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the united states and around the world. i'm fareed zakaria, coming to you live from new york. today on the program -- >> look what happened! is this crazy? >> donald trump wins the presidency again. i'll talk to two great political experts, ezra klein and david frum about how it happened and what lessons democrats can learn. then, one of the intellectual godfathers of maga, warren caste, discusses what to expect for the next four years. and i'll get the view from overseas with the economist's editor in chief, zanny minton bed does. >> this is an magnificent victory for the american people, that will allow us to make america great again. but first, here's my take.

at first glance, it would seem easy to explain last year's election as part of a 2024 global wave against incumbents beset by post- covid turmoil and inflation. the uk saw a huge tory parliamentary majority turn into the thinnest minority in a 200- year history. government has collapsed amid soaring unpopularity. emmanuel macron's party was crushed in france's parliamentary elections. south korea's opposition party dominated in a huge parliamentary landslide. and even in japan, where the ruling ldp party has governed almost interrupted since 1955, the party lost its house of representatives majority. so it might have been preordained that kamala harris representing the incumbent administration lost decisively as well. but harris could have

been bucked the trend. the american economy is doing better than all of these other nations. employment is strong, wages are up, inflation is down. productivity is soaring. more importantly, donald trump has many strengths as a political figure, but he also has many weaknesses. let's recall that after january 6th, 2021, trump's appr 34% in a cnn poll. in a marquette law school poll matchup a year later, joe biden was beating him by ten points nationally, 43-23. then came the overturning of roe v. wade and the 2022 midterms in which the republicans did very badly for midterm and maga candidates in particular got crushed. trump's favorability ratings sank to 31% in a cnn poll, with an unfavorable rating at a staggering 60%. even republicans were disillusioned with him. at this

point, trump had led a republican party that lost its house majority in 2018, its senate majority, and the presidency in the 2020 cycle, and then felt historically badly in those 2022 midterms. in december of 2022, ron desantis was outpolling trump easily among republicans in a "wall street journal" poll. that was the democratic party's strongest moment since trump's arrival on the political landscape. but they blew it. "the new york times" estimates that harris will lose the national popular vote by about a point and a half. a first for democrats since 2004. global inflation is something that was hard to shut down, but there were other issues that the democrats flubbed, which enflamed the opposition and depressed their base. i'm going to talk about it here, because it's the right time to

do a postmortem. but to avoid to appear having 2020 hindsight, i noted each of these responses at the time often provoking angry responses at the left. the first big error was the biden administration's blindness to the collapse of the immigration system and the chaos at the border. an asylum system that was meant for a small number of persecuted individuals was being used by millions to gain legal entry. instead of shutting it down, liberals branded anyone protesting as heartless and racist. they missed a massive shift in american public opinion in just a few years. in 2020, the percentage of americans who wanted to decrease immigration was just 28%. by this year, it was 55%. when kamala harris went on "the view" and was asked how she would have differed from biden, instead of basically saying nothing different, she should have said, i would have shut down the border early and hard.

the second error was an overzealous misuse of law to punish trump. the most egregious of the cases pursued was alvin bragg's one in new york, one that even he was one skeptical of, but was reportedly pressured by some on the left into pursuing. some cases like the georgia one were legitimate. but the host of them piled on in rapid succession, gave the impression that the legal system was being weaponized to get trump. it confirmed to his base what it had always believed. that over- educated urban liberals were hypocrites, happy to bend rules and norms when it suited their purposes. it's worth noting that in week's election, a cnn exit poll found that among those who believe that democracy in the u.s. is threatened, a majority supported trump. law turned trump from being a loser into a victor. as his indictments group, his campaign contributions surged, and his poll numbers

solidified. the final error is a more diffuse one. the dominance of identity politics on the left, which made it push for all kind of dei policies that largely cafe out of the urban academic bubble, but alienated many mainstream voters. there's an irony in claiming to be pro- latino by insisting that people use the term latin- x, only discovering that latinos themselves view the term as weird. this made them miss, for example, that working class latinos were moving toward trump, perhaps because they were socially conservative or liked his macho rhetoric, or even agreed with his hardline stance on immigration. one of trump's most effective ads on trans issues had a tag line. >> kamala is for they/them. president trump is for you. >> the problem is much deeper than simply one about nouns and

