♪ >> from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." charlie: you have held as many -- if you have held -- few have

held as many high-level positions in the foreign service as bill burns. he was deputy secretary of state from 2011 to 2014. prior to that, he was undersecretary of political affairs and was u.s. ambassador to both russia and jordan. he holds the highest rank of the foreign service of career ambassador and is the second serving diplomat in history to become deputy secretary. he retired last year and is president of the carnegie endowment for international peace. i am pleased to have him at this table for the first time. it is great to have you. based on everything you know and as you see the world today, tell me what the threats are that you consider the most serious and immediate. bill: isil gets a lot of attention and is an important challenge for the united date and our coalition partners to focus on. there are a lot with aggression in the ukraine and the media challenge. there are a lot of overarching challenges. climate change and what that can mean as a genuine national

security problem overtime. -- over time. cyber issues. developing rules of the road not just in commerce but in national security for dealing with that whole set of issues. and we are reminded of that with the of bowl the crisis most -- ebola crisis most recently. that is an area where there has been a great deal of progress over the last two administrations. president bush 43 launched and president obama has continued, making a huge difference in the lives of people in africa and around the world. charlie: is the middle east the highest or does it have a special place for you? bill: it's a part of the world you never have the luxury of neglecting or ignoring. and i think, if you look at the challenge of disorder in the world, the old order we became accustomed to, a bunch of that is crumbling in the middle east today. you have the phenomenon of

failed or failing states, out of which extremist groups like i sil emerge. charlie: let's talk about that. the failed states are possibly syria, libya, yemen -- they are the most dangerous and that can happen. if you are a failed state, you have possibilities of al qaeda or someone like that finding refuge and taking power sources well. bill: it is a region that is is -- is uncertain. part of the challenge is puncturing of their image of success. there is not a place as uncertain as the middle east. stopping them stopping al qaeda

, it is important to demonstrate and expose the fact that they cannot succeed in governing in those areas of that they do control. it is like, kind of the eighth century playbook used by the leadership, delivering things the people want. people can find purpose and economic and political opportunities through other kinds of models. you need to show them these models. in iraq, it means appealing to the sunni arab community so they feel a sense of inclusion. and the iraqi government something they haven't felt in recent years. and then it's working with important partners whether it is jordan or tunisia, to develop compromise and help them succeed.

charlie: another success story. bill: it is a grim terrain right now but it's a reason to invest in those kind of aces and help desk places -- those kind of places and help them to succeed. charlie: the immediate threat of isis, whatever term we like to use, to stop their expansion into new territory. bill: and in iraq, there is clearly a strategy for beginning to first stop, and i think the momentum has been stopped. it is a huge challenge. there is bound to be a difficult struggle, but i think it is achievable. charlie: they will do it when they have the iraqi army on the ground? bill: it is a reasonable approach, i think. it will take time to rebuild and retrain the iraqi military.

i am confident that it is possible to roll back those gains. that is the security dimension of the challenge, which is extremely important. but there is a political dimension. it involves giving sunni arabs more of a sense of participation in the political system. charlie: but we had a change of prime minister's, so that makes a difference. bill: i think it has. large parts of the non-shia population i think the government is making a serious effort to be more inclusive. it will be absolutely essential. if there is to be enduring success against isis. charlie: i had the egyptian president here and it seemed, if all else fails, we have to stop isis and we should be prepared to provide troops in that effort. our coalition partners prepared to do that because isis is that kind of emergency?

