>> from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." >> we begin with israeli prime minister netanyahu's speech to congress.

the run up to the visit was controversial. speaker boehner extended the invitation without consulting the white house. many perceive the event as a highly political one in anticipation of elections in israel. then yahoo! warned congress -- benjamin yet not netanyahu warned congress -- >> lifting restrictions on that program in a bout a decade. >> president obama defended the negotiations. >> the prime minister offers the alternative of no deal. in which case, iran will begin pursuing their nuclear program. accelerat e it. without us having any insight

into what they are doing. >> joining me now is tom friedman. a couple of things. one, there was a quote by you that the decision to cook up an address to congress is churlish. quite dangerous. do you still believe that, now you have heard the speech? >> i believe it even more so. for me the real question as i watched the speech, the prime and of israel making the case why there is nothing more important than iran not getting a nuclear weapon. there is a lot about that sentence i would support. i think iran getting a nuclear weapon in an unstable middle east could only lead to more proliferation and nuclear weapons in that region is not

only bad for israel and arab allies but would be terrible for the world. he would unravel the nonproliferation regime. it would happen in a region where the traditional deterrence would not be present. mutually assured distraction is one of the things that kept a balance between the u.s. and soviet union during the cold war. in the middle east, mutually assured destruction is like an invitation to a party for some people. a lot of the traditional constraints are not there. this is a huge issue. if i was a prime minister of israel, when i potentially pollute it by insisting on speaking to the u.s. congress two weeks before a neck and neck election in which i have fallen slightly behind, which invites people to speculate whether this is not just about the future of israel and iran? what i do that?

if this were the biggest issue facing israel, what i not announce that i'm not going to allow any more settlement building in those areas of the west bank that are already understood by israelis and americans to be part of any palestinian state that would be negotiated. i would do that because by announcing that, i would seriously diffuse a lot of the delegitimization of israel in europe particularly. when i listen to netanyahu, i see a guy who, when it comes to taking on iran, his church help. when it comes to risking his own political capital is a wol. >> he thinks that the deal is a threat to israel. >> they are living in the heart

of the region. they have been targeted by iran. they have every reason to believe they will be targeted again. i understand that. our interests can be satisfied. we have to start with our interests by a deal that builds in a kind of one your insurance before iran can get a bomb. that is with the president is going for. i would encourage the congress if i was worried about this, one of the things i would do -- if we get the deal the president is talking about, with a one-year break out insurance, i would encourage congress to pass authorization for the president. put it into law. authorize any means possible or necessary to respond to iran should they violate the deal. >> the president seems to believe what the israelis want the iranians to do, they will never do.

therefore military action will be the only alternative. that will delay the program, not and it -- end it. >> there is a legitimate counter argument. if you extend the sanctions, i don't think there's much of a chance that europeans would intensify the sanctions. it is not clear, if israel were to scuttle the deal, they would even keep the sanctions on we have right now. i'm not so sure that the morning after the collapse of the deal iran goes out and starts enriching full-scale. it could invite an israeli attack let alone an american one. what have we learned about wars in the middle east? you tend to bump into things that you never expected. you tend to outcomes you never anticipated. that could apply to israel as well.

they have thousands of hezbollah rockets on their border aimed at israel with the trigger in tehran. i shudder to think of the damage that could be inflicted from some sort of iranian retaliation. >> lynn yahoo! -- benjamin netanyahu's problem is he does not trust the iranians. therefore he does not trust any elimination -- agreement except the elimination of the nuclear facilities. >> if your benjamin netanyahu and you've seen them blow up your embassy and jewish community center in argentina, and get away with it. america saw iran being advocated in the bombings of the towers in saudi arabia, killing ma rines in beirut. any number of weapons built to

use against our forces in iraq. the only long term security for israel and the neighbors, not to mention the iranian people, is some sort of regime change. the one thing obama's deal has the possibility of, i would be careful about making any predictions about this. it contains the possibility of integration. you can say, maybe the use of force would do that as well. i don't know. very uncertain. >> might lead to nationalistic fervor as it often does. >> the middle east, all real politics happens the morning after the morning after. how the iranian people react, it could be very different in

morning after the morning after. but that is not the dice i would care to roll. >> is it your understanding what is being negotiated will love the iranians to develop the capability to have a nuclear weapon as long as it is at least a year off? >> the position is slightly different. their position is iran already has the kid ability. the only question is if they can enrich enough fissile material. the deal is designed to put years distance in the capabilities. >> the capability would be to enrich uranium which can provide visible material -- visible material -- fissible material. >> it would go out of the country and be stored in russia.

