from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." >> we begin with ongoing coverage of the isis threat to iraq and the change of government. u.s. air strikes continued for

the sixth day. the u.s., britain and france have been delivering food and water to thousands of yazidis on mount sinjar. refugees remain stand it -- stranded. the pentagon has sent 130 more advisors to northern iraq to plan the evacuation of the yazidis. a senior white house official acknowledged the possibility of using american troops to assist iraqis in the rescue of the yazidi refugees. the white house is careful to say there is a difference between using forces in a humanitarian operation. joining me from washington, brett mcgurk, u.s. deputy assistant secretary of state for iraq and iran. he served as adviser to the u.s. ambassador to iraq. i am pleased to have him on this program. welcome. and you tell me, there is a new york times report that said the united states may be prepared to send u.s. troops are rescue

refugees? >> i haven't seen that report but what that is probably referring to is a commitment that the president has addressed the american people, that we are committed to breaking the siege of mount sinjar where thousands of innocent people, yazidis, are trapped on this mountain, surrounded by isil terrorists. we have been doing airstrikes on the north side of that mountain. those strikes have been very effective. they have allowed a lot of them to get off the mountain. we are now actively undergoing an assessment to determine how many people are left and what we can do. >> you are basically saying we will do everything we have to do to get these refugees to safety. >> charlie, the helicopter that crashed tragically yesterday, it was an iraqi air force helicopter eyelid by --

piloted by an iraqi pilot. there was a yazidi member of parliament. they were there to deliver aid and rescue the yazidis. what we have seen over the last 10 days is a historic level of military cooperation between the government in baghdad and the kurdish forces in the north. that is going to continue. we are in active discussions with our partners to organize an effort to get these people to safety. >> let me move to the new government. it has been a central point of the president's position on iraq that you need a government that will be inclusive and rally support from all sectors of the population. do you have that government now? >> the government is not in place yet. the government was certified about a week after the attack in basel. the timeline has a number of steps to form a government.

they have to name a speaker and a president. tot sets off a timeline nominate a new prime minister. that is what happened yesterday. they now have 30 days to form a cabinet. and develop a national program to govern iraq through 2018. he will present that cabinet and the national program to the parliament. we hope to get this done within the 30 day timeline. of course we are urging them to go as fast as possible. >> is this likely, that sunnis in iraq who may have been prepared to support isis or had been supporting isis might now turn against them if there is a government in baghdad that they believe in? >> we are trying to drive that wedge. we are working very hard with sunni tribal leaders as we speak.

i think there is signs that that is succeeding. you also have to address the fact that isil is able to dominate in these areas and remains a difficult challenge. >> can you stop them if you don't drive that went? >> the wages part of it. the president has said we have to have a national government that we can work with very closely. requirementsional for both a cabinet and a national program. the doctor will present the national program to the parliament. that will be designed to pull the country together and govern the state. >> i am particularly interested in this -- your assessment of isil or isis, how much can they sustain? >> we sent some of our best special forces teams to do a real hard-core assessment. we have a baseline assumption , it isis, isil

interchangeable, isil is better equipped, better manned, better resourced come a better fighters, better trained than the al qaeda in iraq that our forces faced. atyou accept that and look the capacity of the iraqi security forces or tribal networks, you start to see the big gap that is going to have to be filled. it is a tremendous challenge. when you look at isil's, the establish a goal that -- they are trying to establish a state. they do it by attacking the shia civilian population centers. what they are trying to do is provoke a reaction by shia initias which zarqawi wrote

2004. make the shia show their fangs and unite the sunni ranks behind our masses. that is what he is trying to do. at the same time, they attack and kill any sunni tribal leaders in their way in syria and iraq. as we have seen in the last 10 days, they will take on the kurds to establish what they need to establish their state. what we need to do is harness the forces of all these groups. there is a common enemy here. the cooperation we are seeing among the iraqi government and the kurdish forces including the iraqi air force providing tactical air support for kurdish forces engaged in combat, which is a fairly extraordinary thing, we want to keep that cooperation going. it is going to require all communities in iraq to come together on a common plan.

