visit philipslifeline.com/caregiver today or call this number for your free brochure and ask about free activation. ♪ announcer: from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. charlie: one of america's most senior and respected diplomats. secretary of state from 2011 two -- 2011-2014. bill burns was also u.s. ambassador to russia and jordan. in 2013, he led talks with iran that set the stage for the comprehensive agreement made last week. he retired from government last week and is now president of the carnegie endowment. i'm pleased to have him at the table. welcome. how do you like this new role? >> i'm enjoying it.

i was very lucky in public service. i genuinely loved it and was lucky. i'm enjoying life afterwards. charlie: how did this happen? this trip that you and jake sullivan and others, meeting with iranian representatives covertly. >> i think you have to go back and remember that the beginning of 2013, president obama's second term, we built up a lot of leverage working with international partners to bring pressure on iran to get around to negotiate seriously. one of the reasons we built up the international coalition was because we showed we were serious about negotiations. so, the president concluded rightly to try to contest whether iran would be serious about negotiating on the nuclear issue. in a sense it was a test of whether they were serious.

but also an investment of the international coalition. if the test did not work out so we could sustain strength and sanctions. it's fair to say all of us were skeptical going into it. we had gone 35 years without sustained diplomatic contact with iran. a huge amount of baggage on both sides. i think the president concluded rightly that the best way to test this was to do it directly and quietly. it would be difficult to get any traction if we had done it with publicity. there were a series of meetings that went on for much of 2013. charlie: a little bit like nixon and china. nevertheless, you have to do these things in a kind of quiet way without the glare of publicity and people taking shots before they have any understanding of where you might go.

william: i think that is exactly right. it became clear after president rouhani was elected, that he and foreign minister zarif were serious. but over time over the course of those meetings in 2013, i did develop a respect for them. they are very tough, skillful negotiators. we began to get some traction. charlie: were they motivated by the elimination of sanctions or was it a broader sense of, we need to change the perception of iran and our relationship with the world? william: i think it is a little of both. in the sense that iran is not a monolith. there are debates that go on within the leadership over the issues.

but what ran across the political system was a sense of the economic pressure, and a sense that the only way to relieve that pressure was to deal on the nuclear issue and deal seriously not just with american concerns that -- but international concerns about the need to constrain their program. charlie: why did they continue to say, we do not want a nuclear weapon? i have had -- i had interviewed the last three presidents of iran. william burns: i have heard that assertion many times. it has been embodied by their supreme leader. but the reality is in any negotiation, you cannot based on trust or assertions, you have to base it on the quality of the agreement. that is what we set out to do. charlie: you understand, why say it this everybody thinks it is not true. unless you believe it is true and there is some definition you have that is different from the definition of the world? william burns: the only definition we can apply is one

that is verifiable, and that is what we set out to do. charlie: why do you assume they had been cheating? william burns: you look at the iaea record, the reason behind the resolutions passed, based on iran not living up to its international obligations. there's a very intricate record about their program. that is what we had to deal with. charlie: we now have a deal, an agreement. in which the singular goal was to get iran not to move forward to having nuclear weapon. and the same time, to lessen the sanctions. beyond that what is the import of this deal? william burns: first i think

you are exactly right. the focus was to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. i do believe this is a solid verifiable agreement with strong international support. i believe it is the best of the available alternatives for ensuring iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. the truth is, there are risks in any choice you make or any option you pursue. we have to be honest about that. and honest about how best to manage that. i personally have always tried to be very pragmatic about this. i do not assume there will be any overnight transformation in iranian behavior elsewhere in the middle east. charlie: and they have said, we are not changing our policy. william burns: right. and therefore i think it is important for us to base our policy on the assumption that that kind of behavior is going to continue to threaten our interests and our friends interests. but i also believe the behavior would be more threatening if

they had a nuclear weapon or the program was unconstrained and uninspected. charlie: do you believe they would have had a nuclear weapon sooner without the agreement? william burns: i think there would be a real risk iran could accelerate its program and get closer and closer to that point, and i think that adds to a degree of instability and fragility in a region that has its share of both. charlie: but they are a month away from a breakthrough. william burns: without the agreement, the iranians would be two or three months away from developing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. that is just one dimension of what you have to do. you also need a nuclear explosive device. one principal advantage of this agreement is that it extends to-three months -- two or three months to a year. charlie: do they have the other two developments, the means to explode it and means to delivery? william burns: up until 2003

