will continue to cooperate with pending oversight investigations of the july 13 failure being done now by congress the department of homeland security's office of the inspector general. and he independent review directed by president biden

mission assurance review as, i stated i'm not willing for the i'm not waiting for the completion of those reports. and i've directed the secret service to take immediate steps to ensure our protectees are indeed safe. and i will summarize those steps in a moment i am committed to pursuing accountability for the secret service's failure in butler, pennsylvania but let me be clear. >> if policy violations by secret service personnel are identified by the agency's mission assurance review. those individuals will be held accountable and they will be held accountable to our fair and thorough disciplinary process the first part of that process is an investigation to identify whether policy violations occurred potential vause policy violations or referred to our office of integrity. and appropriate discipline is administered under our table of penalties

the facts will drive the outcomes of those investigations. and i promised accountability. and i will not rush to judgment nor ignore due process every single person within the secret service feels the weight of what happened we are in an unprecedented red tha environment and to high operational tempo during this presidential campaign the men and women of the secret service are working incredibly hard and doing their jobs under difficult circumstances. they need to focus on their work and they need to know that i have their backs. and that is my commitment to them i want to thank our state and local partners. the secret service relies on local law enforcement for every protective event does valiant men and women work tirelessly protecting their communities they know the people, places and terrain that we operate in we owe them our thanks and simply put, we cannot do our jobs without them

and i know how important this relation ship is. i spent four years in local law enforcement before joining the secret service. i know the long hours these men or women put in and the professionalism they bring to this partnership. and in that capacity i was always proud to support the secret service's protective mission. when called upon as a municipal police, a police officer in no way should any state or local agency supporting us in butler on july 13 be held responsible for our secret service failure typically, the secret service refrained from commenting on ongoing investigations. but we know these are extraordinary circumstances so please understand that the information provided today's based on what i know now to a degree of certainty we will learn more as interviews are completed and further evidence is gathered and analyzed and i will share more information as it becomes available. but i can say

without a doubt that heroism was present that day secret service agents rushed to the stage to shield the former president with their bodies within three seconds of bullets ringing out in an unflinching act of bravery the secret service counter-sniper who neutralize the threat with a single shot undoubtedly saved countless lives were in a high operational tempo and i need and i want our secret service workforce, the dedicated men and women of the secret service. i want to know and i want to make sure that they are uplifted so they can focus on carrying out the mission they are worthy of trust and confidence. and they deserve your support and let me take a moment to speak to the american people that are counting on us to do our job to protect their ability to cast a vote for the candidate of their choice the

secret service's successes are largely unknown you only know of our failures. >> and those have been documented and all of them are undeniably dark days in our nation's history but let me tell you about the dedicated patriots of the secret service these public servants are the quiet professionals working in the background day in and day out. they are standing the watch providing a blanket of protection to the people that work in the white house to the thousands of people who attend political rallies and nominating conventions to the thousands of american citizens who line pennsylvania avenue every four years on inauguration date to see the new president and the new vice president. and they are out there right now doing this mission they are focused and they live their professional lives committed to the values of this agency. justice duty loyalty courage, and honesty

this is who we are and this is what we do and we will earn back your trust now, provide, a timeline of the visit to butler, pennsylvania on july 8 personnel assigned to the agency's pittsburgh field office conducted planning meetings and a site, walked through with law enforcement partners and campaign staff on july 10 secret service counter-sniper and technical security personnel arrived in pittsburgh and began advanced planning for their teams july 12, the build-out of the campaign rally site began and continue through the early morning hours of july 13 in the morning of july 13, a site breaking was conducted with secret service personnel and law enforcement partners supporting the event secret service personnel took their posts and a tactical security sweep of the protective side commenced. prior to the sites

opening to event staff, vendors, and to the public at 12:30 p.m. the secret service open the protective site to event staff and vendors. and then i want to clock magnetometer screening of the estimated 15,000 people attending the campaign rally than staff and vendors began i'd 5:30 p.m. former president trump arrived at the campaign rally via secret service motorcade. and at that time, he met with supporters and secure backstage area within the protective site at 5:45 p.m. a. local butler county emergency services unit counter sniper team member texted the secret service counter-sniper team leader about a suspicious person and sent two photos of the individual later identified it as the silent as the assailant at 5:53 p.m. the secret service counter-sniper team leader texted two secret service counter-sniper teams that local law enforcement was looking for suspicious individual outside of the perimeter, lurking around the