we are working very hard on it. if they do, we can provide them some assistance and support. >> there are those who have argued and made this point, that any jobn argued with not try tohadist, do create an islamic state and that dadi has gone too fast too far. does that resonate with you? >> yes. baghdadi is also very shrewd. he doesn't get ahead of the capacity of his organization. he timed the announcement to a point at which it would breed local resistance. arabs in iraq are not naturally inclined to be part of

some extremist caliphate based on a doctrine of seventh century islam. the capacity of isil and their ability to subjugate local populations was such that there hasn't been the kind of local resistance that you might have seen a year ago. where there has been local resistance, it has been crushed. it has been crushed with isil fighters putting heads on spikes. this is what they do to intimidate local populations. dottie is very shrewd that we are shrewd too. we are working with them now on what is going to be a long-term plan. we have to deny space and oxygen for this group to flourish. that will require supporting a rockys -- iraqis. it will require working with turkey and other international

partners to shut down the flow of foreign fighters. this organization is swollen and is going to be long-term. one reason we want to get an iraqi government is to engage and work with that government to do things that they will need to do to push back. >> do you have an opinion on the idea that if there had been more support for syrian rebels, that iss would never be where it today? >> i know there are different views on that. i leave it to historians. we are dealing with the situation we have. as i said, it is trying to help the iraqis control sovereign territory and that means harnessing security structures and local populations to protect their people and make sure that isis can't establish a governing zone of authority. >> can you help me understand,

what other possible options for the united states to help stop isis beyond what it is doing now? one example would be sending more sophisticated military equipment to the government. >> that is part of it and we are doing a lot of that. when the president spoke to the american people in june, we moved very expeditiously after mosul fell. difficult to know what was happening. it was full of rumors and friction. deploysident moved to special forces teams in and around baghdad to get an eyes-on look at the iraqi insurgents. we have a much better picture now of this organization and what it might take and we are

working very closely with the iraqis on equipment. they definitely want more training. that is something we have to work with the new government on. in the north, we have two very limited military missions. it is the first time we have .truck isis with some affect it has proven to be quite effective, particularly on the north side of sin jar mountain. the iraqis have some capacity to do these things. they have a rudimentary capacity to use missiles with real president. -- precision. this is not just a military approach. it is a political approach. we are still focusing on getting some political consolidation, getting a national program in place which can guide us into 2015. >> what can you do that you are not doing that you will be able to do once the political process

has been formalized and isstallized and operational? >> our efforts will be in support of a national iraqi strategy. that is just essential. even when we did the surge in early 2007, when president bush went to the american people, it was coming behind an iraqi land. for the u.s. to do things in designf an iraqi approach is not going to be particularly effective. it is difficult because the political process was right in the middle of the end of one government, having to form another one. very difficult to get that consolidated national approach. with a new government, we have a real chance to do that through a national program. it will allow us to come in and support the iraqis in that

program. ,f we were to do things now without that kind of consolidation, it would prove fairly difficult. >> when you look at the players today, did we simply misjudge maliki? did we think he would be more inclusive? did we think he would reach out to the sunnis? did we believe he was interested in that kind of iraq? >> iraq is so difficult. they are tough guys from a tough place. well when done fairly it comes to national elections in 2010 and in this last election. he does have a locally rooted support base. the country is a very difficult country to govern. we have pressed him extremely hard and made clear when we thought he was doing things that

were not particularly useful. objectivear ago, our was to make sure the elections on april 30 happened. they happen on time with international supervision and led to a credible result. that was not a foregone conclusion, that that would happen. elections in the middle of last summer. that.ke out against those elections eventually happened. our focus was making sure those elections happened, which set up a process for transition. and youd a story today may not want to comment on this, in which maliki was in some kind of means signing a forces agreement and was supposed to be signing with the president, and just moved his hand over the paper and did not sign it. you were in the room and you said, do not screw around with the american president. >> i was in the room when that happened.

