>> from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." >> joining me is a mike rogers. he has represented the eighth congressional district and is

chair of the house committee intelligence. in that role he is overseeing investigations into some of the most urgent matters facing u.s. national security. next month, he will leave and join cumulus. i am pleased to have him back on this program. welcome. >> see why so much. >> let's begin. why are you leaving the congress? >> is one of those opportunities to have a broader voice and reach millions of people a week. that part was attractive and the way lou dicky, the ceo of cumulus sold me, i need a guy with your experience on the radio talking. that sold it to me and allows me to branch out. congress can be a frustrating place to work sometimes. sometimes the politics are so small you wonder if we will ever be able to solve these issues. i thought maybe it was my chance to broaden the discussion and include more and put the pressure on congress to get down

to the major issues. >> how will it be different from other talk radio programs like rush limbaugh or others? >> here's the good news. there's plenty of room in radio for every type of show and style. my style is different. i will focus on things like american exceptionalism, the issues of the day and talk about in a way that tries to build coalition for success. my fear is we stopped believing in ourselves as a country in every day turn on the tv or open up the newspaper, there's some reason to believe that america is and what do used to be. i think our best days are ahead of us and i want to have that conversation. >> i have general questions about america and our relationship to various regions of the world and opportunities

you have had to travel and talk to leaders. let me begin with the question of the senate report, the feinstein report. you are opposed to release of it. >> i am strongly. when people -- foreign leaders say it might -- and likely will incite violence in their countries when foreign intelligence officials that if the u.s. has varying degrees in relation is saying it will incite violence against westerners overseas when our own intelligence community say it is a high likelihood. not only saying it, they are trying to prepare indices for security and find ways to protect individuals working overseas. i would say, maybe it is worth it if there's a big cause that will be reached here with the release of the report. the problem is, charlie, all of this has been debated. over a decade ago, this program

ended. there's lots of public reports and ambassador pickering did a 600 page review and that is public. the department of justice did an investigation and did not find any criminal wrongdoing. investigation and to not find criminal wrongdoing. senate changed the law. there was no way it could happen again. i do not understand why we would do it knowing all of these people are saying there is really risk of inciting violence and getting americans hurt. >> where is john mccain on this? >> i am not sure. i have not heard any public statements where he is what i've heard folks say he has mixed emotions but will likely see the report go forward or would vote to have it go forward. again, this is as serious as it gets when you have these overseas folks, not just our foreignt it's allies saying it will incite

violence and think about what happened with the woman in the bathroom in dubai, an american woman killed because she was american. think about the reaction of the cartoons in the danish newspaper that invite is incited violence. imagine what something with the propaganda machine of isis that is very effective. that's what i think the totality of that tells me you have to ask really hard questions, what did you hope to gain that has not been accomplished? it does not even have to be accurate, you have to as really hard questions. >> was in the answer? >> i don't get it. not wante, well, we do to see it happen ever again. we have invested a lot of time and this, or we have invested a lot of money in this. that is really at not to that to much information from this different party and we know it will happen and they are saying they are preparing. i had one cia official, who is always activists fear of the conflict we have had, a great american who looked at me as said, the sad part is know i will lose people because of this

will have to fight our way through it. that is no way to treat these people who are overseas trying to do the right thing to protect the country. if you can clearly say there's a policy that needs to be changed and is the only way to do it, we have already changed the policy and had a department of justice investigation. again, with a public report by ambassador pickering. they do not to need -- they do not need to know this granular detail that will only be used by counterintelligence services of our adversaries and terrorist groups like ices to propagandize against a american's. >> president bush was opposed to the release. in the last several days, doesn't want to see the cia made a scapegoat, he said. >> candidly, i agree with him in this case. i will tell you why. if you say we have to, get these questions answered, you are

rightly so. there has been a review. congress is already active. we have already debated about this. this did not happen last week, it happened over a decade ago and it was ended because of the public debate and america's saying maybe it was too far even after 9/11's folks were empowered by law to have an enhanced interrogation program to save american lives. i think it would be wrong to put in the next generation of cia officers at risk to prove a point that we've already made an already agreed will not happen again. that is what my biggest concern is. >> is there any evidence that this cia lied or misled the president during this time? >> is not that we can tell. .t is the semantics of wording they argue, and maybe you said it too strongly. all of that substantiated by evidence.

