♪ from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. --rlie: we begin with china donald trump's unprecedented call what the taiwanese president has put u.s.-china relations into sharp focus. it was the first time since 1979 american and taiwanese leaders have spoken in a break from diplomatic practices. trump said it was a routine congratulatory call, but on sunday night, he criticized china's military and economic policies in a series of tweets. in china, and editorial warned the united states risked a confrontation with beijing.

meanwhile, the obama administration says national security official spoke with their counterparts to make sure of u.s. commitment to the one china policy. joining me now is ian bremmer, president of the eurasia group and richard haass president of the council on foreign relations. his forthcoming book is called "guess what: a world in disarray." i'm pleased to have both of you here. how serious is this? how did it happen? how will it play itself out? richard: it is pretty serious in the sense that the call broke ground, unfortunate ground that hadn't been there since the late 70's. a fact this exchange took place was inconsistent with the choreography of this elaborate relationship. i think what made it worse, charlie, was the follow-up. you alluded to two tweets and an

article in the "washington post" that said this was not improvisational. there was some planning, this and the incoming administration was full party to it. the initial chinese reaction was quite muted. the subsequent chinese reaction has gotten stronger because it was not accidental. how serious is this? potentially very. i don't mean in the terms of a short-term crisis but so much of what the united states is doing in the world is predicated on a nonconfrontational relationship with this country called china and one point 3 billion people. this choreography with taiwan has allowed it. it is basically a fiction that allows the u.s. to maintain a good relationship with china and a basic but informal relationship with taiwan and therefore allows us in principle to establish this in or miss economic relationship and deal with regional challenges like

north korea, global challenges like climate change. by putting and play the one china policy which is a for fourn policy decades, it raises questions about whether this relationship will continue to have large element of cooperation. there is an entire school of thought among so-called realists that the relationship between the great powers today, the united states, and the rising power of the day, china, is destined to be confrontational. athens and sparta. china havestates and defied this and we have defied it for decades. the question is might this production begin to gain traction? if so, the century becomes a different century. charlie: the chinese have said in recent days that taiwan is the single most important issue. richard: the word existential is taiwant wrong, they see as a threat and from this point of view, if taiwan ever becomes

independent, it sets a precedent. that means other parts of china could start to spin off. this is something they cannot and will not permit, particularly against the backdrop of lower economic growth. this has the potential to capture nationalist fervor. something they cannot show any softness on. onre legitimacy depends maintaining a decent economy, but even more, it is maintaining the integrity of the country called china. manyie: we have this crisis now. how will it play itself out? what will have to happen now? what are the choices out there? i am with richard in that i think this is serious. i don't think it's serious that we have to have a crisis just because he picked up the phone. they realize that act as itself as unusualt elect,

and unconventional as it is in the context of the big relationship and an unusual president-elect, they can live with that. but there are a lot of other messages being sent. additional tweets right after saying the chinese are taxing our goods coming in and if we chinese areurs, the expanding their military and manipulating a currency. he did not say it was not a big deal, he doubled down on it. charlie: he said all of those things during the campaign. said a lot of things during the campaign. the question is what will he do as president-elect now that he has a team around. the chinese government, their view of trump when i met them all of a week ago was we don't know this guy, but he's a businessman. he's not going to be criticizing us on human rights or our domestic, internal policies. if he is a hard negotiator, we are hard negotiators, too, but

we can deal with that. if you saw she jinping when he gave his speech a couple of weeks ago, that was the one speech at that summit -- obama did not give a speech there. he said we are the one that's going to lead and drive globalization. the united states is not. this is very different than the china richard and i have been talking about for years, that they are small, they are not ready. this is a china that sees there is a lot of room for them to actually -- charlie: do they believe, regardless of this incident, that there is a power vacuum in the knighted states or in the world? they can't fill all of it, but they do certainly understand that with the trump administration driving a spike into the transpacific partnership, they understand american allies in the region

are very disconcerted. they don't know they can count on the united states the way they had hereto for. today, she jinping announces going to go to davos for stop for the first -- go to davos. trump is going to be inaugurated while davos is going on. this is a very interesting time to show they are the ones writing the checks. ones who invited the new secretary general to beijing, treating him like the head of state, saying the yuan is the most important multilateral organization in the world and we are going to do everything possible to support it. could you imagine president-elect trump saying that? from that perspective am a china sees room to run with this administration, and these are not coincidental things.

