>> from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." >> we begin with the escalating crisis in iraq. the central government is steadily losing control of its territory. the group known as isis captured

mosul and tikrit. yesterday, it seized a city to the west of mosul. graphic images emerged of a massacre carried out by isis as it continues its march toward baghdad. the administration has considered opening a dialogue with iran to assist in the reconciliation effort. joining us, journalist robin wright and les gelb. you are in iraq a month ago. tell me what was going on and what happened to cause this to move so rapidly. it had been long planned and carefully thought out. go ahead. >> this is the greatest threat we have had in the last century.

the jihadis are well disciplined, well-financed, and well-trained. they have a game plan. i think they surprised the outside world largely because of the timing, the swift headway they made through northwestern iraq. i think we have always known, for the past 2.5 years, that this could happen, that they could penetrate iraq, and that the state of iraq was under threat. i do not think everyone understood how fast it could happen. of all the threats we have faced in iraq in the last 25 years since iraq's invasion of kuwait, that this is in many ways the most complex, in terms of finding a solution. name us devastating in terms of its impact. this is a threat not just to the survival of the iraqi state and whether it disintegrates into two or three parts.

it is also a challenge to the entire and figuration of the middle east. and it is clearly the deepest and broadest jihadi threat locally any time since islam emerged as a modern political or military threat. >> with me is les gelb, who would like to remind me and many others that he came on many times along with joe biden. they co-authored a piece suggesting that what was needed in iraq was some kind of federation of sunnis, kurds, and shia, and that was the only way to avoid something like we are experiencing now. having said that, here is a problem in search of a solution. >> the solution is much harder now, even if one were possible. when i suggested it, to really take account of the fact that iraq was a flawed, diverse state, kurds, sunnis, and shiites -- and you could keep

them together ultimately only if each was more or less allowed to run its own affairs within a united -- >> or else have a strongman like saddam hussein. >> or the dictators before that could hold it together. with that going, you have a threat of almost permanent civil war. >> what is the united states to do? >> they are wondering the same thing. the white house is watching this program, charlie. they are mainly thinking as they usually do, in terms of people. can we live with maliki? can we get him to do what he did before? how do we do that? who could take his place? they are fixated on questions like that. but they have set a policy framework that is not bad, which is, we are not going to shoot a bullet until the iraqi

government in baghdad shows that it is offering a political approach that can regain support of the sunnis and the kurds. only then do we think that the iraqi army will fight instead of runaway, and that the country might possibly be united in a federal system. as its constitution allows. >> is there a place for the u.s. and iran to cooperate here, even if it would mean to our sunni friends that we are in bed with her hated enemy, iran? >> the secretary of state has said the united states will consult with iran. that is beginning to play out in vienna today, with the talks between united states and iran in the context of the nuclear agreement. that is the beginning of a process. the pentagon has pointed out

something very different, the issue of coordination. will there be military coordination with iran? there is a difference between consultation and coordination. we are not heading toward a scenario that looks like the united states might provide drone cover as revolutionary guards are involved on the ground in place of the iraqi army. i do not think we are headed in that direction. for the first time, iran and the united states share common cause. they are concerned because their strategies have jointly failed. both of them, in different degrees and different ways,

supported the government of prime minister maliki. this has been in place for almost 10 years, and neither side has been able to convince the prime minister to be able to engage with all parties on the ground. and it will take both washington and the united states to help salvage. neither country can do it alone. this is a pivotal moment. it is one of those confluence of factors that could actually facilitate even the nuclear talks. this is changing the dynamics. >> charlie, i think that secretary of state kerry and his iranian counterpart are already in touch and talking about this, and they are doing it with some political support here at home. senator lindsey graham even supported the notion of trying to work with the iranians, as long as, as he said, the iranians promise they are not going to do anything bad. i do think we will end up working with iran.

