military alliance tothe russian ambassade is not the beginning of a cold war. you believe it has that possibility? i don't think we could or should speak about a cold war because this was another era when we saw the soviet union leading a block of communist countries in the world. that is not the case here. actually, we see russia quite isolated. what we see, however, is what i would call old soviet style thinking in the kremlin.

>> you have said the crisis in

the u.n. general summary had a vote on the crime era question -- on the crimea question. this russia is already know quite isolated and if russia were to intervene further, it would have grave consequences for russia's relationship with call theuld as a whole western world and that would have a very negative economic impact on russia. that>> many people believe they may respond and change the number of troops it has on the border but few people believe that they will withdraw from crimea's. is that your position? >> we will not recognize the annexation of crimea.

it is illegal, it is a legitimate. of course, the facts are that russia has occupied crimea and include taken steps to crimea in the russian federation. the international community will not recognize that a legal act. >> you just had an extraordinary meeting with the foreign ministers. include crimeais there a collective judt about what president vladimir q2 ps up to -- what vladimir q utin is up to? >> he was to reestablish a russian sphere of influence in

the soviet space. that is what it is about. >> will be get away with it? let'>> in the long run, he will not. in the long run, you cannot of peoplehe free will . it is a basic right that each nation can choose its alliances and security policies freely. it might be that russia choose s alliances and security policies freely. it might be that russia has taken steps as they have done in crimea in the short run but in the long run, you cannot suppress people that way. that is actually the style ofoned soviet

thinking. in the long run, he will not succeed. >> do you believe a diplomatic solution is possible and if it is, what would it include? style of thinking. in the long run, he will not succeed. >> do you believe a diplomatic solution is possible and if it is, what would it include? >> obviously, a political entity solution would include a recognition that crime era is

still a part of ukraine. ofrussia has concerns

>> the commander of the army's maneuver center is here. in 2005, 2006, he led the third armored calvary in iraq successfully defeating an insurgency. he also directed the joint task force in afghanistan. chuck hagel nominated him for his third start, the rank of

lieutenant general. starting in july, he will oversee the armies and tank which focuses on the future of warfare. this i am pleased to have you back to this table. welcome. >> great to be with you. >> you as well. >> it is a real privilege to continue serving in any capacity. we want to make sure that the joint repairs to force to the joint force to respond to crises and if necessary fight in future war. it's as americans, we don't expect to and we ought not to fair fights. we want to give our forces every advantage we can give them. this first order of business is to lay a strong conceptual foundation that defines the problem of future war and how we have to prepare our forces to fight and win in future conflicts. prepare to fight

two wars of the same time? what has been there from public statements that it's -- >> what has been clear from public statements recently, that strategy is no longer feasible. this is given the size and the protections of the budget. as the chief of staff has spoken about in the chief of staff has spoken about in the past week is that we believe that our army can do the minimum to support the current defense strategy which is to fight one major contingency operation, hold onto another one and be able to respond. the chief of staff has spoken about in the chief of there are dangers that we will fall below the level. as military officers, we don't make the decisions. is our job to do best we can

with those resources and make sure we do right by the nation and by our soldiers. >> let me talk about what you talk about with interest and this is why people like general petraeus like you. revolution in military affairs. what did he mean by that? >> this orthodox really gained a lot of momentum. it set us up for a lot of difficulties that we had this in both afghanistan and in iraq. idea, advances in technology and communication technology, computing power, precision munitions had made war only knew. future wars were going to exhibit where we had a discontinuity of all wars and come before. the fundamental assumption was the application of this technology would make war fast, cheap, efficient, and allow us to dominate any opponent. the language surrounding this reduction was riviera kid. >> a lot of that came out of the gulf war.