charlie: your reaction to the terms of this vacuum or for the chinese to say we are prepared from the beginning question mark we have always talked about peace and prosperity, now we are talking about peace, prosperity and influence. richard: there's a lot to this. the transpacific ownership was central to the rebalance to asia. means thed not happen third was -- the third leg to this dual got knocked out. there was a campaign about america first. their view is the united states is less inclined, which they already thought after iraq and afghanistan, that the united states was less likely to play a role. they've seen the comment about distancing ourselves from allies. china has always been an odd mixture of a developing country and a major power. is a slight to see shift in the emphasis, less of a developing country. to some extent, they have begun

to arrive and are a major power. the real question is how they exercise their power and do they integrate into an international order based on principles we can embrace or do they have a very different idea about how things in asia and the world ought to operate? to the extent the united states is not active, they are more likely to define it in ways we do not like. the ability ofis the united states to work with china on what be the most pressing national security issue facing this administration, namely north korea, the chinese ability to work with us a nationalist reaction likely to come out over taiwan will limit the ability of , tor government, xi jinping work with us on a policy goal that matters. charlie: does trump follow any of this? beingd: at the risk of insulting, no. this is not somebody who spent his years in this business. charlie: but he's got people

around him. he has to be briefed on these kinds of things during the presidential campaign. richard: that's the bigger question -- to one extent, how much of this is an ad hocracy. are,er messy governments this one is fully consistent with that. one of the things you are careful about is not getting yourself into certain situations. there's nothing wrong with , bush 41 uselomacy it to great effect to develop and invest in relationships. sense that the people around the president-elect had an agenda take this situation that had been finessed between the united states, china and taiwan and basically make it more explicit, to cease finessing it and make it something more obvious.

is if someonenow told donald trump, before you do this, understand the consequences. this is not the place we want to have a showdown, given everything from geography, the that taiwan exports a lot of its goods to the mainland, it's very far away. if you want these guys to help us on north korea, you maybe don't want to push them on this. what i don't see is that someone took a step back and presented this phone call strategically. that is the obligation of staff. charlie: when we talk about people who might have influenced him, who might have influenced him to take the call and who might have said no but didn't? ian: that's a level of detail -- i'd don't know. i literally don't know what the processes. -- asgns and transitions

you said quite right, you have people whose main preoccupation is finding staff. at the end of the day, personnel are policy, so that's the emphasis. that's one of the reasons you want to go slow on some of these phone calls. there's time for that later. question of every meeting i had in china is what is the new administration going to do? everyone is trying to read our tea leaves and they are as confused as we are as to what to expect. a second thing they said is they want a good relationship with the united states. they want a stable region in the world so they can continue to grow economically. they are not looking for fights. they would like to work things out with this administration on terms they find acceptable. my hunch is they are genuinely surprised by -- this was not something -- i've been going to

china for over 30 years. this is the first trip i've ever taken where taiwan did not come up in any of the official meetings. it used to be, every meetings, like station identification, 25% readery meeting, you were the initial talking points about taiwan. we talked about north korea, we talked about other issues. the fact it did not come up was a major implicit statement that we had succeeded in putting this issue and a kind of box and everyone was comfortable with the choreography. now it's out of the box and this is going to become a major distraction. gift to tpp was a major the chinese, one of the major gives we could offer because? because american allies in asia had put significant clinical capital into actually getting this deal done with their own governments, their own parliaments, their own relations. the prime minister of japan hopped on a plane to win -- went

