were other people advising truman as well as well as max lowenthal, david niles and others. truman wanted a legal opinion. he went to a man named oscar ewing who ran the federal security agency. he said give me a judgment. would a jewish state be legal under international law? and ewing's study -- he concluded that a jewish state would be legal and not against any existing legal law. palestine had been turkish and the allies had given part of it to do jews who had a indisputable title and he recommended the u.s. stick to partition. now, at this point the issue is going to be turned back to the united nations. the head of the american delegation to the united nations was a man named warren g. austin.

and warren g. austin was -- gave a few speeches, i'll concentrate on the most famous one in march. frita kearsewiggen was studying and talking to the all the delegates tu-u.n. warned truman that she thought the u.n. delegation in conjunction with the state department was planning to double-cross truman and that she had spoken to secretary of state robert lovett and that he was telling the press that state was beginning to take steps to revise partition and she warned truman in a couple of telegrams, they're really trying to double-cross you. austin prepared this speech in march. this is a speech that he is going to say among other things that trusteeship might be a possibility if and when it proves necessary.

now, truman was given a draft of this statement and this is an issue of contention. what happened? austin said he gave truman a draft of what he was going to say. and that he had approved it. truman would later explain and most people argue that this, in fact, is what happened. that if the u.n. general assembly and the u.n. security had studied the situation and said we can't go forward because the divisions are growing again and we have to temporarily come up with other solutions because the fighting of arabs and jews is going on in palestine, that at that point he might say he could put off the decision for a while and have a trusteeship but this was supposed to be temporary. at any rate, warren austin would

give a speech to the u.n. that knocked the rug out from under truman. he gave a speech in which he said and it was wildly interpreted to be he announced in this mid-march speech that we are now going to go back to supporting trusteeship and we're not supporting partition anymore and this is when truman said in a very famous quote the state department pulled the you go are out from under me and they made me out to be a liar and he was furious. clearly the state department was trying to do things to make a reversal in policy a real event. helio epstein said again a great conspiracy is brewing in washington. and he saw it for what it was. a conspiracy of the state department and james farsell and

the state department as well as the cia to move policy back and to stop creation of a jewish state. fortunately, truman's advisor clark clifford who replaced samuel rozman who became, in effect, the first national security council director. he told truman it was not thinkable to reverse partition. that what the u.s. should be doing is get the arabs to accept it and if the arabs do not condemn them as the aggressors. clifford told truman that warren austin's speech in the state department position was completely fallacious and that partition is in really in complete harmony with the policy of the united states as it has been stated to allow trusteeship to become policy now would actually lead to the very military involvement truman wanted to involve. -- avoid. he said austin's position would harm the u.s., would harm we

know unity and he told truman, quote, we crossed the rubicon in this matter when they passed the resolution at your insistence. if we backtrack the arabs the arabs will treat us, quote, with contempt in light of our appeasement. so anyway, austin did give the speech which became as a bombshell because no one had expected it. rabbi silver had speaking rights at the u.n. as a representative of the jewish agency and rabbi silver got up after warren austin's speech and said immediately, took the podium and said your speech is a reversal of your position which, in fact, it was.

sort of what had state department did is to use truman's willings in no, sir allow other things as a contingency if they have to be put in place temporarily as an excuse to develop a new policy. the secretary-general of the u.n. went to see warren austin in his apartment and told him to his face, you've issued a blow to the whole united states. even the notoriously not antisemetic but hardly concerned with the situation of the jews, "new york times" editorialized that the u.s. was bowing to arab threats and that austin's speech, quote, was a shabby trick on the jewish community and palestine. the one man who surprisingly was not too worried but hiram weitzman who asked his comment on austin's speech. he says this is a stillborn

project produphñ on the spur of the moment by some fertile brain in the united states state department. and weitzman wrote to truman that he, the american president, would keep emphasizing the need for partition as the only possible solution for security and peace in the middle east. he warned truman you cannot turn the clock back before november 29th, 1947 vote. the only choice, he wrote truman, for the jewish people is between statehood and extermination.dmz history andd: providence, he we truman, have placed this issue in your hands. and i am confident that you will yet decide it in the spirit of moral law.[v in a sense he was right. truman had not chosen to be the president put into this