all of it is not to substantiated by one single interview of people in the program. not one. they took cables. as an investigative reporter yourself and a former fbi agent in my time, you can never come to the right decision if you do -- do not putt us context around what you are talking about. >> is the reason they want to make it public because they want to have a public debate on torture and altered things considered to be torture? or is it because of some other reason? >> i do not know. obviously, i do not want to describe any motives to what they are trying to do. i think they want to explain themselves when they released a report. it is really important to remember is specially people who are watching this, we've had this debate. it is not about a new debate we

have not had. we've had the debates. we've changed the law. remember, they had that whole debate to over whether they would use the army field manual as the basis for interrogations overseas. i argue that was right. it was proper. the debate was right. i disagree with making public what we did or did not do. it was the right and proper debate to have about the role interrogations play. we had that debate. the department of justice investigated and now they are saying, some 10 years later, we spent a lot of time and effort, and we need to know so to show we are transparent. we have been transparent. no one is been more transparent. we say, what is the consequence? what is the consequence of releasing this report? is it worth one flag draped coffin on the way back from a great american who was either a diplomat to order a military official that is killed as a result of inciting violence by either isis or some other terrorist organization overseas?

i believe it is not. it could not reach that standard because we have already had his debate. >> and you believe the cia lied to the white house or congress at all or misled them? >> there was certainly problems that happened in the program. they had some management issues in the first four months of the program. i do not believe that anyone intentionally lied. i do not believe it. i did not see any evidence that somebody deliberately lied to congress. they had briefed congress. i know that took members who were on this committee before me were briefed about the programs, and nobody raised an effort at the time. you have to scratch your head and say, why do you believe now that they lied a you did not interview one of them? in order to get to that conclusion that someone lied, i think you have to have testimony. bring them in an address card questions, including the people

that were in the chain of command and including the operators if you are going to do a report like that. none of that happened. how you come to the conclusion? i do not think it is fair because it is not a thorough investigation. >> the committee argues that there was a criminal investigation and they cannot -- therefore they could not interrupt it and interview these figures. >> shouldn't they do it now before releasing the report for smart that is a great question. maybe they should hold it until they do the investigation. i think it has all been done, but if you want to spend more time and effort, at least what you should do if you are going to go and call somebody out saying they engaged in criminal behavior, you should prove it. it had been proven by doing a thorough investigation. maybe they want to do it. that would be ok. to release him if the charge and

not have an investigation, i do not think that is right. you may in fact jeopardize lives overseas. >> a question john kerry raised as well. >> he did. >> who has read the report so far? >> well, it was confined it to the senate, in guy think the senate committee mostly. the 400lowed to read 99-page executive summary. so i did read that. the whole report is 6000 pages and a compilation of cables, a report from one person to another about what was happening or what they thought was happening on the ground for your data compiled all of that. i do not see any purpose for releasing information that i believe given to what is out in public and counterintelligence can put together. i think you jeopardize unnecessarily the compromising of individuals or relationships that will have a long-term damage to the united states of america. i just it -- i do not think this

is a good idea. >> i did not read the report, but i heard there are those who said that one of the intent of the report is to suggest that they didn't learn anything from the torture, the waterboarding or whatever characterized as torture at the time. they didn't learn any thing from it. >> yes, i have to say, the people i talked to in the agency, in the cia on close around the program passionately dispute it. not one of them had the opportunity to testify about why they believed it and why just reading a memo does not necessarily tell the whole story. again, that is one the great shortfalls of this report. >> the other argument is made often that we need to have a debate on torture in this country. you are saying we have had this debate as i understand? >> yes. remember a few years back, i cannot remember the year

exactly, but it was after the program had been shut down. highll shut down the george w. bush, and then there was a debate about what we used and it was adopted at that time through a debate and discussion on that very public disclosure, that they would use the army field manual. i think they adopted the army field manual as a way to conduct interrogations into the future. there are people who disagreed. my opposition at the time it was why would we tell to we are or are not going to do? we had that debate it went through their rigorous debate. and to say we do not have that debate, it can't be accurate. we changed the program. we abandon the program as say they cannot do it and adopted the army field manual. barack obama, by the way in 2008, put out an executive order that said he would never reignite that particular room at any time. i do not know how much more you can do and have that public -- program at any time.