to see trump and did not bring up tpp, but he's strong at home and popular. he doesn't have to worry about a new election anytime soon. he's going to pearl harbor. he could call a snap election and do better. but those other allies have been hit hard. philippines,e australia, all of these countries -- i've heard this chapter and verse from foreign minister and in some cases, heads of state of every one of these countries even before trump was elected. what are you doing? you got to make good on these commitments what we've got no choice but to go toward china. charlie: i would be interested in regardless, is xi jinping xi jinping -- is xi jinping consolidating his power question -- his power? ian: i think the answer is

clearly yes. charlie: is he giving more power to the military? ian: the biggest stake xi jinping made in his early presidency was in the first year, some expansion of assertiveness very quickly on the military front in the south china sea that led to a bunch of american allies overreacting and being driven into america's arms. has was before xi jinping started his anticorruption campaign in earnest which again with the people's liberation army and move toward the provinces and state owned enterprises and now into central ministries. what we have seen consistency over five years is that he's not just someone who is consolidating power but has a long-term strategic land and is building out chinese influenced not just as the communist party over its people but in the entire region economically and more broadly than that. has this fall, in

october of 2017, the party congress. he wants to institutionalize his position, restock the euro and committee with loyalists. so to answer your question, he's becoming slightly more nationalist, but at the end of the day, his position is not going to rise and fall on chinese foreign-policy, the going to rise and fall on the chinese economy and making this transition -- charlie: they are finding it more difficult than they imagined? inhard: like most things life, it's one thing to talk about and another to implement it. the anticorruption campaign has nothing to do with corruption. it is to maintain political control during a difficult political and economic transition and he's taking very few chances. that is why this terminology you saw used for the first time a few weeks ago about his being

the core leader is meant to send the signal that he represents the essence of chinese history and he's now the clinical center of this country. most china experts will tell you he has centralized more power than any chinese leader arguably since mao zedong. continuing and more important, the economic transformation of the country and he feels since the lubrication that came from high economic growth rates is no longer there, the only way china can continue to changes if clinical dissent is bottled up. is bottledl dissent up. how do you get the openness you need at the same time you bottle up clinically? that's the contradiction that could undermine his efforts and mean that china is unlikely to make this transition smoothly. not a leader that

needs to gin up nationalism. this is not a leader that needs a fight on taiwan. one of the reasons why their initial reaction was a little ok, maybe he really screwed this up and we are doing well. longer-term, things are moving in our favor. did he go over because there was an election here in the chinese wanted to get his thoughts there? is 93 years old and has been involved in every administration. he's very much in the mix and respected in china. he still on top of the issues more politically and strategically and has spoken with trump. the decision by trump to take the call from the taiwanese president had to make kissinger loses mine because in big concernt, his

is this is the big global risk in this new world order. charlie: at the last china development form i went to, that was all they talked about. the u.s.-china relationship is a stunning piece of diplomacy. we have one rationale -- anti-soviet system. the relativist -- their relative -- the relevant miss of that and did the cold war. the united states and china have antinued to involve -- evolve relationship despite these protections of gloom and doom. it's quite a diplomatic accomplishment. it's gone to democratic and republican administrations. on balance, it has gone well and the danger of what we see now is the possibility that some of this is in play for the first time in a generation or two. henryfor people like kissinger and the architects of this, anyone who is serious

about american foreign policy and the way the international system evolves, this has added a question at a time when there were already enough questions to keep us busy. charlie: there is a rise of populism in europe. powerople who gained some because they were very supportive of the no vote, they are very much anti-globalization, anti-euro and every thing else. but in the broader sense, we had a different result -- we've got three or four big elections coming up. it's going to be the year of europe in terms of legal activity. already into it beginning with brexit. vote against the establishment, a real frustration over italian economic performance. we will have an election in the farhich won't go to

