>> from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> james clapper is here. he is the director of national

intelligence and is responsible for integrating intelligence gathered by the 16 agencies that make up the u.s. intelligence community, including the fbi and cia. he testified last week before the senate armed services committee on the worldwide threat to national security. i'm pleased to have him at this table for the first time. welcome. we have much to talk about and i thank you for coming in sitting at the table. defined for us -- i did a little of that, exactly what the dni does. >> the position of the dni grew out of a recommendation made by the 9/11 commission after the 9/11 attacks. that recommendation found its way into law. it was signed into law by president bush on the 17th of december in 2004 and my office was stood up in 2005. the basic -- what basically happened is to separate the

position that was formally occupied by the director of the central intelligence agency as a second hat to the director of central intelligence. the recommendation of the 9/11 commission, which was documented in law, was to separate those positions, to have one person that would lead the entirety of the community as a full-time proposition. the three duties are to be the senior but not exclusive advisor , to manage what is called the national intelligence program which encompasses all the resources, the money, which i defend an advocate to the congress each year for the entirety of the national my main objective and theme is to integrate the community as much as possible. crux you have not done many interviews.

>> no. >> have you come to some new idea after the snowden affair? >> we need to speak out more than we have. counter the narrative somewhat that i think has been promulgated about the intelligence committee. in the waning days of my time here, acknowledging i serve at the pleasure of but assuming i finished the term of the administration, use that time to perhaps be more public and speak out more about intelligence to the extent that we can. a major take away for me after the snowden leaks we in the

intelligence community do need to be more transparent. my father was an army intelligence officer. i have been doing this a long time, almost 50 years. >> it is important to communicate what? >> it is important for the public. elected representatives to understand what we do. why we do it. >which is to keep the country safe. >> when you look at the narratives that are out there are there ideas that need to be rebutted? the point of view is understood from an intelligence perspective? the first thing is to understand the nature of the world we live in. it is very turbulent, unstable.

lots of potential threats to us out there. as a briefly outlined in my statement. we operate under a system of law. that we have heavy oversight to ensure compliance. ensure that we don't infringe on the privacy of citizens. those would be the three or four themes. >> what has changed since the disclosure we learn from snowden2 0>> we have and do it some serious compromises, particularly to monitor and track the activities of terrorists. >> how does that work? transparency is a two edged sword.

it is good to the extent that we can explain what we do and why we do it. our adversaries go to school on that same transparency. that has happened, particularly with the terrorists. isil is this dude at learning from these revelations and applying what they have learned. they are indications -- communications and operation security conscious. x they have learned our potential and how to avoid it. how much doing all about isil? >> we know a lot. we know what their objectives seem to be. we have a good understanding of their leadership. >> and where they are? >> generally where they are. we do not have pinpoint locational data on them.

we know generally where they are committed how much cooperation is there between iranian intelligence, u.s. intelligence, russian intelligence. anybody who has identified them as a threat? x we cooperate with the lot of workers. european partners. belgium and france. they are very concerned. we are looking for more ways to share data and information. we have great partnerships in the middle east. iran not so much. >> in this case, there is a common enemy. >> but we are not cooperating? there are no conversations that take place?

>> no. in terms of prussia, a little different. they have a terrorist threat. of late, there seems to be more willingness to engage with us on sharing some information about common threats. >> that came up at the time of the boston marathon bombings. >> it did. >> let's go back to someone i had a conversation with. the two biggest threats the u.s. come from iranian negotiations and what is happening in the ukraine. isil is much less annexes center of threat. do you share that2 >> the first thing i talked about in my testimony were cyber threats. the way they are growing as

serious threats to the u.s.. we had last year the first two bank cases of cyberattacks on u.s. soil. the sony attack -- >> from the north koreans. >> i did not list cyber first. a variety of terrorist threats whether isil is an immediate threat to the u.s., probably not, but it certainly poses a huge threat to our allies overseas. aspirational he, they do pose a threat to the homeland. >> let me start with iran.

the speech with the prime minister of israel. the secretary of state has been speaking about it. what can you tell us? what should be american people know about those negotiations? is there a risk the prime minister will disclose some of the ideas coming out of those negotiations he may have been informed about that would damage the negotiations? >> i don't know what the prime minister will say tomorrow. i really don't know. my focus and the focus of the intelligence community is the ability to verify if negotiations are successful and there is some agreement struck our ability to monitor and verify that career that will depend on intrusive1 --monitor and verify that. that will be huge.