i do not know how much more you can do and have that public , and again, no one is asking, what is the consequence of releasing that that information. again, isn't worth one person coming back with a flag draped across his coffin? i argue it is not. i do not know how they can argue it is. >> on the benghazi report, changing to another report. what were the conclusions? >> the conclusions were some wanted a complete exoneration of all players from the president down to the folks in benghazi, didn't do that. some wanted damnation from the president of the united states who was on the phone to the people in the benghazi compound, and he did not do that. what i tried to do based on my experience as an fbi agent, i

have worked cases involving murder and extortion and bank robberies, one thing i know about a high adrenaline, chaotic, that event is sometimes testimony can differ over the same event. it does not meet one person is being dishonest but the recollection is a little different. i took all of that testimony and all the other avenues of source information i could find, overhead video, time stamped cct video, investigative material, eyewitness testimony on the record. both from the contractors being more public to the security contractors were working for the united states government throughout the world and putting together. if i cannot multiple source every finding as i told everyone, it is not going to be a political document. it pointed out some shortfalls at the agency. it pointed out that there was no

grand conspiracy from the people on the ground. it was narrowly focused. the cia and intelligence operations in libya leading up to the event to see if there was criminal wrongdoing or malfeasance or intelligence failure. it basically lays out a case in 14 findings. i encourage people to read it. the media reports were not exactly accurate. one side said exoneration and one side said it must be a terrible report. only in washington can you get that much and nobody has read the report. i am encouraging people to get a detailed understanding of exactly what is in it. >> let me quote lindsey graham. >> i forget exactly what he said, maybe you remember. >> i do not believe it is accurate given the role mike morel has played. why didn't the reports say that? >> full of crap is a technical term meaning it is accurate, full of facts.

there was talk about morale's role in the case. the other condemnation was if some witnesses did not get interviewed and that was true. there were even department of defense or state which was beyond the jurisdiction of my committee to investigate. a lot of people thought it was going to be the big mother load -- motherlode of investigation. it was narrowly tailored. it did not get into the other questions but it still leaves questions open. lindsay is a good friend of mine. maybe i friendly-ribbed him that either grab wine or coffee in the morning to sit down and read the report would really be worth the time. nobody comes out in great shape candidly. it isn't some -- examines every body as i said or damnation to everyone. it is fair and multi-sourced corroborative.

i encourage people to read before they make comments. >> as you know, some people in anticipating clinton's run for presidency believed what happened during benghazi might be a difficult issue for her. some are saying this report takes that down as an issue. >> i do not believe so. because one thing the report did find there's been no questions answered from the state department or the national security council of the white house which is beyond my jurisdiction. one of the things we touched on the report because we heard it from security contractors on the ground, and that the work with the state department and individuals in the annex. they told them you are not secure.

we will not co-locate with you because this place is not secure. they told him you are not prepared to defend, both experience and the way they were configured and you need more people. they were told, we've asked for help. we were told were not going to get any help. somebody make a decision and the state department and i do not know how high it goes. if there is an investigation nation makes a determination. somebody needs to be held accountable for not meeting the demands of the security force on the ground. that was a big problem that was highlighted. it was out of my jurisdiction. again, the notion it takes it off the table, i am not sure it does. that's what the select committee will probably look at. >> a question about you and not in terms of the benghazi report for the question of edward snowden. where are we on that? what damage you believe edward snowden did the united states? >> i think was long-lasting and

serious and we are trying to mitigate. it is important to remember about 95% of everything you stole from the united states was not about any nsa program, the telephone worker program or any of that. it had military strategy and tactical information when it comes to intelligence. it had nothing to do with what he claimed he was doing to expose a wrongdoing by the national security agency. that information -- >> should the united states offer him an incentive to come back and testify? >> i do not know. the damage is real. one of the things he did that really bothers me to this day is the cause of the information that he's stolen at some of it was leaked, we believe some of it is moving around to different intelligence services. it has to do with force

protection of the men and women who serve in uniform. i can tell you that some are trying to collect information to -- in places has been impacted by that theft and makes their lives were at risk because of that. >> has anything happened to anybody because of the snowden to report as far as we know? >> you can't say because we do not have this particular collection and something happened and if you recall what happened in afghanistan with the bombing attacks. i can tell you before that, collection we cannot get because there were changes made based on material that snowden stole. i cannot tell you for sure that's why it got through.