right, to marine le pen. germany, most of the conventional wisdom is the chancellor will win but with a much reduced lyrical base. -- reduced political base. think about the aftermath of world war ii and the european community, this idea that france and germany and europe would be so knitted together that war would be unthinkable, for the first time, that has come into play. whether the issue is china or europe, i feel we are living in that forn ways decades, i don't know about you, but i never sensed. are living in we history. i fell like there were givens. there was a cold war, -- charlie: you sense we are at an inflection point in the world structure? richard: there are fewer givens, fewer assumptions that hold. there are more things up for

grabs. populations are more likely to say we are going to take a different course without understanding what they are tossing out. i feel it in the europe and in the united states. ian: in europe, trump is truly and deeply problematic. trump's support in europe and the people trump will support are these populists, nigel farage who campaigned for him from the u.k. and who led the brexit movement. it is geert wilders in the netherlands, it is marine le pen. those are the deepest enemies of these establishment -- charlie: are they the people donald trump relates to? ways.t has gone both we have seen it in tweets, we have seen it in her campaign stops, and if there is not just an end to the confrontation between the u.s. and russia, that, if it becomes warmer and

trump has given every reason he has an intention to at least try that out, that becomes a serious problem for nato, for poland, for the baltic states. packed -- that relationship is at its weakest at any point since world war ii. charlie: and russia stands ready to benefit as they could? ian: i can see why they wouldn't. putin has no internal challenges. he doesn't necessarily need an american money, he can just show he's winning on things like syria and ukraine and with trump as opposed to obama. is ard: russia and putin bigger concern than china. has though xi jinping consolidated norma's power, there are still some checks and balances. russia, by contrast, is not a real economy. it is an oil and gas economy and

is not integrated into the region in the world. putin has drained institutions in russia of their power. thes just at the time of missile crisis faced far more constraints than putin faces now. russia is a singular challenge and facing europe at a time when europe is less united than it -- if flat in her putin wants to do something reckless in the baltics, there's no one who will say you can't do that and that will give us pause. when you look at the obama administration and the way they handled russia, have they not understood or had they not wanted to engage or is this putin being the way he was left them no room to make a deal? richard: it's probably two things. the obama administration arguably could have done more in the ukraine to help militarily. you also have to walk the clock back 25 years to the end of the

cold war and look at several administrations beginning with 41 through clinton through w and so forth and say did the united states handle a defeated or how do we want to describe russia after the cold war? there are debates about nato enlargement, american aid for russia and so forth, whether we showed them, whether we handled them right. i think historians are going to find that rich. nato enlargement took flight under the clinton administration and that's when that happened. downie: but the wall came -- days,d: on of all 11/nine. yet the unification of germany with nato and people were sensitive to gorbachev. in the aftermath of rich off, yelton and beyond, historians will debate whether the united states mishandled things or whether there's something about

russian political culture which putin personifies which made any american attempt to integrate and deal with russia a failure, that there was something about russia that was going to exist -- resist a peaceful, democratic transformation. that will be the subject of many phd theses to come. ian: you don't want major global leaders to feel insecure in their international position. xi jinping does not. flat amir putin does. dimir putin does. not being treated with respect by obama and his cabinet. you hear it every time you go there. and by god, they're going to do something about it. they did it in ukraine, they did it with syria -- charlie: if you want to do something in syria now, you have to come through us.

ian: and trump is largely going to accept that logic. at least from what he has said so far. ,he thing i worry about most they brought up russia with me and they are worried about russia. they did not vote with the russians at the last un security council. they had the last three times. they don't like the fact that russia is becoming more revisionist and the chinese are investing all over the world, not just in countries like latin america, they are investing in all of those countries round russia and they are going to see china is the only way to go. you can only go so far was just time, a military and over it's not just the americans mishandling russia, the chinese mishandled him or handle them as well as they can, the power balance is really against moscow and putin becomes a potentially dangerous leader.

