as phillip coil, a former deputy director of the liver more lab stated in this article said -- and i quote -- "i don't know how this happened, that we forgot how to make fog bank. it should not have happened but it did." fog bank is the specific component that the lab scientists were unable to replicate the last several years. related to the safety and rely biflt our nuclear weapon stockpile is the design and size of the nuclear force itself. on this point it is not only u.s. security that is threatened, so is the security of the 30 or so friendly and allied nations that rely on the scalded u.s. extended deterrent. also called the nuclear umbrella. as secretary schlesinger explained at the senate armed services committee on may 7, -- and i quote -- "the requirements for extended deterrence still

remain at the heart of the design of the u.s. nuclear posturing." well, this may seem like an onerous responsibility for the united states it is one that secretary schlesinger explained we must continue to pay because extended deterrence remains a major barrier to proliferation. and restraining proliferation is definitely a cop national security interest of the united states -- a top national security interest of the united states. in essence, numbers marry. we can't just reduce the numbers of our weapons to some arbitrary limit like 1,500 or 1,000. we must have a nuclear arsenal sufficient to cover both the united states and the allies who rely on us. and that number cannot be determined without significant study. if we don't, our allies could conclude they need to develop their own nuclear weapon. the commission also recognized

that specific platforms matter. that's why the commission stated that the triad, the submarines, bombers and icbm's must be retained as well as other delivery systems such as our nuclear-capable kriewsm cruise s which are important in certain areas of the world. it is my home the administration will take the findings and recommendations seriously. we owe the commissioners a debt of gratitude for their service. the best way to show gratitude is by listening to them and charting our course based on where they revealed consensus is possible. finally, mr. president, will congress and the administration heed the commission's bipartisan findings and recommendations? i'm fearful that won't be the case. why do i say that in it appears the administration's preparing to take big risks in the negotiation of the start follow on treaty with russia. specifically, the president announced that he intended to

seek a treaty that moves below the lower level of strategic nuclear forces permitted by the so-called moscow treaty. some reports suggest administration is seeking to go as low as 1,500 deployed nuclear weapons or a 30% reduction from present levels. i'm not going to prejudge the correct number of our nuclear forces. i will say, however, that i agree with the commission which referred to -- and i quote -- "the complex decisionmaking process involved in determining the size of the u.s. nuclear force." what this means is that careful and rigorous analysis is needed before pursuing reductions below the moscow limits. congress has ordered just this analysis in the form of a quadrennial defend review and a separate nuclear posture review but there is every indication our arms control negotiators are working off of some other kind of analysis.

presumably the next n.p.r. would include the level of the agreed start follow on is the right number but this is like writing the test to suit what the test taker knows and not what the test taker should know. the last n.p.r. looked at the world in 2001 and the recommendations resulted in reductions of u.s. nuclear forces to approximately 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons. is the world more or less safe than in the year 2001? is russia more or less aggressive than it was then? is pakistan a more or less significant threat? is iran closer to a nuclear weapon? how many more nuclear weapons has china built since 2001? these are all questions that must be answered. and the needs of our allies must be understood in this context. they are similarly concerned about the size of our deterrent as i noted before. we must engage in consultations with each of them about what u.s. nuclear force posture

assures them of their security not what we think should assure them. and, we must understand what threats they need to deter for their security. we must understand whether they are concerned about russia's tactical nuclear weapons which russia insists absolutely cannot be discussed. if so, how do further u.s. strategic nuclear reductions affect the balance of forces between the hundreds oftant tall nuclear weapons the u.s. possesses versus several thousand nuclear weapons russia possesses. equally concerning is the fact the cart appears to be before the horse. i mean it appears we may be presented with a start follow on that compels a new nuclear posture with significant reductions. it does not explain how that passture will be supported. what kind of modernization program will be undertaken to support the requirement articulated by the commission that the u.s. maintain a safe

and reliable deterrent for so long as one is necessary? what about the manhattan project complex, a physical infrastructure? that sustained it? what will be done to modernize that? it is unclear how we can put further reductions ahead of long overdue modernization. all of this argues for slowing down and taking our breath. the start treaty of 1991 expires early this december. i agree with those who say that the verification and confidence-building elements of that treaty are too important to allow to expire. it is also significant the treaty's provision undergird the moscow treaty. why not negotiate a one or two year extension to permit time to perform the complex analysis that are involved in appropriately sizing the u.s. nuclear force posture? at the same time, the administration could device a plan for the modernization of our nuclear weapons and the complex which support it.

otherwise, the administration will be asking the senate to ratify a start follow on that may include significant strategic arms reductions which compels serious and lengthy review based on the panoply of issues addressed. without the necessary modernization plan which, in light of the fiscal year 2010 budget request, would have to be included in the 2011 budget request that won't be submitted to congress until february of 2010. so the administration either needs to slow down on this ambitious start follow on, move forward on a follow on that only deals with the necessary issues, or submit an amended budget request that reflects modernization programs recommended by the last administration such as the nsa complex situation which has been endorsed or the reliable replacement warhead. with or without nuclear weapons

