as a former fbi agent and chairman of the house intelligence committee, i had oversight of all 16 of our nation's intelligence agencies. my name is mike rogers. i had access to classified information gathered by our operatives. people who risked everything for the united states and our families. you don't know their faces or their names. you don't know the real stories from the people who live the fear and the pressure. until now. >> it was hitler-like, and his plan was to kill as many people

that did not see life the way he saw. >> i want he was taking advantage of tensions and talking a pocket of gas. >> you could watch the country going aflame. we needed him, but he was good at evading capture. >> he could remain invisible. >> he made it clear, we could lose in iraq. ♪

♪ ♪ my fellow citizens, at this hour american and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. >> every politician wants us to go crush an army. they give us their flag, and we can all go home and everybody is wonderful, like a world war ii victory. that shit ain't going to happen. ♪ >> in the battle of iraq the united states and our allies have prevailed. [ cheers and applause ] >> the united states and allies invaded iraq in the spring of 2003 and there was a set of assumptions that proved to be wrong.

one, that we would be accepted as liberators, and two, that there would be the ability to turn the keys over to a follow-on government after saddam hussein was thrown out of office. >> we got him. [ cheers and applause ] >> saddam being captured, all of a sudden you had all this like sense of relief. okay. maybe you've got these top ten guys the army's going to capitulate, they're going to give you their banners and we can all go home. forget it. that strategy was a failed strategy, and we didn't know it. >> after saddam was captured, i think the plan had been to leave. to give the keys to a replacement government. but there was no replacement government. the looting that occurred right after the fall of baghdad showed that there was almost no ability to govern. so had we left, i think we would have appeared extraordinarily irresponsible, as though we had

knocked something over and set it on fire and then driven out. those iraqis who actually thought life would get demonstrably better were very disappointed because it actually got worse. in 120-degree heat there was no electricity, there was no garbage pickup, there was no sewage, there was little law and order. so they became restless. >> we created a huge vacuum by disbanding saddam's regime elements. when we disbanded the iraqi army, we put a bunch of people, mostly sunni, out onto the streets with nothing to do. they had a personal dignity that we took from them. and when we took it from them and didn't give it back to them, we basically sent them home, no paychecks. now they're not being able to take care of their families. that vacuum was created, and it was immediately filled. and zarqawi, he was the guy that was going to fill it. and he came in like a bat out of hell. >> abu musab al zarqawi started to build a network with the

sunnis who were frightened by their loss of political position inside the country. >> people at the end of the day are the same the world over. they want to matter. and in zarqawi's case he found people who thought they could matter. if they through deadly purpose, lethal purpose, applied their time and talent to the cause that he described. therefore, he got much more support for what should have been a terrorist organization and it now became much more like an insurgency. >> we are not satisfied of america at all. we are islam. we want our government to be islamic. they brought -- they said we bring you freedom. the freedom that they bring, we don't want it. >> you have to look at it and go, jesus, why did we do that? nobody thought these second, third, fourth order effects of telling an entire army go home. what the hell are they going to do? and the middle east is not some great vacation spot.

>> zarqawi rose to where he did because he took advantage of the hopes, dreams, aspirations of a group of people who felt they'd been disenfranchised. largely a sunni population felt their interests had been pushed aside for others. >> if you look at what abu musab al zarqawi and al qaeda offered, it was pretty extreme. it was far more extreme than the average iraqi was interested in. >> no, no, usa! no, no, usa! no, no, usa! >> but what was the counternarrative? if a young person frustrated with the situation comes and says, i think i'll join al qaeda. the mother or father says, don't do that. and they start to point and say, well, join the government, but the government was not credible at that point because it was shia dominated and it became increasingly so. there was not a narrative to which a person could have an either/or. so you were asking a tremendous amount of mature self-restraint

not to join the insurgency when they've got really no reinforcing counternarrative. >> god will revenge on us. god will take our revenge from them. and he's giving them an order to go. >> suddenly you have the rise of this al qaeda in iraq leader who can propagate extraordinary violence. >> allahu akbar! >> and what he was trying to do is create a civil war between sunni and shia. >> zarqawi didn't have the forces to take the united states and the coalition, you know, on directly. he therefore needed to create murder, mayhem, chaos, by using the assets that he had. and there was then this tension between sunni and shia and he could essentially exacerbate those tensions and make it such that it wasn't just him that the united states needed to worry about but it was the chaos and the conflict that ensued between multiple parties already on the ground. >> at least 60 people killed. 220 wounded.