forll leave the anecdotes some of these books. i was there when that happened. >> i assume that is a confirming yes but i will go to another question. the president calls you into the oval office. you know more of the players than anybody around. people like petraeus and ron crocker. in today's government, with the experience you have had, the president says to you, tell me the risk here for the united states. to our the threat national security? what do you tell him? >> excellent question. we have that conversation. territo est in the rial integrity of iraq, is that fundamental? we are looking at u.s. interest.

in iraq, a vital u.s. interest is at stake. strategyat royal, our to take one million barrels of oil off the international hadets, iranian oil, that to be replaced somewhere. it was replaced with one million barrels of iraqi oil. that is number one. al qaeda, isil is al qaeda. it is a global jihadist organization. it is swollen with foreign fighters and suicide bombers. up toq, that there can be 50 suicide bombers a month. these are foreign fighters who come into syria to join a global jihad and they are directed to iraq to kill themselves and commit mass murder. that funnel of suicide bombers, they don't say, i am going to do my jihad in iraq. they will go wherever the

organization tells them to go. that could be capitals in the region, in europe, and god forbid, it could be here. also, the expansionist tendencies of iran. iran definitely has huge influence in iraq. you can see why. we also have some mutual interests with the iranians when it comes to iraq. we have to be mindful of that and pragmatic. it affects our domestic economy and the global economy. ourthreat of al qaeda to friends in the region, europe and potentially here, getting a handle on this very dangerous expansionist organization of isil, and of course the expansion of some of the morn a fairy guest tendencies of iran. everything comes to a head in iraq. if iraq were to implode into civil war or anarchy, the fx would not only be the expansion of global jihadist al qaeda

groups, but also a real economic impact here in our own gdp at home. we have to be focused on it. the president is focused on it. on top to bottom in the u.s. government, this has daily attention. as we speak, when i leave here today i will be going to meetings on what to do in the north to roll back some of the isis gains. sobrett mcgurk, thank you much. i hope we can do it again. it is one of the most important national security concerns in the united states for this moment. we will be right back. stay with us. ♪ >> we continue with our discussion of the threat proposed by isis. washington,rom david kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency senior adviser.

here in new york, michael hanna, a senior fellow at the foundation and bill spindle, middle east bureau chief for the washington journal. let me begin with something you had said, michael. assessment on iraq has to be one of interest and threats. buttics can't locate doesn't change those things. is the politics of iraq changing so it will make a more effective response to isis? >> it is getting there. we are still at the start of this process. signals that he appears to be going along, but is still trying to hold out, looking at the supreme court perhaps as a way out. it is a matter of time. he doesn't have the political support on the ground. the question is, whether you can time the politics with the security. the security situation is a serious one that is not going to wait for political progress. it is clear that political progress is a necessary step.

there is this military component that is going to be indispensable in trying to blunt the forward momentum of isis. >> where did you see that at this moment? military threat. >> airpower has had an impact. i don't think we should exaggerate how much it can do what it can do is limit the ability of isis to conduct these surprise attacks, which clearly caught the kurdish forces offguard, and led to this scramble. this was a similar thing to what happened in mosul. >> with the iraq army? >> absolutely. we can hope that airpower will blunt the ability of isis to really expand beyond where it is now. there were fears about the capital of kurdistan falling. and worries about what would happen further south towards

baghdad. airpower might be able to limit the expansion. what it cannot do is dislodge isis, particularly from places like mosul. >> david, this is the same question i asked brett, which is, what is the possibility and the likelihood that the sunni tribes will not support isis now if there is a different government in baghdad? and will therefore as happened in the awakening, be an effective force against jihadists? >> i think it is highly unlikely you will see the tribes support a new iraq e-government. recall, the awakening in 2007 was the fifth attempt of those tribes to throw off al qaeda in iraq. in previous attempts, it failed

because there was no government partnership to work with. it was only the u.s. forces in iraq that allowed that to work. calculus out towards the syrian border, they have to be looking at the relative balance of forces. whoever is in power in baghdad, there isn't the ability to turn against isis and survive at this point. the first thing that is needed is a change in military balance before the political options open up. >> so it is a question of survival and they are not going to challenge isis unless they know they have enough support? >> i think that is right. i agree with the point that was just made. the introduction of airpower in the campaign changes the tactical calculus for isis. they can no longer run these blitzkrieg style assaults.