pronouns. the entire focus on identity has morphed into something deeply ill liberal. judging people by the color of their skin lantern the content of their character. similarly, university speech codes and cancel culture have become ways that the left censors or restricts that most rished of liberal ideas, freedom of speech. one simple way to think about the lessons of this election is that liberals cannot achieve liberal goals, however virtuous, by illiberal means. go to cnn. com/fa reed for a link to my "washington post" column this week and let's get started. in 2016, when trump won the first time, much was made of the fact that hillary clinton actually won the popular vote by two percentage points. the electoral

college may have chosen trump, but the majority of americans did. in 2020, he lost the popular vote to joe biden by more than four appoints andand the election. but this year, he is projected to have narrowly won the popular vote. it will be the first time that a republican has won the popular vote in 20 years. i'm joined now by two very smart people, "the new york times" opinion columnist, ezra klein, the author of the book "whyhy we're polarized," and david frum, a staff writer at atlantic and a former speechwriter for george w. bush. first, fundamentally, how much of this was incumbency penalty, that seems to have affected every election in the last 18 months, and how much of this is something special that we should analyze? >> so if you chart how every incumbent government has done in elections, for the past 15 months, two years, virtually everyone gets annihilated in the election, by much more than the democrats did.

thetories in the uk did terribly. if you look north, justin trudeau is terribly unpopular. we're seeing center-left and center-right governments do down. if you look at the coalition, one simple way of thinking about it is in 2020 and 2024, you have very similar coalitions in the election. and trump is doing much better among hispanic and black voters. in 2020, trump is the incumbent, there was a pandemic, people are mad at him. he's not very good at being president. you have this coalition, but trump has a minus three- point incumbent penalty. democrats win by four and win the election. this year, biden is president, the biden/harris administration are the incumbents. people are mad. it's a post- inflation period, we're seeing angry electorates and incumbents everywhere. call it a minus 2, minus 3 incumbent penalty. democrats÷÷ lose by 1 to 2 votes. on that level, maybe you don't need to explain that much at all. here's why i don't just

take that and throw it around myself like a shawl and comfort myself to sleep. they lost by 1. 5 points in the battleground states, right? when they were actually able to keep it very narrow compared to a lot of other incumbent governments. >> 175,000 votes in those three states would have flipped the electoral college. >> so that means strategic decisions could have really mattered here. when you're talking about a swing of 2 percentage points of a vote, that is not something that only structure can explain. it is actually -- they were actually able to keep it close enough that doing something different would have mattered. >> that's an interesting point. the point is not that it was a employeeout and that's why the democrats should be soul searching. it was ant blowout and they could have won this. david, what about the economy? i mean, why is it with what is unarguably the strongest economy in the world at this point, it didn't work? was it a time lag, an inflation matter a lot more than we thought it would?

>> if donald trump had presided over this economy, as he soon will, he would have said again and again, this is the greatest economy since the 1960s, things are great, unemployment -- the democrats are uninhibited. if there is someone in america who is sad, it is impossible for a democratic administration to speak positively about what they have done. i am not a democrat. i marvel at this. there are so many veto points in the party. and this creates a very dangerous situation now. what do democrats love on this earth more than soul searching? i don't know. they love it. maybe a mutual accusation, blaming blame ing each other. they hate each other, and they're now about to turn each other. should we have gone left on populism, should we blame this part of our coalition or that part of the coalition? and meanwhile, the emergency is going to start immediately. donald trump is going to come to all of this and immediately pardon the january 6th criminals. he is immediately going to abandon america's

commitment to ukraine. he is already signaling for the chinese, taiwan is yours if you want it. and, of course, the flood gates of corruption are going to be massively opened. how will he pay the half billion dollars he owes in civil judgments? will he sell truth social to somebody? the saudis, elon musk at some giant markup? the crisis is going to be here and the democrats will be looking inward when the country needs protection from what donald trump is going to use his flimsy margin to do. >> do you think that -- i mean, how much is it worth for democrats looking at the two key factors, it seems to me, are the loss of hispanic vote and the loss of the youth vote. and they overlap a bit, because hispanics are younger, on average. but those are the two kind of the big shifts. >> there's one key factor. they've gone from the party of the working class to