bill: once they are trained and equipped, there is the potential to roll back. syria is a much bigger challenge. i think it will be important to look to other coalition partners as well as turkey to see what kind of contributions they can make overtime. charlie: will they be prepared to do it? bill: i think they recognize the threat. it is an encouraging sign and i think it will require that kind of sustained coalition to succeed. charlie: it comes down to the ground troops, doesn't it? and in iraq, you have the iraqi army. i understood susan rice, she was here recently, but everyone knows now because of the language she used but it seemed the top priority in syria has to be isil. then they can go back to whatever considerations they

have for the government. bill: i think it is the immediate threat and the priority. but it is difficult to disentangle the two. it is a magnet for, the regime for foreign fighters and others who flocked to isil. it is difficult to see a more stable future unless you have a transition of leadership in damascus as well. charlie: it is diplomatic. bill: i think ultimately -- there will have to be leverage on the ground to produce the circumstances in which you might be able to make progress diplomatically. charlie: meaning what? bill: meaning that the regime will my be able to sustain itself the way it is right now. whether the principal backers can see more clearly if they

want to see a stable syria, a syria that is not a platform for all sorts of extremist groups. it you have to see progress towards that kind of transition. charlie: ok, let me understand that. you really are as good a diplomat as we can find. what you have to do is you have to meet the challenge and support moderate ranks and whatever you can do to make them the primary focus of your attention. and you have to deal with it in a diplomatic way. are the russians and the iranians prepared to do that? and what do you have to do to encourage them to do that. bill: it is a good question and i am not sure at this point is either one can play that role. without a transition for leadership, i think that syria will remain explosive. if you look at russia and their internal challenges, the threat of islamic extremists, they are

ponderable and a lot of respects, so they should have an interest in this. but it is not evident right now that they share that feeling. charlie: with the, what do you think that his intention is with syria? bill: i don't think he has any sentimental attachment to us. i don't think he has been convinced yet. charlie: i think there was a point in time where he might lose, would russia have accepted him at that point? bill: there was a point in the

winter of 2012 or 2013 where the russians were a little bit nervous about the future. the balance on the ground started to shift against the regime. but then, they intervened in the serious way. and that kind of moment passed. i think we can re-create it in the future. the human suffering in syria is so horrific. half of the population is displaced. a huge challenge of reconstruction whenever that day comes. the sooner you have that traditional leadership, the better it will be. charlie: is it a battle of supremacy in the region? what is it? bill: i think it is competition with iran. i think with the assad regime on

the outside, i think he felt betrayed. that entered into it as well. it is a combination of factors right now, but the animus and the determination is quite clear. charlie: you have met with the iranians, tummy what you think about them and their intent, the nature of their country and the possibility for regime change. all of that. bill: when you look at the challenge of this regime not so much hamas. but first and the point of view of american policy, when you look at iran or the nuclear issue, you have to embed it in a strategy and be clear about the fact that it threatens us and our friends in the region. but within that strategy, it's extremely important to prevent the iranians to acquire the

-- from acquiring a nuclear weapon because it would multiply exponentially any of the dangers mentioned in the region. i have been convinced that the best of the available alternatives is through a strong and negotiated settlement. i think it is possible to reach that kind of a settlement, but by no means a sure thing. charlie: why do you think it's possible? bill: because we build up a fair -- built up a fair amount of leverage over the time. they have taken its toll on the iranian economy. i think in part we have demonstrated alongside the leverage a willingness to engage seriously, to work out with our partners, a settlement that would allow the iranians to have a civil nuclear program under sharp constraints.

i think it is possible to achieve that kind of a settlement. charlie: turn it around. if you were iranian, other than your reputation in the world, why should they do it? because they don't believe, i assume that they do not have a sophisticated sense that if we get weapons or cause for proliferation in the region, it's not good for us. so we will forgo our effort. bill: it is hard to generalize. the iranian regime has lots of points of view. they have some hardliners that have a very suspicious view of these negotiations as well. charlie: who represents the hardliners? bill: a lot of people around the supreme leader. charlie: what about him? bill: i think he has always been suspicious and skeptical of negotiations. suspicious of american motives.

i think we helped demonstrate in the interim agreement that both sides can comply and deliver on the commitments. that has created a pretty solid foundation for the much more difficult discussions right now. there is going to have to be an understanding of a long duration with a clear sense of what the consequences are if there are violations. there are restrictions. charlie: can sanctions be snapped back? bill: it is possible. i think when there is a reasonable length of time.