ajr building at this time, secret service personnel were operating with the knowledge that local law enforcement was working on an issue of a suspicious individual the concept of local law enforcement working on such issues is common at sites. and on july 13, there are over 100 calls for support at 6:00 p.m. former president trump took the stage to begin remarks based on what i know right now. now that the secret service counter-sniper teams, nor members of the former president's security detail had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the ajr building with a firearm it is my understanding that personnel were not aware they assailant had a firearm until they heard gunshots at 6:11 p.m. remember the former president trump's protective detail contacted their pittsburgh field office counterpart to inquire about the radio update that there was an issue local law enforcement was looking into near the

perimeter that sixth 11:00 p.m. they assailants first volley of three shots was fired. and within three seconds, the former president's detail rushed the stage and covered former president trump shielding him with their own bodies the fourth through a shots took place over the next several seconds, 15.5 seconds after the assailants first shot. a secret service counter-sniper fired a single round that neutralized the assailant that concludes a quick brief summary of the timeline and with that, i'll turn it over to our staff here to begin. >> any questions hi. >> thank you for doing this. you said earlier this week to congress that you start again. you said earlier this week to congress that you don't want to tip anything on the scale as far as discipline, area action is concerned. i need to ask you since you testified, has anyone

been suspended with or without pay has anyone been fired and will you tell us as people are disciplined along the way or is this something we're going to need to just constantly be asking, where were you updating? tell us five people have been fired six people, seven people. what can you tell us? sure. thank you for that question, david so as i said in my opening statement, there are going to be there's the mission assurance review if that mission assurance review is looking into if the real policy violations at that point now if in fact there were policy violations at that point, now, it it'll go into a parallel path of a disciplinary type of investigation. those are internal investigations that deal with employee matters. so we're not going to be able to provide real time updates are continuously to provide you updates on that. but what i will tell you is that these

were very thorough investigations. and if in fact there were policy violence relations and they are substantiated, those employees will be held accountable i think if i just makes people want accountability, you may not be able to tell us names are or something, but wouldn't be able to say that people have been disciplined. people want to hear that i will be able to at least at a high level begin provide at least some type of statement that people are be accountable, being held accountable may i appreciate it? fox digital new video of somebody on the roof we believe is the assailant running back and forth while president trump was speaking. what do you make when you see that go with this time? yeah. >> so it affirms to me and again, you heard this from the fbi and they're still conducting interviews and looking at this it even just affirms to me that this was this was a failure. we should have had better protection for the protect date. we should have had better coverage on that roofline we should have

had at least some other set of eyes from the secret service point of view covering that that building was very close to that outer perimeter and we should have had more of a presence and so as far as the timeline running out of him running back and-forth, i know the fbi is provided a bit of a chronology as well. and so i'd have to go back and look at that. but the bottom line is this david this was a secret service failure that roof line should have been covered. >> we should have had better eyes on that i have just a quick follow-up. can you describe you said there were 100 calls for support. what kind who those calls came from and what those look like. and also moving forward, do you anticipate and if so, what any different changes in protocol between how secret service communicates or works with local law enforcement

specifically, as they work to secure events are other things that thank you for that question so with regards to with regards to calls for support, it was very hot day that day. >> there was a lot of not only ems this type of calls to address people, but there were people that needed some other type of law enforcement assistance this happens candidly happens a lot at outdoor rallies were especially on hot days so there was a lot of traffic, radio traffic on the local net about, hey, i need emt here. so there was a lot of people that were that were needing assistance with respect to the interoperability . so one of the things that i've directed is i've commissioned a task force. that task force is going to be leveraging the resources of the department of homeland security it will be co-chaired in all likelihood by someone from the secret service and someone from sisa and i think we're also

going to bring in some state and local law enforcement. >> the interoperability challenge. >> it's not an easy fix. it's not as simple as just trying to figure out the local frequency of the agency you're working with. and then piping that into your radio network? it requires a substantial technical fix in the meantime, before we can get to that, what i need to have is i need to make sure that our folks when they're out there, we use a counterpart system on the day in butler, we had a pennsylvania state trooper in our security room they also had a unified command posts that had some of the other agencies that were onsite that day. it is plainly obvious to me that we were not we didn't have access to certain information, not by anybody's fault it just so happened that there was a sense of urgency that there might have been ready to traffic that we missed. we have to do a better job of that so moving forward, in addition to this task force that will

provide more information on next week as we begin to stand that up. i've also directed all of our sachs are special agents in charge of field offices across the country to reevaluate where we put our security rooms. if a state or local sets up a unified command post, maybe we need to be in that room as well as opposed to just being in another room and relying on counterparts system. >> it was so apparent to me than in this incident in the final 30 seconds, which has been the focus of what happened before the assailant opened fire. there was clearly radio transmissions that may have happened on that local radio net that we did not have and so we have to do a better job of co-locating, leveraging that counterpart system. >> and this is going to drive our operations going forward we did not it did not make it over to us or whether we did not hear it. it just did not make it over to us it did not make