it has pushed them into the population centers. they are hiding among the population. that makes it very hard to dislodge them without some kind of ground force. right now there is no ground force in iraq that can push isis out of the area. it is not just population centers. it is also infrastructure. dams, oil fields, roads. this is a much broader issue than just the military fighting around mount sinjar. awouldn't even say it is proto-state, it is a state. >> it is a state? do you agree with that? still feel more like it is a movement but it definitely has infrastructure and -- >> command and control? >> not just command and control,

but a civilian infrastructure in many ways. for all the brutality that they have committed and all the massacres they have done, they have also shown remarkable practical strength both in syria thato some extent in iraq has allowed them to keep control of these areas. >> i couldn't agree more. they are governing the areas they have taken. they have the fighting ability of al qaeda but the political ability of hezbollah. they have hospitals, courts, schools. they have a judicial system. they are collecting taxes. they are issuing title deeds for property. they are exercising all the governance functions you would expect of a state. they controlled the territory and that territory is expanding. functionally, they are dramatically more dangerous than

al qaeda ever was. >> they are still able to do most of that simply because they arrived in a situation where the normal population was living in chaos and insecurity. they have been able to deliver some bare minimum of normalcy. as long as everyone is aware that if they leave, there is going to be a worse situation, they will probably be able to continue. how sustainable is that? that is a long way off. >> where do we think syria is right now? assad is trying to retake aleppo. is he likely to do that or will the rebels with stan his attack? >> it depends on input from the outside. rethinking aleppo, much like the siege, would take months and months, maybe years. ,eing able to encircle the city

and if they were able to do that to aleppo, it would be a huge .low to the free syrian army these are inchoate groups not under common control. ihe non-isis jihad opposition, losing aleppo or putting it out of the battle, would be a huge loss. what we see now, more broadly, is that efforts to have the qa taris and other players be more supportive in terms of finances seen the-- we have official franchise, the islamic , these groups are suffering at the moment. what has happened is that this has opened up space for both isis and the regime, because the increase in support to fsa

groups has not kept pace. our policy at the moment is creating room for both isis and the regime to make military gains. >> our policy toward syria? >> absolutely. we have a clear, sequential set of steps that we can take with local partners in iraq. we have something like a coherent policy and merging. the big gap is that this is not a discrete set of problems. this is a cross-border problem. the international boundary between iraq and syria is no longer. >> let me bring another country into this iran. what is it doing both in iraq and syria? >> in both cases, going back a bit, it was behind maliki, it was behind assad. it is still completely behind assad irrigate it has bailed out on maliki.

to turn that around. a lot of this really revolves around syria. way brett hard, the mcgurk was talking, it is virtually impossible to solve the isis problem in iraq without solving the isis problem in syria. that boils down to how assad gets dealt with and where we go from here. one big turning point now is if the fsa disappears, if the join isis,ive up or then you basically have isis and the regime within syria, what will happen then? will they fight it out? will the regime lay a productive role in one way or another? he sees that as his way out of this. i suspect the iranians will try to push him -- i was in iran recently and they pushed aside

as your guide to solve the ice is problem. you're saying, let assad be assad. david? the critical factor here is the relationship between the iranian government and the new iraqi government. succeed in destroying isis, but if we don't also break the nexus between the iranian government and the iraqi government, the results of that success could be iranian controlled territory from western afghanistan to the heights. it would be hard to spin that as a success. i think that the russians and iranians are in a very strong strategic position now, largely a cause of the rise of isis.