if iranian leadership ever tried to break out, there would be time to suppress that. if you have an iranian leadership that tries to do that, it is possible to constrain, in a very systematic way, iran's program. and to deter it from seeking out -- seeking to break out of that program. it is a tall order. the president said it is probably less than 50-50 and can be accomplished. charlie: i asked if this would be the crowning achievement, to susan rice, do you think it could be? bill: if the president along with our international partners could produce the kind of strong agreements that he has outlined and i have tried to describe, i

think it would be a significant achievement. it has to be embedded in a wider strategy for dealing with other aspects of iranian behavior. they still cold-blooded late threaten our interest. we will push back against that and reassure our friends and partners in the region. trying to produce that strong negotiated thing is best of our available alternatives. charlie: what is your understanding about the multiyear, perhaps 12 years, the terms of that they would be restricted by a number of centrifuges to go forward? how would that work? bill: well it is a process that is still being negotiated. it's important to produce's longer duration as possible. a long time in which the rainy

-- the iranian nuclear program was under sharp international constraints and you have intrusive verification and isms to ensure against any kind of a breakout. charlie: what is the point of 12 years rather than -- bill: the longer the better, in many respects. charlie: it's a number they would accept, i assume. bill: and they have talked about double digits for some time. i think it's a sensible starting point. what i think what you want to do is prolong that as long as you reasonably can. and ensure that that breakout is preserved over that time. charlie: if you are trying to do -- if they are trying to do something in secret, they could not achieve it? bill: the interim agreement was through 2013 and we managed to introduce some new verification inspection measures.

those are really important. a comprehensive agreement would have to build on that much more ambitiously. there is no perfect guarantee. but i think having those kind of intrusive transparency measures is going to be absolutely crucial. charlie: what would happen if there was an attack on their facilities? what would be the consequences of that? would it delay their nuclear effort? will it lead to some kind of action against people in the region and perhaps here? bill: all of the above. experts have looked at this issue and concluded if you took military action, you could certainly set it back by two or three years, whatever length of time people conclude. but, you would probably also drive the program underground. it would probably reinforce or

accelerate that position. and depending on the circumstance, you could also see a crumbling of what has then built up, the international coalition. those with the economic pressure and sanctions. this with the time when you have no shortage of instability in the region already. there could come a time if we are not able to reach this kind of agreement under lots of different circumstances. when you look at the alternatives, the best of the available alternatives is clearly, in my view, the strong negotiated agreement. charlie: and you think they would be prepared to do that at some point? and they are certainly prepared to make a rational choice? bill: i think it is possible. it's not a certainty. there are gaps that need to be bridged between here and there. but i think it is possible and well worth the effort.

charlie: what do we know about the ayatollah? bill: not a lot, is the honest answer. he is someone that has always been suspicious of the united states and built his worldview around animus towards the united states. it is difficult to consider a negotiated solution to the nuclear challenge when you have that kind of suspicion. charlie: does his opinion matter? bill: i think it does. i think the fact that he was elected president and was able to bring an a foreign minister that i believe is committed from the point of view of iranian interest to work on the agreement, i think it suggest that there is some space there on the iranian side. charlie: do you think they chose him because they wanted somebody who could speak the language communicate in that way. to presume he was a favorite of

the supreme leader although i heard he was a -- he had some connection to the supreme leader. under the ahmadinejad regime. bill: he is a skillful diplomat. they are very tough, what they are interested in, they want the best possible deal. and whether we can bridge that gap, i honestly don't know. as i said, i think it is worth testing because the alternatives have much bigger ones. charlie: what is the hardest thing to overcome and get it done? bill: there are a number of issues and it's hard to disentangle. probably the immediate lifting of sanctions on the front end and our point of view. you want to have a phased easing of sanctions over time. that is in return for performance. it is an important challenge to overcome during negotiations.

the whole issue of enrichment capacity and how to get to that one year breakout, that we have talked about. it has to be negotiated in a very painstaking way to make sure that the rest of the international community, and we, we ensure that they are not any activities going on. it is compensated. -- complicated. but it gives you hope that you can reach a conclusion. charlie: tell me about the rivalry between saudi arabia and iran. obviously, two different branches of islam. two powers. one has cultural heritage. and they are essentially enemies.