it to us. and i go back to my opening statement where the members of the detail they did not all day knew that there the issue that the locals were working an issue at the president's 3:00, which would have been off to his right, which is where the shot came from 100 sorry to follow it to clarify on the hundred calls that you've got roughly that day? >> i understand a lot of them were heat-related. how many specifically were suspicious people was this the only call the eventual shooter that was a suspicious character? and then also just to clarify, did you guys have a drone on site? did you try to use it? and if not, why did you not use the locals offer of a drought? >> sure. >> so as i understand it now, based on the information i have, there were other calls for a suspicious individuals and your other question was about drones drones sure right

so we did not have a drone on site. we did not put a drone up based on the information i have right now, i am aware that there was a request from a local agency to offer to fly a drone on that day? and that is also a part of the mission assurance review that i've asked to get some better insight in. one of the other changes that are implemented when i, when i became the acting director is we are now going to leverage the use of of unmanned aerial systems at sites. now so we are putting those assets out and, we should have had better line of sight on some of those high ground concerns we thought we might have had it covered with the human eye. but clearly, we are going to change our approach now and we are going to leverage technology and put

those on unmanned aerial systems thank you so much for doing this. you mentioned that there were text messages from butler esu to us secret service counter-snipers. i'm curious if that is routine. you know, there were two communication channels at the butler rally and you referenced earlier this week it appears that information was stuck or siloed at the state and local channel. what was the plan to relay information from locals to the secret service? initially, what is the protocol? i just have one follow-up. >> sure. so nicole, we use that counterpart system, right and so the teams, especially on the tactical side, when it comes to the town have trickle are counter assault team. >> they actually had an embed with them from the local tag team and they had that radio net as well with pennsylvania state police. when with respect to the counter-snipers, they were using cellular telephone,

texts, communications at this point moving forward, what i have directed now is that everybody should be using the radio net. and if we don't have the ability to pipe in or leverage that counterpart system that's one of the things that we're looking at now, we should be able to have direct coms with the people that are supporting us. and that's moving forward. that's what i have direct so just to clarify, us, secret service counter-snipers did not have radio communications. >> now, with the local, now with the local cs folks that we're providing a support they were basically had an area responsibility independent from where our counter-snipers we're were secure and just the last thing did the u.s. agree? but service counter-sniper teams that arrived onsite on july 10, ever relay line of sight concerns what came of that? and can you confirm that this was the first 2024 campaign event that counter-sniper teams were assigned to the former president. >> sure. as part of their advance they they identify

those line of sight, those high ground turns and there's a division of labor with respect to the whether or not this was the first time it was it was the first time secret service counter-sniper were deployed to support the former president's detail i don't much for doing this i have a question about the review that you did, the picture that you showed in the senate the other day of the vantage point that the local snipers had how do you know that that's the window that they were actually posted at? they're saying that they are on a completely other side of the building and related to that has the secret service actually interviewed the snipers that were in the adr building so thank you for that. >> so once the fbi had released the butler farm show site we were able to take custody of it and we send the full resources of our office of investigations, which included

the forensic services division we did a full sight reconstruction and this is part of our ongoing mission assurance review and as part of that, that also included the plotting and also trying to identify where not only our personnel were, but also we're state and local law enforcement work and then the second part of your question was the mission assurance. we will we will start we're starting with our federal personnel and working out. we will get if they're willing to be interviewed, we will ask for the local law enforcement horseman onsite to be interviewed that day how we went went back and reconstructed that was based on what we had based on the ops plan and then also based on what our own folks as they understood it on the day off

yeah. there's no way so i think what we'll do is we'll let the mission assurance play that out and we'll look forward to interviewing him and definitely getting their side of the story but what i also want to reiterate is this was a secret service failure. and so they should not be blamed, we're not trying to shift blame to anybody and that's the important takeaway that we need our state, local partners out there doing this with us every day director. thank you for taking the time. >> just a couple of questions. if you could walk us through some things to help us better understand. have you gotten to the bottom of why there was no one station on route from a law enforcement perspective and why there was no one there to secure the building to make sure no one could get up there. have you have you gotten any

clarity on why those two lapses in security were in place to have a couple of quick follow-ups. >> sure. it's something that again, having been there the day after i was named named the acting director i wanted to put eyes on and go out there and see it and looking at that site it really seeing how close that site was to the stage, seeing where it was. it definitely raised a lot of questions in my mind that there should have been physical presence, if not on the roof, that there should have been better security to prevent anyone from getting up on that roof? >> so moving forward we've i've directed our office of protective operations and i'll special or special operations division now that when we are up operational and we have counter-snipers out there that we were working with locals and that they would in fact they in fact will also be out presence