>> it did. fair fights. i think it was a misunderstanding of the result that really led to a lot of this. the conventional wisdom became in the wake of the gulf war, the technologies that they demonstrated, tremendous ability and a tremendous in the gulf war would be decisive in future wars. do theyplanations, undervalue the training and professionalism? iraqi'sundervalued the approach to the war. you can say there are two fundamental ways to fight this. asymmetrically and stupid and i think the iraqis chose stupid in next 91. they were overmatched in ways they could not even imagine. at war withn iranians from 80-88. they were used to infantry

walking towards them. now we had armored divisions. we have forces that were confident and well trained. overmatched orf underappreciated. >> who has fought the best asymmetric war against the u.s.? >> all of our adversaries have tried. you can go back obviously to the frontier wars and the wars against native american tribes which were fundamentally asymmetrical. i think you can look at fights we have had in the philippines, the philippine insurrection. >> that means -- >> it is common sense. if you see an enemy has certain traits, you don't want to impale yourself on the strength. you want to go around the strength. revolutionary forces are asymmetrical. >> yes, because they come from a position military weakness. this would have to organize

military operations in a way that allows them to strike a strike zone and to make contact with us and to fight us on their own terms. and they operate on multiple battlegrounds. >> did the insurgency in iraq have that ability? >> what we encountered was a localized hybrid insurgency that coalesced over time. what is striking about this insurgency and the one in afghanistan is that this they continually evolved taste on the -- based on how they saw our responses. initially, the iraqi insurgency was really driven towards inflicting couch fees on us.

quested dangers of these of gret

fallacies is that they confused important capabilities, vitally important capabilities for strategies. russianand for the answer to fe wars. you assume you can solve the problem of future war by applying firepower on demand. policy is that0 all you need is a global swat team that can do raids against limitations. you can do that for a low cost. operations forces are amazing.

are incredible professionals. >> how is that different from what you said? >> our enemies apply countermeasures to all of these capabilities. they are traditional countermeasures. technological countermeasures to these cap abilities. of course, all enemy organizations are not the same. because of our global interest and because of our vital interests and those of our key partners and allies, they can be placed at risk by nationstates and the forces of nationstates and also the sort of network organizations that are quite dangerous because you can look at has below as an example. you can look at some of the insurgent organizations. isi, hezbollah, these are nonstate actors who have capability is previously associated only with the field

of forces of nationstates. those are destructive weapons, communications simply to mobilize resources. quested a defend on nationstates to provide them the weapons they use? -- do the nationstates provide them with weapons they use? >> yes. qaeda and al associated groups be without the ability to establish support bases and safe havens. deterortant for us to nationstates as well as nonstate actors, but also to be able to respond to crises involving the field of forces of nationstates and the so-called hybrid enemies . >> there is a strong sentiment in the country. a lot of people think the future of modern warfare is paramilitary.

say is characterized as a counterterrorist warfare rather than counterinsurgency warfare. >> i think that is a fair statement. people would like war to be a problem that you can address just by rating. because it is not get you in all those difficult things on land like people and populations and security, but these enemies are able to operate in and amongst populations, elvis ago two areas that are particularly weak, not under state control. it is important to work with partners each and we have to have a kid ability ourselves. >> you made your first reputation in terms of the vietnam war. part of what came out of the vietnam war is hearts and minds. relevant too be isern warfare if in fact it

a counterinsurgency that you're fighting. >> that's right. >> you depend on them for intelligence, information. >> what we see him alone is common, i think too many of these conflicts -- of course, mx.of them have unique and what is common in syria, what is common with the conflict in yemen, what you see in northern nigeria, what you see in libya today, what you see in its mali, other spots. what you see are these transnational terrorist organizations who take advantage of local competitions, political competitions for power, resources, and survival and then they portray themselves as patrons and protectors of one of the aggrieved parties. that is how they gain access. once they gain access, you see what they have done. they have their own agenda and they establish control through

tally, murder, and intimidation. the only way that you can defeat them is for some force to be intimidationthat off the population. >> we have no force doing that other than the force of the syrian army. element. their own >> that is actually right. i'm not saying that we should do this. that is a policy decision, certainly. want to bedon't delusional about the ability to want to be delusional about the ability to achieve or to help the searing people achieve a sustainable outcome that is anything less sr some sort of political system. >> where will it come from in syria? >> well, that is the problem. than establish as a sectarian violence continues. is becoming more fragmented>> gg