competitors, i believe. bill: there is a sunni and shia dimension and a persian and arab dimension that adds layers of complication. charlie: but it's a competition to have the most influence in the region? bill: i think that's right. i think there has been a wider influence on hegemony in the region. i think that rivalry will be in that region for some time to come. however, the issue of the nuclear question is resolved. charlie: is there difference in terms of where the iranians are or is it safely how they measure the threat to them? bill: in terms of the analysis i think that over the last few years, there have been very

intense consultations have gone on and my impression has been that there is a fair amount of common understanding of where the iranian program is. there is a difference of view and the prime minister has been very clear about this in public about what constitutes an acceptable threshold. i think the prime minister has made clear, prime minister netanyahu that any enrichment program at all is threatening. charlie: the imminent danger the potential danger. the commission has not made its decision. bill: when i left, that was certainly the analysis of the situation. charlie: they want to get there as fast as possible. bill: it could be.

the only policy, is that they might make that decision. charlie: and what you want to do is restrain the ability and deter them. you have spoken with iranians, and you have nuclear weapons. israel has nuclear weapons. they are not in the agreement. you are. bill: i think it's an argument of self-interest. because ultimately, with any government in all the years i have been a diplomat, that's what you appeal to. it seems to be that the downsides far outweigh the potential upside. you look at the international pressure that's been built up against iran. you look at the president and his determination to ensure that

iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. it carries obvious risks to try to move down that road. charlie: suppose they say it is our decision, our country, we just want to do what you are able to do, and we reject your idea that it's not in our self-interest. we believe it, and a story. -- end of story. bill: the iranian leadership has said it is not interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon. as a starting point for policy, you have to assume that some people might try to make a different decision. charlie: what you asked to write a memo about the risks of invading iran? bill: it was iraq.

ryan crocker and a couple of other colleagues did most of the work on this. but secretary powell at the time was quite concerned about the possible consequences. and diplomacy or statecraft, you have to think about the consequences. secretary powell asked us to write this and a remember it was 8:00 one evening, page 14 of a single spaced paper and he said time is up. i think he conveyed it to the white house, an expression of concern about all the different kinds of things that could go wrong. if anything, it was an argument for trying to make sure that we had a lot of company on the take off. charlie: does that mean there was a serious debate about the wisdom of invading iraq? the fact that he had it you and ryan crocker, two of our best diplomats do a hardheaded analysis of the risk or the

advisability of invading iraq? are these all the risks with this policy? what you hear, conventional wisdom in some corners, that it never took place. the idea of the debate in the bush administration never took place. bill: i can only speak to my experience and there was debate about how to go about this kind of a challenge and think through carefully the different consequences. and i have to admit, i reread that paper a couple years ago and we got it about half right and half wrong. i am not trying to suggest we had any kind of monopoly. charlie: i like the idea of looking at history, but i think the argument would seem to be that it was part of the fallacy of the program. there is no sense of what

happens after you invade. bill: in hindsight, that is pretty clear. especially when dealing with a society as complicated as iraq and saddam hussein with all of his oppressiveness had kept the lid on the society which, as you can see, had a lot of potential sectarian passions that can spill out. charlie: as we have seen. bill: it's an argument when you think about these changes, thinking about the alternative. what is the alternative? what comes after? charlie: we saw it in the arab spring. bill: we did. it does make the choices any easier. you have to enact a humanitarian disaster that drives the policy.