talked about fighting against al qaeda, at that time he was making it up. he is not anymore. we are in a very messed up strategic situation. i don't see a u.s. strategy. what i see is a crisis response to the situation in iraq, that is largely driven by baggage relating to our own conflict there between 2003 and 2011. that is one way to look at it. i think a more important way to think about it is a geographical spillover of the war in syria. that is where our policies lack coherence. >> what should be done to make it coherent? >> i don't think we should back assad against isis. we should deal with isis first and think about what comes next with respect to assad. >> i suspect you will see

something comparable to what has happened in iraq in the last couple of weeks. you see i ran and the u.s. aren't working together, but sure they were coming to the same conclusions. these two countries have now worked, maneuvered around each other for a long time. they can telegraph what the other side is going to do. they didn't work together, but they arrived at the same place. david, can you imagine any military or strategic private channels between iran and the united states? >> i can imagine that. i don't have any specific information about it. 2007, was in baghdad in we were in talks with the iranians. the iranians are all over north africa and the middle east. they have a state-based view of this challenge. opposed tory heavily

this new organization. we do have common interests, but that doesn't mean we are on the same side. >> in the simplest terms, could they join together to defeat isis and then say, now we have separate stakes? we want a out and you don't want him out. whiche gotten rid of isis neither of us wanted. >> i suppose it is possible, but that is beyond where we are now. there is a massive challenge of organizing some kind of response right now. >> tell me what that ought to be. >> i think what we need to look at here is some kind of campaign on the scale of kosovo or afghanistan in 2001, a campaign that is primarily air-based, but air power alone can't defeat a group like this. you also need troops on the ground. arming and supporting the kurds

as the french are doing and we are doing, is a key part of that. the tribes is another component and so is the iraqi state. you need to have some significant ground force. otherwise they can disburse and avoid the airstrikes. in afghanistan in 2001, on december 7, when the last taliban stronghold fell, there were only about 400 american special forces people in country, but there were 50,000 theans fighting against taliban. unless you have that scale of ground forces and a willingness to have advisors and support, and people designating the airstrikes, very difficult to get where you need to get with air power alone. you said earlier you don't think the u.s. has a strategy. it seems that is exactly their

strategy, what you just outlined. >> i don't know if we are there yet. we have gotten to the point where the administration made the case that this requires that kind of attention. i think we are likely to see that. i think we should see that. this isn't simply a question of a terrorist organization embedded in a twin insurgency. now, a real threat to international order. we can't simply step aside. of course, we haven't seen the administration and the case in those terms that could sustain that kind of engagement. >> you are saying they don't make it public or they don't make it internally? >> i think both. >> how do you think we are going to get out of this? >> i think the first step was to stop the bleeding and make sure that we didn't see further expansion that would threaten core interests. >> to mind with humanitarian.

>> absolutely. that really drove a crisis response. >> militarily, isis has to be bottled up. they are reaching their natural expansion limits. it is not just a military strategy. they have got to get a political strategy to work step-by-step with it. strategy and political strategy have to be in lockstep. >> i can make the case as to why there needs to be this very significant response. the point is though, it is going to require leadership from western countries to take that action. it is not something that can be done cleanly. to make the case for a minute, in addition to this that everybody is focused on in sinjar and iraq, this week in metca, a group of jihadists to decide whether to throw their lot in with the islamic state

instead of al qaeda. a similar thing happened in yemen. we have several hundred foreign going in and out of this conflict. they have white faces and western passports. they have no previous connections to jihad. there is a land boundary between this conflict and nato. we are talking about a very substantial threat to western democracies arising from this conflict. we are talking about a group that has hundreds of billions of dollars. it has heavy tanks, heavy vehicles and heavy weapons. it is controlling territory. this is a threat that is dramatically larger than anything we have ever seen from al qaeda. it is beginning to overtake al qaeda. it is like a snowball running downhill. people see the military success