hugely important to us. our ability to verify. that to me has to be the focus. >> if you don't have that, it ought not be a deal. if you have immediate intrusion in terms of a threat developing. >> we would need the basic foundational information provided by those inspections and surveillance capabilities. which then we would double check, verify with organic capabilities. >> is very different in the assessment of risk for iran getting a nuclear bomb? between u.s. and israel? we and the israeli intelligence, which are very good, i have had

a long association with them. they are very confident -- competent and professional. at the intelligence level, we have a very close relationship. we are pretty much on the same page with respect to our knowledge of a capabilities. >> and when? >> and when. >> so what is the difference? >> what policy makers say and do about it is a different proposition. i try to stay out of the policy arena. >> when they may have a have a breakout, there is a general agreement? >> there are a lot of variations on the theme. there are so many assumptions.

there are a lot of technical considerations you have to draw that have bearing on those judgments. i will say, without going into specifics, we are pretty much in the same ballpark. >> it has been reported that there is the possibility of agreement lasting 10-12 years. they would have a built-in ability to inspect and limit the level of centrifuge development. a drawdown of sanctions. >> what you are talking about is in play. there is no great benefit to my commenting on what the provisions of the agreement might take. that is up to negotiations.

>> i am hearing you. i would love to hear what you think is extensional -- essential in terms of security. to prevent the development. >> the actual length, that is a matter of negotiations. >> some argue a longer time may have the hope for a regime. >> i am not, that is a policy issue. we have not profess that we are proselytizing for regime change. that is up to the iranian people. >> there have been reports about cyberattacks.

is that true? without stipulating countries, that is the nature of the cyber domain. it pervades so many aspects of our life. particularly in the u.s.. all over the world. you are right about the point and counterpoint. we have probes and counterattacks and we try to defend against them. click we are on the offensive as well, i would assume? >> i don't think i can comment on that, but i think we have a significant capability offensively if the policy judgment is made to exert it.

>> is that the biggest fear you have? many people know, when leon panetta testified he thought the next pearl harbor might be a cyber thrust. >> leon did say that. our general assessment is, as i called it, characterized it, the likelihood of a cyber armageddon is not as likely as the insidious increase in the nature of attacks. as exemplified by the two bank attacks on our soil. another ratcheting up read that is the nature of the threat, rather than some massive pearl harbor or armageddon type attack. only a nationstate could do that. there are only a couple of nationstates.

clearly, nationstates, unlike non-nationstates, while they have a larger capability, also have vulnerabilities. >> nationstates do. >> china and russia. >> they have capabilities. >> the most of his gated and capable pervasive capabilities are represented by those two bank countries. >> when you went to north korea, you said that was on your bucket list. >> some people think that was strange. it stems from the fact that i served in the republic of korea. i was director of forces. got very involved in the issues on the peninsula. so it was always a professional objective.

so i did. it was for me a remarkable experience. >> there are reports that there was a 12 course meal between you and a north korean official. you were sent a bill for your part. that seems unusual to me. >> they don't like us to much but they like our money. >> did you like their food? >> the dinner was, and i have become a korean food aficionado it was a wonderful meal. it just was not very enjoyable because i had a rather tense, terse exchange with the director of what they called the reconnaissance bureau. general kim, who characterized himself as my character part --

counterpart. and his organization represents an amalgam of them -- amalgamation of intelligence parts. >> did anything you saw or heard to change her mind about their capabilities, intent, ambition. >> one thing that struck me the two principal people i interacted with, they are older. my generation. fixed in their narratives. i did have occasion to, on the way out, get on the flight.

i had a 45 minute discussion with a member of the state security. one of the younger generation. the conversation with him was more temperate. he had been to the south and seen what was there. ask me if i would be willing to come back to north korea. if there is hope for change maybe it is generational. i don't know. >> are you believe there is hope for change? >> under the current regime, no. as i say, they are committed to their narrative. i don't see a change. >> their narrative is? >> they are anti-american. they are very much under siege and there is a sees mentality. as they look outward to the rest

the world, they see a lot of hostility. from the south, north. >> which is interesting to me. in intelligence, you are trying to figure out not only facts but also the mind of the leadership. that is clearly a role you have to do. do they appear to the rational decision-makers? >> oh, yes. >> i think they are rational. certainly in their way. when i served to their, -- served there, i was worried about some of vent that became incendiary. that would explode without being intended but was unfortunate and

outgrowth -- an unfortunate outgrowth. ♪

>> let me turn to ukraine.