the intelligence community believed they were trying to develop a program. i don't think we have ever been entirely sure how far they got, which makes sure that the provisions are tight. charlie: we know that they were trying to put together material. william burns: yes, and the stockpile increased in 2003. they had 164 centrifuges. 10 years later they had 19,000. a stockpile is something like 10,000 kilograms of enriched material. one of the big advantages of this agreement is to reduce the stockpile, which is 10 weapons worth of some material by 98%, down to 300 kilograms over 50 years. -- 15 years. that is less than what it takes for one nuclear explosive device. charlie: have you read the document? william burns: i have. charlie: i only know two people who have read the document. he basically had this document

with him and he said, this is in an incredible way, it guarantees a future nuclear program, the dangers you will not have the ability to control what is happening outside of known sites. that is the danger. william burns: i think the danger of iran speaking out to develop a nuclear weapon has always been greater than using a declared facility to do that. that makes the verification provisions in this agreement extraordinarily important. without those provisions, it would be impossible or difficult to tell whether or not the iranians were trying to develop a covert site. some of the other provisions are extremely helpful in this regard. for example, you have continuous access to the whole nuclear supply chain from iranian mines through production and storage of centrifuges. it is difficult to construct a covert site and an entire separate supply chain.

it is extremely important and something we have embedded, in the interim agreement, and built upon in the comprehensive agreement. charlie: why do you think there is so much skepticism about the agreement? is it just politics, or is it a genuine concern about people -- by people that the arenas got -- the iranians got the better part of the deal? william burns: i think this is an issue that deserves debate. it is important not just in terms of the u.s. and iran, but the stability and future of the middle east. it deserves serious debate. it is not surprising that people will differ over whether provisions are strong enough. there is also understandable concern about what this means in a region in which, i don't expect there will be an overnight transportation of

-- transformation of behavior. what is the relaxation of sanction mean for iran's ability to exert influence? whether it is through lebanon or militia in iraq. those are legitimate questions. i'm still convinced that we are far better off with the agreement than without it. with all the debate and controversy, there are two questions we have to come back to. the first is if we where to walk away from the agreement, could we get a better one? the second is, if we cannot get a better one, are we better off with the deal or without it? charlie: and could we have gotten a better deal if we continued to negotiate? because some argue that time was on our side because the rainy -- the iranians knew that down the road is a new president who will be tougher than president obama. william burns: i think president obama has been very tough and

realistic and pragmatic on this deal. if you wanted to get a deal sooner he could have done it. the reason it took so long is because he was determined to get a solid and verifiable deal. charlie: what is the weakness of the deal, as you see it? william burns: i think it is a solid deal. i think there are questions that arise, particularly with regards to two challenges, first the execution of the agreement. implementing this agreement will require the kind of sustained day in day out short focus that we have not always been great at in the u.s. government. and second, to embed a nuclear agreement in a wider strategy in the region that reassures our friends in the gulf and israel and elsewhere, and pushes back against iranian behavior that will threaten us. charlie: i think i understand what you mean.

but embedded in a wider strategy that says this deal ought to be part of one part of a relationship with iran, and another part should be trying to push back to ameliorate their behavior with neighboring states. william burns: i agree. that is easier to say than to do, but i firmly believe those are the ingredients of a sensible and workable strategy. charlie: but did the neighbors have the same opinion? saudi arabia has its own issues with iran that go beyond nuclear. the emirates, israel also. have they reached the same judgment about the consequences of the deal, and the embedding of a new strategy? william burns: none of those players have been shy about expressing their doubts about this issue. we have a serious challenge of ahead of us, in terms of reassuring them. that is the reason the president posted a number of gulf leaders