at the very least, the presence of law enforcement officer can deter a lot of bad activity having been a local police officer, i will never know how many crimes i prevented just by being there, just by walking the street and being out there and so moving forward, one of the things that we want to do is we want to deter people from even thinking about trying to do something like this again. and the only way we can do that is leveraging not only the resources that we have, but the resources of our state and locals and putting them out there in an overt presence. >> two very quick follow-ups you talked at length at the hearing the other day about the system that did not operate that could detect drones can you describe a little bit of how that works? that does that go in the sky itself to detect? the drones? and then finally the interoperability issue. i'm clear in terms of that secret service radios were not communicating with the locals.

but you had people in the command post, right? who in theory could hear and know some basics of what was going on. is that the my understanding that correctly. >> so with respect to the counter uas pier i don't want to get into too much sensitive information, but what i can tell you is it allows that that asset allows the geolocation to be able to plot where a drone is within a certain distance of how we set up. so think of it as like geo fencing. and then being able to pinpoint and detect where that is and with respect to the agency that we have, we had pennsylvania state police but it appears that there was there was really a big sense of urgency going on and the state and locals were doing everything they possibly could to try to find the assailant had already come to their attention they were actively trying to find him and i believe everyone was doing

their level best to try to locate eight him. but there could have been other agencies that we're putting out radio transmissions and this is something that will work with the fbi to get further on but those radio transmissions might have just been back to the unified command post and maybe not have made it over the pennsylvania state police here. but that's something that we're we're going to look into and definitely something that we are moving forward. we definitely want to remedy this going going going forward yes that there were working an issue at the 3:00 of the stage thanks for doing this. i wanted to ask you about changes moving forward. former president trump has said he wants to continue having outdoor rallies. what specifically will be different at the next rally that wasn't the case. and butler and if i could ask a follow-up to do you have information in the 30

seconds after the gunman was confronted on the roof by local law enforcement officer, that there were local law enforcement trying to communicate with the secret service that there was someone on the roof for the garden, and that transmission was the one that was missed okay. so with respect to the former president wanted to get back out there, listen, it's a campaign season, right? >> candidates want to be out there they want to be whether it's an indoor site or an outdoor site, it's on the secret service to make sure that we create a secure environment and less we identified by challenges, we identify concerns, and then it's on us to figure out what we need to do to mitigate that so if there are going to be future campaign rallies outside we it's going to be on us to make sure that we're providing all the assets and resources to make sure that those sites are indeed secure with respect to the radio traffic conditions based on what the fbi, my colleague from the fbi

testified the other day and they are working on isolating some of those radio frequencies from the state and locals that there was somebody who did in fact radio out that they had seen the individual with a weapon what i can tell you is that that piece of information that vital piece of information. and by no fault of anyone, it was a very stressful situation. it did not make it over our detail. are counter-snipers. everyone that was there that day were operating under the assumption an under the under the last bit of information they had received, that there was an issue that the locals were working at the 3:00 that's a bit of information that we had not anything about a weapon i wanted you to address or if you can describe the pittsburgh field office and their level of experience, especially in preparing for events like this and also have they explained

their thinking and how they define the perimeter that day. sure. thanks homes are pittsburgh field office. i don't think there's anybody in the secret service who is failing this more than the men and women of our pittsburgh field office and i've met with them and they are down right now. and so when i've met with them the other day, it was very it was very difficult. it's difficult for them they feel like they let their colleagues down. they feel like they let the country down they are wearing this and it is it's open. you can see it. it's an open wound that they are carrying there are very experienced office and what i will say is they are cooperating with the mission assurance. they understand the gravity of this situation and

they are definitely, definitely down right now. >> how does he regarded protection? >> protection yeah so when we when i said it's a failure to challenge our assumptions, meaning the assumption that, hey, that's going to be addressed, what that's going to be covered by state and local. >> so earlier this week, i convened a call with all of our special agents in charge of all of our field offices and i expressed to them, listen, we need our state and local counterparts. we also have to be very direct, very clear about what our expectations are, about what we need from them. whether it's a particular asset, whether it's particular numbers of personnel we need to be very clear so that they have an understanding of exactly what we you need