each other with levels of violence. >> was important about the cereal problem is how we think about it. we've got to ask the questions here. what is the nature of the conflict? done has been great work on that that summarizes the nature of the conflict. then get -- then given the conflict, what can be done? dimensionn internal where syria is getting worse and worse. what some have suggested is need for international community to work on the problem from the outside in. the conflictvent from expanding geographically and becoming more destructive. then, to try to begin to work toward some kind of political outcome that can break the cycle of violence. ultimately there has to be some

internal political combination. that removes support for these extremist groups who find it is in their interest to perpetuate violence. what happens in these cases is you have a wartime economy that begins to sell perpetuate. you have powerful people inside who see it asuum in their interest to perpetuate the conflict. lacks the marlin perkins. he wasperkins, wherever staying, he was not on the battlefield. jim fowler to do that. your point is? wax we are searching -- >> we are searching for these easy solutions of war. we will just get other armies to do the land war stuff for us. we will be like marlin perkins and standoff.

the nature of for, wars are political. it has a lot to do with interest in these areas. we have encountered some of the pitfalls. why do the police, why were they sell unreliable? helpsn't because we didn't organize. they were subverted by taliban supervisors. >> kandahar was there core? >> it had been there ideological center. we help create this exclusionary political economy that left key elements of the population outside. that is the population from which the taliban drew strength to regenerate pakistan and come back in. great jobng a

training the forces there. cases ine been assisting navies of other countries to only discover we were trying to get a navy that was conducting smuggling. one of the key things that we , we have to in iraq put the politics in the center of the efforts. then, recognize through the degree that our interests are congruent. case listenin this to trotsky. you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you. [laughter] this is a tendency that we have. >> look what happened to trotsky. [laughter] >> war did happen to him. >> it did.

tend to be ast we americans, we are optimistic people, our strength, our power, this tremendous example of our democratic society and economy, we defined the world. in relation to us. outend to think if we set this course, and we can rely on these certain narrow capabilities for national defense, the world will comply. of course, we interact with enemies within wars. we have talked about that as conflicts of all of overtime. adversaries and potential enemies in between wars. if you stake out a narrow capability and say we're not going to bank on being decisive and protecting vital interest in security, our adversaries will

find a way around that. what is necessary to have a viable national defense is to have inappropriately broad range of capabilities that can be applied in combination. and, this is aerospace power, this is seapower, increasing cyber capabilities. it is land forces. ultimately, all of the problems in the other domains, they are land-based. people live on land. if you want to retain the capability to deter war by lacing something of value to your enemy at risk, you have to have sufficient land forces to have that deterrent. inis that why we kept troops europe and korea? >> of course. >> otherwise it would not be an effective deterrent. >> i don't think it would be. they would see it as an ability to invade capabilities and achieve their objectives.

for example, in putin's calculation, and crimea. his calculation that he can use land forces to reassert russian power on the eurasian landmass. >> because of geography. >> and geopolitics as well. how we define our interests and what we are willing -- >> that have left people who might favor a regime on the border. >> exactly. people go to war today. for three fundamental reasons, fear, honor, and interest. >> who said this? >> certain things remain true. >> they go for fear, interest, and honor. >> honor.

fear. interest. -- hererth three things are three things. war is political. who was it that said that war is all it takes? -- war is politics? that hase smartest ever been? >> it is hard to be better. he writes and a dialectic. he puts out an antithesis. it is so well done. you have to read it. >> who was he? >> a prussian who helped found and teach the prussian war academy and was one of the founders. this is in the early 19th century. he is a product of the napoleonic wars. trying toans were institutionalize the genius of napoleon through educating officers and generating the