>> iran -- it will not be a military coordination. it will be something else? >> the first step is to see if we can get the government in baghdad to make a political proposal that can begin to unite the people again. without that, nothing will work. is there a chance of some military coordination? i would say if some of the worst fears about the jihadis coming south to baghdad turn out to be true, we might even have some military coordination. as we are not going to put anybody in on the ground, and the iranians might put commandos on the ground. while we may not like it, i think we would prefer it to a jihadi takeover. it is the same thing in syria, charlie. of course we want assad out. he is a bad guy. but who is the bigger threat in syria, assad or the jihadis?

it is the jihadis. strategically, who do you need to worry about more? >> while this talking is going on, they get closer and closer to baghdad. what do we do if they are within a day of baghdad? >> i do not think that is going to happen. i think there are very few organized jihadi forces. the truth of the matter is, our cia does not even know within 10,000 how many they have there. it is not a lot. the iraqi forces are now organizing. i think iraq will be safe from any regular attack. there will be bombings and terrorists, but not an organized attack. so there will be an opportunity for the iraqi government to get organized. >> robin, a couple of questions. three questions, in fact. what is their objective here, of isis? number two, the other sunni countries, who have reason to fear islamists like these radical extremists, where are they?

and three, what kind of relationship do they have with the ba'athist elements that are now supporting the extremists? >> isis wants to create a broad islamic state, modeled on the caliphate centuries ago. it wants islamic law in its earliest, most are connie and form, one which many muslims today reject. it wants to do that across borders. the creation of this sunni rump state that spans borders -- the border between syria and iraq is no longer there. there are elements reportedly inside arabia and elsewhere, target individuals supporting -- reportedly tens of millions of dollars for military equipment. that is really dangerous. this is not the position of many of our gulf allies.

there is a split. we talk simplistically about a sectarian divide between sunni and shiite. it is a divide in the islamic world in general between those who are looking for an extremist course, and others who are looking for more moderation, who want a 21st century state. there is a lot of diversity within the islamic world. and on this question, a lot of differences. in some cases, you find that because of that sectarian divide, that is pushing a lot of the sunnis more into their sunni identity. we are not yet at the point where we are into a sectarian war, that we are headed there

fast. >> what about the call for shiites to rise up against these extremists coming to baghdad? what impact will that have? >> it will work. he is the most influential shiite figure in iraq, and maybe worldwide. i think he will get militias standing up and being willing to fight. let me come back to the point you were asking robin about, our friends in the gulf. because they have been doing us a great deal of damage. while the governments officially do not support arming the jihadis, there are plenty of businessmen and religious leaders in our friendly gulf states who have been supporting them, in syria and now in iraq. the united states, in order to help calm the situation, is going to have to crack down on them.

they look to us for their security, and yet they are undermining the basis of american power and interest throughout the middle east. >> the people who are giving the money -- >> crack down on the people giving money. the saudi government, the kuwaiti government, the qataris, they know who are giving the money. >> are we looking at a conflict that will spread through the middle east? >> that is the greatest dilemma for the obama administration. does it get sucked into a conflict that actually becomes sectarian and involves drawing us into a division or a chasm that has been around for 1400 years? that is one thing we need to be very careful about, that we do not get involved. i lived in beirut for five years of a 15 year civil war. these sectarian conflicts, the power struggle, over the

definition of a modern state, can endure for far longer than we want. do we have to make a decision tonight or the next week over what we do? we need to be so careful in this one. the fact is that our involvement in 1990-1991 was military decisive within six weeks. we got saddam hussein out of kuwait. we got saddam hussein out of baghdad in a mere three weeks. they were military victories, but ultimately political failures. what we have to make sure is that this is a political success. that is where we have to begin, and making sure there is a viable government that represents all iraqi interests. >> the stability of a foreign policy? >> the teams did not do a great job, but it was facing -- >> because of ending without troops in iraq or syria or both? >> i do not think leaving iraq was the basis of this. even if we had 10,000-20,000