losing them. democrats will have a significant margin among voters who went to college and a significant loss among voters who didn't. it is that structure of the electorate that's leading them to lose the hispanic vote, to lose more black voters. the educational polarization has breached is racial walls. the fact that trump is assembling a more multi- racial coalition, but this is part of why they lost women -- they didn't lose women, but didn't have the margins among women that they wanted to. >> why, because -- >> pause it's the same thing. the democrats are alienating working class electorate. year by year, worse and worse. that they need the win. the working class is very, very big in this country, and it's the core of the democratic party's self-identity. one reason i don't totally agree with david on this question of whether or not democrats need to do some soul search welcome go back now through three elections, 2016, 2020, 2024. in each of these leches, the win in either directions are very close. in 2016, trump loses the popular vote and wins on, you

know, a butterfly's flap of its wings in wisconsin and pennsylvania and michigan. james comey does not send that letter and donald trump loses. in 2020, the swing state margin is quite narrow. this year, too. if you want to end what feels like a growing emergency in american politics, and i do agree with david that trump is very dangerous and a lot of very dangerous things are about to happen, the democratic party doesn't need 50 or 51 or 52% of the vote. it needs to build something more durable than this. and in order to do that, it needs to stop bleeding voters. it is bleeding at an accelerated level who are supporting a candidate that is so anathema that they can even think. when you have that type of cultural distance, you have to really ask, what closes

that cultural gap. i thought a lot about the fact that democrats are more culturally comfortable with liz cheney this year than joe rogen. that is something that has really changed. >> when we come back, we're going to ask, what is the democratic strategy to do just that. when we come back.

and we are back with ezra klein of "the new york times" and "the atlantic's" david frum. so what we were talking about is how do the democrats widen their base? how do they get beyond just their base?

>> well, the democrats have the problem, or the challenge, they don't have one base, the way the republicans do. they have a bunch of different -- is it black women, the most loyal voters of the democratic party? educated professionals? is it the old unions? they all want slightly different things and they all turn each other. and meanwhile, the republicans have a failure of their elites. because one of the things i think we all need to learn from this 2024 election is that you can't expect people who are paying for groceries to care about the fine details of institutions in washington. those have always been protected by agreement among the leadership of both parties. there are things you don't, like try to overthrow the government if you lose an election. donald trump has consolidated not just the republican base, but the republican donor class and the republican leaders to say, trying to overthrow the government, acceptable. >> so, if that's the case, you know, it's sort of this -- the alists versus the anti-institutionalists.

does it tell you that the majority american are actually anti-institutionalists? >> i think that the majority of the american public don't care. and i don't know that it helped harris that she was campaigning liz cheney, and sort of, at the end of the day, it was sort of the guardians of the institution versus counterrevolutionaries. because i think what they misunderstood was the salience of institutions. and this was built on 2022, right? democrats have this midterm election in 2022. they win unexpectedly. the red wave never crashes ashore. in retrospect, it would be much better for them if they had got, annihilated in 2022, as they'd expected. but because they department, the unusual thing that happens with democrats, is instead of having a pivot with the midterm defeat, as we did in 1994 and 2010, to think about the voters that you were losing, they instead pivot to think more seriously about the voters that they are winning. why are they overperforming in midterms? why are they overperforming in special elections? it's because they're winning these high- information, high- political engagement voters who turn out in these

midterms and special election kind of votes. >> so you need large turnout now helps the republicans -- >> large turnout now helps the republicans because it's full of people who don't care about the institutions and not highly connected to politics. >> this is the message that people need to take away from this program. we are back in a world in which high voters count. and those institutions are going to be in enormous danger. if you are someone who's watching this program, do not disengage. do not engage in acrimony. do not start finger pointing. there's an emergency about to break over american institutions and you have to focus there. >> and do you think, to extend that point, is trump and what he's going to do, you think, enough, at least temporarily, to unify the democratic party? >> it's not about the democratic party. because that's many people who, as ezra said, care about groceries. it needs to confront -- unify everyone who cares about american institutions. the liz cheneys of this world, to say, he's going to pardon people. he's going to cut off ukrainians. he's going to sell taiwan.