many taken to hospitals in the center of baghdad. very possibly this was a sectarian attack. >> zarqawi was kind of hitler-like. i mean, he was an individual who was incredibly brutal. he was a dictator with a plan. and his plan was to kill as many people that did not see life the way he saw it and to try to change the face and the nature of the middle east. and, frankly, the islamic world. >> zarqawi was taking advantage of tensions on the ground between the sunni and shia for hundreds, if not, thousands of years. essentially taking a candle to that pocket of gas. >> horrific violence that was occurring across the country. there were people being killed every day in baghdad by the score. there were these big suicide bombings, car bombings, 14 a day in some periods during iraq. >> it was a chaotic scene, a dangerous place to be both for uniformed military and for the innocent civilians who were kind of caught in the maw of that trap.

>> zarqawi became the symbol of the ability to fight head on head against america. >> he absolutely hated the west. he hated the united states and hated what we represented. >> he was the person that suddenly made it clear we could lose in iraq. >> zarqawi absolutely needed to be killed. he needed to be killed. running for president means staying in a different hotel every night. so i use the hotels.com rewards program to earn free nights. which i can use for my new friends here. thanks, captain obvious. you're welcome. roger that, sir. my name isn't roger. supported by hotels.com.

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abu musab al zarqawi was the person that suddenly made it clear we could lose in iraq. when i got there in the fall of 2003, i thought it was going to be tough but we couldn't lose. six or eight months later i realized we could lose. >> zarqawi absolutely needed to be killed. he needed to be killed. the only way that you were going to defeat somebody like him was to understand who he was personally. we started to paint this picture of who we actually needed to focus on capturing. >> zarqawi was a young tough out of jordan. industrial town of zarqa. he'd been in prison in the 1990s and he'd come out as a very hardened extremist.

>> zarqawi initially was not al qaeda. in many ways, he was more extreme than many of the senior al qaeda and made them uncomfortable. but on the other hand, very successful in iraq which had become the biggest battlefield between al qaeda and the west. and therefore, they didn't have much choice other than to back him. >> darki was so successful in iraq that bin laden at a distance could only conifer upon him the right to be the emir of that region and to create what we have called, you know, al qaeda in iraq. aqi. >> abu musab al zarqawi was a good organizer and a good leader. he would travel around the country. he would visit local leaders of sunni groups who were potential supporters of al qaeda and he would deal with them. and he was a very reasonable, very charismatic leader in a small environment. >> he could solve damn near any problem you give him because he was that kind of person. >> i remember once we listened to a radio program that he had done, and he talked to a bunch of his forces around the nation

and he basically gave credit to the heroes of samara and whatnot. and it was the kind of thing a corporate leader would do, saying sales did a great job this week. supply chain is doing wonderfully. it was good leadership. [ speaking foreign language ] >> zarqawi motivated thousands of his followers to commit their lives to the cause. and troops across the coalition were suffering on a daily basis because of improvised explosive devices, insurgent attacks. >> he was walking the walk. he wasn't just some bin laden in a cave kind of thing spewing hatred to the west. he was the field commander for al qaeda fighting america.

>> i was placed in command of joint special operations command in october of 2003. jsoc is an organization that was put together to do the nation's most sensitive missions. >> i was the senior intelligence officer working for stan mcchrystal while he was the commander of joint special operations command. >> i was transitioning into the role of deputy director at the national security agency. and was very engaged in the hunt for zarqawi. >> i immediately went on a tour of forces that were deployed and and it became clear to me that our effort in iraq was going to have to increase significantly. as soon as i entered the country, it was evident the insurgency growing, which turned out to be abu musab al zarqawi, was much stronger than people appreciated, and we were likely in for a long fight. so my mission was to be focused against that enemy. >> where was this transition from saddam to zarqawi? the most visible sign of that

transition was in march of 2004, which is what's called first fallujah. the battle of first fallujah. it was insurgency. and zarqawi was leading it. >> fallujah exploded when four contractors were ambushed. killed. their bodies were burned and mutilated. one of them was my old operations sergeant in the rangers. the bodies were hung famously from the traffic bridge, and there were people dancing in the streets. there were young children holding pieces of american bodies almost like you'd wave around a lollipop. the first thing you feel is just rage. you feel frustration. you want to get in and you want to solve the problem. >> they want to kill innocent life. to try to get us to quit. we're not going to. and our military commanders will