from them that is, that's on us we need to be better communicators and articulate exactly what we need to mitigate any challenges concerns, or anything that we identified during that advance process. and so i have full confidence in our sachs in the field. i full confidence in our, in our state and local counterparts that moving forward now we're not going to have this assumption that, oh, we think that they have it. no, we're going to we're going to work together. we're going to have good, hard, fierce conversations about what we're going to do. and then we're going to go out there and we're going to make all of these venue secure moving forward. >> thank you. i can director one thing for starters, i was hoping you could elaborate a little bit on a portion of the timeline in which you address a communication between the secret service detail and personnel at the pittsburgh field office? it just struck me as a little vague and i was

curious if you could elaborate on what that communication was. >> the former president's details they had a an advanced person on the ground who was responsible for the site. the radio transmission goes out about locals working an issue at the 3:00 that for the member of that detail called their pittsburgh field office counterpart hey, what do you what do you know about this in the midst, right in the middle of that phone conversation? >> the shots begin firing so that's that's the context of it sorry if i missed could you say how they became aware of the locals working at issue in the first place to even have that conversation, but that was the radio transmission that was put out by our security room. >> i got it. okay. >> the other just to follow up i'm curious about your you mentioned that this was the first event where secret service counter-snipers had been assigned as part of this security for former president trump to what extent do you

think that factored into what we're ultimately shown to be the failures, just that this was a first time, at least in a while in his capacity as a former president, that they were there on the site so the novelty of it. sure, sure so let me let me just clarify. >> one thing. this is the first time that secret service counter-snipers, but the former president at campaign rallies has actually been getting state and local resources tactical assets, counter-snipers from state and locals so with respect to why they were there in butler, listen, we event hi, wade are threat landscape every day. we calibrate based on that thread we evaluated a threat stream that we have and we put our secret service counter-sniper personnel out there and looking back it was very fortunate that we did but the former president will have counter-sniper coverage moving forward as will the president,

the vice president, senator vance, and then we'll await the eventual democratic vice presidential nominee we are going to put full resources out there to make sure that our campaign in cadence now is obviously picked up and we're going to make sure that we have all the resources out there to address any challenges that we have thank you. >> as you're doing this review, are you looking at the days leading up to this event and the instructions that you gave to state and local and federal partners. i know in the past there used to be a powerpoint presentation that was given before events like people who were part of each unit and the secret service would stand up, go through the mission, who was assigned to them, what they'd be doing. i understand that did not happen in this case and hasn't been happening for some time prior. is that something you think was missing here? is that something you might review and bring back? and do you also think the

secret service? his too reliant on a state, local, and federal. >> i mean, you have on 2000 hsi agents hoping events coming this fall. >> that's a third of their workforce and it takes a lot from state and locals as well. so first, would you bring back the powerpoint? do you think there should have been more planning and our u2 reliant on state and local and other partners. >> thanks. julia so that will be part of the mission assurance the communications and what was communicated leading up to it what i can tell you now, based on information i have is there was and what you're referring to is what we call the police well, we bring all the agencies together that will be directly supporting a particular visit we know that there was a we know that there were agencies from the various jurisdictions were present the ones and when i say that the ones that were the primary ones identified with providing support and we're gonna be involved in the

advanced planning process, meaning they were going to provide a counterpart kind of like what you said, the powerpoint if you're going to be conducting the site, this is special agent. so and so and here's their contact info. and then usually at the end of that meeting, everyone kind goes off and they form up and then they go over how they're going to go out and do the walkthroughs and identify some of the things i based on the information, i don't know about the powerpoint, i can tell you that there was a a police a police meeting with respect to the powerpoint i certainly think that visuals we're always good. >> i think that if we're not using it, we certainly will. but that goes back to my direction that we have to be very specific about about what we're communicating and what our expectations are moving forward with respect to the it reliance on state and local law enforcement listen, there are there are 700,000 full-time law

enforcement officers, over 700,000 full-time law enforcement officers in the united states. the majority of prosecutions in the criminal justice system in the united states are done by state and locals. that's a result of criminal destinations that they do every day in their communities to keep them safe. 100 over 130 or 135 officers died last year serving their communities, federal, state, and local 47 of them died by violent means gunfire there's not an overreliance on them. they're out there every day securing their communities. they know the terrain, they know the people. more importantly, they know the local laws if you are in a state where it's open carry we're going to rely on them to enforce local laws. i as a federal agent cannot go out there and enforce the laws of the commonwealth of pennsylvania. i need those state and local law enforcement officers. so i would push back on that with respect to leveraging other federal partners when we were in the department of treasury. and i

was a brand new agent, i would stand post during a campaign year with agents from atf, irs criminal investigations we were all one big happy family customs customs moved over to dhs, just like we did we do this every four years. we rely on those partners. we use them during national special security events like the democratic national convention, the united nations general assembly, the presidential inauguration. those are whole of government security operations, which the secret service is the lead planning for and we're going to bring in partners from across the government. i don't feel that it's an overreliance. it's something that we have done going back to our days of treasury. and we're going to continue to do that. we need those partners and we need those state and local officers. >> sure period. where locals understand that?