it is said that vladimir putin, when the over flow took place, he made a judgment that was an affront to him and the west had something to do with it. especially the cia a. i have also read the chinese have agreed with that judgment. >> people get too caught up in their narratives. i think the russians know exactly what they are doing about narratives they put out versus what they know to be the fact. >> tell me difference. >> in the case of ukraine, as you alluded when unicode which -- the president left without any warning, and of course given putin's worldview, he saw

this as yet another revolution which he believed or talked himself into believing was instigated by the u.s.. which it was not. >> believing that gives him an incentive to respond in a different way. >> this mindset about ukraine, the crimea for example, what a terrible disaster it was when the soviet union collapsed. putin is somewhat of a throwback to a previous era. the great russian and buyer. -- russian inempire. the number one foreign policy objective is dominance of the former soviet space and especially ukraine. >> they are the places where russian language has a prominent

play within certain provinces. >> the russians have a very expensive official definition of russian citizens. any russian speaker. >> do believe putin is responding to that? this has been a response -- he got himself involved in this and did certain things. wants a strategy to take over the crimea -- launched a strategy to take over the crimea. it is somebody who was operating in terms of perception and power. >> there is debate about whether this was his grand strategy all along or whether it was opportunistic. >> what do you think? >> i think it is the combination of the two. it was opportunistic after the ukrainian president left. he saw an opportunity to take

back the crimea which he did. it was not all that hard since he already had about 18,000 military people there in the first place. >>and then of course capitalized on the separatist movement in the eastern offices of the ukraine -- parts of the ukraine. there is an opportunity presented himself -- that presented itself to him like georgia. he former soviet space where he could exert leverage. >> what you think his intent is now? >> the intent is to -- he would like to end the fighting. >> between the government and separatists. >> the damage being done to that area. that is potentially another huge financial drain on russia, just

like crimea is. from both humanitarian and economic perspectives, he would like to stop the fighting. i do think, and this will be the subject of debate i think they would like to have that area as reasonably hole as possible. which means at some point, going after the port which would give them a land bridge to the crimea as well as access to the sea. that has not happened yet. i do think he is reaching the point where he would like to stop the active combat. >> are we prepared to stop him from making the link to the

port? >> that is a policy issue. it will not venture into that arena. whatever were we might do to toward moves by the separatists. >> there is no question if it was a nato country. >> that is a different situation. that is why the baltics are you different proposition. i think the russians recognize that. recognize that is a different proposition. >> have said in your testimony we should arm ukrainians. >> i said we need to emphasize this is a personal perspective not company policy. it is under consideration. for me, it has more to do with bolstering the resolve of the ukrainians and the assurance we are with them. i was recently in kiev.

when you are there, however briefly, you can't help but be struck by the intensity of this issue for us. -- for the ukrainians. >> when you say we should arm them, what do you mean? >> i don't want to go into specifics. >> to defend themselves? >> so-called lethal defensive weapons. click should we match with the russians are doing for the separatists? >> i'm not going to go there. that is a tall order. even if we wanted to do that. the russians are right next door. they have considerable military equipment and depots. they can send a lot of stuff into the ukraine. tank for tank or a pc per abc, it would be hard to match. >> do worry about putin's response?

>> i do. that is why that is a difficult judgment to make. whether or not we should your arm the ukrainians. the russians have been public about it. they may not just restrict their reactions to the ukraine only. there are other things they could do as a result. >> henry kissinger sat where you were. he said, you have to give putin a way out. some kind of political negotiations. you seem to be saying, i think he wants that. this may have been too costly and gone too far. >> that is impressionistic. from all i see and read, i do believe he would like to see a way to end the hostilities and combat and death and

instruction. in the end, all of these things have to be settled diplomatically. that is the only way to resolve them. >> many argue that is the only way to stop the killing in syria. >> that is true. ultimately, we are not going to kill our way out of that either. that has to be dealt with diplomatically. >> with the russians participating? >> they have a big state. >> they are long supporters of the year many ends they have been longtime supporters of the syrians and the sod. -- assad. they have to be part of the solution, no question. >> do you think that is the killing over there? have a cease-fire? a negotiated agreement as to what the future of syria should

look like? >> the opposition somehow has to play into that. orchestrating all that is a difficult diplomatic challenge. >> what interests me about iran we are fighting isis in iraq. reports i have read in terms of the iraq he army, iraqi militias are significantly involved, as much if not more than the iraqi army supported by in some cases from iran. >> is a conflict situation. you are right. the security forces that formally constituted the army, police forces. and then you have the militias.

variations on the theme. six or eight principal militias. this is frankly a challenge for the prime minister. how to marshal these resources. acknowledging their primary challenge is getting rid of ice all. >> most of the militias are shia. you have the big problem, unless you do something with sunni support, -- >> that is true. the need for inclusiveness of the sunnis and the sunni tribes for. we have a lot to try to prevail on the iraqi government to draw the non-tribes into this.

