some benefits to resolve some conflicts in the region. is that a true assumption? >> that is an interesting, interesting take. i mean, i think, you know, our interviews in the region, when we looked at the arab per social securities the iranian threat, one kuwaiti rights activist said, you know, address the palestinian issue and you will defang iran in the region. and i think much of it is mobilizing -- its mobilizing capability, the vocabulary it uses is partly related to the air yab-israeli issue and is not completely and i think the fundamental issue is the issue of governance and legitimacy in arab societies and the gap, tension there is often expressed in the terms of the arab-israeli conflict and why palestine is such an important issue. so from the region the arab-israeli frontal is a

critical one for addressing the challenge of iran. >> i think we might also quickly add a good litmus test is to see what obama's overtures are to see what they put forward on the peace process and if the concern over iran gives them incentive to do so maybe it would be a good litmus test but so far we have yet to get results and might suggest an answer to you. we are going to take a break. and -- because i asoup that all of you folks who have -- assume that you you folks who stayed with us, and have enjoyed this discussion so far are probably hungry and there is food outside in the hallway and we are doing boxed lunches since we are stadium seating and take your various breaks and bring your lunches back and we'll have dr. brzezinski on, hopefully, by 12:20. that is the ambition, no later than 12:20, try to get back into

the room to reconvene for our final session. thank you all. [applause] [inaudible conversations]. >> up next a look at u.s.-iran policy with zbigniew brzezinski former national security advisor for president carter and foreign policy advisor for the obama for president campaign, lasts about an hour. [inaudible conversations]. >> okay. i think we are ready to go ahead -- those of you who haven't finished feel free to continue to enjoy your lunch. dr. brzezinski finished his which is the important thing.

david aaron, my cohost for this event was supposed to do the introductions but i gather he is not feeling well today and i have the pleasure of introducing somebody who needs no introductions and i don't intend to give one. zbigniew brzezinski has spoken out on the issues, we here to talk about, openly and candidly and forcefully over the last several years and i think american policy is beginning to move in the directions he's acted. but i'm sure he has a few more suggestions for the president that he can share with us today. >> thank you. thank you very much, it is nice to be here. i'm sorry, i wasn't on the sessions that were held this morning. because i know i would have learned a great deal. in fact i don't think i have much to tell anyone in this group, that you already don't

know on the subject. but, nonetheless, perhaps i can provide a basis for a discussion. i have to say also that i am very impressed by the publications, rand has produced on the subject. they do cover most of the really critical issues in our relationships with iran, and i think they are an important contribution to wider understanding of a subject which has been the object of, in my judgment, oversimplification, rather than analysis over the last several years. and i'm happy that jim dobbins is chairing the session because i know he has been directly engaged in the american-iranian relationship and in particular, at a critical time right after 9/11. so, taking all of this into account i think i will just share with you some general impressions, or thoughts, regarding the american-iranian relationship as it hey be

unfolding in the near future. obviously, the point of the day apart tour for this relationship, given that the united states has now stated officially by the president we are committed to a negotiating relationship, with the iranians without pre-conditions, involves the iranian elections. and we'll know before too long what the outcome is. my sense is, that if mahmoud ahmadinejad wins these elections, we are going to be in for a period of time in which he is going to be triumphalist and is being contested and he knows he is in a very difficult race, he knows that he does not have much sympathy in this country, for good reason, and, he is going to be a triumphalist negotiator who is going to make life, i think more difficult. if he doesn't win, we'll still have a difficult period of time before the iranians settle down

to serious negotiations, the fact of the matter is that if mahmoud ahmadinejad does not win, it will require some significant readjustment in internal procedures and arrangements, within an extraordinarily complicated governmental structure. i do not know how the supreme leader will relate to the new president. if it isn't mahmoud ahmadinejad, who at least is a known quantity, whom it does appear, th that... is somewhat sympathetic but in any case will be a -- readjustment, of other key players, like jalili who is the head of the national security council and neither of whom views himself as a subordinate of mahmoud ahmadinejad. so, we are going to have a difficult pattern of adjustment, if it's a new so-called

president. i emphasize the word "so-called" because i think there is a tendency particularly in america to think of mahmoud ahmadinejad as somewhat an equivalent to our president, which he obviously is not. and everyone in the group knows about it. the bottom line is, that the iranian policy-making process is going to be one way or another, complicated by the outcome of the elections. people initially become more intransigents, if one outcome prevails, it will certainly require a serious internal readjustment, and, perhaps, significant policy discussions, if someone else wins. but, what then about the allied position? the phyto five or so, five plus one, as of now we don't really have a good sense of how crystallized that position is. be are goshiating, so to speak, together in the u.s., is negotiating by indirection to some extent but there is a