-- >> 100 them to that, this global topetition -- one addendum that, this global competition might create perverse incentives. that is to shore up credibility. qatar might be goaded into launching an attack to shore up its credibility. this might set in motion some really problematic dynamics. >> how did baghdadi pull this off? what enabled him to do this? >> baghdadi was picked up in 2004 as a minor player. the original leader of al qaeda in iraq, when he was killed in 2006, amongst his pockets was found a map of baghdad with a circular ring of terrain around the outside of the city. his strategy that he outlined was to cut baghdad off from the

outside world and conduct operations to terrorize the shia and get them to attack the sunnis, which would cause the sunnis to coalesce behind al qaeda. what baghdadi is doing is rewriting that zarqawi strategy. existingcked up an playbook and he is running that. was absolutelyq hopeless at administration, governance, getting people alongside. baghdadi have done is, has been able to trade the administrative elements of the state. it is like the fighting capability of al qaeda with the administrative city of hezbollah. people engaged in the syria campaign have experienced with has below. -- hezbollah.

>> that was the big chance he took. they were out in the desert and they were presented this opportunity to move into syria. >> an opportunity to become something. >> there is no way to understand iraq without syria. it has been years in the making. the organization and its ideology has been in place for some time. their ideas were fantastical when they were degraded to a terrorism problem. 20/20 hindsight is easy to have. could the united states have made a difference and therefore we wouldn't be looking at isis today? >> there was a window of time before this was an insurgency. ofm 2011 until june or july 2011, this was a broad-based publicly driven civilian democratic movement across

syria. it was brutality by assad's regime that turned it into an insurgency. initially it was much more like what we saw in egypt. at that time, a diplomatic push and strong engagement by the u.s. and other western countries might have made a difference. we certainly created the conditions by our inaction. even before the formation of the free syrian army, way back at the beginning point, we had an opportunity to intervene and we did nothing. >> i am doubtful that that would have made any difference. i think the assad regime made it very clear that they were not interested. they received substantial outside backing from the iranians and the russians. there was no opening in those early days for diplomacy. i think we were right to try at the time through the first

geneva process that ultimately failed. the calculations of the assad regime have been unwavering from the start of the uprising of syria in 2011 until today. that hasn't changed. >> we are going to try to defeat these people and not negotiate as long as we are losing? >> they have defined victory down. they are willing to cede much of the countryside to rebel groups. i think they and mentioned that they will collapse under the burden of trying to administer territory without resources. the are trying to fight for an urban belt and they are fighting to a strategy. the rebels are not. the only parties fighting to a strategy in syria are the regime and isis. >> a bit? >> you can go back to march, 2011. the wife of the president was

contacting people in qatar. they were looking for a diplomatic deal. there was a period where they were open to a different way than they ever actually talk. change botha real on the rebel side and the regime side during that year of 2011. people becoming more extreme and away from, polarizing what was originally a more diverse center. a lot of the people who led the early phases of the uprising in syria were sidelined by more militants and extreme groups. i am not saying we could have reversed it, but the point is that we are currently looking at what is happening in iraq through the lens of our own baggage. there is a whole other set of factors that are much more around syria and i think that is what has given the breath of life to al qaeda.

it has now recovered in a whole new life. i disagree with what brett mcgurk said earlier. isis is not al qaeda. they hate each other. they have been fighting each other in syria. they are very different. although they are just as brutal as each other and have similar ideology, this is a turf battle. if isis comes out on top, it look more dangerous. >> isis has this advantage in that it has this huge battlefield in which fighters can fight. it has largely been confined and bottled up -- they don't have that same recruiting. it can't give that opportunity for young men to come and fight.