take whatever action is necessary to secure fallujah on behalf of the iraqi people. >> this fight starts. the first thing that happens is we're going to go in and get control of fallujah. and very quickly, it boils down into a fight, and then to a siege. >> they were fighting zarqawi and al qaeda. we realized, you know, holy [ muted ], this guy is for real. >> u.s. troops are attacking on several fronts. but they're under fire everywhere, and the casualties are mounting. >> as an effort was made to recapture the city, it was pushed initially and it was halted for political reasons. >> tonight, there are reports that two of the three marine battalions surrounding fallujah have now pulled back from their front line positions.

>> what happened was it created this standoff with coalition forces, with a few iraqi forces on the outside, and then al qaeda insurgents controlled by abu musab al zarqawi on the inside. >> you could watch the country going aflame. it was really during that period of iraq when the american military was stopped from going in and inside fallujah became an al qaeda safe haven. [ speaking foreign language ] >> you had a sanctuary inside we knew zarqawi was operating. and of course, whenever a terrorist or insurgent organization controls ground, whenever they control an area, it gives them credibility that they wouldn't otherwise have. we needed to get zarqawi.

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whenever a terrorist or inyou -- insurgence organization controls ground like zarqawi in fallujah, it gives them credibility that they wouldn't otherwise have. he was clearly the leader we were tracking. my force was going after him, and we were constantly trying to figure out where he was. >> zarqawi was a very clever man. he was quite intelligent. not simply about how he could create murder and mischief, but how he could essentially remain invisible. >> we'd have reports the same day he was in mosul or he was in al qaim, hundreds of miles apart, or he was in baghdad one day and in ramadi an hour before that. you say, there's no way. >> zarqawi was good at evading capture. first, he had good, what we call operational security. didn't use cell phones and whatnot that we could track effectively.

he also would go from his traditional sort of black terrorist leader dress into western civilian clothes. or into iraqi native garb. >> he actually came through checkpoints. think about how bold that is. you are the number one guy being hunted, and you're going to drive around in public. he came through checkpoints and got away. there was a sense that he was everywhere and nowhere. he was an absolute ghost on the battlefield. >> we say every american is out there looking for abu musab al zarqawi. that's technically true. but every american soldier doesn't know what he looks like when he's clean shaven. doesn't know what he's like when he's in western dress driving a sedan. >> if we were going to find zarqawi, we had to operate faster than zarqawi was operating. because he was operating pretty damn fast on that battlefield.

>> we begin tonight with torture outrage. arab tv networks plastering photos all over the air waves today of u.s. troops apparently abusing iraqi prisoners. we blurred out the images but we warn you some of them are disturbing. >> in the spring of 2004 is when i first heard about abu ghraib as being a potential scandal. abu ghraib was a prison that saddam hussein had operated with pretty horrific conditions. and then the coalition was using it to hold detainees. to the average american soldier, what you saw was mistreatment of iraqi prisoners by criminally ill-disciplined american guards. but if you step back from that and you look at it from the eyes of iraqis, i think it was very different. many iraqis said publishing these pictures is just another way to humiliate iraqis. and i think most americans didn't understand that.

>> the military has brought criminal charges against six american soldiers and their commander has been suspended. but the worst damage may be yet to come as the pictures spread throughout the arab world sparking anger and outrage. >> absolutely helped zarqawi, helped in recruiting. a lot of the foreigners we captured and asked them, why were they here? they said to avenge their brothers from abu ghraib. >> zarqawi was given a gift. he'd gotten credibility fighting the americans with the siege of fallujah. and then you have this moral component that says this is what the americans do. they claim saddam hussein was bad, but they are just as bad. here's proof. >> was it a disaster? >> maybe it was worse than a disaster from my strategic level. it was just difficult to imagine it being much worse. [ speaking foreign language ]

>> nick berg was a young man who had come to iraq and he was doing contract work. he got captured and then got turned over to al qaeda. >> my name is nick berg. my father's name is michael. my mother's name is suzanne. >> my force was responsible for hostage rescue. so of course, we tracked every american and allied person who was taken hostage with the potential to rescue them if we could. we didn't know where nick berg was. and then one afternoon, one of my subordinate commanders came in the office and said, you need to watch this. and he put his laptop on my desk and then hit play on a video. it was, of course, the al qaeda video that had captured nick berg standing in front of a series of black-clad hooded al qaeda leaders. nick berg is in an orange jumpsuit. and then at the end of that they pull out a large knife and they decapitate him.