ultimately they will have to be involved, particularly in northern iraq. which is predominantly sunni. >> this is interesting because of what you have said. many people look at tikrit and think it is the first step in terms of trying to retake most ul. >> if you look at the map, it is a string of cities which have strategic significance. a lot of open, and the space. -- emopty space. if they are going to recapture the areas, that is the stepladder they have to march up. >> or the criticism -- one of the criticisms in congresses,

why did we know more about the development of isil? you have responded, you cannot measure the will of the armed forces. >> thank you for correctly quoting me. that is exactly what i said. we reported robustly on their capabilities. we also reported robustly on all the deficiencies and shortfalls of iraqi security forces. what we did not foresee, i did not foresee, overnight. literally overnight. what .5 divisions of iraqi -- 4.5 divisions of iraqi security forces would melt away. i will say, going back to my own war in southeast asia, we would have never been good at predicting will to fight. we overestimated the ability of

the iraqi army and desert storm. i was chief of air force intelligence. we overestimated theyir capability to resist our invasion. that is a hard subjective judgment to make. >> what is your assessment of -- there is much talk about the attack on mosul. mother too much information was given out and whether it might have happened. can you tell me whatever you can about the attack? >> it will take, the conventional wisdom on retaking or capturing an urban environment, which the city is. a city of more than one million people. the force ratio over history are generally 10 to one. 10 attackers for one defender.

moreover, the iraqi security forces are not terribly proficient in urban warfare. that will take some time to train up. the accommodation of raising a force sufficient to do that and training them, such that you have confidence they will be able to retake most all -- m osul, that is a big challenge and that will take time. >> can you teach them to have the will to fight? >> that is a key question. i don't know whether we, the u.s. can instill in the iraqis or any other foreign military force the will to fight. the will to fight, i think, ultimately stems from the loyalty to a government. to a cause of their own.

i don't know that we can impose that on iraqis were anyone else. -- or anyone else. that is why what the government does is so critical to including the sunnis in this fight. without them it will be very problematic. >> that is the reason you had a change in baghdad. >> they did through their own mechanisms. we manipulated. yes certainly the iraqi prime minister understands the challenge and the need to include the sunnis. that poses a challenge for him with his own shia background. he has critics among the she has. -- shias.

if you seem to be too inclusive of the sunnis -- if he is seen to be too inclusive of the sunnis. >> maliki still has a voice. >> he does. >> what is the situation on the ground? >> in iraq, we have achieved a lot. we have reduced the territory that i sold -- isil holds. the peshmerga, the kurds have been great in that part of iraq. accommodation of the iraqi security forces coupled with the coalition air power and our advice and assistance has brought about not just a stalemate but in many cases some reversals.

in kobani, which is in syria, they lost 3000-4000 fighters. huge losses there in syria brought about by becoming a nation of forces -- brought about by the combination of forces as well as airstrikes. >> there have been significant illuminations. >> we have -- eliminations. >> we have taken up several of their key leaders. however, they account for that. isil leadership traces its origins from al qaeda in iraq. they know us, they have long experience with the u.s.. one of their features or attributes the leadership without strategic guidance which is done on a decentralized basis.

they account for losses and plan on it. yes, we have had some successes taking out their leadership. they have replacements. >> some argued we still have not illuminated -- eliminated al qaeda. >> the senior leadership in pakistan has been decimated. but we have had the emergence of the franchises if you will. isil has made a lot out of the provinces of their caliph fight -- caliphate. places like libya and egypt and southeast asia. we will have a steady state of terrorist groups that will emerge starting first most

interested in local issues. in some cases, threatening the homeland. eight q ap -- aqap is still a serious threat to the homeland. >> we are learning the identity of the man they called jihadi john. how big a threat you see that? >> the threat for us in this country, and europe. where through skillful successful and success to gated -- sophisticated use of social media, isil is very slick about this. a vote in whatever emotions that it takes to infect people who

become homegrown violent extremists. this is the issue we were the most about in our homeland. it is difficult to detect using classical intelligence signatures if you will to detect these people. this is the issue in europe. in the case of the charlie hebdo attackers. one of them at least had been to yemen some three years before. that was enough, apparently, to infuse them with jihadi message. >> they came back and laid low for a while. >> they were known characters to french security officials. >> as was the man identified.

he was known to security in london. >> i will point out in irony here. i have been on the receiving end of virtually all the critiques and investigations to include 9/11 and cents. i do find some irony a common theme of every one of those critiques has been that the government should have been more intrusive. it was true 9/11. with the christmas bomber. fort hood. the boston marathon. >> the government should have been more intrusive? that meant to you, what? >> you that we should do more intensive surveillance of people living here. whether they are citizens or not. >> the irony is --