understanding of the nature of war and warfare. he is coming at a shift in the character of war. in the past it had been armies that had narrow campaign seasons tied to monarchies. you have the mobile's. napoleonas because of question mark he had a grander understanding of war and what motivates soldiers? >> it was the legacy of the french revolution. sentiment associated with christian nationalists. that led to -- >> you study napoleon. >> you have to study napoleon. he is one of the greatest innovators. one of the greatest field commanders. >> what did he do? >> he learned from a couple. he learned from a guy who preceded him and came up with a divisional system to operate and

mount terrain. he decentralized. infantry, calgary. -- calvary. the game of rocks and paper. each of these capabilities are not decisive in themselves. it is how you combine them. that is what the joint forces do. land parlor -- land power. seapower. it is not a single arm solution to war. it is how you combine capabilities to exploit the initiative. as part of the application of all elements. napoleon understood better than anyone how to combine arms. he had a great idea of operational maneuver. to avoid enemy strength. the movement to the rear. turn defending enemies out of prepared positions. he had capable commanders in his

early campaigns. mission orders. >> war is political. war is human. always. >> always war is human. fear, honor, and interest. what drives conflict? what is driving the conflict now in serious? you have to understand the fears. the minority populations who think their fates are tied to a sod. it is fear. if there is a political order that doesn't have room for them, and fear of these jihadist organizations. it is a sense of honor. >> there is the problem. the moderates are in between both groups. >> majorities are caught up in

these conflicts. these, butadhere to they are powerless. in the caseliving of syria for generations under regime, there is. groups, what we would call liberals, they are voiceless and powerless because any opposition is stepped up. the organizations that have power after the collapse of the regime are the clandestine regimes. this helps explain to some degree the rise of the muslim brotherhood. who was organized? squarele were into here -- tahir square.

they had been in opposition to the government for years. >> absolutely. in iraq, the only people who are organized are the x patriots opposition groups who came in and were able to establish control through proxies. what the iranians have done in iraq is they have backed a lot of different horses. -- the't heard from difference between iranians and americans is americans are chickens. you make a lot of noise and you lay one egg. iranians are like fish. we make no noise and lay thousands of bags. ggs.housands of e did thekfired when he operation in basra. are doing everything they can to maintain a high degree of

control in iraq. my view of what iran is trying to do is they are trying to keep the air world week so they can -- weak, so they can advance their interest. you have a week government -- dependent onment iranian support to survive. >> we live in a world of high-tech. a world of drones. the world of a different kind of war. >> enhanced medications. >> the world of cyber world fair -- -- cyber warfare. long-range ballistic missiles connected to weapons of mass destruction and a rogue regime. >> that's the biggest threat? >> i think. it is apparent that iran is moving in this direction. >> to we believe that both of

them have long-range ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear? >> we don't know. i don't know. we have the people working on this. >> the fear you have is long-range missiles that have the potential to carry weapons of great destruction. >> right. it has been great work on this on long-range capabilities. it is not just the missile. it is a striking network. somebody attacks in new york and d.c.. the advantages that we have banked on over the last several decades of surveillance capabilities, that kind of a network is going to be available to adversaries. there has never been a silver bullet solution. you have the submarine, the

bomber, the radar. you have the tank. we have to recognize that our future adversaries will have capabilities we have now and be able to disrupt our strengths. what is our answer to that? forcea balanced joint that can play rock, paper, scissors with anybody. you have to be able to put it all together. many have written about work about anti-access aerial denial. to try to deny forces the ability to get somewhere for access. the basic question, ask us for what reason? you need land forces as part of the solution. this narcissistic tendency we have, we are seeing this as a defensive threat. it is an offense of threat. i think it is a threat that the threatalogous to in london world war ii. the former secretary of

defense bob gates said to me, we are not using all of the weapons that are notl necessarily military but could play a role. we have not employed does enough -- we have not employed those enough. you have had a lot to do with that in afghanistan. why was that so difficult? >> it goes back to politics. afghanistan,, in this was a state that was destroyed. it was destroyed by the soviet occupation. a destructive civil war. then the taliban regime destroyed institutions we would recognize. after 2003, taking an approach to the military affairs enabling militias through our air power