[ screaming ] >> i was, frankly, fixated on the video in a sort of morbid kind of way because i remember my fists were just clenched up because not only are you frustrated, you're angry. >> people were always second-guessing, who actually did the beheading? i'll sit here today and tell you i believe from the nuances we saw and the body language we saw of the different individuals, that zarqawi was the individual who grabbed that young man by the stock of hair at the top of his head and cut his head off. and then stood there like, you know, screw you, america. >> it really brought the war to a personal level as it got more and more brutal.

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if we were going to find zarqawi, we had to operate faster than zarqawi was operating. because he was operating pretty damn fast on that battlefield. >> zarqawi was a crisis. he had an advantage. he was on the ground. he understood the ground. and he was essentially taking local activities and turning them to deadly purpose. >> insurgencies in fallujah and najaf threaten to undermine stability in the country.

and this april proved to be the bloodiest month ever in iraq with at least 126 americans killed. >> very quickly, we realized that just going after enemy leaders won't defeat the enemy movement. you've actually got to defeat the enemy's network. >> we have to reform how we do intelligence operations on this sort of modern battlefield. >> if you go back to when i was younger, intelligence would be collected by military units or civilian intelligence agencies, and then they would send this intelligence to the operational force. you'd go out and capture somebody. you'd come back and turn them over and that's sort of it. that's way too slow. all the things for which operators have risked their lives on was being wasted because we didn't have the capacity to digest it. it's difficult to change an army in combat. >> i wanted to break down every single wall that existed. i did not want operators that were operating out of ramadi not talking to operators operating

out of mosul because the guys they were fighting, they are talking to each other. in order to defeat a network, you have to be a network. so, guys, gals, let's get our shit together and open up the lines of communication, especially when it came to intelligence. >> the single most important thing we could do is collaborate. we got the capabilities that we didn't have, and additional capacity that we could never produce inside my small force, and we leveraged that with conventional forces with intelligence organizations, with other parts of the government. >> mcchrystal, flynn, their pitch to the national security agency was we don't want your material. we want you. we want you to join us so that your talent is making a difference in real time. >> i first met mike flynn when he was a colonel. he came into my office. he pushed on all fronts for a different relationship between the national security agency and special operations command.

asking us to take risks with how we did our work that would essentially change the order of how we did what we did for 50 years prior. >> this is a frickin' battlefield. so don't come out here with u.s. policies that function well in washington, d.c., but have no function whatsoever on a battlefield. >> he was right, of course. he pushed us in all the right ways. he got us to a place we couldn't have gotten to alone. oftentimes people's ideas of nsa is a bunch of people sitting in a basement somewhere cracking codes. in order to make a difference, you need to do it in the proximity of the operators who are going to use it. so 17,500 or more times we took a person from an nsa organization and deployed them to an operational facility. >> we implemented this blending of operations and intelligence and exploitation of documents,

media, all facets of intelligence and began to really feel like, wow, we've got something different here with how we're bringing together our ops and intel team. >> every day we did an operations and intelligence video teleconference and it had about 76 locations. and at the height of the war that video teleconference would have 7,500 to 9,000 participants. passing information, coming up with common strategies, informing each other. it is an information war. the person who knows first and learns fastest wins. >> during the hunt for zarqawi, stan mcchrystal caused the united states intelligence community to collaborate unlike any other time in their history. that transformation that he led actually still alive today and will never go away. >> it took us a while. we were able to operate at a speed that was different.

>> by the summer of 2005, we'd been after zarqawi actively for about a year and a half. and he was probably at the height of his power at that point. he controlled much of the western euphrates river valley. he was able to push violence almost anywhere in the country. and we hadn't been able, obviously, to get him. i was told i needed to fly down to the white house and meet with the president. in the narrow confines of the situation room with all of the national security council sitting there around the table and the president, he asked me very directly. he says, okay, what are you doing, and are you going to get him? i told him what we had done, and i said, yes, we will get him. i can't tell you when, but we'll be successful in killing or capturing him. our task force had gotten better and better at what we do. he we were able to do more raids, connect intelligence better. one of the things that first happened was we captured a video across the internet of abu musab

al zarqawi shooting weapons, and it was sort of a propaganda video. we captured the raw footage of it. [ speaking foreign language ] >> when al qaeda had finished producing it, they put it out as a propaganda video. it showed him in a very effective combat leader way shooting an american squad automatic weapon. we immediately released the outtakes. and it showed that when the weapon jammed somebody else had to come and clear the jam for him. and as they walked away from the range and he handed the weapon to one of his terrorist comrades, that person then handed it to another person who grabbed it barehanded by the hot barrel and burned their hand terribly.