but you can say, hey -- this was lost -- we had this wave of attacks. i do not know how far we have to draw this line. that's why you do not allow traitors to still information -- steal information they don't understand and pass it to people who will use it against the united states. it got lost in the debate about how serious the consequences are and provided to the public and we believe to unfriendly intelligence services. >> i've talked to people about the rise of isis. do you believe that in the country was well served by what the cia knew and what they told the president about isis?

>> as chairman, i get a lot of the raw information and understood a couple of things. a, we had foreign government leaders, sunni led, many of them to the united states and said we have this growing extremist problem in eastern syria. we knew that and they said we need help. we knew we saw this fight going but between baghdad he and also query. and a leader who was in charge of what he called the islamic state and syria. and we saw all of that willing. some would say, you do not tell us they were going over the berm in syria on this day or this week. that is true but strategically we saw it happening in the intelligence community was reported. because i then made a wrong decision by saying we are not going to do that and they were only asking for logistical and intelligence support and weapons training and other things, i

thought they made a mistake. i do not think it justifies and saying you did not tell me exactly what was happening. the trouble was brewing. that is what policymakers are challenged to do the right thing or live by the consequences of your decisions. that part didn't happen. we need to understand it is not perfect. it is not a crystal ball. are you providing enough warning that something bad is going to happen? they did that. >> what shall we do now about isil and what strategy would you recommend and what action would you recommend that the president do? >> currently, we do not allow special operators to join friendly units we may have trained to collect veteran intelligence to make sure the units are training better.

to coordinate targeting and logistics packages for these fighters. that would be immeasurably helpful to the units to make them more effective fighters and stay on target. that should be an easy thing to do. it gets back to the semantic debate, is it a boot on the ground or have we embroiled ourselves in another conflict? that is our leverage. if you don't do something like that, you have to wrestle with the decision. i think it is a bad idea. that would be one of my first doubts. i would around some of the weapons training. we need to get turkey back in the fight. it is wrong they sat on the sideline and watched some pretty awful things happen right over the edge of their border without getting involved. they are a nato partner and they need to perform. we need to ask them tough questions and maybe if they want to remain in nato if they are not willing to stop this civilian slaughter right across

the border. >> do we have in this country and intelligence service right across from cia to nsa and wherever else it might be found that is performing at the level that the president and the congress ought to expect? >> well, i think they do. they have certain capabilities we have added our own hurdles for certain political philosophies. we have injected difficulties to disrupt operations overseas. we are going to have to have a debate in this country about what we want our intelligence services to do. i am not, the rdi report. if they have the ability to disrupt terrorist activities and great intelligence and a great track record, shouldn't we make it easier for them to do that given the fact would've made this policy and that's what we

want to do? i don't think we are there yet. what we have is you can do it and do these five things but not in these five things when it comes to stopping terrorist attacks. i'm not talking about the five things would all find reprehensible. five things that would work wire temple and speed, keep at it and make a decision quickly. if we could get those back, they would perform even better than they have been. they are doing a pretty good job from keeping them back from the shores of the united states and a pretty good job of allowing information to flow to our european allies which have disrupted attacks. the challenge is you cannot ask them to come up with intelligence in syria or go near

it. to do it. >> i've had people sit at the table and say to me, yes, we understand assad is the enemy he is but we have to take on isil first. yes, you can hold him responsible but right now we have to take isil and reduce them immediately. >> if you want a peaceful solution or relatively peaceful, you gave it that assad has to go. without bloodshed and that portion of it would be a huge success and be the dream of every diplomat. that peace can happen but you have to set the table for that to be successful. i mean, if we aren't sure where having a successful, disruptive campaign against isis, assad is going nowhere and the russians or iranians.