at camp david. it is why secretary kerry plans to go in the beginning of august. a single meeting is not a strategy. we will have to keep this up over time. but i think it is possible over time to build that. charlie: tell me what the argument would be with respect to saudi arabia and the emirates and israel, it you were in the role that asked carter has today? -- ash carter has today? william burns: the core issue is we are clear i about iranian behavior continuing to bring our friends and interests. but that would be more threatening if you had an unconstrained iranian nuclear program or had a nuclear weapon. it seems to me to make sense to ensure that at least you will not have that element of threat or fragility. it is still an issue with the eager challenge of dealing with iran's other behavior and that is something we need to work with our friends to take on. charlie: how do we change their

behavior, with respect to supporting hezbollah, providing money and arms, hamas, houthis in yemen? william burns: we need to make better use of tools that already exist. there are security council resolutions that prohibit iran. we need to step up intelligence sharing, do what we can to improve the capacity of our friends to prevent that in the future. and work even more energetically and effectively to counter those pressures. in the long term, i think there is the reality that you have an iranian population, 20% of whom -- 70% of whom are under the age of 30. he saw the reaction to the agreement. charlie: cheering in the streets. william burns: right. and the entrepreneurial class to connect with the rest of the world.

i do not expect overnight transformation of behavior. are a lot of risks, but i do think over time that will have an impact as well in terms of how iran interacts with the rest of the region. you know, henry kissinger said that iran had to choose. charlie: and a country and ideology. william burns: right. i don't think that has yet been made -- charlie: they have not made the choice. they feel they are a part of a worldwide movement -- what makes up that movement? william burns: there's a revolutionary ideology that has been at the core of it. charlie: a huge part of it has been anti-american. william burns: i think that is a

part of the beliefs of some people in that regime. charlie: how hard is it to get beyond that, that america has never been on the side of iran? since the revolution of 1979. william burns: i think that hovers in the background of conversations today. there's a lot of suspicion, the americans going back to the hostage crisis. navigating through that is not easy. none of this effort has been based on trust, or the notion that somehow you can just leap over that historical reality on either side. but i think what has been demonstrated is you can focus on practical issues and make progress. charlie: you know that i am interested in russia. you were the ambassador to russia. the president says, russia played an important role.

a positive role. what role is that? william burns: i think throughout the process, this was not just about the united states and iran. it was about mobilizing international support first in favor of a sanctions regime and ultimately to come up with a common negotiating position with iran. that is not a small achievement for the president or john kerry, when you consider there were lots of other crises between that. it has not been a small thing that we were able to, despite those problems, sustain sanctions and a serious coherent effort in negotiations. i think that was largely on the russian side. they do not have an interest in a nuclear armed iran. they understand the challenge that would pose.

i think that is what sustains them. charlie: but what's interesting to me is that when given an opportunity to take a position to be on the same side as the u.s., that they viewed in the public interest of russia, they were there. william burns: yes. and that is true for china. charlie: it wasn't a knee-jerk reaction against america. william burns: no. the same is true with china. so continuing to hold that coalition together and keep people together at the table was important. for both the president and secretary kerry. charlie: and beyond that, and you have alluded to that, it was not easy to build these sanctions. to the extent they did. clearly, they had an impact. they were effective. it's not easy when you have all these countries who have all kinds of economic interests. william burns: no, and particularly during the economic

fragility, to get countries to reduce imports was not easy. as i said, the reason for that was partly the strength of the u.s. financial system. it was partly iranian intransigence for many years. it was also partly, especially after president obama came into office, we demonstrated we were serious about negotiations. i emphasized that because that was a critical ingredient. sometimes people argue we could have stayed at the table and increased sanctions indefinitely. the problem with that is, if we reached a moment where the iranians were serious about compromise in the eyes of the big international players, and we weren't, then you begin to see sanctions the road -- erode. there comes a point where you build up pressure, that you have to use it or lose it.

charlie: the president always said it was an impossible. but others have argued including the prime minister of israel, that if sanctions were working, more would work better. and you needed a deal to eliminate sanctions if iran would simply eliminate all centrifuges and capacity to build a nuclear weapon. william burns: i understand the argument but there are two problems. there is an evidence to suggest -- and there is not any evidence to suggest sanctions alone would have caused iran to abandon its enrichment program altogether. second -- charlie: why not? if they were hurting, and they were hurt so much sticking to the table, hurting more, they would say we give up? william burns: i just don't see any evidence that the iranians were going to capitulate on that core issue. it is certainly possible to get the iranians to accept, as we have done, sharp constraints on their program over a long duration.