>> you describe to maybe difference in the two administrations in terms of what they believe is possible -- you described to me the difference in the two in the distractions in terms of what they believe is possible. >> bibi would have prepared a military response. the military disagreed and he was not ready to overrule him. they thought once they started the war, it would in effect never and. -- they would keep -- it would never end. they would keep trying to build a bomb. iran would retaliate the hezbollah. they would be in an endless cycle. there only bad -- there are only bad options on the menu. the idea that bibi represents

the perfect solution is an illusion. >> thank you, tom. >>when we come bac i turned the program to jeffrey goldberg who has a conversation with ben rhodes. ♪ >> i am jeff goldberg filling in for ben rhodes. -- filling in for charlie rose. joining me now is inroads. -- banden rhodes. thank you for being here. is this beach going to damage the president's cause? >> we had been hearing these arguments privately and publicly for some time. he has made clear his opposition

to the type of deal we are pursuing. we heard a lot of different arguments we have heard in different places, pulled together in one . the president made similar arguments before the joint plan of action was agreed to. that has been borne out as a successful effort. again, the prime minister has been clear about his view. we don't think he is putting forward an alternative to deal with iran getting a nuclear weapon. >> i'm surprised the emotional effectiveness of the speech. as a speechwriter, did you find it at all convincing? did you find anything that made you worried as essentially the adversary here? >> we are not adversaries. israel is one of the closest friends we have in the world. a lot of what the premise are said -- crime minister said are views we share. what he said about the need to

defend the jewish state, those are things we agree with. we have a difference on how to do that. there is tremendous emotional resonance. the question is, how do we accomplish the goal we share? >> you share the view of the regime. he said he thinks these negotiation should be enlarged to include iran's support for terrorism. the administration has been adamant you don't want to do that. why? >> we think the nuclear challenge is distinct. the prime minister said the challenge is a combination of nuclear weapons with the regime. we need to deal with the threat of a nuclear armed iran. that is what we are trying to do. they would be much more and boland -- emboldened than they

are today with a nuclear weapon. our concerns about other iranian activities will be exactly the same. we will be concerned about their support for terrorism and hezbollah. the fact is, if you can verifiably insurer they are not able to get a nuclear weapon, we will be more secure and the region will be more secure. >> why are you so confident you will be able to verifiably ensure they do not have a weapon? this is a country that had two facilities hidden from view for years. why do you believe it is possible to know what they are doing underground? >> the type of inspections we are contemplating do not just cover the nuclear sites. it also covers their uranium supply chain. uranium mines and mills. we are looking across the

entirety of the program. that is your best hedge against a covert path. make sure not only do they have facilities but they would have to construct a covert supply chain. >> you know as well as i do that intelligence is not perfect. we have seen multiple occasions of intelligence failing. is there something different about this i'm not understanding? >> iran would be understanding -- excepting inspections that go beyond anything in the world. more eyes than any other similar program. without a deal, you do not have those. have a greater risk of a covert hat. with a deal coming get inspections and the ability to verify. to challenge. to seek outside are of concern. -- out sites that are of concern.

the concern is we can verify what they are doing. >> what you think the israeli government is worried? >> the prime minister has a long-standing view of iran that takes a particular line and opposes this kind of agreement. the type of deal he laid out is one that is on the table. one that involves them dismantling their program. changing the nature of behavior in the region. that is a recipe for no deal. no country would support us taking that position. >> they are the party in the driver's c. they are a week country, under sanction. there's the perception out there among some people that the u.s. once the deal more than iran -- wants the deal more than iran. >> they are under the pressure of sanctions. they are stockpiling highly

enriched uranium. they have submitted to inspections. they've kept their low enriched stock pile. they have already adjusted behavior because the interim agreements. no ability to produce weapons grade plutonium. not using in enrichment facility. not having a one-year break out time line. strict limitations. it would set the program back in terms of their capacity to break out and pursue a nuclear weapon. at the same time, we are dealing with different alternatives. what is the best alternative? a long term deal that verifies

they are not pursuing a nuclear weapon, they are at least a year away, and involves the transparency measures. that is better than the alternatives of military action that would only set the program backed by a fraction. or simply pivoting to sanctions. every time we have moved to sanctions, the iranians continue to dance their program. >> the so called sunset clause, it says the agreement would expire. why is this being talked about as ian in issue of time to read why don't you set it up -- why is this being talked about as an issue of time? what intercepted up so the un security council can look added and removed conditions? rather than saying, if you wait 10 years, you will be relatively speaking free and clear? >> a couple of things.