>> in light of all the criticism of spying on americans. >> in those specific instances there is a call for more intrusiveness. and yet the response to this note disclosures is to be less intrusive. how will that be settled? >> there is no silver bullet. there is a balance between protection of national security and protection of civil liberties and privacy. if there was some way where we could find the needles without having to bother hundreds of haystacks? that would be great. we cannot do that right now. we do our utmost to ensure we do not infringe unnecessarily and even legally -- illegally. >> are you saying you need to be more intrusive? >> i am not suggesting that at

all. the intelligence community will do the best we can with the tools we have and the resources we have, which are going down, by the way. >> du have the tools and resources to do the job we expect? >> we will do our best. i would note we have the perfect storm, which i have spoken publicly about. the snowden links, which have done damage to our capabilities. the judgments we have made to reduce certain collection activities. you compound that with the cuts we have taken in intelligence. intelligence did not get a pass from sequestration. unless something is done, we revert to sequestration and 2016 and we will take more cuts. >> not to mention the homeland security and all that. >> that is an example of why

sometimes people ask me what keeps you awake at night? i worry about the dysfunction in washington. >> what you mean by that? >> i think, having furloughs and shutdowns and part of the national security apparatus hold hostage like this, it is only the department of homeland security. that has impact on the rest of the intelligence community. everybody sees that. i worry about the impact on morale. keeping the great people have brought on since 9/11. it is an enterprise responsibility, i feel i have to protect defend the intelligence community. >> you say you are staying up at night worried about the fact you

are required to do a certain job, to protect the security, and you are worried about whether you have the resources. >> several acts specs -- aspects. not only the resources. the morale of the workforce. retaining the superb people we have brought on since 9/11. >> can i go back to iran? is there any evidence iranians are involved inside iraq in the fight against isil? >> oh yes, they are. they are there. canoes visor he capacity -- in an advisory capacity. faith fly -- they fly uavs. they have a robust commitment. >> we also have advisers in

iraq. >> we do. one is my nephew. >> he is in the army? >> yes. >> does that constitute boots on the ground to you? >> boots on the ground is generally considered combat forces. not training, advise, and assist functions that are there now. >> is it your judgment we need roots the ground to defeat i sold? -- isil. probably somebody's but not necessarily ours. >> when you look at the engagement on the ground all the factors that go into it, how significant will ever power be? >> -- iar power be? >> it has been and will be

significant. particularly in syria, if we do not have ground forces. it shows the progression of our ability to use air power. the tremendous impact of isr intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. i cannot help but think of myself, my war, southeast asia. with -- i went to vietnam early in 1965. what intelligence was and what capabilities we had then versus now. there is no comparison. night and day. >> everybody says syria will be more difficult to deal with. >> there is a big difference, in the case of iraq, we have an and the seat. -- an embassy. we can operate there. we have none of that in syria. when you compound that with the complexities of the situation in syria.

there are hundreds and hundreds of opposition groups. >> most of them extremists. >> no, that is a other complexity. some of them are. >> how strong are the extremists versus moderate forces? >> right now, the extremists have among the opposition the upper hand. down the storefront -- there is a capable fighting organization that has achieved some victories. you have the competition and fighting between and among the opposition groups. and then with the regime. you will have tactical marriages of convenience sometimes where the extreme opposition and the moderate opposition will team up to fight the regime. it's a complex situation overlaid with the presence of the irradiance and the support of russians. has a lot -- hezbollah. >> what do we do?

>> the only way this will be resolved is through negotiation and diplomacy. i don't see any other way. >> at one point, our stated goal was to see us on leave -- assad leave. on the other hand, there are people who said our priority has changed. >> the immediate priority is isil. our long-term objective will be for assad to lead. >> in iran, some believe the ayatollah is trying to negotiate his way and can get to the possibility to make a weapon. >>'s objective here is, first

to secure relief from the sanctions. i don't to get a big secret that -- >> to have heard the economy. >> he would like an agreement that recognizes their right to engage in some nuclear activity and probably, at least on a threshold basis, to give themselves the option to build a nuclear weapon. which we assess they do not have. >> they do not have one? >> they do not. >> a pleasure to have you at this table. >> give a much. james clapper -- thank you very much. james clapper. see you next time. ♪

>> happy national pancake day sports fans. hillary versus the web. hillary versus jeff. basically, hillary versus everyone. but first, israel. american cultural references as tall as an ihop breakfast special. he said no deal on concessions.