position. but as truman himself came to think with a quote that brent mentioned that providence had placed this heavy responsibility in his hands fortunately, for the jews world over truman eventually held his ground and even with the opposition of such sterling figures as george c. marshall, he came out at the last minute without anybody knowing what he would do in that fatal moment for recognition of the new jewish state of israel. [applause] >> well, thank you, alice, thank you, ron. just so that the audience knows how we'll proceed, i think we're going to have a discussion here on stage between the three of us for a few minutes and then turn

it over to a question and answer session, which i'll moderate only to the extent that you keep your questions to the point. when we get to that. i wanted to begin -- alice, you mentioned one of the factors that was at work in truman's decision was this christian zionism. one of the things i found very y striking, though, in your book is two places where truman says something that is, i guess, out of character with what you would expect of a christian zionist or maybe not. at one point he's recorded in -- he's recorded as saying jesus christ couldn't please them when he was here on earth, referring to the jews so how could anyone expect that i would have any

luck? [laughter] >> and then -- it's almost funny. later on you have him say -- and this is, i think, context to the exodes issue. the jews i find are' very selfish. they care not so many astonians, lat veians or anything as long as they get special treatment yet, when they have some physical, financial or political partner neither hitler or stalin has anything on them for cruelty áu on the underdog. put an underdog on top and it would make no difference whether his name is russian, vjewish, negro, mormon, baptist. i found very jews remember their past condition when prosperity comes. so in light of that, what do you -- what are we to make of truman's innermost attitudes? is there a conclusion that can be drawn? >> yeah, i think people have

was an anti-semite who really didn't care about the jews and came out with statements like that. but i think you can kind of see it as an arc. he came into office being very sympathetic. he ran head into the state de8urj resistance. then there was tremendous amounts of pressure on him by the american public and especially by the organized american jewish public. led by silver who did put tremendous pressure on him and this is really how he reacted and his aids would even say that when truman was under undue pressure he would explode and make statements like that but they didn't really believe that was what he was really feeling or thinking. and those statements kind of present him as a victim and i think that's how he saw himself. that he felt, i've tried to get the 100,000 in.

i've called on the british. i've submitted to a commission with them. i've done everything, but everything i've done never works out. either the british reject it, the arabs reject it, or the jews themselves don't like the plan. so, you know, he felt like no matter what i do and he was especially angry at the jews because they were the ones who were giving him so much political pressure at home but i wouldn't -- i think just taking those statements and looking at them without looking at the whole context could give you a wrong impression, i believe, about how he really felt. >> it reminds me somewhat of a famous editor i once knew who very pro-israel who once made the comment that his support for the state of israel was an inverse proportion to the israeli consulate people who wanted to arrange meetings with

him. [laughter] >> you also have to remember the jewish agency, people said to them, among themselves, and many examples is from the responders, they said point blank when they heard statementsth compuonist committee these people in america are going to ruin us back for us. can't we calm them down? they felt they were making progress and then they would make militant demands. the most pro-zionist congressman was a man from brooklyn. a fierce zionist congressman and as soon as truman back steps or wouldn't take a position that the zionist were support, they would castigate him and that would drive him crazy and he

constantly got the pressure from the zionist community. there's a good one in the lincoln and the abolitionist. he was not an abolitionists. they were not satisfied with lincoln. for many years they considered lincoln an enemy. and lo and behold including frederick douglass but years later frederick douglass said lincoln was a hero and he was a great man and a great emancipator even though he didn't do everything we wanted, his american politics and his reality of american politics and he was a great man who brought the nation forward. well, it's the same thing here. truman was not a zionist and he reacted zealously and it was relentless day in and day out. the reason why jacobson was so important -- if you look at the difference between the way rabbi silver would talk to truman or address him and the way hiram

weitzman, he treated him with respect and admiration as a fellow leader who wanted justice for the jewish people in the world. where silver would say, you're selling us out. you're a bastard. don't you know what's right? and he would see weitzman, he gave a direct order. do not let silver and those people in the white house. >> there was a famous incident where he shook his finger at truman's face and he was extremely face and told the person after that i never want that s.o.b. in my office again and that's when he kind of shut down and i don't want to see any more extreme zionist leaders, which is a category he had developed. >> one thing neither of you touched on in your remarks and i