it is easy to underestimate the unintended consequences. charlie: so the president, what is it you understand the president's policy to be because of the lessons of iraq and afghanistan? bill: more generally? it's not an argument against a military dimension of dealing with some of the challenges that we see in the middle east. lots of problems are not going to have a military solution. they might have a military dimension. it's an argument about thinking carefully about those kind of questions. what comes after the means to an end. a vital interest to the united states. what are situations in which an american leadership will be absolutely indispensable, what can we expect others to do? charlie: a general question, the

idea of syria and the red line, without debating that, is there an essential part of diplomacy when people say something, they do it? bill: words matter. so when you take positions, you have to be careful about it. in that case, you can make a credible argument that the weapons program was dealt with successfully in another way. charlie: it is an interesting thing for me because so many of our allies took offense and fear of the decision not to go ahead. notwithstanding the russian deal. but saying there is a bigger lesson here, you are going to have people questioned your willingness to engage.

bill: i understand the question that was asked, but the outcome that was produced largely through john kerry and working with the russians was successful from the point of u.s. policy because you removed the chemical weapons program. you look at isil's gains, and if there had been a chemical weapon stockpile, still there and vulnerable -- charlie: they would've had access to it, perhaps. assad would not be in power if hezbollah hadn't double down. it is possible he was on the run. two things happened. hezbollah doubled down and the u.s. could not find the way to enlarge and support a moderate force. bill: the assad regime has proved good at one thing oppressing its people. there was a moment in the winter

of 2012-2013 where they were back on their heels. the situation on the ground was shifting against the assad regime. and just as he said, hezbollah doubled down and intervened in a pretty serious way. they pushed back moderate gains at the time. and after that moment, they tightened its grip. charlie: do you see the moment when it is happening? it's a tough call. if you push more and he had been toppled, your worry is what follows him? bill: that is a huge question and i think people would be kidding themselves if they said that there would be an easy answer to that question. it is essential for syria and the people of syria. it is a lot easier said than done. charlie: what a great country,

ukraine, and e-work and ambassador to russia, so rich in cultural heritage. some people look at it today and see all kinds of violations. they see all of those issues. and they see a russia leader who they say is motivated by the collapse of the soviet union. although the driving force may not be to restore it but do something else. how far has he been willing to go in your judgment? bill: my years in russia have been a long exercise in humility about and in my powers of analysis. charlie: because he surprises you? bill: he is a tactician and he has shown that with the ukraine. the thing to remember about russia is he is playing over long-term a relatively weak strategic hand. russia is basically a one-dimensional economy. it had the potential to

diversify. it has a smart and well population but it has not done that yet. corruption is a big problem, it is eating away at the rising middle class. demography is a huge challenge. the whole expanse of the earth from the ural mountains to the far east, there are only about 30 million or 40 million russians. looking across a very long border at more than one billion chinese. russia has a lot of challenges. russia has -- in ukraine, you see the most significant challenges since the end of the cold war. it's important for us to continue to work with our european partners to produce steady counter pressure, to do everything we can to help ukrainians rebuild. because in many ways, the best antidote is to show that the ukraine can climb out of the hole it's in.

it will take time. henry -- charlie: henry kissinger sat where you have sat, and you both are students of foreign policy. he said, we have to recognize russia has an interest in the ukraine and a history in the ukraine. and i assume we do. how do you recognize that in terms of the solution of the future of the ukraine? is it simply they have a democracy and they choose where to go? or du tailor your impact and create a circumstance so that that element of russia-ukraine will be stabilized? though -- bill: russians don't get to make ukraine's sovereign choices no more than we can get them to

make those choices. i think you have clearly seen an interest in some sort of association with the european union and they see that as offering a lot of economic opportunity. charlie: and in doing that, do they give the back of the hand to russia? bill: not necessarily. without being poly on a -- pol lyanna-ish about it, recent circumstances make it hard to think in these terms. it is entirely conceivable that ukraine that has more of a connection to the eu can be of benefit to russia as well. economic connections will be very important. it is not impossible to find that kind of balance. a lot of that sense has been lost in the crisis over the last year. charlie: it must be frustrating to be a diplomatic you think the -- diplomat when you think the other person cannot think rationally. bill: sometimes but you don't get to do things rationally all the time. one of the starting points for