troops in iraq, i think the political problems underneath would have exploded. >> did we lose any influence with maliki's government? >> bush was trying to get the agreement on status of forces. he did not succeed. i do not think you can lay this at obama's doorstep. i think it is totally unfair. the real issue now, even if obama does everything right, it is going to be hard. the real issue is, can we put together a coherent strategy to deal with the problems that robin described? can we get a coherent strategy throughout the middle east? you cannot do it in iraq alone. it is in iraq and syria problem. it is a problem of the business people and the religious leaders in the gulf financing the jihadis against our interests. you are going to have to pull all these pieces together and decide, what is the problem we have to deal with first? >> put all the pieces together. >> it is up to the united

states. if the united states does not do it, it does not get done. >> ron crocker said, we need the secretary of state in baghdad right now. when he the president on the phone to iraqi leadership. the iraqis are not in a position to work it out on their own. >> but then you need the overall problem. this is not just iraq. it is syria. it is not just iraq and syria. it is the middle east. it is an opportunity to work with the iranians to solve the larger strategic threat, which is, right now, the jihadis threatening both syria and iraq. you cannot just solve the problem in baghdad. >> what happened to the effort we poured into training the iraqi army?

>> this happens time and again. we were all that effort into training, arming, and equipping the south vietnamese. and when we left and the north vietnamese attacked, the south vietnamese army folded. we have done 10 years worth of training, equipping, and fighting outside the afghan army. we do have to worry that when we pull out, they are going to collapse as well, and the taliban will do there what the jihadis are doing in iraq today. it is not the united states that can solve these problems. as long as we are there fighting their war, they are going to rely on us, and never develop the resilience to deal with the problems on their own when we leave. >> no motivation. thank you. we will be back. stay with us. ♪

>> kai bird is here. his new novel is called "the good spy." it looks at the life and death of robert ames, one of the cia's legendary and unusual agents.

he was killed tragically in the bombing of the agency in beirut. kai bird said, had he lived, he might have healed the rift between the arab world and the west. i am pleased to have kai bird back at this table. let us start with the obvious. tell me who robert ames was. >> he was a veteran cia officer who rose to become mr. middle east, but started out as a clandestine cia officer in 1960. he was mentor by the legendary cia director richard helms. he specialized in the middle east, became a fabulous arab language speaker, and he was -- the title "the good spy" is apt, because he was actually a very good, decent man, but also very

good at his work. >> why was he good at his work? >> human intelligence, it turns out. the art of spy craft is really about human empathy, finding a way to be empathetic with a foreign culture, often in a very dangerous neighborhood. and ames was just fabulous. he would sit down and smoke a hookah pipe in the souk with storekeepers. and he could sit down and, as one of my sources said -- sometimes in this business you have to sup with the devil, but you use a very long spoon. ames supped with the devil, but with a very short spoon. he got to know them. >> he made a trip to see yasser arafat, which would have been against the cia rules. he did not tell them. >> exactly.

>> and then he wrote his wife and described it. >> incredible, but this is one of the reasons i was able to do this book in such a closely biographical fashion. i found these letters. his widow graciously gave them to me. he had about 150 pages, handwritten letters. in one of them, you are quite right. he described being taken by arafat's intelligence chief -- >> and much more. >> and demand that ames sup with the devil. he got close to -- he cultivated -- initially, a recruitment, but he realized the man was not recruitable. >> you could not buy him. >> his superiors tried and failed. bob ames took him into a refugee camp and introduced him to arafat.

this is a time when henry kissinger had promised the israelis and said we would never talk to members of the plo, the palestinian liberation army, that it was a terrorist organization we would not have any dealings with. but of course when ames started this relationship, in 1969, very early, kissinger knew about it. not immediately, but ames told his boss, helms, and helms encouraged him to do it. that is what intelligence officers do. they go where foreign service officers, diplomats, cannot go. >> tell me about salameh. the relationship is crucial to the book. >> these are men who are complete opposites.