first of all we are negotiating an agreement that has a specific duration on it. we are not negotiating a permanent treaty and we never have been. there was never going to be a fixed duration. on the other hand, that should not be read as some type of preemptive commissions let for them to pursue a nuclear weapon on the back end of the agreement. the same type of options that we have now will be available in 10 or 15 years. secondly, the transparency measures are going to be extensive beyond the duration on the limitations of the program. you will know what the iranians are doing with their program. the question is, why would you not want to have a decade or more of verifiable limitations on the program?

the international community can make a judgment on the back end of the deal of how to move forward. >> president obama has said one of the reasons he is so concerned is he wants to prevent a nuclear arms race in the region. what i have heard from arab allies, they are just as nervous. >> we take seriously the security of our partners. that includes israel and arab partners. we are talking about an iranian program that is set back from where it is today. we have been living in a world with an iranian nuclear program. iran is going to have less facilities, less centrifuges, longer breakouts time, during the duration of the agreement. we would say we are preventing iran from getting the nuclear

weapon you are concerned about. >> you are not guaranteeing permanent non-nuclear is ization. >> we will continue to oppose iran getting a nuclear weapon. there is no permission slip after the agreement. there are limitations that will be imposed for the duration of the agreement. you can make a judgment about where things stand. -- we can make a judgment about where things stand. we have to reassure partners this in no way lessens our concern. it's not a broader -- we are more aligned with arab partners when we look at issues like syria, yemen. >> but arab partners would say, in fact, you have a let assad regime maintain control over much of syria. you have not intervened in a more muscular way.

a more robust way. their critique is you have been so focused on the nuclear file you have allowed yemen to fall to iran. has the law is more powerful than ever. this goes back to the original question of why the sole focus on this behavior and not others that are affecting american national security? >> that is not our sole focus. we are a superpower. we are working to counter influence. we do a lot to restrict the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. we cooperate in terms of israel's efforts to counter has block. we share information and intelligence. with respect to the gulf, we have military personnel. the defense relationships and a joint military exercises.

that is aimed at reassuring them we have a commitment to their security. the president of the u.s. stood up at the un's general's assembly and laid out core interests in the region. he put at top security and sovereignty of our partners. that includes allies like saudi arabia. >> you and i both know there have been tense moments between the prime minister and president. is there a chance the white house reacted to strongly -- too strongly to the speech? susan rice called this a destructive moment. >> this is not a dynamic we sought out. we have had a clear policy of coordinating and briefing israel about these negotiations.

we addressed differences tightly. -- privately. the speech is something planned between the prime minister and the speaker of the house. that created the dynamic we are in. what susan was articulating is the relationship should not become partisan. part of what makes the relationship special it is not between the labour party. it should be bipartisan. that is what we are going to stand for. the prime minister is making a case that is against the case that we believe is the right policy for the u.s. we are going to make our case as well and do it respectfully. >> what would happen if the prime minister were to win the argument?

let's say, this was an effective speech and he convinced wavering democrats to join in with a republican sponsored sanctions program that the iranians say would drive them from the table. >> our message to congress has been, give us the space to get a deal and then take a look at it. let's do it, lay it out. we will make our case. people can make the case against it. let's say we do not get a deal. let's say we are not able to get to the finish line. the iranians may not move far enough to reach our bottom line. in that case, it is very important that the perception internationally be that the iranians are responsible for the failure of negotiations. that has been how we have get buy-in for sanctions.