it really made them look like clowns. and so what had been a very impressive propaganda video became a clown show. that didn't capture him, but that just convinced me we were closer than ever. we were able to get the video before he released it and we were able to figure out where he had been in iraq. our effectiveness as an intelligence agency proved better than ever. we were hotter on the trail of abu musab al zarqawi than ever. gotta take a sick day tomorrow. dads don't take sick days, dads take nyquil severe the nighttime, sniffling, sneezing, coughing, aching, fever, best sleep with a cold, medicine. moms know their kids need love, encouragement and milk. with 8 grams of protein, and 8 other nutrients. 9 out of 10 u.s. olympians grew up drinking milk. moms know kids grow strong when they milk life.

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we implemented this blending of operations and intelligence. >> and i was increasingly confident that we were hotter on the trail of abu musab al zarqawi than ever. in late april of 2006 our intelligence people, using unmanned aerial vehicles, were watching a location. and they saw activity. >> and it was just not natural. it looked like a gathering of cars and people in a place where they shouldn't have been. >> one of our intelligence sergeants major said, we need to go there right now. so the force flew to the objective and immediately did a raid on it. >> there was no fighting at that objective but they captured 12 iraqi men. now, this was a farming community, but the people they captured were clearly not farmers.

>> you're talking engineers, teachers, a cleric. we narrowed the 12 down to five. we bring the five up to balad for questioning and through interrogations we narrowed that down really to the one guy. and that was abu alawi. >> we did not mistreat prisoners. the two interrogators, a male and female that worked with them, built a real relationship with him. they took him down to baghdad one time to let him meet other people. they let him watch his favorite movie one night, which was "the exorcist." then finally after about 40 days they felt frustrated that he knew more than he was willing to tell. and so they said, okay, we are going to stop interrogating you. we're going to send you on in a regular detention system. of course, he didn't want to be put in the regular detention system. so at a certain point he simply said, i have something to tell

you. >> and he started to tell us about this spiritual adviser named abdel rahman. >> the individual said he knew who the spiritual adviser was. the spiritual adviser would periodically go meet with zarqawi and conduct the kind of spiritual advice you might get from a mentor. >> one of the pieces of intel we got during our interrogations was when there was going to be a meeting with zarqawi, abd al rahman would physically move his entire family from whatever home they were living in to another house. >> so once we located the spiritual adviser, we watched him, put him under surveillance and day after day we watched for this particular indicator. now, this was a difficult time because the violence in baghdad was high. it was just skyrocketing. and so every day we had this

discussion, how long do you go? as you go day after day the pressure rises to just go and get him before he might disappear. finally one day, we see this spiritual adviser move his family. >> we're like holy [ muted ]. this is for real. then abd al rahman departs. we thought he was going to go out west toward ramadi and toward the euphrates river valley. we're thinking the whole time that's where zarqawi's been. and lo and behold, the guy doesn't drive west of baghdad. he goes north towards baqubah. >> he moved north in a sedan. suddenly this sedan on a divided highway moving through baghdad pulls off to the side of the road and the individual just gets out and the car drives off. within seconds, a truck called a bongo truck pulls up next to him and picks him up and he jumps in and they drive off.

it was clearly a planned switch. we'd call that trade craft. and it was pretty impressive. >> now abd al rahman is moving in another vehicle. we decided that we were going to follow every single vehicle. so we're following both of them. >> he went north and went to a small town, and he went into a corner restaurant. a little shop/restaurant. he went in one door and a little while later comes out another door. and there are multiple pickup trucks parked outside, almost like out of a movie. multiple white pickup trucks all with very similar markings. and so from 10,000 feet look the same. now we've watched him enough, people are starting to be confident they know how he walks and how he looks. and he gets in one of the vehicles. >> so we saw the vehicle, the next vehicle he gets in, and we follow that one. >> he goes up to this area called hibhib, which is an area

that looks like a very nice suburb. it's got a road and a small canal. behind that is a palm grove. and so we see the pickup truck come up, come into the driveway of one of the houses, and as it parks in the driveway the individual gets out and an individual dressed in all black comes out of the house, walks to meet the car and greet him. >> and comes out to the edge of the driveway, looks right, looks left to make sure nobody was following abd al rahman to that site. he came kind of swaggering out in his all dressed in black. everybody, we were all standing there. we were like, holy [ muted ]. that's zarqawi. everybody's hair was up in their neck. so now it's let's make sure that everything that we do is done exacting and precise and with absolute laser focus.