he's going to try to pardon himself. he's going to create a new doctrine that we've never had before of presidential immunity from crimes. the investigations against him are already being wrapped up. he'll put pressure on the states to cancel the state investigations. and he will look for ways to pay his civil judgments that are going to look to a lot of people like bribe taking. >> so we've got about a minute. do you feel as though, when you listen to all of this, the democratic party needs to, you know, in very broad terms, does it need to -- it's tried to move left economically a lot, but it's never tried to move right on social ditions. >> i don't think this is as simple as right and left. i think the democratic party needs to become more pluralistic. be better to talking to many kinds of people and going into many kinds of places that it does not find comfortable. also, it needs to govern better and with more of a laser focus on the issues of people who don't always agree with it. the swing in blue states and blue cities was about

inflation. also about disorder. also about high home prices, right? there was a lot of democratic malgovernance with how bad trump was was covering up. but if you live in san francisco or l.a., i don't think the swing was such a surprise. i saw it talking to people day to day. >> final thought, 15 seconds, do you think there is -- there's going to be a crisis in the republican coalition? >> unfortunately, no. i think this is just going to be saluting one bad action after another. there may be some foot dragging and slowdown, some assessment by some senators to get something for ukraine. but, as we've seen, they're broken on the inside. they'll conform. >> all right. thank you both. this was absolutely terrific. when we come back, is the republican party becoming the party of the working class and what does that mean? i will speak with the founder of a conservative think tank, oren cass, when we come back.

for much of the 20th century, the democratic party was seen as the champion of america's working class. this was a legacy shaped largely by franklin d. roosevelt, whose pioneering social policies lifted up millions. but this week's election proved donald trump's broad appeal among working class voters. joining me now is oren cass, he's the founder and chief economist at american compass, a conservative think tank. oren, welcome. i'm so glad to have you, because you really have been in some ways laying the intellectual foundations for kind of trumpism. so let me start by asking

you, is the republican party now firmly a kind of working class party? because it does seem to get the majority of working class votes. and yet, you know, the big thing that republicans do wherever they come into office are these massive tax cuts that disproportionately help the rich. when you look at the transition team that trump has appointed, it's $2 billion, one for wlth. they're talking about extending the trump tax cut, $2. 5 trillion over ten years. what's going on? >> well, i think you've captured the tension very well. the republican party, the voters of the republican party at this point are squarely centered on the working class. and you know, it's important to define what we mean by that. i think the best way to understand it is, it's the majority of americans who still don't have a college degree and experience especially the economy, and also the culture through that perspective. they have turned away from the democrats. they find president trump's

message much more appealing. but as you've said, if you look at the institutional republican party, the think tanks, certainly a lot of elected officials, certainly donald trump himself to some extent, there are still significant parts of it that are the legacy of what i would call the old right. so i think you're seeing a transformation in progress, and maybe the best marker to think about is the distance from mike pence to j.d. vance, right? that's a very concrete marker that the transition isn't complete, but it has clearly come a long way. >> and when you think about the appeal, you said, i thought very interestingly, it's that they are attracted to the republican party of trump for economic and cultural reasons. what i'm struck by is the degree to which there does seem to be a more cultural phenomenon, at least in the sense that the democrats say all the right things and do a lot of them. and biden has been very pro- worker, very pro-blue

collar workers, you know, but culturally, that working class base seems alienated. is that the key to their -- as to why trump appeals to them? >> well, i would disagree with that characterization of the president biden administration and the harris campaign. it's fine that they said things about workers, but you know, where did you really see the biden administration focus? obviously, it was on a catastrophe at the border that let in estimates are up to $10 million migrants, many of whom are low- paid workers undercut american workers. if you think about education, they say nice things about apprenticeship and the trades, but what was their main focus? it was forgiving student debt while doing nothing to actually reform higher education. you know, they talk about industrial policy, but the vast majority of their industrial policy investment was on fighting climate change. and, i think -- and then certainly if you look at the

harris campaign, it obviously struggled mightily. i think it's especially interesting to look at its attempts to reach young men. you know, their outreach -- their opportunity agenda for young black men, one of the five points was about cryptocurrencies and one of the five points was about legalizing marijuana. so -- >> but you make this point -- you made this point in a piece you wrote, which i thought was fascinating, which is trump's advisers tried to show him how his tax cuts had helped the working class. and they fudged the numbers. when the real number came it, it turns out that they had not helped. and if you plug biden's numbers in, his policies did help the working class. why does that -- i'm trying to, you know, you i know you don't want to give advice to democrats, but why is it that all of that money that went boo red states, into non-college- educated workers, why didn't it help? and that is culturally alienated from the democratic

party. >> well, i'm happy to give advice to democrats. i spend a lot of time trying to get them to wake up, because i think our political system would be much healthier if we had two political parties that were genuinely trying to speak to and address the interests of working and middle class voters. i think the point in my mind is, there aren't clean buckets of cultural versus economic issues. you know, we did some polling recent in american compass that looked really not at what do you think about this policy, that policy, but what are your real values and priorities? and what you find is that, you know, we have this idea of the american dream as opportunity and dynamism and entrepreneurship and you know, moving to the big city. and what most americans want is stability and security and an opportunity to build a decent life in the community where they grow up. and so i think what you start to see in the way trump and j.d. vance speak to american voters, in the core of their agenda, that does focus on