i worry more about where the russians go over the medium to long-term than about the wheels falling off. where you areis supposed to make the plug for "the world in disarray" charlie. charlie: thank you for coming. back in a moment. we will talk about populism in europe. stay with us. ♪

to italy.e now turn prime minister matteo renzi said he would resign after rejecting his proposals in a referendum. he argued his plan was stabilize the country and while the some reform.t in here's what the premise are said to me in a "60 minutes" profile which aired here 10 days ago. yes,u win, if the vote is the italian government will be more efficient, it will be less your craddick, and it will make -- less bureaucratic, and make more competitive. this is -- mr. --zi: this is my strategy

which is why italian geniuses have to decide to leave italy because there is a system in which bureaucracy decides everything. charlie: you are saying there's a brain drain in italy. the smartest people are going to london, new york, beijing. mr. renzi: absolutely. charlie: if you win, that's what will happen. what if you lose? what happens? i think if we will lose, the referendum will be a for change.sage it's not the problem in case of loss. the system remains exactly that. the system remains exactly that

with 950 people in parliaments. everything remains the same. charlie: i know you have heard this before. but i think the discussion about changes very popular in italy because a lot .f people think it is a risk charlie: they say if the vote , you would lose? mr. renzi: all the polls and in the uniteds ingdom, and the columbia -- don't know. can do: but you hope you what between now and december 4? mr. renzi: my strategy is

that we have to vote yes. charlie: they say you have made this about you, not the prime anister and it has become vote about you and that's not good. yes, and now was my mistake in the first days of the campaign. and myself, i understand the mistake. i don't accept the people who politicians have to refuse to admit mistakes. no. i'm a man. i can make some mistakes. but right now, the discussion is very clear. 63 government in 70

years. mr. renzi: exactly. bureaucracy, everything is difficult, everything is complicated and my idea is simply give simplicity to italy. two years, we achieve some results. , with the law for initiativesd new against the directive of public administration, new strategies for investments. now, italy is one of the ofntries with more presence the national investors. this is very important. charlie: this is what you think will be the result of a yes vote? more competition, more investment, less bureaucracy? mr. renzi: yes.

starts itstaly future. in the last 20 years, italy discuss only about the past. the past is wonderful in italy. the most beautiful place around the world in my opinion, i'm sorry for other people around the world. this is an incredible place, but the past is not sufficient. we need a future because we are italians and italy is not all museums. charlie: it is not only museums but some people think italy is only museums and you say we will change that? also say you are the last best chance to change italy. you are the last best chance to competitive is a nation in a competitive world and no longer a museum. last best chance. think italy is rich

of great hope around the country. i'm not the last best chance. there are a lot of best chances to change italy. generation that fought against the old generation who really could change this country. charlie: here is what some of my journalist friends have said to me. he's a man in a hurry, talks too inh, has tried to do a lot two and a half years, but they remind me your priest said to exists, but you are not god. mr. renzi: it's true. he told me. it's very funny.

in the arena. charlie: teddy roosevelt said the man in the arena deserves the credit. after a time when the politicians were very able but unable to change the country because we changed a lot of governments but we don't change the country. interested to change about government, i'm interested to change the conditions for the people. so yes, i talk a lot, i try to compete with older colleagues and older people and other countries. but this is the only way for this italy at this moment. the referendum was

regarded as a test for the european union and the no vote was seen as a repudiation of establishment politics, propelling the rise of populism across europe. in austria, the green party count -- candidate one over his opponent. reviews lee served as ambassador to nato and i'm pleased to have him back on the program. where have you been? guest: i've been in chicago, watching out good integration can create a good city but watching what is going on with europe with great unease. charlie: why unease? andt: starting with brexit accelerating over time, we see a wave of populism and nationalism and golfing the continent. the vote in italy, although there were specific issues at votedand not everyone against the referendum can be seen as a populist, it was

