out of character with what you would expect of a christian scientist, or maybe not.

at one point, he is recorded in -- record saying jesus christ couldn't please them when he was on earth, referring to the jews, so how could anyone expect i would have any luck? that almost funny. and then later on you have him say -- and this is i think in connection to the exodus issue -- the jews i find are selfish. they care not how many how yugoslavs, greeks get murdered as displaced persons, as long as the jews get special treatment yet when they have a physical financial or political power neither hitler or stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment of the underdog. put an underdog on top and would make no difference whether his name is russian, jewish, management, he goes haywire. i found huge use the remember the past condition when

prosperity comes. so in light of that, what -- what are we to make out truman's attitudes? is there a conclusion that can be drawn? >> i've think people have used those quotes to say truman was an anti-semite who really didn't care about the jews and came out with statements like that, but negative can kind of see it as an ark. he ran into the state department resistance. then there was tremendous amounts of pressure on him by the american public and especially by the organized american jewish public led by militant rabbi who did put tremendous pressure on him, and this is how he reacted. and his aides would even say that when truman bulls under undue pressure tube exploded and makes statements like that but

they didn't really believe that is what he was feeling or thinking. and those statements kind of present him as a victim and that is how i think he saw himself. he felt i've tried to get the 100,000, i call on the british, i have submitted to commission with them. i have done everything but everything i've done never works out. either the british reject that, the arabs reject it or the jews themselves don't like the plan. so he felt like no matter what i do, and he was especially angry at the jews because they were the ones giving him so much political pressure at home. but i wouldn't -- i think just taking those statements and looking at them without looking at the context could give you a wrong impression i believe about how he really felt. >> it reminds me somewhat of a

famous editor i once knew who is very pro-israel and made the comment his support for the state of israel was an inverse proportion to the israeli consulate people who wanted to a range meetings with him. [laughter] >> at the jewish agency people said to them among themselves and many at sybil's of this in the correspondence -- they said point blank when they heard statements of the zionist emergency committee and rabbi silver, he said these people in america are going to ruin everything for them and set us back. can we call them doud? they felt they were making progress, and then they would make militant demands and most pros honest congressmen in the united states was a manual from brooklyn and all jewish constituency. fierce zionist congress man. and as soon as truman backstedt for a moment and wouldn't take the position the zionists were

supporting he would condemn truman as a traitor, sellout, fraud, anti-semite and castigate him and the blood drive truman crazy and he constantly got that kind of pressure from the organized zionist community and we make the analogy at the end of the book which is a good one between lincoln and the abolitionist. lincoln pleasant an abolitionist. the aladdin visiones one of satisfied for lincoln. for many years they considered lincoln an enemy and lo and behold, including frederick douglass but years later he says he was a hero and he was a great man and greater demands peter even though he didn't do everything he wanted. his american politics and reality of american politics and he was a great man who brought the nation forward. it's the same thing. truman wasn't a zionist and he reacted viscerally against militant pressure because he was tremendously pressured from the

other side. and there was relentless day in and day out. i mean, the reason jacobsen was so important, the only -- if you look at the difference between the way that rabbi silver would talk to truman and address him and the way that weizmann would address truman in the letters he treated him with respect and admiration as a fellow leader who wanted justice for the jewish people in the world where silver would say you're selling a house out, you are a bastard, don't you know what's right? and he would seek weizmann, give a direct order i will only see and talk to ian weizmann. do not let sulfur and those people in the white house again. >> what else has changed? >> there was a famous incident when silver was in the office and apparently shook his fingers in truman's face, and truman was upset and person he saw after that i never want that and so be in my office again and that is

when he kind of shut down and said i don't want to see any more extreme zionist leaders which is a category he had developed. >> one thing neither of you touch on in your remarks and i wonder if you get into it in the book is the position of the defense department, because my understanding is it wasn't simply marshall for the leading cabinet secretaries opposed but james also took a strong view. can you talk about that? >> he was the cia as well hammes cia long memo was declassified and is one of the intelligence magazines too late to include in the book and it wouldn't have mattered if we put it in the book. it was almost verbatim, the same argument as the state department. it could have been interchangeably written. they were using the same arguments. parcel believed the bases were