they are viable enough to give us confidence they will not acquire a nuclear weapon. but the second problem with that thesis is i don't think it was possible to build a strong international consensus around dismantling their program. it was the international consensus that made the sanctions so effective. it wasn't just about us, it was about others applying pressure. charlie: so europe would not necessarily have in there for -- have it in their -- have been there for that tightening of the screws on sanctions? william burns: i don't think they would in the end. in a perfect world, that is the outcome we would have aimed for but we don't live in a perfect world. that has never been on the menu. charlie: the president also said that if in fact this deal had not been able to work it out that the sanctions would have fallen apart in part because the sanctions got you there to negotiate, but you cannot build them back.

yet at the same time, a snapback function is part of the deal. those things could be a little bit in contradiction. william burns: but what binds the two together is that a snack back -- it's not back would be in reaction to iranian violation. charlie: therefore they will be motivated to rejoin. william burns: right you can build international support. we have come to a point where you have a new iranian government, prepared to engage seriously. whereas before, he faced a choice of making maximum use of leverage we had built up, or if we were seen to be the party and not the iranians, then there was a real risk we would start to lose it. that is the danger of walking away now. i think the reality is it we were to do that in pursuit of a so-called better deal or strengthen sanctions, we would

be isolated. most of our partners would see that as bad faith. i think he would start to see the sanctions regime crumble over time. the iranians would benefit and we would be left with a not very appealing outcome. a nuclear program that is unconstrained and unexpected. -- on the inspected -- u ninspected. charlie: the other thing, and there are many aspects, the u.s. wanted this more than the iranians did. the president believed it really would prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon. at the same time, when the arms embargo came up as an issue with respect to the u.n. arms embargo, which iranians argue as -- was part of a sanctions effort and therefore should not be eliminated -- but they seem to settle on that.

the president made the decision this deal is too important for us to go for all or nothing on the arms embargo, so therefore we will compromise. but it suggests a very strong belief by the president that this deal would prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon and we could not afford to lose it over this arms embargo. william burns: i think the criticism that somehow we were desperate for a deal and the president wanted it more is not fair. as i said before, had the united states wanted to get a deal at any cost, we could have done it a lot sooner. with a lot less pain. the reality is when you look at difficult issues like the arms embargo restrictions on ballistic missile, that were put into the resolutions as a punitive measure against the nuclear progress, the reality is to sustain those resolutions you have to persuade partners as well.

most of our partners had different views. many of them. it was not just a u.s. judgment. it was something that had to reflect the views of a group. second, there are a number of other measures that exist that prohibit iran from supplying weapons to hezbollah or others. we need to make effective use of those. there are a number of things we can do to push back against behavior. we need to find ways to be more effective in doing that. charlie: the other argument being made is the idea that $200 billion that they will come into because it is owed to them. they will immediately use in part, to support all the things we are against. william burns: i think the figure is probably closer to 100 -- $100 billion. whatever it is, it is a light of

money and a big concern. the truth is, we don't know what that leadership will do with the money. it is fair to assume that some of it will go to support -- and supporting forces, and others in the regime that are fighting proxy wars against our friends in the region. at the same time, one of the reasons iran came to the table is because they were suffering economically. there are huge needs that go well beyond $100 billion. it is fair to assume a significant portion is going to have to go to showing iranians that their economic place is getting better. i don't know with the balance -- what the balance will be. it is a fair concern. it is more reason to embed the nuclear agreement in the strategy. charlie: which has not been done, but is underway? william burns: right. that will have to require a lot of priority. ♪

charlie: speak to this. a lot of people think this is a crucially important time. as you said, this is important to have the debate about beyond the agreement, and nuclear weapons in general and iran and its role in the world. they argue that if you believe it is more likely iran will get