sensible diplomacy is understanding the way in which whether it is your counterpart on the other side of the table or a country or society, you don't have to accept that. you don't have to indulge it. you have to understand it. charlie: understand their interests and how do you address their self-interest. bill: you do. i fall prey to this where americans think about it's always about us. but it's not. it is not in the middle east. it's not what animated the arab spring and everything that's come since then. you don't have to accept it or indulge it. you have to understand at least the perspective that others are bringing to the table. charlie: somebody said to me, the first question they always ask is, what do you want? what is it you want? once you understand that, you can deal with rationality and possibility of variation of that. bill: and you have to understand what you want. if you go into a negotiation and not absolutely certain about what you want -- otherwise, they

will figure it out for you and it's not a good way to negotiate. charlie: another thing that interests me is how you try to make sure that you avoid the mistake that explodes. i am thinking about 1914. the idea that there is something you don't see that has the potential of inflaming everything. charlie -- bill: it's where communication become so important. there is no substitute for people communicating with other people. edward r. murrow. he was the great cbs --, and he once said to a group of young diplomats that the most important blink is the last three feet. one person talking to another.

that is still the essence of diplomacy. charlie: what is the most interesting part of your career? bill: i have been really lucky. i had a great run over those 43 -- 33 years. from the early stages when i worked with secretary baker, it was a moment and kind of an intersection of historical developments. the end of the cold war, desert storm, madrid, german reunification. charlie: this is 1988? bill: to 1993. and some really high quality people that worked well as a team. president bush 41, colin powell. i learned about how to think and act strategically. charlie: what did you learn? bill: a lot of the things we have been talking about. how to seize moments. baker, after putting a great

deal of effort in developing a coalition helped achieve victory in desert storm. he saw the moment to move ahead to the madrid peace conference and make progress on the arab-israeli issue. there were a lot of skeptics at the time. in houston, he has a wall filled with cartoons, all of which were deeply skeptical about the first eight of the nine trips we took to the middle east. persistence was really important. charlie: he spoke about this idea, i think he had went to syria 14 times, and the father said, no. we are not getting the coalition. with respect to stopping saddam hussein. and finally, it was yes.

bill: and baker, i admire the way he narrowed down people's choices and stripped away the arguments. he did it with assad, prime minister shamir, the palestinians. he was able to produce something in madrid that few people thought possible when he made the first of those nine trips. so, i thought it was really admirable. charlie: he also had one of the most important qualities a secretary of state can have. he had the sure knowledge that he had the best political friend of the president. bill: and a lot of other qualities. much like hillary clinton in a lot of ways. both hillary clinton and baker no one was better prepared than them when they walked into a room. that is really important in not just a negotiation but any kind of diplomatic interaction. they both think strategically as well.

so, those of the qualities that make for very good secretaries of state. john kerry has demonstrated that as well. it is so important and diplomacy to try and solve a problem. charlie: what about the trip to china? who had the idea? bill: hillary clinton had a lot to do with it as well in the sense that i think you saw it in the first trip and's secretary of state -- since the secretary of state. i think they both -- charlie: the dinner was to asia. bill: i think they both understood the significance of asia as the center of gravity in the international system as far as i can see in the 21st century. it doesn't mean that it's the

only -- it doesn't mean it's the only important thing. it's unique. it was a pivot at the outset. there was a certain amount of pivot end of the -- envy in europe too. any american administration will have to look in many different directions. i think it is logical, and it built on the last administration to try to rebalance, reprioritize, the approach to asia. charlie: as you well know, the prime minister is coming here to speak for the congress. i have talked about that controversy recently with susan rice. what are the consequences of that? bill: i have long believed that the u.s. israeli relationship is very important.