>> not yet. possiblehis is the salvation of al qaeda. what is about to happen in afghanistan. if we make exactly the same mistake in afghanistan that we made in iraq and pull out completely, allow political vacuum, lose our leverage, it is possible that al qaeda, which has already acknowledged the authority of omar, that they could reinvigorate in afghanistan. then we would be looking at a much more dangerous circumstance. this tunnel vision that we have around mount sinjar, the danger of that is that we miss a much broader set of risks including the possibility of a resurgent al qaeda in afghanistan. don't you think the administration understands this? >> i hope they do.

i don't hear it coming from people. i don't see a single unified focus on this range of problems. what i see is crisis response. thing,his iraq-syria part of the problem is, it is very hard to see how you can go back to the status quo. all the policy before had been based on, let's get it back to the status quo or at least moved forward slowly. because of the isis presents now, that seems very unlikely to me. everybody is going to have to adapt to date changes while coordinating this massive fight against isis. >> one point on that, for everybody to adapt to those changes, this does offer some opportunity for a more coherent regional platform. when you have countries like saudi arabia and iran that are rivals regionally, both focused on the threat of isis, there is

an opportunity for some constructive regional diplomacy around this issue. it has metastasized and that really threatens regional security. >> as david said, certain ,nterests with the iranians even if we are not going to be friends with them, the interests do align often. >> thank you, bill. i do, michael. a bit, good to see you again. thank you for joining us. ♪

>> tonight, and appreciation of lauren bacall. she died on monday. she was 89. she was a fashion model when her photo was noticed on the cover of harper's bazaar. she was asked to screen test for a movie called isil." -- called "to have and have not ." t." it starred humphrey bogart who she would later marry. in a career that spanned 70 years, bacall became a movie star. she is considered among the last

of the screen goddesses of hollywood. she was awarded an honorary oscar in 2009. awardso won two tony for her work on stage. she wrote about her career in a series of autobiographies. the first won the national book award. she came on this program four times. here are some moments from those conversations. >> when i was a kid, i always wanted to play actor. i wanted to perform. i wanted to be on the stage. needed seems to me, it to be a total part of my being. no member of my family ever came even close to performing arts. >> where do you put up laws in the things you could have done in your career? at the very top? obviously "to have

and have not " for so many other reasons, but applause was something i thought i could do. >> if people want the friendship of betty bacall, they have to know what about you? >> they have to know how outrageous i am. [laughter] >> what does that mean? >> i believe that without laughter, there is no point at all. i think everything is a joke. that doesn't sit well with everybody. there are a lot of humorless people in the world that i don't want to know them. i can't imagine being a friend of anyone who has no humor. have a sense of humor and not take yourself seriously. you have to take your work seriously but not yourself. i think that wit is one of the guiding factors, one of the most

important things in any relationship. >> did bogey halfwit? >> and how. him forwas it about you? it was the highest emotional time of your life. >> i think i know the gifts that he had. among other things, a tremendous character and integrity. total integrity. andad great wit intelligence. many surprising qualities. he could not be bought. he knew the way to live life. >> what is the best thing he did for you other than making you very happy over those 11 years? -- mystressed even more mother always did, but he stressed even more than she did the importance of keeping your home fresh. just because you were together

for five years, 10 years, 50 years, it didn't mean that you had to begin to yawn. you had to find ways to keep it alive. >> did he never want to make a film with you after those two? >> yes, but he never would interfere in my career. he never would say, i want her in this movie with me. he would always leave it to the director. not going to get in the middle of your work. whatever you do, it is your choice. he would advise me if i asked for advice. otherwise, you deal with it yourself. at the end of a working day, you come home and that is the center of your life. >> how would you like to be remembered? >> you can remember me because of our great conversations and because you and i are on the same page as they say. theyhe chips fall where may. i am not going to be around to

worry about it. but i hope it is kind of positive in one way or another. >> lauren bacall, dead at 89. ♪

>> in the middle of the mojave desert. one of the most storied cities in the world. this is las vegas. where fortunes are won and lost, where lives are made and destroyed, where the house always wins. until it can't. >> a lot of pain and stress out here. >> one gambler preyed on the casinos in its weakest moments and walked away with more than $15 million in a single winning streak.