>> were they not standing right next to separate so there was we had our security room and then they had a unified command post and we had pennsylvania pennsylvania state police officer representative in our security room there was no secret service agent no there was not that was unique, as i understand it. that's an emergency management model that they that they use. and, you know, as i mentioned in that conversation with our special agents in charge in the field i've directed hey, we need to rethink where we put our security room if the large majority of our partners are in a unified command post or in a different location. we need to probably be there too. and so we have to rethink how we where we put our security rooms and we are in fact doing that now, moving forward look at allen jonah with bloomberg thanks so

much appropriators in congress this week delayed consideration of dhs, his budget for fiscal 25. >> they want to know more about what secret service needs i know you said tuesday, obviously, every agency head is always gonna say they need more resources, but can you be specific about what resource needs there may be particularly when we're looking at the technology issues, radio transmission, to see you as system. >> sure. >> show following this, we have had tremendous support from the department of homeland security and from the secretary and we have in fact looked at all of these needs given this dynamic high threat environment that we're operating in, an order to meet this, we can meet this now. but it is going to require additional investments and resources and we are having those conversations we certainly have been we've had great support not only from the department, but also our appropriations committee. committees. and we are working through kind of what our needs are right now. we will have

future conversations about this and we are appreciative that everyone is really coming together to make sure that we have what we need to meet this high threat less than that. >> that's not that's not for me to weigh in on, but what i would tell you is there's also a lot of discussion about why should the secret service do criminal investigations and what i will say is this, we were founded in 18, 65 as an investigative entity. it's in our dna. i firmly believe that the best protection agents learn those skills, being criminal investigators you learn how to interact with people. you learn organizational skills. you learned to be analytical. those were all traits that you need to have when you're on a detail moreover, if you look at where we are today buildings,

communities, everything is interconnected and so we have a particular expertise in cyber and cyber crime and critical systems protection. and so when you overlay that, that investigative skill set that we have you know, it's more than just securing the president or our protectees in a brick-and-mortar setting. it's also protecting them from things that make them vulnerable due to cyber and so the only way to learn that those skills to be able to detect, to be able to analyze, to be able to make sure that we are hardening not only cyber system those, but hardening a building that is fed by cyber systems. the only way to gain that experience, that knowledge is to be able to do criminal investigations. additionally, it is within our investigative authority to follow up on threats. people make threats to the president and the people we protect every day we need to have that domestic and international network of field offices to be able to track down those threats. and if

necessary, bring those people to justice and present them to a us attorney's office. >> so this you know, i know there's been a lot of talk. >> should we or should we should we do this? >> should we be in dhs? >> the bottom line is this. if you want the secret service to continue to be the secret service and be effective that what it does it needs to be doing investigations and it probably needs to be in the department of homeland security until congress fingers are others have an opportunity to weigh in still quick question there's a report that a whistleblower has alleged that you personally directed cuts to the counter surveillance division, which led to the threat assessments team failing to performance duties that it typically would before the before the butler rally. >> is that accurate? is that allegation accurate so i've recently i've become aware of this. >> we got to congressional letter on it. what i can tell you is that the counter-surveil

lance division they do a fantastic job. they have a very specific mission set a lot of that mission set is here in the national capital region, focused on permanent protective sites. but they do go out and they support when requested, they go out and support former details i know that there's been allegations that i personally cut or that i let's see, that i denied requests the counter-surveillance division has been out there supporting the former president's detail at some very high-profile events they continue to provide that support and there are out there providing support right now so we're going to respond to the letter that we received and we'll be sure to make that. i'm sure they will be able to share that response when the committee says it's okay to respond is that a no i did not know did you finally

figure out what how he got that gun on the roof? >> did it fit in the backpack? >> were working we're working to determine that that's something that the fbi is working on. there's a couple of i don't want to speculate as to exactly how he would have gotten it up there so we have already trained numerous details to be able to mobilize, to pick up multiple candidates most of the presidential campaign activity usually picks up coming out of the conventions. so we are prepared for this it's just that now we are in such a heightened dynamic environment. we are actually making sure that we are probably putting everything we can to make sure that we don't have a mission and failure. it is incumbent upon everyone in the secret service.