wonder if you get into it in the book is the position of the defense department because my understanding was that it wasn't simply marshall among the leading cabinet secretaries who was opposed but james also took a strong position. >> we didn't deal -- it was actually -- when the book was ready the cia, the famous cia long memo just was declassified. it's in one of the intelligence magazines. it's too late to include in the book and the cia -- it wouldn't have mattered if we put it in the book. it was almost verbatim the same arguments about the state department. they were using the same arguments. they believed the bases were threatened. that we need an access to arab oil and arab oil was extremely important. he was a close associate -- i can't think of his name the name of armco and he believed that's who we have to be in contact with.

those are the people who will protect american national security and these are the people we have to stand with and that means essentially keeping open access to arab oil as the main thing in terms of american national security and that means opposing any program or effort of the zionists, america's interest lie with the arabs. there was also -- the strange thing, this information strange footnote that we don't really develop enough in the book. there was the argument they brought forward that if a jewish state was created, remember, this is the beginning of the cold war, it would be a communist state. and that at one point they spread disinformation that came from the arab foreign office and the british. and they sent a whole bunch of disinformation a group of refugees trying to get into palestine were actually all filled with kgb officers who were sent in pretending to be refugees so they would come in,

get citizenship to the new jewish state and be the cadre that would make it into a communist state and actually there was a front page story to that effect in the "new york times" that jewish dpships are all soviet secret police. [laughter] >> and the state department actually -- this was pure disinformation. it turned out to be absolutely untrue. >> disinformation coming from whom? >> from the arab -- the arab league and the arab propaganda apparatus and the british and it was completely false. it was proven to be false but they were spreading this and it was presented bit state department to the white house as accurate. as another reason for why we can't have a jewish state. >> it was kind of countered by weitzman who said well, it's just the opposite. the jews are fleeing the communists. >> weitzman said the jews who want to come in into palestine are fleeing communism. they hate them.

>> so what conclusion then were drawn when the soviet union recognized israel, what, minutes after -- >> well, no, they played a bigger role than that. they came out -- and it was a big surprise at the u.n. that they supported partition because everybody assumed they were going to be against it. and the british were especially shocked because they thought partition was going to die at the u.n. because the british would -- the russians would never support it but they did. i mean, the russians were trying to uproot the british empire in the middle east. and they saw this as a wedge issue between britain and the united states that they could play on. >> one week before andre gave his famous speech on the u.n., actually, if you read et text of the speech it's a very noble humane speech, we cannot fail the jewish people who have been oppressed, killed in the camps. we care for them. they must have their own state. it was a powerful, emotional, almost zionist speech.

and one week before dean rusk who have under-secretary of state prepared a position paper for the white house on the soviets and their position in the middle east and they said the soviet union will support and is supporting the arab side. the soviet union will not support partition. it's one week before grameco's speech and he gives a speech stunning everyone including the zionists and no one expected that. >> it was funny at the u.n. when the state department was playing all these games at the u.n. and trying to undermine partition, the assign spokesman would get up and denounce and mot supporting partition. it's ironic that they were the ones -- >> were there any people in the bowels of the state department democracy who supported partition and supported -- and supported truman's position or

was the department lockstep against it? >> not as far as we can find in state department papers or the relationship series. you won't find anyone in the state department especially in the near east desk. near east desk is the one assigned to make policy for that region. and that was that total lock and step opposition to partition. >> was that pure realpolitik a diplomatic view or were there culture factors that affected the depth mindset, ambassadors, arab countries and kind of arabist t. lawrence mentality. >> well, lloyd henderson who run -- talked about who was stationed in the soviet union after the and was head of the nearest station and he was stationed in iraq and it's where there he developed a very anti-zionist position. >> what's the name of the man

with who translated fdr -- >> william eddy. >> who became first ambassador from saudi -- first ambassador to the saudis. he translated the text of fdr's conversations, why we know what happened there. he was again believed in the arab mission. and saw the saudi position as the just one, the arab position as the just one and he considered his role as ambassador and before that to explain to the united states the just cause of the saudis and the arabs. >> let me say one more thing about that. from what we could surmise, the united states really didn't have that developed a position about the middle east. and they sort of followed the british and they saw the british as the ones who as having the mandate, you know, the ones that had the responsibility for palestine so, in essence, they