ames was the son of a steelworker from philadelphia. not blue blood. not boston brahman. not yale, skull and bones. not the stereotype you have of a cia officer. he was the son of a steelworker from philadelphia. an all-american basketball player. 6'3", handsome, hazel blue eyes, blonde, and strikingly handsome. he favored cowboy boots and aviator glasses, tinted. just walking down the streets of beirut or aden, he stuck out like an american. he was a good husband, a good father to his six children. he would have a drink occasionally, but he did not like to drink. he got criticized by his own

colleagues in the cia, who said, if you don't drink alcohol, how can you recruit agents? but salameh was the exact opposite. >> also ames, in the beginning of his career, there was some argument against him, because they said, he is too intellectual. >> exactly. he came from la salle college, not harvard or yale or berkeley. >> the other side was saying he was too intellectual. >> he loved books. apparently, when you walked into his apartment in beirut, it would we cut it with history books about the middle east. he favored history books and biographies. read very few novels. the exception was john le carre. >> tell me about salameh. >> when ames met him, he was arafat's chief bodyguard and intelligence chief, and very smart political officer. he favored gold chain and fast cars, and good red wine.

he was a muslim. he looked beautiful women. he was married to a lovely palestinian woman and had two kids, but he fell in love and acquired a mistress and then a second wife. in the form of miss universe. this was a very flamboyant fellow who hung out in nightclubs in beirut and fell in love with miss universe, and ames had to at one point -- a total opposite, but they respected each other. they formed a working professional relationship. when salameh acquired this other woman, which aims disapproved of, salameh was about to marry her and he said, she would like

to visit america, and she really wants to go to disneyland. so ames arranged it. they sent him to hawaii for a short vacation, and new orleans, where there was a large meeting of cia officers to brief and debrief salameh. >> salameh was a bad guy, too. >> he wore a pistol in his belt. ames occasionally had to do that, that he hated guns. he was no james bond, that sort of stereotype. but salameh carried a gun, and he was involved with black september. >> when did you develop a relationship with mrs. ames? >> one of the reasons i got onto this story was that as a young man, when i was a boy, 11, 12, and 13, i was ames's next-door neighbor. my father was a foreign service

officer, and this is where ames had his first posting abroad, saudi arabia. he was our next or neighbor on this very small, windswept desert compound. i have memories of him and his lovely blue-eyed, blonde wife. >> you write about him, that his -- what did you say? the point was to influence the course of history and make a better world. he wanted his covert intelligence to persuade the policymakers to make good decisions. but by the summer of 1978, he felt that american policy in the middle east had run into a dead end. >> he became very frustrated. as is actually a typical story, as i have learned from the sort of clandestine wing of the cia.

you come into the agency, and you are excited by the secrets that you are exposed to. >> you know things other people don't. >> you know things other people don't know, and you think that is going to help you to change the world. ames is very idealistic in this way. and you think as a young officer that you are going to be able to influence policymakers, politicians who run foreign policy. if they just know what i know. but after 18 years in the agency, ames is becoming a little more cynical, much more skeptical. >> he thought he could use his relations with salameh to influence arafat, and make arafat less radical and more willing to engage and pursue a two state solution. >> exactly. i argue in the books that this is what happened.

over the course of their 10 year relationship, 1969-1979, it was a two-way street. salameh was trying to draw ames him, and through ames, get the u.s. government to deal with the plo. simultaneously, ames is trying to draw salameh and influence him and his boss, arafat, into being more realistic about palestinian aspirations, and to think of laying down the gun, and to start talking not only to the americans, but eventually to the israelis, about a political compromise, what we would call today a two state solution. and i would argue he was successful, if you look at the progression of the palestinian narrative in the 1970's. they got closer and closer to doing this. not directly to oslo, but it planted the seeds of oslo. >> mosad, as i suggested earlier, had salameh on a hit list. >> from very early on. >> they wanted him because of things they felt he had been complicit in.