we all understand the gravity of this situation, and we are rising to meet this moment and we are certainly as we go into the democratic national convention, as we await picking up another candidate with the eventual naming of a vice presidential nominee from the democratic side. we're going. to staff that and we're going to make sure that we have all the resources and assets necessary to provide that level of protection thank you, everyone. >> we've been listening to ronald rowe, the acting director of the secret service, giving a press briefing answering questions, in detail about july 13 and the attempted assassination of former president donald trump, the acting director there, saying that he recognizes that these are dark days, not only for the agency, but for the nation saying though, quote, we will earn back your trust. >> he sees going about doing that as a path toward seeking accountability up to potentially holding secret service agents accountable if

through due process, they're found to have committed policy violations. >> he also said, notably that no local law enforcement should be held responsible for any secret service failures. this comes brianna, after some finger pointing between local law enforcement and the secret service over what happened that day. >> and he was obviously just in the hot seat before congress after his predecessor, the now former secret service director designed following her rather abysmal performance before congress. and one of the really testy exchanges that he had during that hearing had to do with accountability. and he seemed to put a little more flesh on the bone about that where he was kind of describing the process about what that would look like. because as senator josh hawley challenged him on this he was saying, essentially that there would be accountability, but that he wasn't going to do it in kind of a slap dash kind of weigh in here. he laid out that if there were violations, the accountability would be there

would be an investigation if the investigation found violations that would be referred to the office of integrity, they would meet out whatever the punishment and might be. it seems like up to the point of firing someone. so he sort of laid that out. he's clearly trying to thread a needle here to between dealing with the fact that certainly this is an organization with a morale problem, no doubt following what has happened. he pointed out that heroism was present that day and he's also trying to create this idea that there is some transparency. he's saying, i'm telling you what i know based on what i know at this point in these are extraordinary circumstances. normally wouldn't comment on an investigation, but i'm doing it in this case to that point about transparency. he actually provided a timeline of even before july by 13th, what it was like for secret service descendant advanced person, some of the procedures that they went through, any also provided some details that we should ask our experts about. we've got cnn law enforcement analyst jonathan wackrow with us and cnn senior national

security analyst juliette kayyem joining us as well. julia, it's starting with you. what were your main takeaways from what we heard? heard from the acting director well, this was a long press conference and so the details may have been lost, but the story is now becoming clear to me between the testimony and what was disclosed today. >> there was by the counter-snipers. we now know a concern about the rooftop. they expressed does that concern then when you heard the acting director say we discuss that concern and there was a division of labor in law enforcement talk that means it wasn't us. it was them, it was the state and locals. he then says this, the secret service made assumptions. he keeps coming back to that word assumptions about what that meant. he criticizes the secret service for those assumptions, they were clearly erroneous and that meant that the state and locals did not have coverage of that building, which was at the outset put outside the security perimeter, which also was a

fundamental mistake. so you heard the acting director also talk about a new task force looking at about how security perimeters are. for me, this is the first time exactly. this question that we all had is how the heck did they leave that open, which we've all had is they actually didn't. they actually were concerned about it. there's a mistake or a miscalculation on assumptions about who's covering it? and then that's everything. everything else flows from that. you can't regroup after you leave a building like that. if you have an assassin determined to kill the former president yeah, it comes down jonathan very much to a giant gaping communications problem here brianna absolutely. >> and i just want to get back to that the conversation around assumptions. when there can you cannot assume anything when it comes to protection? and when i

hear acting director roe talk about the failure to your question, the assumptions or the assumptions that are in the field. i do appreciate the fact that he has gone out. it has made a mandate two special agents in charge in the field to eliminate those assumptions, right? but to me, that is you're starting to move the needle towards a systemic problem with the protective model because we have agents that are out there doing these advances. we heard that timeline of how long the preparation was for this event. if we're making any type of assumptions with local law enforcement, other key stakeholders within the security plan that is you creating that intrinsic a potential for failure. and we cannot never have that again, eliminating those assumptions is absolutely critical in width that to your point is the communication, right? we cannot have bifurcated communication between local and local state and you'll federal agencies

all working in unison that can no longer be the norm. the new norm has to be a unified approach to communication. a unified approach to roles and responsibilities when it comes to executing a common security plan in at the end of the day, brianna, it's a shared fate by everybody jonathan we should point out, you're a former secret service agent. i wonder how that call from the acting director for accountability and for due process for agents, if there was a policy violation that they can sustain through evidence. how is that being received by the rank and file? thank well, listen, i mean, i think that in the secret service, you know, our motto is worthy of trust and confidence. >> so this is nothing out of the norm. what i'm afraid of here is that we'll accountability actually be shielded by administrative policy, specifically, the fact that the acting director brought up the table phil of