we have been able to say, the iranians are responsible and we need to apply pressure. if the appearances, the u.s. took an action through passing of new sanctions that derailed the negotiations, that puts us in a weaker position to build the sanctions that the israeli prime minister is advocating. it is important to let the negotiations reached there and point. if there is a deal, look at it. if not, let it be default of iran. -- be the fault of iran. >> to think the primary stories trying to drive the u.s. toward a military confrontation with iran? >> i don't get is his preferred course of action. however, there is a logic to the alternative. if you get an agreement that is verifiable, but goes in the double digits, that gives us a pathway to make sure they are not going to get a weapon. if iran does not reach that type

of agreement and we covet to sanctions, the options start to shrink for the u.s. you are either betting on the notions that iran is going to capitulate under economic sanctions, which does not seem likely given the nature of the regime. or you are left with a decision to take military action. the president has said, all actions are on the table and he means it. the point is, the military is not as effective as a diplomatic solution. >> has the white house study this and said, we are not able to buy much time if we destroy new care facilities question mark x yes. -- facilities? >> yes. if you're talking about an agreement will be on a decade or even a decade, that is a

longer time than you could set that the program by just bombing a certain number of facilities. they do know the nuclear fuel cycle. they do have expertise. what is most likely to happen in a scenario where there is a military option is they do breakout. the program goes underground. >> what makes the president believe an iran that is essentially empower, that has been granted through this alleged deal to write to enrich uranium, that puts it on a pathway towards the end of sanctions, what makes the president think this kind of moment would lead to better behavior on the part of a country he himself describes as a sponsor of terror and assad regime? >> we would make this deal, even on the basis that the iranian regime is not going to change. this is a nuclear deal that we

would make on the merits. because we distrust the regime, we would make it because it includes verification measures. however, if making the deal does help lead to a dynamic where the iranian regime is moderated that would be a preferable course of action. but we are not thinking on that. the purpose of the agreement is not to bet on the notion iran will moderate. the purpose is to prevent iranian from getting -- iran from getting a nuclear weapons. we have learned that they prioritize their funding. the hardliners are comfortable in the current dynamic. where iran is in the penalty box. they still can operate. there is the possibility that if you have this type of agreement,

there is a different faction of iranian society that does not feel comfortable with you more comfortable hartline -- comfortable with the more hardline direction of the country. we are not banking on that. i think it is more likely that dynamic takes place if there is a then if there is not -- nuclear agreement then if there is not. ultimately verification measures are the best hedge against iran taking actions. >> how you feel about the negotiations? >> i feel like they have come a long way. there is no guarantee. the reason we put this isas a 50-50 proposition is it will come down to a matter of portugal well on the part of the iranians. ultimately, that lies with the leadership.

we are in the ballpark in terms of the gaps narrowing. we can see what this could look like. we are not there yet because the iranians have further to move on issues we care about. we are not going to make a bad deal. we have had pretty of our opportunity to accept a bad deal and have not done it. quick -- >> ben rhodes, thank you very much. ♪

>> we continue looking at u.s. israel h relations with tamara cofman wittes. also, ray takeyh. thank you for being here. >> the speech was very effective as a speech. particularly at the end when netanyahu was saying to his

domestic audience and cortical base. -- political base. he said, if we need to, we will stand alone but we are not alone. america stands with us. that is the video clip his party will use. >> i thought it was unusually modest speech. the prime minister is accused of being maximalist. his demands were at a modest level. he wanted to deal with the sunset clause and ballistic missiles. those are not -- >> are these conditions iran will accept? >> what he highlighted were not criticisms limited to the being in yahoo! -- benjamin netanyahu. these are the criticisms of

numerous democratic legislators. that is the consensus position in many ways. >> i think those involved in the negotiations would agree, in principle, if they could get those things, that would be great. they just don't think that is realistic. what was striking to me and policy terms about the speech then yahoo! did not have -- benjamin netanyahu did not have an alternative strategy. >> to do here any kind of practical advice? >> it was to increase pressure. there is no way you can prove or disprove it will group -- work. >> he was saying we them out.

-- wait them out. use time to your advantage. that is the strategy the obama administration has been trying to pursue. his allies were pressing for new sanctions right away. time should be on the side of the p5 plus one. if netanyahu had embraced the weight them out strategy -- wait them out strategy in january, he probably would not be giving the speech. >> do you think he is bluffing. the system is weaker? it would have to respond by making concessions? >> there are a number of reasons

to stay at the table to read it works for them. they have managed to legalize and legitimize their program. it gives you a measure of economic relief. unifies the elite at home. there are a number of non-nuclear reasons to stay at the table. i'm not sure that additional sanctions would damage the negotiations. the proponents of sanctions made one mistake, after the central bank sanctions. they should have pivoted from sanctions and to trying to define what they think parameters of a final deal should be. that is what is happening with bob corcoran and others. they are looking at how to inject their voices. i cannot tell you he will not walk away. i'm skeptical. these negotiations have been going on for 13 years. it is difficult to be concerned about the longevity of negotiations that have gone on that long. they are the second-longest any