>> mosad tried to kill him with a letter bomb before munich. ames warned salameh not to open his mail at his home, and saved his life at least once. >> did the israelis know that? >> eventually they did. >> that they had warned him not to be in munich. >> yes. in summer of 1978, a mosad officer approached and asked, is ali hassan salameh your man? has the cia recruited him? >> if he is, we will not assassinate him. >> well, he was not a recruited agent. the cia agent turned on his heels without giving an answer. is precipitated a hot debate in cia headquarters. what do we tell the israelis? ames learned about this debate. by this time, he is out of the clandestine service and doing intelligence analysis.

he heard what is going on and again warned salameh, you have to be careful. he actually shipped him encrypted communications equipment to try to beef up his security. >> there is also a man called asgari. >> he was in the iranian revolutionary guard corps, and fought in kurdistan and then was shipped to lebanon in the wake of the invasion in the summer of 1972. he was one of the iranian intelligence officers who stayed behind after his unit was transferred back to iran later in 1990 -- 1982, 1983. i have sources saying he was the

intelligence officer on the ground for the iranians who put together the truck bomb attacks not only on the u.s. embassy, that killed ames, april 18, 1983, and 16 other americans, and wipe out the whole cia station -- eight cia officers. but asgari was also involved in the truck bomb attack most americans are member better, that happened six months later on the marine barracks, 240 -- >> that led them to get out of beirut. >> his story is fascinating, because he had a long career in iran, rose very high up, became deputy defense minister, asgari did -- >> under a moderate president. >> under a moderate president. and then had a falling out with

ahmadinejad, his rival in the revolutionary core. in 2007, he defected, and left iran on a business trip, supposedly, to syria, and disappeared across the border into turkey. it is a mystery about where he is today. but i report that he was debriefed in washington, d.c., in the cia safe house, and he came with a laptop full of intelligence about the iranian nuclear program and hezbollah, which he knew very much of because he had helped train them, train their intelligence corps. this is a classic dealing with bad guys. >> we think he is somewhere in the united states today? >> i think he is somewhere in

the united states or somewhere under an alias and protection in europe. >> he delivered for the united states, and they decided to give him witness protection? >> apparently, this is what happened. without a doubt, he defected. he is still here, but we don't know where. >> what happened to ames? >> ames, after his contact in the plo, salameh, was killed. -- was killed, he was devastated. he thought this was a big mistake on the part of the cia. he was in his office in langley one day and got the news. i described an eyewitness watching him get the news. he was ashen, clearly shocked. >> but he knew the mosad was after him. >> he was hoping salameh would survive yet again. >> it was a car bomb. >> it was a car bomb that killed salameh. ames had by this point switched

to the analytical side of the agency, and was promoted rapidly. by 1982, he was the guy who was briefing ronald reagan in the white house. >> he would brief the president? >> in the oval office and it can't david. during particularly the summer of 1982, the very crisis-laden summer. israel had invaded. >> because of casey. >> he was close to casey. casey understood that ames was not only a great officer, but a great read for. >> casey liked characters like that, so he gave him access to reagan. >> and ames persuaded reagan to sign on to the reagan peace initiative of september 1, 1982, which was the first sort of u.s. initiative that thrust the u.s. government into the midst of the

israeli-palestinian conflict, and said, you guys can't agree on what to do. here is our american plan. it was a step forward, i argue, but it never went anywhere. >> and he was finally killed. >> he happens to go back to beirut on april 17, a sunday. the next day, he walked into the u.s. embassy, and a few hours later, this truck bomb rolled in with 2000 pounds of plastic explosive. >> 16 people died. >> 17 americans and 46 lebanese innocents died. >> and who did that? >> i argue that was the iranian revolutionary core. and this guy ali-reza asgari. >> who was the mastermind? >> the on the ground mastermind. this was state terrorism. it was not a suicide bomber. >> you argue because of some mistakes were made that

hezbollah became empowered in lebanon. >> yes. this is the beginning of hezbollah. in 1983, hezbollah did not really exist. there was a shadowy breakoff group that formed right after the sabra and shatila massacre of september 1982. this really precipitated the formation of hezbollah and the force representing the shiites of southern lebanon and south beirut. >> why do we all love the intrigue of the middle east so much? >> as the israelis constantly tell us, and they live in a dangerous neighborhood. and it is true. but it is a complicated and intriguing neighborhood filled with a complex mosaic of