penalties as a secret service agent? yes. when you violate a policy within the secret service, there is a penalty structure that's too that my question is, were there penalties? i mean, we're their policies that weren't even in existence. is this more procedural? and you know, of the proceeding? sure. side of thing that communication in the structure with local law enforcement and how do we work together? those are more procedural, not actual policy. so i think that what you're going to see coming out of this are two things. changes to policy on how we actually engage with our local law enforcement partners probably formalizing think memorandums of understanding on event by event basis, but also changing our practices and procedures on site to allow more accountability to be held by those who have the responsibility of these security plans juliette, i want to ask you, it was one of the last questions that the acting director vector got, which had

to do with his personal involvement and a letter that has been sent from senator josh hawley to him requesting a lot of information. >> it's talking about a whistleblower who has alleged to hawley's office that it was roe personally who cut by 20% the counter surveillance division. and holly is alleging that that actually would have created a situation where that sort of outside area that's in question would have been basically completely secure. it seems it does seem very hypothetical. it also may raise some real really important questions as well. let's say that what did you think about that this is what this is what, how he does. >> he wants to create a headline that heads towards him and not towards the significant problem that the secret service obviously has. first of all, that that decrease in in

personnel out, we need to find out. is it true number two why did it occur? and number three, did congress authorize it? because of congress authorized it, then it's back to the senator and not on the secret service the second is it's wishful thinking to think it's the counter-surveillance group that would have been that could have solved this problem. i'd know where this is, what people who haven't been in public safety or or homeland security think there's just like you know, one solution right the real issue is, is an i keep going back to this the person i want in terms of my interest is who established the security perimeter. a couple of days before because i look at it now and think that seemed not right given where the roof is. and then when concerns were made about the security perimeter, why didn't the secret service ticket over? that has nothing to do with counter-surveillance , which haldi wants you to

think it does. it has everything to do with the operational planning and some of the judgments made on the ground by the protective detail's so i if it's just the idea that if only write this one thing had happened, that the senator has discovered that therefore the president would be saved. disney is wishful thinking. i'm glad that the director is pushing back on these senators to who don't seem who don't understand law enforcement, homeland security preparedness, operational planning, all the things no one's defending what happened and huge mistake. but it doesn't it does not mean that the senator is right. >> yeah. listen on one hand, congressional oversight is so important and they should be raising questions we also did hear senator hawley have some seemed like serious i don't know misunderstanding about even how some basic sniper operating worked at the hearing

thank you, juliette. >> we appreciate it, jonathan. thank you. we appreciate it. let's turn now to events in the middle east, fears of a wider conflict are growing as us officials are warning about iranian retaliation against israel that could come within days, tensions, of course, on the rise since the assassination of hamas political leader ismail haniyeh, who was buried today in qatar. >> the iranian government and hamas say that israel carried out that assassination. now, israel has neither claimed or denied responsibility for that tack. but meantime, we are learning about moves by the pentagon in response to these developments. let's bring in cnn national security correspondent natasha bertrand, who joins us with the details on that. natasha yeah, boris, we just learned from the pentagon's deputy press secretary that the u.s. is going to be making a number of force posture changes in the middle east in light of this increased threat by the iranians, given that it is widely expected that they are going to retaliate for that

alleged israeli assassination of that senior hamas figure into iran earlier this week. now the deputy pentagon press secretary declined to detail what exactly those force posture changes would look like other than to say that it is essentially going to be an attempt to bolster the security of not only israel, of course, but also us forces who are really have a footprint all across the middle east and in iraq and syria, of course, this is going to be an attempt primarily to bolster their air defense systems, which of course are going to be necessary if iran does decide to launch some kind of large-scale ballistic missile attack, like they did back in april it also is expected to potentially involve the movement of all of the naval assets in the region right now, including the roosevelt carrier strike group, which is currently in the gulf of oman, but could be moved a little bit closer to the area here, including lebanon, if the situation calls for it. but the u.s. has a lot of assets in the area right now, including and fabius assault ships in the

eastern mediterranean i mean, so they are pretty prepared at this point to respond at a moment's notice, but still additional reinforcements here are probably going to be sent in just given the likelihood that this iranian attack is going to be potentially larger and even more complex than what we saw in april alright, natasha bertrand, thank you so much. we near keeping a close eye on that and we will be right back with much more nexium 24 hour prevents heartburn, acid for twice as long as pepsin get all day and all night heartburn as it prevention with just one pill a day. as it prevention. choose nexium can you do this as early as your 40s? >> you may lose muscle and strength. protein supports muscle health in shear max protein has a 30 ground blend of high-quality protein to feed muscles for up to seven hours. so take the challenge, insurer nutrition for strengthen energy you know what's brilliant think about it. >> boring is the unsung

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