threatened and we need access to arab oil and arab oil was extremely important. there was associate and he believed we have to be in contact with those -- americas interest labour but -- misinformation strange footnote we don't develop enough in the book, but there was the argument they had brought forward if the jewish state was created, remember this is the beginning of the cold war, the communist state. and that at one point the spread information that came from the foreign office in the british

and they sent a butcher of tignes delete the disinformation that they made up trying to get into palestine actually all filled with kgb or whatever officers who were sent in pretending to be refugees so they would come in, get citizenship and the new jewish state and be the culprit that would make him into a communist state and actually there was a front-page story to that effect in the new airtimes that the jewish ships are all soviet secret police. and the state department actually, this was information that turned not to be true. >> information coming from -- >> from the arab league and propaganda apparatus and the british and as completely false. but they were spreading the sand was presented by the state department to the white house as accurate reason why we can't have a jewish state.

>> but it's kind of countered by weizmann who said it's the opposite the jews are fleeing the communists, they are not -- >> weizmann said they want to come to perlstein from the former communist countries fleeing communism. they hate them. >> what conclusions were drawn when they recognized israel, what, minutes after -- >> they played a bigger role than that. they came out and it was a big surprise at the u.n. they supported partition because everybody assumed they were going to be against it and the british were especially shocked because they thought partition was going to die at the u.n. because the british, the russians would never support put the date. the russians were trying to approach the british empire in the middle east and they saw this as an issue between britain and the united states they could play. >> one week before andre gave his famous speech in the u.n.

which actually if you read the text it is a very noble humane speech we cannot fail the jewish people, we care for them, they must have their own state, with a powerful almost zionist speech and one week before the under secretary of state prepared a position paper for the white house on the soviets and their position in the middle east and said the soviet union will support and is supporting the arab side and the soviet union will not support partition. it was one week before he made the speech and then he gives the speech, stunning everyone including all the zionists. malae expected that. >> and what was really funny is that the u.n. when the state department was planning these games with the u.n. trying to undermine partition the soviet union spokesman would get up and denounce the united states for trying to undermine the u.n. not supporting partition.

was ironic you know, they were the ones supporting it. >> were there any people in the state department bureaucracy who supported partition and supported transposition or was the department lockstep against it? >> not as far as we could find reading for the state department papers or the foreign relations series you don't find anyone in the state department actually especially in the near east desk. they are the ones assigned to make policy for the region and that was totaled law can't step opposition to partitioned. >> was that politick a kind of diplomatic view or were there cultural factors the mindset of the massacres in arab countries and that kind of arab t. lawrence mentality? >> well, lloyd henderson who long talked about the was stationed in the soviet union

after that and he was the head of the near eastern division, he was stationed in iraq, and doubles and iraq that he developed this very antizionist position. >> and what is the man who translate fdr's -- >> eddy. >> he became the first ambassador from the saudi -- first ambassador to the saudis and he translated the text of fdr's conversations of why we know what happened there. he was, again, believe in the arab nation, and saw the saudi position as the just one and arab position as the just one and considered his role as ambassador. and before that, to explain to the united states the just cause of the saudis and the arabs. >> let me say one more thing about that. from what we could surmise, the united states really didn't have

that developed a position about the middle east. and they sort of followed the british and they saw the british as the ones who as having the mandate were the ones that had the responsibility for palestine. so in essence, they had a very similar position to the british foreign office and that is why truman, when he came up with that st. pankewitz, the conspiracy in the state department, the striped pants belize referred to the british foreign office people. >> when you have to realize about the british is last year the british foreign office released the incredible memo on the cold war by earnest. you read these things, you can find them all online. bevin and the role of the communist trying to split the labor movement in britain. and you read his long and alice