the russians and iranians are propping up assad and making him feel very comfortable these days. you have to make the tables to make the options not very good for assad. we need to understand that moving forward. and you can and i do agree you have to do the disruptive activity. as many as 20,000 western past holders operating in iraq and syria under the isis banner or is banner. that's a huge national security problem. you have to do -- deal with that. the pressure is on to make the russians and assad think that are not going to survive. maybe i cut my deal now. >> john kerry said we might have an agreement with the iranians in terms of the nuclear negotiations in three or four months. are you optimistic? >> unfortunately, i'm not. we've seen issues where we think

they are playing games. at the p5 plus one, after we extended the first time at before we gave a recent extension, they signed a deal with the russians. that's a clear indicator to me that maybe we've got problems here. think about where the iranians are. they have influence and the sunni capital in yemen. they have undue influence in iraq. they are causing mischief in bahrain. our partners are really coming out of their chairs in frustration at this. all of that activity is going on a while they very narrowly are trying to get some deal that many of us think it's too generous for the iranians. when we started, we were not

going to allow them to enrich. they are taught about we gave the money back and in negotiating over how much you can enrich. how did that happen? >> what you think happens if there is no deal? >> the iranians will like to continue to give a little and get a lot as long as they can get away with it. i think sanctions need to change. i think we ought to reengage. i am tired them saying in order for me to continue talking, you have to give me a lot of money. that is not a win for us. there are certain facilities that will not allow us in. we know their ballistic missile is not touched by this agreement. we know they're continuing to improve and upgrade their capabilities while they're doing this discussion. again, we are already seeing conversations with other middle east partners, sunni led nations about how far they need to press their ability to enrich. we get this wrong, were going to have a nuclear arms race in the middle east. i cannot think of anything more terrifying. >> how many meetings have you

had with the president of the united states one-on-one since you've been chairman of the house intelligence committee dealing with all of these issues? >> one on one? none. >> you been in the situation room our general meeting but never one on one? >> that's worth -- that's correct. >> have you requested it? >> we have talked about being available any time. the president does not deal much with congress at all and not just republicans. my counterpart has not had the one on one meeting on the specific issues either you it is an interesting way. as a member of congress, just a member of the intelligence committee, i've probably had three or four individual meetings with president bush on national security issues and a whole host of other meetings and the situation room or broader group of members. it's not the same.

it's not his style. it's concerning to me. i want to work with the white house. i expressed my concerns through the appropriate channels. to me, is not the best way to conduct national security. i think he can out more friends and allies in tough situations if he reached out more. maybe next year he will do that. >> congressman mike rogers, thank you. good luck in your new profession. you are a young man, i assume you could come back to politics. >> i'm not saying no and i have an interest in playing my role in a positive way. >> thank you for joining us. we'll be right back. stay with us. ♪

>> conflict and aggression has dominated the story of u.s.-cuban relations. in 1961, the united states severed diplomatic ties with cuba and upheld an embargo. a new book called "back channel to cuba," it reveals a record of

dialogue between those sworn enemies. joining me are the authors, peter kornbluh and william leogrande. i am pleased to have both of them here. let me talk about the beginning. what were the lost opportunities? why haven't we had a better relationship with cuba after all of these years? >> we've missed a couple of opportunities. there was an opportunity at the beginning for the united states to coexist with fidel castro's revolution. we had an ambassador who work hard and 1959 and 1960 to see if

he could find common ground. that did work. relations were broken. after the missile crisis, there was an opportunity of because the cubans were upset with the soviet union and president kennedy opened a secret channels to see if there was a possibility of normalization. that effort ended with his assassination. fast-forward to the ford administration, an effort by hearing is adjourned to normalize relations as part of the overall structure. that was interrupted when the cubans sent troops to angola. and probably the most important initiative, president carter actually ordered his bureaucracy to begin a process of normalization for the first year, things moved smoothly. and that was brought to a halt when the cubans sent troops into ethiopia. there been a number of opportunities.