bringing good manufacturing back to the united states, that focuses on tightening the labor market, making sure that employers have to actually hire american workers, it's a real commitment to building, and really going back to the kind of economy that supports most americans in their aspirations. and there's obviously a lot of work to be done in translating that. >> all right, stay with us. stay with us. we'll be right back with oren cass. next sunday -- i'm venturing across the globe to see how these new weight loss medications are transforming lives and disrupting the industry. >> these drugs are very effective, but they're not going to be for everyone. >> is ozempic right for you? next sunday at 8:00 p.m.

i'm back with oren cass, the founder and chief economist of the conservative think tank, american compass. oren, i wanted to ask you about trump govern going forward. it seems to me that some areas where he'll move fast, the party will be united against the kind of woke agenda, i think, at this point, the republican party is united on tariffs and against free trade. but it feels to me like the two bigger shoes are going to be the tax cut and the deportations. so let's first talk about the tax cut. that's $2. 5 trillion added to the debt. if you take social security, which he now says that he's going to exempt from taxes, that's another $2. 5 trillion. that's $5 trillion added to the debt. will that all happen? what are your thoughts on that? >> well, i don't think it will all happen. i think one of the many shifts you've seen in the republican party over the past

decade is the idea that tax cuts just pay for themselves and we should just do them and not worry about the deficits, is really gone. i think what you see, especially in the white house, with more fiscally conservative republicans, is a belief that we should extend tax cuts where we can, but they're going to have to be paid for. so i think there's going to be a lot more negotiation, there's going to be a lot more, okay, what's in, what's out? and actually, that's where tariffs become potentially a big part of the discussion, because one of the things that tariffs do is they do raise a lot of revenue. but i don't think we're going to see a repeat of 2017, when it's just a grab bag of everybody's favorite tax cut without concern for the deficit. >> and social security? >> that's an interesting one. i think that's in the sort of big pile of proposals that trump put out. it's frankly hard for me to envision it actually making it across the finish line, given and some of

the other things on the table that are going to be better for the economy and better for workers, as well. >> and let me ask you, finally, mass deportation. i mean, one of the tightest labor markets in history, you deport -- they've talked about deporting 24 million. even if you deport 2 million, won't that be huge by disruptive? and do you think trump will do something on that scale? >> i think you will see an effort at significant removals, particularly focused on those who have arrived most recently. you know, estimates are that as many as 10 million people have come across under the biden administration, many now under temporary protected status, abuse of the parole system. i would expect to see a lot of that repealed, and also, hopefully, a lot of enforcement on the employer side. a big part of the picture here is just actually telling employers, if you are employing people who are here illegally, we're going to crack down on you. and i think that will

absolutely have an affect on the labor market, but i think it will generally speaking be a very positive one. tight labor markets are labor markets that are good for worker. and what we saw in the first trump term, for that matter, when you do have a very tight labor market, the result is not inflation, necessary. it's rising wages and ideally investments in productivity. that's the secret service of capitalism. tight lash markets with employers therefore investing to make people more productive. that's what we haven't had in a couple of decades in this country and that we need to get back to. >> oren cass, pleasure to have you on. thanks so much. next on "gps," zanny minton beddoes of "the economist" on the world's reaction.

the current cover story "the economist" is called "welcome to trump's world. " so what will a second trump term mean for the global economy, for geopolitics? joining me is the editor in chief of "the economist," zanny minton beddoes. zanny, what do you think, it says the world's reaction, it's a big thing. what strikes you most about how people outside america are reacting to this election? >> i think it really depends on what country you're talking about and what leader you're talking about. if you are, you know, amongst the world's autocrats, you probably welcome this. i think many people around

the world were expecting it. there are two places i think are in dread. one is mexico. i think mexico is in real trouble right now. both because donald trump's deportation determination is going to really hit mexico, and secondly because mexico is going to be hit very hard by any protectionism that comes in. mexico is one. the other, i hate to say, is europe. because i think europe is really, really in trouble. firstly, again, the eu has a huge trade surplus with the united states. donald trump is not going to like it. and it depends on the u.s. still for its security. and i think the europeans -- when donald trump came in for the first time, they thought this was a bit of an aberration, and they slightly went back to sleep. we thought with the ukraine war they were going to come together, and an extent, they did, but still there's this huge reliance on the united states. and europe is a place that's going to be hit hard and we'll see it very soon. because the decisions he makes on ukraine, in the next 100, 200 days are going to determine