common position among the key players? my sense that it is far from being so, there is a pre-disposition to take a common stand in favor of negotiations. but, only -- when the going gets rough what is the position of the different parties? to the extent of engaging i think the french and british are close to our position, roughly speaking, although it is not easy to say precisely, at this stage, what our position actually is. but, basically, in a kind of a sympathetic fashion. morovers, in that trio, sarkozy himself has a tendency to take very strong positions, and it is not clear how far he is prepared to push the envelope on the subject but seems among the europeans to be what might be loosely described as more tough-minded or rigid or

assertive, more so than the british even and certainly more so than the germans, or the russians. how that might affect the negotiating process is hard to judge, but, sarkozy doesn't want to be a wall flower in the process and wants france to play an important role and alluded to that recently in djibouti, commemorating the opening -- not in djibouti, in the gulf, commemorating the opening of the new french military base in the area. the germans and the russians clearly are not prepared to push the envelope very hard. i don't think they are prepared to commit themselves to very drastic sanctions of the kind that some would like. and, their position from the outside probably will be supported by the chinese, who are not a party to the negotiating process but who have a role to play and the role is not insignificant in the long run. this sort of conundrum or complex of issues, is

complicated by the fact that as of now, there is no real sense of clarity on the side of the five or the six, however you count them, regarding what is actually the status of the iranian nuclear quest. what are the iranians actually seeking right now? the nik analysis of 2007 has not been rejected to the extent one can make any judgment, it appears to be still the judgment, that is to say that right now there is no convincing evidence that the iranians are actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, that they are in the process of moving towards weaponization, and there may not be definitive evidence to the contrary, either. but it is certainly not the case that one can assure with confidence, as is often the case in press analysis, public comments, that the iranians are

actively engaged in seeking nuclear weapons. nonetheless, the fact remains as their program unfolds they move closer to the edge, simply by the neft ability of the -- inevitability of the program, internal technological dynamics and so even if they are not seeking nuclear weapons, they a certainly moving closer to having the capability of -- eventually of having nuclear weapons. that distinction, however, still has to be kept in mind, we are negotiating with someone who is in fact asserting that they are not seeking nuclear weapons. and we are not in a position, definitively to state we have conclusive evidence to the contrary. that certainly complicates the negotiating process. it raises, therefore, the question, how do we negotiate? how do we negotiate with the iranians on the subject? i think there is a school of thought, which some people are advocating with different degrees of commitment, and

degree, in favor of insisting on some sort of pre-conditions still. perhaps, the iranians ought to, in some fashion, still make an act of good will, regarding their enrichment or something to that effect and there is a more overt disposition to argue we should move into the negotiating process with explicitly new concepts of more severe sanctions. that the five of the six ought to agree in advance on more severe sanctions and lit be known to the iranians. -- let it be known to the iran yeens and there is a pre-disposition on the part of some to argue that the formula, that all option are on the table ought to be emphasized which is a say to say to the iranians if you do not accommodate force may be used against you. there is certainly a

pre-disposition which perhaps has been even intensified not intentionally, but de facto by something that obama said to put a time limit on the negotiations. and certainly, there is external pressure in favor of that from the israelis. and the president was actually extremely clever in the way he fashioned his acceptance of that suggestion, but, in a manner which is so callfied if he so chooses he can also ignore it. nonetheless there is an effort obviously on the part of some to say he has accepted time limits and the time limit is the end of the year. and last but not least there are still inclinations to combine entry into the negotiations with something which in terms of the -- diplomacy amounts to explicit insults, namely repetitive charges of the iranians with active pursuit of terrorism, and, although that is not discussed openly, it is at least

a question whether we have terminated all forms of covert activity, designed against iranian government, as part of the earlier policy of promoting democracy, or, perhaps, just regime change. the latter is not necessarily the same as the former. and, so, all of that does raise some questions, how are we going to negotiate? i think obama's elusive treatment of the time limit, and his reference to know pre-conditions in his speech yesterday, such athat he is prepared to give the negotiations a serious try, that is to say, to enter into them with a desire to have them succeed and with the understanding that any complex negotiating process -- and this one is bound to be complex, will take a long time. and hence, any notion of a terminal date for the