a nuclear weapon, then what you will have is a middle east that is more dangerous than it has ever been. that is likely to happen if they believe it is likely they will get the nuclear weapons. i'm asking you to speak to the question of the powder keg idea. that all bets are off if they get a weapon. william burns: i think the middle east is already a powder keg and a nuclear-armed iran will make it more explosive. it's less likely they will acquire a nuclear weapon with this agreement than without it. i think without this agreement that concern would become much more immediate and accelerate, which is the last thing the middle east needs right now. but there are a lot of other dimensions of that the powder keg that the u.s. will have to address. charlie: which are? william burns: pushing back against isis and defeating isis, which is a huge challenge and

will take time. in iraq, as strategy not just about security. strengthening the capacity of the security forces, and it's also political. you can retake tikrit or mosul but if you don't have a legitimate area political answer, the problem will occur in the future. syria is a huge catastrophe. that will demand our attention sometime to come. the problems in the middle east, i'm afraid, are going to be with the people of that region and the united states for the next generation and beyond. charlie: i was at a conference where you were participating and someone asked, what are we doing to make sure we are part of a program and an idea so that young people don't turn to isis? and you, in a sense, came alive

at that argument because it seemed to resonate with you, that somehow part of our strategy has to be what is the lure for people to go there and how do you provide an alternative opportunity. william burns: i agree. that is an extremely important point. first, it is only people and leaders in that region who will be able to answer that question. the problem with the powder keg or the vacuum that exists in the middle east is the crumbling of much of the arab states system. the big question hanging over that, what comes next? charlie: saudi arabia, lebanon jordan. a lot of places. william burns: right. and ultimately people in that region will have to come up with the answer. that will require a long-term commitment to better education a sense of economic hope that doesn't exist, a sense of

confidence in governance, which also doesn't exist and was at the root of a lot of what we saw in the revolution. it will take a long time to do that. the united states can contribute to that. in terms of long-term challenges, trying to help modernize educational systems, modernize economies, but also in the short term by limiting some of the fragilities that exist. that is what i would argue things in the case of the iranian nuclear question. on the assumption that an iranian program is unconstrained, will add another layer of danger in an already explosive situation. charlie: are we just thinking about that? it seems fundamental. way back to al qaeda, you have got to have an alternative. it spawned in part, the arab

spring, having to do his government, but it was also the aspiration of people. in the internet world, they saw what life was like elsewhere. william burns: they saw what other people had that they don't. that has animated what we saw in the revolutions from 2011 onward. there was a really interesting set of studies called the arab human development reports. it was done a decade ago. it is as accurate today as it was then. they talk about women's rights economic opportunity. until leaders in the region, with support from us and others address those -- charlie: but the argument against american diplomacy by many is that we have ignored those ideas and those issues in the interest of having a stable relationship with someone who is on our side. and in the interest of having a free flow of oil. william burns: that has been a

fair criticism and there are lots of points. it will be extremely important as the u.s. looks at its strategy in the middle east to try to find an effective short-term answer. not be blind to the reality that you cannot sustain stability unless you are making progress in those other issues. societies that adapt and modernize are going to be able to stay ahead of pressures. those that don't are going to become brittle and break. charlie: that goes back, the american diplomatic effort had no real knowledge or understanding or was fearful of having any relationship to anybody who opposed the shah. whether it was egypt or the muslim brotherhood or wherever.

william burns: and it tends to be a shortsighted diplomacy when we do that. as the u.s. looks ahead, we will have to find a more effective balance between the short-term and real need for order and stability, and recognizing you cannot sustain stability unless you make progress on other issues. charlie: this is the new york times today. i want to talk about isis. this is the lead story. "isis leaders take steps to ensure group's survival. power is parceled out. drawing lessons depleted by drone strikes, islamic state's leader has empowered commanders with wide-ranging authority and a plan to ensure that if top figures are killed, the organization will adapt and continue fighting." this is no uncommon enemy we have.