in an important way the future of europe. >> and this is going to be a big shift from trump 1. trump 1 had a lot of europeans and internationalists , institutionalists. and by signaling, i'm not going to take nikki haley, i'm not going to take pompeo, what it tells you is that the people who will influence his views are people like j.d. vance, who are frankly, you know, basically anti- ukraine, think the u.s. should pull out. i think if you were ukrainian, looking at this election, you would be terrified. >> well, i think you would be, having heard that. up until the election, the interesting view in kyiv was that people were getting so fed up of the self- deterrence of the biden administration, the unwillingness to allow the ukrainians to use long- range weapons towards russia, that some people were beginning to say, our reporting was telling us -- some people were saying, let's throw the dice, trump will be decisive, and hopefully he will want to win. he won't want to let russia win. and they were talking themselves into a view that perhaps, actually, a trump

administration would bring the conflict to an end, but in a way that ensured ukraine would give up some territory, but it will be able to stay -- have security for the territory it still holds. >> the key is the nato guarantee -- >> i think now, you're absolutely right. and i have the short end, was it the pompeo trump or the j.d. vance trump? and what's happened in the last day suggests that it's going to be very much more the j.d. vance trump. you're absolutely right. in kyiv, i would now be really, really worried about what's happening. >> could all of this unify the european unions and make them spend more in defense and get more strategically oriented? they're rich enough to do it? >> if it doesn't, europe is finished, to be honest. europe needs to spend more money on defense. europe needs to come together to support ukraine, if donald trump ensures that the united states doesn't. europe is way behind on the cutting age technologies of the world. europe's in a real mess and has been sleeping walking in this mess. if you look at what's happening in european politics, the

day that donald trump was elected, there's a crisis in the german government. french president macron is completely impotent. he made a big mistake last year calling an election. probably the strongest leader in the eu right now is georgia maloney. and i think europe has always come together in a crisis. we saw that again and again through the euro crisis. maybe this time, it will, but as of now, unfortunately, i just don't see it. and i really worry that europeans will sense that they have to do something, and they just won't do it fast enough, because with ukraine and with putin, there is real pressure, time pressure to do something fast. >> when you look at the gulf states, i mean, they generally like trump and they like trump 1. are they looking forward trump 2? you were just in the gulf. >> i was just in the gulf. and broadly, yes. this is a man they can do business with. the saudis have a very close relationship with donald trump. but i think there is that, too. broad yes, they are welcoming it, but they feel a little scarred by the

transactionalism and the ility, too. i think the saudis will be looking to get a defense deal signed as soon as possible. this could mean that there'll be movement in the middle east. i think contrary to what many people think, i think donald trump could push ibi towards doing something. >> what about china? this is the big question. >> short- term, china gets hit obviously by whatever tariffs -- >> but they've been expecting that. >> they've basically been decoupling anyway. it will hurt them. their economy is in trouble. their economy is slowing. but broadly, i think this plays into their view of where the world is going, which is a united states that you can't rely on, and a united states that, you know -- >> pulls back. >> and that's good for china, right? that not only plays into their view that it's china century, but feels like it's good for them geopolitically. >> zanny minton beddoes, as always, such a pleasure to dwruk.

talk to you. >> very good to see you. >> thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. i will see you, as always, next week.

clean sweep. >> we're going to fix everything about our country. as trump allies jockey for roles, the president- elect's plans take shape. >> this will truly be the

golden age of america. that's what we have to have. maggie haberman joins to talk trump's mind-set. how will his second term differ from the first? plus, dems in disarray. >> lots on the line right now, people are going to be tested. >> after widespread losses, how will the democratic party emerge from the wilderness? and full house. >> the american people spoke loud and clear on tuesday. >> republicans could control both ends of pennsylvania avenue. are they ready? "inside politics," the best reporting from inside the corridors of power starts now. good morning. welcome to "inside politics sunday. " i'm manu raju. it's opinion an historic and whirlwind week, and now washington and the world are bracing for what's next. just last night, cnn projected donald trump carried arizona, completing a stunning seven swing-state sweep, and now the ell