negotiations, sometime next year, i don't think is something that he is likely to entertain very seriously. i think also, the administration realizes to make the negotiations on the nuclear issue move forward, it will be necessary to address several other issues at the same time. that is to say, security issues in the region, first of all, perhaps, implicitly at least, a discussion of iran's role in the region, certainly the question of iran's role in afghanistan, which remains pert inept to our ongoing efforts in afghanistan, and there are economic issues between us and this iranians, we have claims against the iranians, for damages and otherwise, and the iranians have claims against us because of sanctions, and withholding of assets and so forth. so, there is bound to be a set of negotiations, going on, at the same time, and, perhaps, by

movement of some of them, movement on other issues, more difficult issues, may be facilitated. i emphasize the word maybe. but, it is going to be a very difficult and complex process. on the issue of the nuclear program, itself, i think the negotiating point of departure might well be a desire to exploit more explicitly what the iranians have been affirming publicly for quite some time, namely their three invocations, we don't want nuclear weapons, we are not seeking nuclear weapons, and our religion forbids us to have nuclear weapons. note, incidentally, that this stands in sharp explicit contrast with the position of the north koreans. the north koreans have been saying the very opposite. we want nuclear weapons. we are seeking nuclear weapons.

and, in your face, ha, ha, we have nuclear weapons. that makes it much tougher to negotiate, about an arrangement which excludes nuclear weapons. the iranians, perhaps out of the -- deceit, but, programs, in part at least truth fully are saying we're not building nuclear weapons, don't have nuclear weapons and our religion forbids nuclear weapons and in parted that says this is reassuring but we have legitimate doubts to question the degree of your commitment to these propositions, and one may even be more impolite and say we have reservations about your veracity, but, let us use this as a points of departure, aim

establishing bona fide rangerments to take these assertions as the truth and that then gets us into a discussion of what is still feasible in that regard. in fact halting uranium enrichment is now pretty much overdue because i have advanced so far and the opportunities to negotiate with them have been wasted, perhaps that issue could be addressed earlier. when their enrichment program was at the very, very early stage. they are not going to dismantle what they have achieved. they a are not going to abandon what they have been doing in the regard. but, perhaps the -- there may be ways of halting that process, and, in any case of subjecting it to much more extensive inspections, by the iaea those inspections in keeping with inspections that are plied to other npt participants because

it is doubtful the iranians will accept additional regimen for themselves alone and will fly in the face of their notion of sovereignty and will make them an exceptional case internationally, and for obvious reasons that would be difficult for an iranian regime to swallow. nonetheless, it may be possible to negotiate some special arrangements under iaea, that provides additional assurances. one of the candidates for the president, that may be in the running, has suggested, one of his comments, in the course of the electoral campaign currently ongoing in iran, that a consortium forren richment might be considered. and that will be a significant step forward and if the iranians were prepared to accept that, that would facilitate an arrangement though it would be a special arrangement applicable, i assume, at this stage,

primarily, or maybe even exclusively, to iran. though it might be applicable to other countries, in the region, which wish to acquire a nuclear power capability. and there is talk of that, and there is talk of that in egypt and even talk of that in turkey, so that in that sense, perhaps, something of the regional type might be an arrangement that proves to be feasible. nonetheless, one cannot exclude the possibility that there will be no agreement. and then the question arises, what? i'll be very explicit on this subject, i think the notion of a military strike against iran is a nonstarter. a nonstarter for the united states and it has to be a nonstarter for everybody else. and that means specifically israel. it is a nonstarter for the united states because we already

have one.5 wars, in afghanistan, and an unfinished war in iraq and we could have a military collision in korea and there is nothing good for america in having military collision with iran over this issue. and the consequences of that will be extremely damaging in the region. and extremely damaging to our interests. the iranians will have the capability to retaliate against us in iraq, they can make our life more complicated in afghanistan, they can certainly interfere with in limits, but in fear nonetheless, with the transportation of energy through the straight of hormuz, and they can massively impact on the price of oil, escalating it dramatically, beyond 150, up to 200 or so dollars per barrel with disastrous economic

consequences for us. with even damaging consequences for china. which raises an interesting question, what political elite would see its own state interests advanced in most if that were to happen. now this doesn't address oall o the issues connected with a war in the area, if this would happen, so, the russian elite would benefit the most, the price of oil which undermines chinese economic development and bogs us down in a war and impacts us negatively in the economy, some people, mr. putin himself, would not view as an international disaster, that is perhaps another reason why we have to think not just twice but three times or four times about that option. and this is also another reason why we have to make certain israelis don't do it because we'll be the ones who pay the price if they do it. there is no reason to calculate