william burns: nope, and the longer they become entrenched, the more difficult they will be to dislodge overtime, which is why there has to be a sense of urgency about the effort we are making in iraq. and why this has to be not just a security strategy, but security and political strategy as well. charlie: what do we mean by political strategy? william burns: it means you have to have a government and leadership in baghdad and a central government that can reach out. charlie: and they are tolerant of sunni aspirations. william burns: that's right. if you can't demonstrate tolerance, it is hard to hold together a multiethnic society. charlie: and in bahrain, a sunni minority is conscious of the shia majority. william burns: and having that long-term view about the importance of pluralism. you don't have to replicate american democratic

institutions, but you have to build a sense of tolerance respect for pluralism, and institutions that will nit those -- will knit those exist together. that is the challenge. the problem that isis poses in iraq is a huge security challenge. it's also a big political challenge. they take advantage of the sense of grievance and frustration and resentment on the part of -- charlie: but has it gotten a little bit better since the government was replaced? william burns: the maliki government was a pretty low bar. i think the prime minister is focused on the right challenges. i don't mean to suggest it is easy to take these on. i think they are pointed in the right direction, but it will require a lot of help and support and encouragement from the u.s. and others. charlie: does this deal mean it

is more likely that somehow shia militias and the iraqi army are supported by iran and others in the iraqi military and the united states air force will be working closer together? william burns: the shia militia in iraq, the most extreme, have had a mixed record on the ground against isis. i understand the concern. i understand the reality that they are parallel interests in the sense that iran and allies don't want to see isis succeed. but that doesn't mean you are going to see close coordination. charlie: when the history is written of the obama administration, is it possible

history will say this president, because he came to power when the u.s. was withdrawing from iraq and he was committed to that, given the fact that he left no troops there and the afghanistan war which he began to reduce, that he was so conscious of the lack of success in our military involvement that he made decisions that were too cautious, too conservative, and, in that circumstance, isis grew? and part of the responsibility is we did not do enough at the right time? william burns: i understand the concerns and criticism, but i don't agree with them in the sense that you can take issue with specific tactical decisions made. but in general, i think the president has recognized clearly

what is at stake and the critical role the united states plays. charlie: you think we have done enough to combat the rise of isis? william burns: no, i think there is more that we certainly can do today. charlie: not can do going forward, i'm talking about looking back. have we not shown a sense of urgency, and therefore they taken advantage of that, in syria and iraq? william burns: in hindsight, sure. i think we could have demonstrated a greater sense of urgency earlier. but i don't think the roots of isis go back to the kind of choices that we made. they go back to the collapse of much of the arab state system, before they go back to external interventions, whether it was iraq in 2003 and elsewhere. that contributed to change realities that all sorts of groups tried to take advantage

of so it is a complicated phenomenon. a greater sense of urgency might have been more effective. but looking ahead, i think there is that sense of urgency. charlie: what is the strategy? william burns: it will have to be a re-doubled effort in both political and security terms. in syria, it is an enormously big problem. i wish i had better insights. i do think the negotiation of leadership in damascus will be essential. the longer assad stays in power, the bigger of a recruiting magnet he will be for isis. that will require persuading the russians and the iranians. charlie: i know you don't want to go to criticizing the government you served in, but at the same time we seem to have been ambivalent about assad.

william burns: i think -- charlie: in the beginning, we accepted that he had to go. we gave expression to that. and then at the same time, when isis rose, we began to say susan rice here said we have got to look at this with different eyes. it is not necessarily the priority now to get rid of assad. william burns: i just think it is hard to disentangle one or the other. i do think assad is a recruiting magnet for isis. charlie: but have we done enough to overthrow him, or have we left them on that? william burns: we could have done more. i think at a moment when it might have had more influence,

early on, in 2012 after the revolution began and there was intense debate over those issues -- which is not surprising. it is always hard to answer the question. how do we avoid a slippery slope and what comes next. but the honest answer is we could have done more. i cannot sit here and say that would have made a huge difference. i honestly don't know. ♪

charlie: what are we missing with respect to russia and ukraine? william burns: i think the one thing that we are not so much missing but it is easy to lose sight of is the significance of helping ukrainians rebuild the economy and society. right now the e.u. is preoccupied with greece. but in many respects, just as it is important to push back against aggressive russian behavior, it is equally important to help ukrainians rebuilt their society and economy. in many respects, that is the ultimate antidote to putin's aggression in ukraine.