is how the soviet union was a threat to democracy and western europe, absolutely brilliant and he was trying to educate the truman on the issues on what would become the cold war and it's fascinating, because at that time, truman came into office, the same thing on the palestine policy, just wanting to do what fdr pledged to do, to fulfill fdr's program. and it this great historian most people don't know, wilson campbell, wrote a book last year, truman and the cold war. and he points out the truman started out listening to all of fdr's pro-soviet advisers on till reality mocked him in the head. in the u.s. was going to meet the british as an ally in the cold war and this is going on temporary with palestine. you can't bevin and the british your enemies when that british are going to be a key ally you need to stand up to the soviet

union. >> it sounds like it was neuralgic for the british not just on account of cold war calculations but they're seems at least to me and bevin also anti-semitism as an animating in polls. >> yeah. s.o.b. was. >> i don't think that is true. >> some people say he wasn't. >> but i don't know what my understanding was a lot of people thought he was friendly with the jews before all this happened. in the earlier period, and that he really did not understand the very strong feelings of the jews for wanting their own state that he kind of miscalculated and thought the jews of palestine were likewise man. that there was not as strong a feeling amongst them to do.

>> bevin came to the united states in the middle of this purple and had insulted truman and made statements really that new yorkers were anti-semitic. making and nasty statement about the jews -- >> no, what he said is americans wanted jews to go to palestine because they don't want them in new york. laughter pos connect anyway, s.o.b. went to the new york yankees stadium and the entire stadium the announced earnest bevin is here and the entire yankee stadium booed. [laughter] [applause] >> good thing he wasn't at a dodgers game. [laughter] one of the figure i would like you to touch upon at a little more length is clark clifford because he seems to have played an instrumental role, and to what extent is this a function of clifford's convictions? how is it he came to be the counterweight to george marshall in the final arguments that were offered to truman?

>> as i said in my paper he was influenced by rosenman and spent a lot of time with him and i don't think he had strong feelings about zionism before. but he became a zionist. he was extremely instrumental in what happened and laying out all the arguments for truman that countered state department arguments. and i think he genuinely believed in zionism. >> let me ask one final question then we will turn to the audience, and this brings this forward to the present with the remarkable statement of kennan's that you read. you could argue at many points his argues were borne out. at least until 1973 it stopped the flow of oil, but moderate governments were overthrown in

iraq and libya, and egypt, and syria and so long replaced by extremist governments. the soviet union did get a grip on many regimes in the region. now jews are accused of disloyalty on account of the existence of israel. was kennan mostly right? >> no. i mean in fact one other thing we should say, one other argument which was a strong one at the time is that they all said war is going to break out between the new state and the arabs and the new jewish state could not and would not win. they were convinced of that. there was no way the jews would win and defeat any arab armies. it would be a blood bath and the the middle east would erupt in fire. that was part of their argument. in fact the main part of the argument, they were totally wrong on that.

they didn't think they could defend themselves and they didn't think they could win. certainly the point is -- >> in fairness to the people making it it was an improbable victory. >> yeah. but to a lot of the jewish leaders and palestine they felt in fact they would be able to stand up against the insurmountable odds and they knew that they would be able to and that aside from the transjordan army trained by the british that the arab fighters would be relatively weak and without motivation would collapse, which is one of the jewish agency arguments. but in the long-range, from day one to the present, the arabs have held true to the argument, and you use the term palestine, and was jews, jewish palestine, there were no palestinians. there were going to create an arab state in the jewish state but the arabs than as well as palestinians now never accepted partition. that is why the arguments are similar. they could have had peace and

would have had a much smaller israel, granted at that time the petition along the u.n.. they would not accept it and they didn't accept it, and that is the rub. the other thing you say it isn't true is in fact is essentially despite all of the boards and problems, egypt made peace, jordan made peace with israel and today as we see some arab states the keys to the anti-israel trying to have common interest with israel against what they see as a similar threat of iran to their governments. so i wouldn't say kennan was right. >> i guess i said that was the last question but one final one from me. [laughter] sorry, i assume my privileges. what did you learn about