the reality is, it is not a partisan issue. the strength of that relationship is important in a moment where the middle east is in such disarray and filled with such uncertainty. the way in which the invitation to speak to the congress was organized, was unfortunate. there wasn't the kind of ordination, at least in my expense, that you normally have. it is unfortunate. it does not diminish the importance of the relationship but it does not help. charlie: and they are engaged in a political campaign. bill: the timing makes it much more complicated as well. it is on the eve of israeli elections. charlie: did they make real progress with respect to the step forward on the israeli-palestinian issue? he's clearly worked hard at it. bill: he's right to work hard at it. there are a people who looked at the demonstrators in tahrir

square, cairo, they concluded may be the issue doesn't matter so much anymore. i think it still matters. for palestinians, israel's security, a lot of people across the region. the united states, whether you like it or not, has a unique role to play in the diplomacy of that issue. charlie: what is our role? bill: to try to see if we can work with both parties as well as with key arab players and others around the world. to see if we can come up with a process that produces the kind of two state solution that lots of people have talked about. charlie: there are two ideas here. some people argue you cannot have an israeli-palestinian agreement without the u.s. involvement. others will argue, which is not necessarily contrary to that you can never have an israeli-palestinian peaceful

existence that doesn't start with the two parties coming together on something. they have to want it and want it badly and understand the consequences of not having it. the united states can't fly over there and tell them it is in their best interest. bill: the simple answer is yes. i think both parts are true. there is no substitute for people in the region seeing the importance of moving in that direction. i think the u.s. has an important role to play in helping encourage that. charlie: do you have any optimism that this will be a possible outcome? bill: i still hope it will. just because i am still convinced a two state solution is in the best interest -- i think it is starting to slip away. i don't think it has slipped away but as each year goes past, more and more issues kind of corrode the atmosphere between

israelis, palestinians, and the wider region. it gets harder and harder. it's a real shame. it doesn't have much to do with the palestinian issue but i do think for israelis and palestinians, it is by far the best outcome. and i think the alternatives are going to undermine both israel -- charlie: what is the biggest impediment to that happening? bill: i think you need to have a sense of urgency. charlie: they certainly have that. bill: both parties have to demonstrate that to make it possible. and you need leadership that will take advantage of that moment of urgency. charlie: do we have that now? bill: well, the passing of time

does not help. charlie: with all the consequences for a one state solution, which is not a solution, they would argue that because israel does not want to be put in that position, it is not a place to -- at the same time, one of the principal arguments being made by the prime minister is this notion of a jewish state. bill: i think it is very difficult when you look at the forces of democracy and reality. arabs being the majority. the land from the jordan river to the mediterranean, you are looking up forces of technology that even though israel has a lot of support from the u.s. and has enhanced security over recent years, it is hard to predict what new technology will produce in terms of threats to israel. and ideology. being more radicalized as well. they create a sense of urgency trying to seize the moment before us and make progress on that. charlie: and clearly all the other problems are not because that israel and the palestinians reached an agreement.

it is often said, as long as it's there, it's a problem in the region. bill: it is. it's a problem in israel's long-term security. without a two state solution you end up with a lot of difficult challenges to deal with. long-term occupation, that's not healthy. charlie: i find in terms of israeli leaders that i know and have interviewed, there is an awareness of that. occupation is not a healthy thing. for the psyche of a country. bill: it can be just as corrosive for israelis as it is for the palestinians. charlie: when you left the foreign service, do you say goodbye or do you say i'm going to go over here and do this for a while and maybe i will see you back? bill: i had a wonderful run. i am proud of the colleagues i served with over the years. the country i served. charlie: suppose you had been the deputy secretary of state.

this is a scenario. suppose someone had been secretary of state becomes president. and says, i had a great deputy secretary of state, he would be perfect secretary of state. bill: i was really lucky in the 33 years i had and i am lucky to be at the carnegie endowment. charlie: succeeding a great woman. bill: jessica did a wonderful job and i will do my best not to screw it up. charlie: a pleasure to have you on this program. thank you for joining us. see you next time. ♪

>> it has been called the harvard of silicon valley. y combinator is perhaps the most prestigious incubator in the world. it has funded more than 700 companies today, including dropbox, airbnb, and stripe. behind the start of machine is a couple with their own start up story. how did they build y combinator into what it is today? joining me today on the addition of "studio 1.0," husband-and-wife paul graham and jessica livingston. thank you for joining us.