charlie: you have the ukrainians build up the economy. william burns: right, a healthy political system. putin has operated in a target rich environment. he has looked at the vulnerabilities of former soviet countries and has taken advantage of them. charlie: will history say the united states missed an opportunity to have a better relationship with russia after the fall of the wall and have made mistakes that led to the rise of vladimir putin? william burns: i think there was a serious effort made in the 1990's in the clinton administration and the bush and obama administrations to build healthy relationships. i think there was tactical progress, like around 2010. charlie: but that wasn't vladimir putin. william burns: well, he wasn't far from the scene.

charlie: the question was, he was not far of the scene, they suggest that the u.s. thought that we could simply put all of our eggs in medvedev's basket because he was more likely to be -- william burns: i never thought that was the case. i think the reality is that for lots of russians, even including critics of putin, the history of the last 20, 25 years is a narrative of the west taking advantage of russia's moment of weakness. i'm not saying we should indulge it, but i think that is what lots of russians think. charlie: yes, i do know they think that. it's not true but you think it is a reality that animates them? with respect to the march of

nato, we went and got close to georgia and perhaps ukraine if things had gone differently, was that a good idea? knowing vladimir putin and russia's fear on the border because of world war ii and napoleon? william burns: ukraine has always been the rawest of raw nerves for russians. the challenge is to help ukrainians rebuild a healthy political system. that needs to be the near-term priority. in addition to pushing back against russia. charlie: a western idea, not just the u.s. william burns: yes. charlie: so we will have a new president in 2016. and he calls you up and says how are you enjoying it? and he says, tell me what you think my priorities ought to be?

give me a memo. how do i maximize our role in the world towards positive ends? william burns: i think there are a lot smarter people for the president to call. it's easier for americans after what has been a pretty complicated 15 years after 9/11, two long and costly conflicts in iraq and afghanistan, a global financial crisis, and to lose sight of that -- second i think there is a natural sense somehow that the united states is on the decline or that our relative influence isn't as great. i don't think that is true.

that is not just american arrogance, but it is the resilience of our economy, our demographic strength, global energy revolution, and increasing centrality of north america in that. it is geography. our liquid assets that cushion us. i think we have a window before us. looking out over the next 20 or 30 years in which america's preeminence will not be questioned. charlie: economically and militarily? william burns: i think so. the question is how do we use that window to help adapt to a world and reshape our relationships around the world to reflect the realities of 2015, 2017, not 1945. looking at how do you reshape

global institutions like the imf. there has been legislation stuck in congress to support reform of the imf to reflect china's rise. we get ourselves in an unnecessary predicament when we don't take the initiative and use that window before us to start reshaping some of those institutions. we did a little bit of that with the asia infrastructure investment bank. here is an institution that is emerging, when our answer could have been "yes, but." we recognize the significant of new institutions in asia stimulated by china, but it is important that there be international standards that ensure transparency. i think we still can rally a lot of countries around that kind of approach. we face a lot of challenges to regional order as well. we are going to have to rebound. rebalance not just in terms of

regions in the asia-pacific, which deserves high priority, we don't pay enough attention to our own hemisphere. we have a lot more to do in terms of the transatlantic relationship to shore that up, not just in the face of the challenge by russia, but to see if we cannot build the kind of trade and investment in our relationship that we are trying to do in the pacific as well. and then we also have to rebalance not just across regions and be clear about what our priorities are, but also rebalance the tools we have. after 9/11, at least in the number of instances, we fell into the habit of looking at force first and diplomacy for the aftermath of force. whereas the reality is what you want to do is use diplomacy as

the tool of first resort, backed up by the threat of force. remembering our enduring strengths, be mindful of the window before us. the united states will be able to shape events more than anyone else. it is important to use that window before other events shape it for us. that is an optimistic view of what is possible. charlie: thank you for coming. it is a pleasure. thank you for joining us. see you next time. ♪

>> we're live in sydney. austerity approved, greek lawmakers pass more reforms. they met the government has made mistakes but negotiations were exhausted. they have avoided the indignity of losing a member but it may

have cause lasting damage. predictive text. studiesthey look at words like bullish and bearish to see how it mirrors market moves. getting to greek lawmakers, a second wave of austerity measures. these are the last reforms demanded before a third bailout can be launched. the prime minister urged this result but he doesn't like what it means. rishaad: he certainly doesn't. he made it clear the government is implementing something they don't even believe in because they limited the options. this includes a second