beating this wave of unease with the establishment, with the european union, with the elite, a great deal of anxiety that has peopleto anger, leading to take a stand and say we want change, we want to do it differently, we don't like the way we have been doing it. irony is herereat is a prime minister trying to change italy and make it more competitive. he faced accusations he was trying to get too much power for the prime minister's place and into the executive wing of government, but he was the establishment because he was prime minister but he was trying to change the establishment. then people come along and voted no because they wanted to change it more. guest: that's right. he was trying to work within a system that many people believe has failed. he tried to put forward some

important ideas of reforming the senate and other parts of the government in order to make government more responsive, more effective, more able to meet the needs of the people. but i don't think the details were important. what mattered is people wanted to say enough is enough. this is not working and we don't like anybody who is in power. they would vote against anyone who is in power, so in the populists get in in a year or two, they will have a problem because the problems that are there are big and the economy that is not competitive, you have people who suffered quite a lot, the youth vote overwhelmingly went against him. these are people who are underemployed are unemployed or still living with their parents and they don't have much of a future and they are saying we want a change and they are willing to take on faith anyone who offers a solution. whether it's nigel farage in

great britain or donald trump in the united states, they are going to go with the guy, and it is always guys up to this point, who are offering a quick, easy out. charlie: why was austria different? ivo: in some ways, austria was not different. 47% voted for an extreme right-wing leader, so it was a close election. interestingly enough, the person that one did run on a pro-eu ticket and post a stark choice. i think when you compose a stark choice, you'll see a great division. thetimes you will find non-populist win as they did in austria and others, you will find the populist win as they did in great britain. the next big test is france where we have two candidates, one of whom is almost certainly going to be marine le pen who is

the populist candidate running against the presumably conservative candidate and it's going to be 50/50. who's going to get above that margin? the thing we are talking about as we are talking about nearly we in the country's saying want something different, we want to find a new way of doing business, and we want to go against not only the establishment but the institutions that have been part of the european order and part of the national order for 30, 40 to 50 years. ♪

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charlie: it is -- is it also part of your concern that some of these authoritarian leaders, some of these leaders who have been on the scene for a while and have never been able to command a majority have values that are not in the great tradition of the western values of europe and the united states? tendencye is a certain to use an us versus them mentality and appeal to the majority in most cases, to blame immigrants, to appeal to more a sick xenophobic array since -- more basic xenophobic or racist instincts. this social compact, the integration that used to be part

of the way we thought in western societies we ought to govern ourselves is breaking down and you get a much more divisive kind of politics that you see in france when it gets to the issue of muslims. the netherlands where moroccans, in particular, are being targeted as a potential minority that is the reason for the problem we're having. in italy, is the large influx from folks across the mediterranean coming from sub-saharan africa. people who look different or practice a different religion are used as a scapegoat as reason for the problem we are defining. thesee: is it possible western countries, if the movements are successful will pull away from the united states? would worry more about people turning inward and we enter a nationalist movement in

most of these in european countries. you are already seeing this in poland and hungary where there's an increasing willingness to muchstances that are very against that are very much against the kind of mainstream andern values we have seen, anti-european union and in some , to feed-putin opposition to the european union. about a europe increasingly composed of individual nationstates who no longer need to cooperate to ultimately put one nation against another and put the kind worldflict we had before war i and world war ii, where the actual use of military forces seen as a way to resolve disputes. that is what the european union and the european project was about to eliminate, to have france and germany, to erstwhile enemies that fought three wars

come together and work for the mutual prosperity of french and germans. that structure is starting to break down. it started with brexit where the u.k. said that's good for you guys, but it's not ok for us. you see these growing populist movements that say the european union is the problem and we need to have more power internally to address the problems we face and you use nationalism as a means to get to that end. you back to the age of the nationstate which in europe, you surpass that with the supranational institution called the european union and that union falls away and states look at their interest from a purely national point of view, that we don't like you and we need to resolve our differences no longer through negotiation, but possibly through the use of