advisers, after the collapse of the taliban, which was a so ecological -- a psychological collapse, what you had in the wake is you have a help pull the state together to get a viable state. conference.d buildinginstitution was we didn't have enough of an effort there. the state institution functions were captured by these militias organized crime networks. they affected state capture institutions. they were driven by criminal agendas. mainly by political agendas. in a post-u.s. afghanistan. it was driven by a lack of faith in a vision for the future. they were hedging bets and building up a power base. inwhere'd you put an army

that? >> you put politics at the center. the problem is, how do you convince key afghan leaders it is in their interest to deal with corruption and organized crime? the political settlement that emerged was dependent on criminality. unchecked criminality. if i give you the ministry of defense, and i allow you to do what you're going to do, die version of systems, rent seeking behavior, the commoditization of positions, you can have your power base, make money, if i threatened to do that, you are no longer going to give you your loyalty. the settlement that emerged in 2004, earlyafter 2005, was reliant on organized crime. everybody focuses on president

karzai. moreof the problem is much complicated and diffused than that. thing iso the whole political, and incumbent on all .f us to play a supportive role >> supportive of what? >> of reform. great afghans.ny i wish americans could know these guys. they are committed. >> a lot had been killed. >> there are so many who are resilient and persevere. these are people who are part of a multiethnic reform movement that is anti-taliban and pro-western. >> the idea was well could we have supported more extensively while we had a number of forces earlyin the midst of stages of involvement?

when the taliban was at its weakest. 2002-2000 three. >> was that a missed opportunity? >> i think it was a missed opportunity. it was based on flawed assumptions on the nature of war. war is not about the application of military power against enemy organizations. that is a big part of it. you have to defeat organizations. that is the part of war that we are best at. >> basis of security. >> and solidify those gains politically. we are not going to do nationbuilding. we always had to do some degree of activity. to consolidate gains lyrically -- gains politically. if you look at the panama invasion, the engagement in the philippines, what -- no one >>

generals have been at the top of strategic thinkers? >> a number of them dealt with difficult circumstances and persevered through imagination and leadership. george washington. we taken for granted. it was an amazing leader and commander. i think if you look at the battles of [indiscernible] it is not without assistance. when you come to world war ii, you look at george marshall. an organizer of victory. i think each of these generals have their strengths. if you want to look at tactical command, there is a great book that compares and contrasts patton, eisenhower, montgomery, bradley. you see there styles come into play in the battle. of a missed opportunity

based on those relationships. >> vietnam? >> you have to go with abrams. and man of vision. he was a combined arms man. doingeneral, you're no specific things anymore. >> the gulf war? war, i thinklf there are debates about all of these. the idea to avoid enemy strength in developed the enemy. strike from an unexpected position. >> petraeus? who did that? >> fred franks. they did the long envelopment.

then the flank attack into kuwait. that was easy, quick, efficient. what made it different was the enemy not being smart about how they fought us. it narrowly circumscribed political objectives. give kuwait back to the kuwaitis. >> c had a couple of things early in his career. these examples are instructed. some of the buzz words you hear now, agile, nimble, lien. all of those are important. forces, getdly to there fast. ultimately, what you have to do after you get there, that is more important than getting there fast.

converte not able to that into larger success. then you have flexibility on the part of command. ifhave ian hamilton who says i change the beaches we are landing on, it will disrupt the landing plan. the alternative is to impale yourself on turkish machine guns. which they did. you can learn from these campaigns. , it is notom history going to give you the answer. >> it is easy to see the consequences. >> war is the great auditor of military institutions. we have to be careful as we think about future war that we don't do so in such a way that we underpin our capabilities with flawed notions of ideas about what is adequate to secure our vital interest. >> general h. r. mcmaster. thanks for having

>> this is taking stock for thursday, april 3, 2014. i'm pimm fox. today's theme is exploration. mars one wants to establish a permanent human settlement by mars by 2025. to hear my interview with the cofounder and chief executive behind this ambition -- ambitious endeavor. and a drone you can launch just by throwing it in the air. our small to big segment features a standout device, you can own artifacts from the most