had a very similar position to the british foreign office. and that's why truman when he came up with that conspiracy in the state department, the striped pants boys referred to the british foreign office people. >> the only thing you have realize about the british, you remember last year the british foreign office released the incredible memos on the cold war by ernest bevan. if you read these things you can find them online. bevan as a laborite knew about the role of the communist trying to split the movement in britain. you read his long analysis of how the soviet union was a threat to democracy in western europe, absolutely brilliant. and he was trying to educate truman on the issues in what would become the cold war. and it's fascinating because at that time truman came into office, the same thing on his

palestine policy just wanting to do what fdr had pledged to do, to fulfill fdr's program. and there's this great historian, most people don't know about him wilson campbell who wrote a book last year "truman and the cold war" truman started listening to roosevelt's writings. and this is all going on contemporary with palestine. you can't strike out -- do something that will totally make bevan and the british your enemies. when the british are going to be a key ally that you need to stand up to the soviet union. >> but it sounds to the issue was newuralgic also in in bevan

antisemic -- >> bevan was. >> no, i don't think that's true >> some people say he was and some people say he wasn't. >> yeah. i don't know what my understanding was is that a lot of people thought he was friendly with the jews before all of this happened. >> in an earlier period. >> in the earlier period and that he really did not understand the very strong feelings of the jews for wanting their own state. that he kind of miscalculated and thought the jews of palestine were like wise men there was not that strong a feeling amongst them to do it. >> bevan came to the united states in the middle of this period and bevan had really insulted truman and bevan really made that statement that new yorkers took as antisemetic. he made some caustic, nasty statement in the jews in new

york. >> americans want the jews to go to palestine because they don't want them in new york. >> right. [laughter] >> so anyway, bevan came to the u.s. and i think he went to the yankees game at yankee stadium and the entire yankee stadium they announced ernest bevan here and the entire yankee stadium booed him. [laughter] >> good thing he wasn't at a dodgers game. [applause] >> one other figure i'd like to you touch upon a little bit more, a little more at length is clark clifford because he seems to have played really an instrumental role. and to what extent is this a function of clifford's convictions. how is it that he came to be the counter-weight to george marshall in the final arguments that were offered to truman. >> well, as i said in my paper, he was very influenced by rosaman and spent a lot of time with him and he didn't have strong feelings about zionism before him but he became a zionist -- he was extremely instrumental in what happened.

and really laying out all the arguments for truman that countered state department arguments, and i think he genuinely believed in zionism. >> let me just ask one final question and then we'll turn it over to the audience and this brings us forward to the present with that remarkable statement that you read. you could argue that on many points his arguments were wholly bourne out. the arab world didn't at least until 1973 stop the flow of oil but moderate governments were overthrown in iraq, in libya, in egypt, in syria and so on replaced by extremist governments. the soviet union did gain a grip on many regimes in the region.

now jews are accused of this dual loyalty on account of the existence of israel. was kennan mostly right? >> no. i mean, in fact, one other thing we should say, one of the other arguments which was a very strong one at the time is that they all said war is going to break out between the new state and the arabs and the new jewish state could not and would not win. they were convinced of that. there was no way the jews would win and defeat any arab armies. it would be a bloodbath and the middle east would erupt in fire. that was also part of their argument. in fact, that was the main part of their argument and they were totally wrong in that. they didn't think they could defend themselves and they didn't think they could win. you know, certainly the point is -- >> in fairness to the people making it, it was an improbable victory. >> yeah.

but to a lot of of the jewish leaders in palestine they felt they would be able to stand up against insurmountable odds and they know they would be able to and that aside from the trans-jordan army trained by the british, that the arab fighters would be relatively weak and without motivation and would collapse which is one of the jewish agency arguments but in the long-range, from day one to the present, the arabs have held true to the argument and -- you use the term that it was palestine that it was jewish palestine. they were going to create an arab state and a jewish state but the arabs then as well as the palestinians now have never accepted partition. that's why the arguments are so similar. they could have had peace. and they would have had a much smaller israel granted at the time by the partition line the u.n. drew up. they would not accept it. and they didn't accept it