cultures and religions. it is fascinating. mostly fascinating. ames fell in love with the middle east, even though it is a difficult case to work. >> he wanted to learn. he studied the language. >> he could joke in the language. he could read the literature, read a newspaper, and carry on political conversation. this is very rare, i have to say, for an intelligence officer. even today, there are very few cia officers who can do what he did back in the 1980's. >> the book is called "the good spy," by kai bird. stay with us. jessye norman is here, and we can be happy about that. she makes us all sing. the famed opera singer has written a book on "stand up straight and sing." her memoirs of growing up in augusta, georgia, performing in the world's greatest opera houses. i am pleased to have this friend

of mine back at my table. >> happy to be here. >> tell me about the title. >> that is what my mother used to say when i was six or seven years old, getting ready to perform. she would say, stand up straight. >> did she have the most influence on you? >> so many people that have had influence and still have influence on me -- my parents, my grandparents, my aunts, my uncles, my next-door neighbor, the lady across the street, my godmother. >> when did you know you had a voice that recommended itself? >> i had been singing and speaking. i have no recollection of never being a singer. i have no recollection of that. i was always wanting to do it. it helps that i am a bit of a ham. i rather enjoy it. >> and still do. it did not start in the church? >> it started at home, and then

in the church, and then in the schools, and then community organizations. that first performance was in my living room. >> many people have had conversations with you a number of times. why write this memoir? was the part of the story you felt we did not know? >> part of my story -- only i can talk about my relationship to my family, talking about growing up in the segregated south and overcoming that. at the same time i was growing up, i was not lumbered with this. it was not a prop i was bearing, because i grew up in a wonderful community. this was an incredibly supportive thing. you know, at the time, one does not realize it, when you were growing up. you do not understand that people are growing up in a different way. having loving parents and people in the community that are as interested in you as they can

possibly be. the woman across the street wants to know about your report card. >> to communicate to you that you can do anything -- >> that you might have to work at it harder than should be reasonable, but you can do it, and you must do it. >> you have mentioned the segregated south and your parents. they gave you protection and confidence. >> and experience and talking to. it was not unusual to sit down and talk about the day's problems, or something that had been on television from montgomery or selma or somewhere, and for us to understand it, and know that we were a part of the struggle as well, even as young children, and that we needed to understand that, and to surmount that. >> when did you leave augusta? >> i left augusta at age 17 to go to howard university as a freshman. it certainly was a good place to go. it turns out that i was actually admitted to howard university

the year before that. i had not completed high school. >> how did you get early admission? >> i had early admission because i visited howard university coming back from having performed in the marian anderson competition when i was still 15. i stopped in washington on the way back to augusta, with my choir director. we went to howard university, unannounced. the dean of music at the time had been the dean in paine college in augusta, georgia, so she knew him. we went over to the university. it was a school day. it was a friday. he invited us to come up to meet the voice department head, who was carolyn grant. i sang for her. she asked us to wait outside the

class in vocal pedagogy. she said, how old are you? are you doing well in high school? i said, i am on the honors list. she said, your high school transcript will have to bear that out, but when you have finished high school, i would like to teach you. of course, i could hardly believe that. she was a wonderful teacher. i the time i got to her, she had been teaching voice for 45 years. there was nothing about the voice or vocal production or physiology that she did not know and could not explain. it was really -- it was wonderful. >> what have you learned about your voice over the years? >> i have learned to take care of it, that it needs rest as much as it needs exercise, and that i have to respect the fact

that i must not sit in a draft, thinking, i will be all right. that is very dangerous. i cannot be around people who are coughing. one has to take care of one's physical body and one's voice. >> a chapter on growing up in germany. >> i feel i grew up in germany, because my whole horizon of what the world was like changed, going from the segregated south, having gone to university, to the university of michigan -- and now i was living in a divided country and a divided city. it was -- the irony was amazing. >> berlin. >> there i was, never having been on a professional stage as an opera singer, ever, and making my debut in richard wagner, a quintessential german character in a german opera in a german opera house.

it was a truly amazing time in my life. i was like a sponge. i was soaking up everything that was happening, whether it was the theater across the street, where they were doing shakespeare in german to such a level that it was difficult to realize it had not been written in german to begin with -- >> and you developed an appetite to know the world. >> the whole world, and to understand how different it was, and that there were people living under an oppression that would have crushed the soul, had they allowed it to. but they did not allow it to. they went to museums, concerts. even behind what they called the iron curtain, spirits were flying high. >> way before you knew me, i lived in paris. i think i told you this story. i was in paris and you saying. you came down that, whatever it was -- stairway. first, why did they choose you?