that an israeli strike would be effective conclusively in preventing the iranians from acquiring nepsz. it would be painful, it would be damaging, but it would probably actually accelerate their efforts because they would become more explicit in a setting of national rage, nationalist fanaticism and a very unified militant posture against israel and the united states together. so there is no benefit for us, there is no real benefit for israel in this, either and i think we do no one any service, and particularly not to a country which we consider to be a close ally and whose security we are committed, by being ambivalent on the subject. and there is no way the israelis can do it if we are not for it and if we are prepared to say you will not fly over our aerospace which is irai air space, which is iraq, and they need it to refuel, and

refueling requires safe circumstances for the undertaking and the is your recollection will not agree to -- the turks will not agree to it and the saudis could be tempted to wink if it was very quick but a very quick attack probably not lasting for a long time would be less effective and i doubt they could permit repetitive acts, involving an attack and they might very well interfere in particular with air refueling and so there is no question that israel can't do this on its own if we are clear about i but, beyond that, i think we certainly need to do more than just that. if there is no agreement. we certainly could offer and should offer a nuclear guarantee to every country in the region, israel included, that is to say, and threat of force involving nuclear weapons involving iran as a nuclear power would be a threat viewed as a threat against the united states. and i think we have sufficient credibility to make that stick.

we can certainly consider the possibility, also, of perhaps suggesting a nuclear free zone in the middle east. that would require israeli cooperation. but, if the israeli government is that in eastern, which has nuclear weapons, even has only one, poses an existential threat to israel, israel in effect is saying that its nuclear deterrent is not capable of deterring the iranians. the israeli argument is that the iranians may be irrational, fanatical and therefore as soon as they have one bomb they might actually use it against the israelis there by creating an existential stet threat and if that is the case the israeli deterrents fails to deter in which case, perhaps a nuclear-free zone, in which there is a quid pro quo involving the iranians and the israelis might be conceivably

attractive, although my suspicion is they would not be attractive, either to the israelis or the iranians. and that is -- last but not least, means reaffirming deterntsz in effect by the guaranteeing and by our posture and i see no reason to few that with dismay, deterrence has worked with the russians at a time when the soviet union was truly aggressive, it has worked with the chinese, even though -- now say turning talked -- mao talked about nuclear killing 3 million or so people and it is quite tolerable and worked with the chinese and has in a way worked between the pakistanis and the indians and the threats of war between pakistan and india was higher before the two became nuclear powers than today, largely because they both instantly realized that if there is a serious military engage i, it escalates inherently, it poses a risk, of a devastating

nuclear exchange, and this is one of the reasons why, in recent years, indian-pakistani clashes across this line of control did not escalate. both sides became increasingly prudent. and that is -- thus, there is in fact an object lesson in the experience with nuclear weapons. they do create a kind of uncomfortable, unpleasant self-restraint and that is perhaps not necessarily the worst of outcomes. in a region that is very dynamic, very unpredictable, and very prone to violence. this is not an overwhelmingly optimistic prognosis. but, it does suggest that there are options for the united states, and the first option is to explore what is feasible regarding an outcome with which we can comfortably live and that is an arrangement whereby iran is induced to become again a more active member of the international community, is

given a greater opportunity for its own national development, is introduced to operate in a climate in which its own fanaticism and nationalism becomes less extremist, and as a consequence of which, also, iran becomes a partner in a more diversified set of arrangements regarding the distribution of energy, in europe, and asia, from which to some extent iran is excluded by virtue of the ongoing conflict. that would be beneficial to the europeans, into the far east and so there are great stakes involved and with the president -- the president has made a commitment in a speech to pursue something along these lines. that speech was not a policy speech. it was a philosophical statement. defining how america should relates itself to the changing world. but, as such i think it has created the point of departure for a more rational and perhaps

productive policy. perhaps we can now have a discussion if you wish. thank you. [applaus [applause]. >> thank, from the washington institute for near east policy. in discussing the question of a potential nuclear free zone in the middle east i think you said perhaps it might be attractive to -- make this argument to the israelis it should be attractive to them bass in fact the israelis seem to be suggesting their own nuclear deterrent would not necessarily deter iran from aing them in spite of several billion dollar investment by the israelis, and the rather robust nuclear deterrents including a second strike cape ability through the