>> we order a part of our force, which is down in baghdad, to conduct an air assault movement by helicopter to go up and capture him. capture or kill. >> we wanted to capture him because i desperately wanted to talk to him. i wanted us to be able to interrogate him. so we went to launch the raid force, and then we get the word that one of the helicopters of the raid force had broken. which was very abnormal. almost never happened. we have to get another helicopter, so there's a delay. we're worried, because he is in the house, but what if he you zblie look at him and, he said, sir, i'm going to bomb it. we can't get the rain force there fast enough. i really wanted to capture him, but i knew he was right. i said okay. two airplanes are up in the sky. at that moment they're refueling.

when they come off of refueling, only one comes off. finally you get word, okay, bombs away. a few seconds later you see a big explosion. >> when the bomb went off, i thought jesus, i hope he is dead. that's not a given. i have seen people get up and walk away. medicine.g-term control i talked to my doctor and found a missing piece in my asthma treatment with breo. once-daily breo prevents asthma symptoms. breo is for adults with asthma not well controlled

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sorry, captain obvious. don't be. i've got the hotels.com app, which makes it simple to book a room for $500. or $25, but it won't be here. you can stay with me. thanks. i've already lost enough today.

>> when the bomb went off, i thought, oh, jesus, hope he is dead. >> still not sure when we got him. not sure he hadn't slipped out. snoo they show up about ten minutes after the bomb goes off. when they show up, the first encounter they have is an

ambulance. driven by some iraqi police. they have zarkawi's body in the back. >> the iraqi police fist said, okay, with he got him, and our force said, no, we got him, and there was a moment where guns were drawn, and then the iraqis backed down. >> five more minutes, they would have gotten the body out of there. we would have never known. our guys try to save zarqawi's life. he was so imploded from the explosion that he was -- you know, he was dead. >> we subsequently brought his body down to our headquarters, and they lay him on a poncho. >> myself and stan stood over the top of him, and we just started looking at each other, you know, nobody is cheering over dead bodies. this is -- that's him. >> he looked exactly like al

zarqawi from the pictures. he was in the right clothes. he was not disfigured. he was just internally injured. he was just dead. >> now zarqawi has met his end, and this violent man will never murder again. zarqa zarqawi's death is a severe blow to al qaeda. >> we had lost people against him. we had killed a tremendous number of people in his network, and he would kill an extraordinary number of innocent iraqis. there was a satisfaction that we had done away with something that was in my view inherently evil. this is not the kind of warfare that we're involved in. >> some iraqi police celebrated news, but many others worn down

by three long years of violence are thinking this could be a turning point. >> when zarqawi was removed from the battlefield, that was by no means the end of anything. it was the restart of the larger purpose. >> this thing is not over by far. it's great we got him, but zarqawi created. >> he created incredible insurgency, something bigger than a small terrorist organization. he created a movement. >> when i look at what we're facing now, i see tszarqawi all over this battlefield. zarqawi is the father of the islamic state, and that consists of lebanon, jordan, parts of

israel, all of syria, most of iraq, the northern part of saudi arabia. zarqawi, he named it. so the modern day islamic state that we still will be dealing with years from now, he created it. >> the terrorist group known as isil must be degraded and ultimately destroyed. >> i think zarqawi absolutely laid the foundation for the islamic state, and he convinced people it was achievable. >> it's an ideology. it's a belief system until we change the behavior of this radical form of islam. we're never going to defeat this. rrnl

. back in 1981 i had the american dream. the beautiful wife, the house in the suburbs, and a beautiful 6-year-old son. one day i went to work, kissed my son good-bye, never saw him again. in two weeks i became the parent of a murdered child, and i'll always be the patient of a murdered child. i still have the heartache. i still have the rage. i waited years for justice. i know what it's like to be there waiting for some answers. over those years i learned how to do one thing really well, and that's how to catch these bastards and bring them back to justice. i have become a