force. that is a future that one year ago would have been very difficult to see as possible. we are at a state where this is no longer impossible. threat to the a eurozone and eventually a threat to the european union? ivo: i think so. there's the possibility that, for example, if marine le pen wins in france, i'm not saying she will, but she's going to get a lot of votes and if she were to win, there's a serious possibility she would have a referendum on ending french participation in the eurozone and that the end of the eurozone. we could see this already happening in italy after the referendum if the five-star movement takes charge. they will have a referendum on exiting the eurozone. .f one goes, they all go

it's one of the reasons greece is not allowed to get out of the eurozone. without the eurozone, once integration reverses, the spiral of disintegration might go quite quickly. eu, a year ago, no one would have thought possible, but it's at least something one has to worry about. of the: that's one consequences of the italian election and how massive it was, 60-40. ivo: 3/5. it's a big number. as i said at the outset, some people voted against the referendum because they did not like the particular solution. the last prime minister came out against the referendum saying this was not the right way to change the constitution. i think renzi made an error putting the referendum in his own future at stake saying if

you vote this down, you are voting against me in the same way david cameron did. , are's a real question referenda the best way to resolve these big questions or should one use regular elections? in britain, it was shown if you have a referendum, you don't know what the out come is. particularly if the vote is for status quo, which you don't like or something better, which we don't have to define, which is what the brexit vote was about. quohis case, it was status and the status quo is painted as the referendum. renzi was making the argument that in order to continue making progress, you have to change the system and people said we want to change the whole thing and voted against it. having the referendum to solve these complicated decisions may not the best way. charlie: the interesting thing

wantu had people who might some change in terms of the efficiency of government but did not want some change in their own lifestyle. the idea of change had a certain butal in terms of an idea in the end, they didn't want it. and thosetar movement people didn't like it because they didn't go far enough in terms of turning the system upside down. ivo: i think you have it exactly right in the problem with having a yes or no vote, where complicated issues, different argumentation to have to a binary choice. one of the reasons we have a representative democracy, where we elect congressmen or senators is because we don't want to make those choices and have them done

by 40 people. we want to make a government that makes those choices and if we don't like the government, we will throw them out and have another election four years later. this is the danger of moving toward these direct forms of democracy. on some issues that are very clear where there's a clear yes or no, it might make sense but on big issues, like the constitutional structure of the country, and to decide that on a yes-no basis where there are so many issues that come into play, that may not be the smartest way of solving our challenges and to address them in a direct way. much better to vote for a political party more like the one that has the values that you, the voter have, rather than another set of local parties. that is why we have had a representative democracy and it

has worked well for a pretty long time and these referendums are creating a division in the countries that leave no one better off and become rallying cries for a whole variety of anxieties and anger that exists in our society that isn't very helpful. does this do to the idea of migration and diversity? ivo: it makes migration and diversity more difficult. but the more difficult the thing -- a more difficult to thing -- difficult thing to do when you have a divided society. after the brexit vote, the government made very clear that an end to open borders was the necessary price to pay in order to implement the will of the people and we increasingly see the reaction to migration and refugees and the mobilization of public opinion against people

us.are different from the difference between us -- charlie: the creation of fake news. ivo: the propaganda with the creation of fake news sites, ,erpetuating in russia today russian sponsored networks, it's all part of this larger picture that is emerging of the disquiet that is feeding people's anxieties. when people are worried about their future and are concerned about what the direction of the country is, they are more susceptible to demagogue it politics of the kind we are seeing. president of the chicago council of global affairs, thank you again. thank you for joining us. we will see you next time.

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>> the rally extends ahead of the rate decision in india. reversing a decline with the figure coming out at the bottomm of this hour. they will invest billions in the united states. >> the flight of the yen is raising funding costs in china. the equivalent of $25 billion less. >> the