events have intervened to prevent us from finally getting over this bilateral. >> how badly do the cubans wanted this? >> today, and i would like to see better relations. the interesting thing we found was that cubans have reached out to almost every president, even the most hard-line over the years with questions and gestures and messages of reconciliation. they want reconciliation on mutual respect, the revolution respected and not going to negotiate away their system of government. they have reached out to every president. the messages we found was fidel castro sending a secret message using a journalist to lyndon b. johnson. saying we want to continue talks with you and the difficult political year of 1964. castro sent a message to richard nixon, only 11 days after his inauguration. even though he knew nixon was a hater of the cuban revolution.

castro even reached out to ronald reagan a number of times and we found the documents in our research that showed the administration rejected these gestures as propaganda. today, it all adds up to a history and a willingness of cuba to be interested in better relations and maybe now is the moment. >> you think after the russians left, it would've been a much better opportunity for success. >> you would think so. but as you look at the history

and see the united states government has moved to the goal post during the cold war, they wanted to things. cuba to sever relations with the soviet union and stop sending training militants and guerillas in latin america and revolutionary movements and etc. once the cold war was over, we want to cuba to democratize and give up their own revolution in order to improve and normalize relations with us. >> and the other dimension was the cause of the soviet union collapsed in eastern european, though iraq -- and human economy was dire. it was only a matter time before fidel castro's government collapsed and they were not interested. >> as close as it came was? >> during the carter administration was. they sent troops to ethiopia and

it brought into a partial ending. >> did they know it torpedoing the efforts? >> they did and they hoped to revive them. over the next two years, even a little bit into 1980, the cubans and reached out to the united states and fidel castro freed 3000 political prisoners and their families and allow them to immigrate to the united states area all in an effort to resume process of normalcy. >> when the interesting things is we were able to sit down with former president carter and we talked to him and he had actually reached out a number of times and use a secret emissary and the ceo of coca-cola to send messages to castro saying are you interested in better relations give me your policy in africa. >> wasn't because he was from atlanta and knew carter? >> he was a good friend of jimmy carter and he wanted to see coca-cola back in cuba. he had already gone once and met castro.

one of the things president carter told us -- is that at the very end of the carter administration, carter offered castro a deal. the immigration crisis and in his second term, the carter administration sat down and talked about -- there was no second term. carter said to us, one of the most poignant statements in the book, if he had to do it all over again, he would've normalize relationships and not the guest he would have a second term to do it. and now postponed it. >> reagan was very opposed? >> he was a different element when it came to u.s.-cuban relations. >> even though reagan began his administration are ready to invade cuba and had the support of his and visors, he ended up negotiating a series of

agreements with the cuban government. to agreements on migration and negotiated around central even though the did not reach a positive conclusion. we negotiated an end to the conflict in southern africa and it took eight years of negotiations, the cubans were finally brought and to the negotiations by the reagan administration, assistant secretary of africa, cubans proved to be constructive. >> looking at it, all of history, do you blame the cubans or americans more? >> it depends, it was times when the cubans had higher priorities in their foreign policy that normalizing relations and they will work to willing to put those aside as quid pro quo for normalization. the remotes in the united states when we were so focused on the cold war or so focus of the politics that we weren't particularly interested. >> free to do in terms of how much the politics -- speak in terms of how much the politics there was a consumer to remove?

>> florida was the deciding factor in the race between bush and gore and seven by 500 votes that could get a cuban-american votes -- settled by 500 votes that could be cuban votes. al gore was concerned about the little boy returned to his father and he was worried about a cuban-american vote. and certainly since the end of the cold war and the reagan era, there was 20 years with florida politics were key to the issue of cuba policy. cuba thought it was a domestic issue rather than international. today, that has changed. it is no longer a political costs to be paid. >> at the same time, you might assume the administrations have maintained the pressure hoping they would get change of behavior in cuba? >> that's the interesting thing about the history. u.s. officials have repeatedly assumed an imperial mindset toward cuba and we push hard

enough and somehow they will capitulate. and do what we want. and the cuban revolution has essentially been built on a resistance of that very notion. and cubans have stood on principle. >> are we looking at a situation where nobody wants to focus on the betterment of cuba, u.s. relations? >> that has been a problem through the obama administration. even when obama was a candidate, he said the policy has failed and it is time to do something new. once he got into office, the press of other issues pushed cuba to the back of his agenda. it has stayed more or less on the back and what is interesting is that the seven summit is coming up.