>> president mitterand chose me. >> a man of culture. >> and a person who wanted the idea of egalite, fraternite --the meaning of the tricolore of france. he wanted to include all of us, and not just the french. i was extremely honored to be chosen to do this, and i did it. >> watching you, i was just taken. i know you have sat across the table many times after that. here is a tape of that day and that evening. here it is.

♪ ♪ how far up is that in your memory banks? >> it is the front of my memory bank. hundreds of thousands of people in the street, as you well remember, that evening. over the last 20 years, i think i have met everybody. i think i have indeed.

it has just an impressive. >> it was so memorable. >> so memorable for so many reasons. 200 years after the french revolution -- to sing on the place de la concorde, around the obelisque -- and all of this was completely live. you can hear when i am disjointed a bit from the chorus, because the conductor could see me, what of course i could not see anybody. i had to rely on what i was hearing. i still remember the same frisson i had in my body, thinking, you know these words as well as you know your own name. just get on with it. just do it. >> who chose the outfit? >> that was designed by alaia, chosen by the man in charge of the whole desolee. it was decided by the minister,

by the president, that i should wear something that resembled the french flag. it resembles the french flag. >> other than that, tell me about great moments on stage. >> great moments. if i ever sang in carnegie hall -- i had only been singing about four years or something. the opening night of the 100th anniversary season of the metropolitan opera. that was quite a moment to make my debut on the opera stage there. i sang berlioz. later on, i sang cassondra and dido. both of those characters in the same night -- that was quite a workout. >> are there performances, operas, compositions that you think, jessye norman owns this?

>> i do not know that i could daresay that. there are certainly things that i saying that other people want me to sing a lot, like the last four songs of strauss, or this one person opera that i do of schoenberg, "the waiting." or another one person opera i do which is a play turned into an opera by poulenc. these are things i do perhaps differently from other sayers, so i get asked to do these things very often. >> is there anyone you wanted to work with that it did not happen? >> i would have to think hard, but there are people i would like to have the opportunity to have worked more with, a conductor with whom i had the great privilege of working when i first started singing. that was rudolf kempe.

i learned so much from that man in such a short time, and i was sorry we did not work more. i did the molar songs with him. i did the mahler songs with him and i learned so much about singing and portraying deep thought within a song, and allowing the audience to feel that and not get caught up in the emotion. that was something important to learn very early. >> what was that film based on you in paris? >> it was called "diva," starring wilhelmina hernandez. >> did they consult with you about that film? >> they did talk to me to be accurate about the young man portrayed there, who really did exist. and he really did work for the post office, delivering telegrams. remember telegrams? [laughter]

>> one of the great things about having the life you have lived is, because of the profession that chose you, it is a global thing. >> it is. >> it is a thing -- you get to meet almost everyone. >> it is wonderful. it is marvelous to see that truly does transcend borders. you can find a person that is working as a cashier, who loves music, who tells me, i saw you on public television and made my children watch. that warms my heart as much as hearing the president of austria say that he enjoys the music as well. it is wonderful. >> and you are too. the book is called "stand up straight and sing." thank you for joining us. see you next time. ♪

>> live from pier 3 in san francisco, welcome to "bloomberg west." ahead, amazon has conquered e-commerce. now it is aiming for smartphones. the company is expected to unveil the first amazon smartphone added event in seattle tomorrow. the move will give amazon another platform to sell millions of products. at&t is said to be the carry of the phone. facebook is taking its aim met -- taking aim at