history of the middle east without producing a result. everybody knows what the first is. >> ben rhodes just talked about said the u.s. does not want to proceed as party the party that cause of the talks to fail. what would be the causes of apperception taking root in iran and the greater middle east? >> there is concerned about them in the middle east. the international trinity, europe, -- community, europe, there is work to do. if you cannot win a pr battle with the holocaust denier, you have to revisit your pr strategy. >> you have written that the supreme leader is any way a strategic gdenius.

this feeds into a broader notion that it is difficult ultimately, and this is the dirty secret, it is difficult to stop a country of means and native intelligence and resources that once very badly to have nuclear weapons. are we looking at something inevitable over time? i'm not sure. there are two big pats. it and illegal. they tried illegal path first. the risk of that is sanctions, economic distress, the possibility of a military strike. that is risky. the other strategy is to get an agreement that is permissible in terms of the technology and has a limited sunset clause. you can build up to an industrial sized capacity which puts you in a position to search for a bomb. that is a longer path.

the other is a riskier path. >> do you think the theoretical deal we are talking about, is amazingly chronology is wrong. the premise minister came to denounce a deal that does not yet exist. do you think it would set iran on a path toward a nuclear bomb? that is the scathing critique of the obama administration's approach. >> it allows iran to maintain enrichment capability. knowledge is upon expiration iran can be treated -- >> the proliferation treaty. >> iran has an industrial program. what happens is you is moved to read possibility of leakage is extraordinary.

they can develop undersigned -- climb to seeing -- secret facilities. you have to have permission from the iranians. they are unsatisfied with the inspection regime in place. if the deal expires, the decision to have a bomb would be an iranian decision. >> the challenge here is what rate is describing -- ray is describing is a iran that can reach threshold capacity and sneak across the line to read the question is whether there is a way to avoid it. iran was driving there before the negotiations begin. in 2013. we have halted that, for now. at some point, in some manner

without negotiations, they will be going down that road anyway. it is a heavy burden on the obama demonstration that the best they can achieve is to slow down the timeline for iran to be a threshold that their state. i don't see any alternative that pulls them back. except the hypothesis that more pressure will do what all the pressure so far has not. >> is there an alternative we are missing? >> the critics in the proponents are not that far apart. if the administration dealt with one aspect of the deal, namely the sunset clause, it would be in a better position in terms of clause. a ten-year sunset clause that begin talking about 30 years, i think that is a poison pill. if they adjust it, i think they are in a very good position.

they have to go back and renegotiating clause. henry kissinger had to go back and renegotiate all the time. it happens. sold one, salt to. -- salt one, salt two. that is a progression that is easily understood. adjustable and disturbing. the tenure sunset clause. >> -- 10-year sunset clause. >> did he come here to create conditions in which a u.s. military strike on iran would become inevitable? >> to me, this was the most interesting aspect of the speech. the area in which he seemed to depart from his previously articulated positions. if you look back to the

disagreement that corrupted between the u.s. and israel a few weeks ago as reported in the press, that the u.s. has been negotiating on the basis of a one-year break out time and the israelis are saying that is insufficient. >> it will take them a year from a decision to get to a bomb. >> that was a goal post that the u.s. and the rest of the p5 plus one thought was completely unrealistic. unachievable. if that is the goal post, there is no deal that will be acceptable to the israeli government. we did not hear about two years of reg out town -- break out time. what that means to me is netanyahu is leaving things ambiguous. he was leaving room for himself to process -- acquiesce in a deal if it got closer.

he did not want to lay down a gotland in front of -- gauntlet in front of congress that would put them in a decision. >> are there said enough conditions where there was only an eventual lee terry solution -- military solution? >> he says he wants a better deal. he is right to highlight the deficiencies of this. the inspection regime has to fall within managed access. these are not eating netanyahu -- bibi netanyahu objections. there is a loneliness to the white house iranian position. the republicans are against it.