executive american presidential decision making? because this was really an extraordinary instance in which there was a revolt against the president of the united states. and he had -- this was a president who wouldn't want a mandate on his own. he had a cabinet filled with a gigantic egos and figures like forceful and marshall. what lessons do you draw by effective presidential decision making from this whole episode? >> well, truman was very aware of what was going on and in hindsight when he wrote his memoirs he said this was an endemic problem in the united states government, and his position always was the president -- it was the president's prerogative to make foreign policy and all presidents had to be very aware of the fact people in different

barack trustees were going to try to undermine that because they would be there long before the president left. so and i think this is a continuing issue. >> the other problem is that truman, right from the beginning, said that he would deflect on other issues he really wasn't on top of to the state department foreign policy but he said from the beginning of the one area i know something about this palestine and that's something i want to be in charge of myself. and he made a distinct conscious distinction he wanted to be on top of the micromanaged palestine policy much is not the case with other areas, the cold war, soviet union -- you know, it came to major decisions on truman dropping the atomic bomb. he himself said decision to drop the atomic bomb, which many people consider something he must have lost sleep over and been a major thing he said it was nothing compared to dealing with the palestine issue.

>> well on that note -- [laughter] [applause] >> i want to remind the audience mr. stephens didn't know he was going to be speaking here on till tonight, so a special hand for mr. stephens. [applause] we are open for as many questions as the speakers can handle, and please obviously no major league political statement or anything of the sort. >> i just wanted one point clarified. you said after the churchill left was it bevin come is that the name you gave? >> earnest bevin. >> i thought it was clemens -- >> the opposite, adamle was prime minister and bevin laws -- [inaudible] >> clement was winston

churchill's's both successor and predecessor because churchill came back again in the early 50's. i just wanted that one point. >> i've always been curious about george marshall. he threatened to resign, and then he didn't resign. and he's such a large name in american history. do we know anything about his thinking? was the anti-semitic? what were his -- what were his thoughts why he opposed so much? >> some people felt he didn't have very strong feelings before he became secretary of state, but he was very influenced by the state department once he did become secretary of state, and kind of adopted their attitude towards the middle east and partition in israel. >> also, he had a long talk right before the leaders of the

jewish agency going to vote in palestine whether to proclaim a jewish state. he had a long talk and he came to see him in his office and the text is available. and he gave him and allergies between his experience trying to negotiate between the nationalists and communists in china and the chinese civil war and the chinese army and how everything he believed collapsed as eight reality hit him in the face with the strength of mao's zombies and he tried to get warnings and long arguments, serious long arguments using the situation in china's and algae as to why the how ghana would not be able to win and he tried to warn them. i understand what you're saying

and your passion but please, go back there and tell ben-gurion we can't proclaim the jewish state and they voted against it because you are open to lose, and i found reality was and what i expected in china and you're going to find the same thing when your flight starts. he really believed that. he spoke as a military man, giving him a military assessment. he said i can understand your passion. and he listened seriously and pointed back to ben-gurion. he gave arguments we have to consider and think over. they were not ideological arguments of kennan and henderson, it was military assessment and he believed that. >> this gentleman here and then pass it on. >> how significant was the participation of bernard bernstein and the defense that you described? >> brard bernstein?

>> he was counsel at the united nations to the conference of jewish organizations. >> never came him across at all on anything. since his name never appears as far as we can see. >> because the arms embargo, israel was getting all of its arms from czechoslovakia. how come israel didn't become a member of the communist bloc? >> well i think the labor zionist leadership was not particularly pro colombians. they were pro colombian as some upon [inaudible] but the mainstream of labor zionism was the mechanics socialists and not consider themselves friend lead to

clemianism. they took the aid where they could get it and they were delighted us soviets changed their line for a while and they could get arms from czechoslovakia but they were not pro clemianism. >> those arms didn't come from that brief period between the power, the arms can even after the soviets had taken over, the arms can after czechoslovakia? >> while the soviets were already powerful and influential. czechoslovakia was not yet a people's democracy. ..