cubans have been invited and they said they are going to come for the first time. castro and barack obama will be across the table, the first time a u.s. and cuban president have met in 50 years. now, they issue is on the president's agenda and he has to decide what is going to do. i think he will go to the summit. officials have not made a formal announcement yet but they seem to be indicating he will go. what you'll do at the summit and what he'll say to fidel castro we don't know. >> doesn't have to do with how long fidel castro lives? >> he's quite elderly now and much more frail. not integral to the dynamics of cuban politics. he's free to do whatever. but he's going to retire in two or three years. and turn the reins of power to

a non-castro -- so things are changing in cuba and that's part of the issue for u.s. policy now. are we going to stay on the sidelines of the embargo and not to be part of the effort to change both economic and eventually politically or are we going to build bridges that come with better relations? >> clearly, the politics of south florida have changed. no longer the hold of the democratic party. >> you see that reflected in the position that hillary clinton has taken in her free candidacy. just set the embargo against cuba is counterproductive to u.s. interests and she wants to see it listed, change -- lifted, change.

she know the votes are there for more moderate. and the money from big donors is there. >> what happens when the castro's goal? >> he was he a transition and the decision aching of the cuban government for not only will the castro's golf but that generation who made the revolution or against batista are set to go to your are going to have a generation of people born and brought up during the revolution but have a different outlook. >> there is the impression that raul has been more open to negotiations. >> i think that's right. no question and the same way gorbachev wanted to ended the cold war to restructure, the cubans are interested in normal relations with the united states so they can restructure. >> we saw putin. >> we did. i think putin's goal is to rebuild russia as a world power. the cubans are interested right now and what ever economic assistance they can get. i do not think the cubans want to go back to dependency they

had on the soviet union which cost them so dearly. >> lessons for the future would be? >> so many. one is that the whole idea of incrementalism and the u.s. approach to cuba, you do this and you do that has not worked. the quid pro quo, reciprocity, calibrated response. barack obama -- and the one lesson as he goes to the summit is that he should go with a package of changes in the u.s. policy rather than i'll do one thing a you do that and all of this will go down the line.

>> does anybody in latin america wants to see it? >> everybody in latin america. that it will boycott the next summit and i will not be another on less cuba is involved. cuba is involved. there is one more reason why it is imperative for barack obama to take this opportunity and latin american governments have afforded him to change the policy with cuba. the summit as a golden opportunity to raul castro to bury the hatchet and start a new chapter in relations. there is an american prisoner in cuba. a subcontractor and has been there for five years. i've seen him twice for a total of seven hours. >> has he been treated well? >> he's been treated well. he hasn't been abused there because he's high-profile prisoner. his mental state is such that he really does need to get out. cubans want to trade him for three cuban spies who had been in prison for 16 years. they want a humanitarian gesture. the lessons of previous

humanitarian prison exchanges that obama could use as a historical foundation. if anything were to happen to alan gross in a cuban prison, gets hurt, commit suicide, dies of a hunger strike, then the ability to move forward with real u.s. international or national interest are going to be compromised. >> what shall we expect next? >> the president goes to the summit of americas and has conversations with castro and hopefully, it's able to make a breakthrough on the issue of alan gross which is progress in -- obstructing progress in the past five years. as serious steps of putting the relation back in a normal. >> the possibility of democracy in cuba? >> over the long run -- 10, 15, 20 years. the kind of economic changes are

reducing the government' ability to control economy, to control social networks and creating what i would call the substructure of "it debates. you can see it in academic journals and the journal for the church. a much wider range of debate today than there was 10 years ago. >> how many political prisoners today? >> it depends on whose list you look at. probably at 100 or more. the strategy today on part of government needs not to sentence people to long jail time but arrest people and hold them for couple of days to disrupt their activity and release them.

>> "back channel to cuba: the hidden history of negotiation." william leogrande and peter kornbluh. thank you. thank you for joining us. see you next time. ♪

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