henry kissinger could read an uncut acquittal number of democrats -- henry kissinger. not a small number of democrats to a >> are the moments when you think they are being played? >> as ray said, these are complicated negotiations. there will be trade offs. the u.s. has to satisfy a lot of coalition partners. amongst its partners in the region -- those are a lot of different friends to satisfy simultaneously. it may be there is no set that will satisfy everybody. the u.s. will ultimately have to decide who it can most afford to disappoint. given the conditions that

obama has laid out, the consequences he is worried about if it's deal is not achieved the proliferation concern in the region, if that is really the target, he has to satisfy regional partners. >> if the saudis are unhappy, this will not be a happy situation. >> netanyahu made a good point. if the delivery -- deal is not good enough, the proliferation will happen anyway. that said, it is not the terms of the deal itself. it is about the side deals the u.s. can make with them. security guarantees. other provisions it can put into place in terms of regional security architecture. the terms of the deal in and of themselves don't tell us enough about whether the regional partners are happy. it is striking to me this is a moment when israel has maximum leverage stuck to the u.s. about what it once.

-- wants. what it can get from the u.s. in terms of security guarantees. it is not using this time to have that conversation. it is engaged in an argument with washington. >> did the u.s. entered the negotiations prematurely? is the u.s. and sanctions regime, where they really bringing the iranian regime to a crisis point? do we throw them a lifeline -- did we throw them a lifeline? >> the economy was declining. i think the u.s. entered the negotiations prematurely. they have been involved for a long time. the question of unclean twin interim agreement which had a letter positive stuff but also stipulated principles for the final deal that was a mistake.

>> tomorrow, israeli elections. how much of his visit to washington was about preventing a second holocaust and how much was about making sure the israeli voters return him to power march 17? >> to be perfectly honest, i'm not sure it is possible to disentangle them. in his own mind, i'm not sure it is possible. >> he believes he is the state himself? >> he clearly believes ift is his mission to prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon. to do anything it takes. his role as prime minister is to do that. that means it is essential he be prime minister. he holds both these views very sincerely and passionately. >> give us a write-down of his problem. he is facing an electoral problem. the centerleft coalition is

pulling fairly well. there are a lot of people on the right tired of having net ya who. -- benjamin netanyahu. what are the chances is prime minister ship will end? >> odds are he will be able to serve again. not necessarily because he will win the largest block of seats. but looking at the fragmentation of the parliamentary system, there are more accommodations that canould produce an agreement with him at the helm. in the polls, labor's numbers have been going up. >> why is it then ya who more unpopular? -- netanyahu more unpopular?

>> he has been in power for six years. every election is to some degree a referendum on him. they look at foreign and security policy another war with gaza. tensions in jerusalem. no solution on the israeli-palestinian conflict or the threat from iran, which has been talking about for years. they asked themselves, at a certain point, if this guy cannot get us answers, can somebody else? it is not clear the israeli public sees in the political spectrum any alternative that offers more likely solutions. >> do you think there is any chance the ayatollah would want rapprochement with the u.s.? can you envision him saying, i would like to meet barack obama.

how important is anti-americanism to him? >> he has learned to separate the deal from the possibility of coming to terms with the u.s. she understands a deal serves a number of purposes. a nuclear arms control agreement, should there be one will not affect their approach to the u.s. >> it seems logical to say there is no trust between the two leaders, obama and then you hope -- benjamin netanyahu. there is a coldness that is even colder than usual. do you see this damage as permanent? ? > i do not see it as permanent. i think there is a permanent lack of trust between them. i don't the would prevent them from finding a way forward on the iranian nuclear issue or a host of regional crises.

i think that in some ways, netanyahu set out with a concealed tory tone, -- conciliatory tone. >> warmer than he has ever been. >> maybe. the substance of what he had to say left room for the u.s. and israel to come to terms on this issue. practically speaking, this is an administration that is gaining. it will not be tilting at windmills. if it finds itself dealing with prime minister netanyahu there are certain issues they are probably not going to try to push forward including renewing israeli-palestinian negotiations. cooperation will certainly be there. crisis management. but there will be a hesitation

to press forward creatively on some of the other big issues where there could be progress. >> thank you. ray takeyh thank you for being here. >> thank you. ♪

>> with all due respect to ben carson, do not pass go, do not collect $200. on the show tonight, the bush money pouring in, hillary clinton, boring, but first e-mail. this story is not dying. how is this controversy most hurting hillary clinton's presidential prospects? phil: i see two points.