reductions this is a critical exercise. we maintain a significant nondeployed reserve of nuclear weapons today because we're concerned about the reliability of our aging weapons. the last of which was designed in the 1980's and built in the 1990's and we have no viable production capacity. we worry about the failure of a weapon that could affect an entire class of weapons possibly knocking out one of the legs of the triad. we worry about this because the weapons are old and we don't have the capacity to respond quickly to a significant failing in these weapons because of the agency and obsolescence of our nuclear weapons complex. additionally because of the ancient state of the nuclear weapons complex we must also be worried about the danger of a strategic surprise. put another way, a new global threat. if a new threat emerged, a real prospect given the instability of pakistan, and north korea's proliferation to syria, we don't presently have the capacity to

quickly build up our stockpile or develop a nuclear weapon capable of dealing with that threat so we maintain many more nuclear weapons than necessary. a modernization program for our stockpile and infrastructure would permit the administration to pursue all of its objectives now, including reducing the number of warheads. the administration should fund the nnsa transformation plan which would allow us to build a smaller, more efficient, and modern laboratory and production infrastructure. and finally replace the manhattan project facilities we are currently spending so much money to maintain. in fact, the nnsa complex transformation plan was specifically endorsed by the schlesinger commission. it can pick up and fund the reliable replacement warhead studies which would, for the first time since the 1980's put our weapon designers to work on a modern warhead for the stockpile but it must move

forward now. unfortunately, the budget the administration just put forward does not recognize the critical state of affairs in our nuclear weapon enterprise. it not only does nothing to mod werize our weapons -- modernize our weapons it continues the necessitcontinue theneglect of p program. and the stewardship is underfunded in the 2010 budget request. worse yet according to the projections in the president's budget, the underfunding of the science in stockpile stewardship will be accelerated between fiscal year 2011 and 2014. the impact of these cuts to the science campaign can also be seen in the continued cuts in the funding requested for the laboratories to use the stockpiles stewardship program tools including the dahrt facility, a big x-ray used to study what goes on in a nuclear

weapon at the earliest stages of criticalness without actually producing nuclear yield. another example is the advanced computing program, the use of which this budget continues to underfund. the budget for the engineering campaign which developing capabilities to improve the safety and reliability of the stockpile is kept at the 2009 level which is a reduction from the 2008 funding level. again, between 2011 and 2014 the engineering campaign budget is cut. and it is cut more significantly than the science campaign budget. the effect of the administration's budget, therefore, is to continue and even accelerate the brain drain at the labs. and the commission is not alone in warning about the effects of the brain drain. a recent "los angeles times" 5r8 was based in -- was based in part on a recent study that pointed out the lifetime extension programs of the w-76

and b-61 warheads were affected by the fact that we forgot some of the key processes involved in building our nuclear weapons. the administration would also be wise to consider that there was bipartisan consensus on every aspect of the commission's report, save one: the ctbt. the administration has said that it intended to push hard to get the senate to ratify this treaty although the senate has already rejected it by a significant margin. i know of no information that suggests the matters that led the senate to reject the treaty have changed and in some effects like the deteriorating condition of our strategic deterrent they are worse. lastly, it is worth pointing out that the commission articulated real dangers from nuclear terrorism and "tipping point" of a proliferation cascade on which we are now perilously perched because of the response of the

world community to the illegal iranian and north korean nuclear programs and the president has recognized this threat in prague when he stated -- and i quote -- "in a strange turn of history the threat of global nuclear war is down but the risk of nuclear attack has again up." i think that's exactly right. my concern is, the initial steps the president has chosen to deal with this threat, the threat is also identified by the commission, are not at all tailored to provide a solution to the grave threats. it is important to ensure the verification measures of start do not expire but that treaty won't deal with the threat of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons technology or material. likewise, ctbt, a bad idea, shrouded in good expenses wouldn't be capable of detecting political tantrums like the north korean test even when the international monitoring system is told where and when to look. yes, these are the measures the administration has chosen to spend its capital on.

i urge the administration to look for areas to work with the congress, globalizing the none-lugar program, and -- nunn-lugar program, and strengthening our nuclear intelligence, and forensic capability just to name a few. the commission on the strategic posture led by two of our most esteemed experts on u.s. national security, has just completed more than a year-long review of the role that knock weapons play in our national security. the 12 commissioners have done what no one thought was possible. they found a bipartisan consensus, they presented their findings and recommendations to the president and the congress. and it now becomes our turn, the elected political leaders to take the fruit of the commission's labor and move forward on the necessary and long overdue steps the speakers have deemed necessary. regardless of party affiliation, in order to protect the american people.

mr. president, finally, i would like to refer to a debate that occurred on the floor, i believe, last thursday. foll following remarks of the distinguished minority leader and concerning remarks made by the assistant majority leader. this has to do with guantanamo bay, the prison there, and the people that we have kept in prison there. i want to specifically address the chorus of false claims and insinuations about that facility, noting that it has grown louder and tandem, i suspect, with growing american opposition to closing the facility and pwhreug -- bringing the terrorists to u.s. soil. a majority of americans now oppose the closure of guantanamo, this is according to a "usa today" poll of june 2. this is by a margin of 2-1. many of the arguments we've heard recently to dissuade them,

frankly, give off more heat than light. my friend and colleague, the majority whip, gave a speech in which he claimed arguments opposing the closure of the prison at guantanamo made by senator mcconnell and others are based on fear. i contend that these tkpwraouplts are based on serious concerns about -- arguments are based on the serious concerns about the safety of americans and the obstacles to closing the facilities. last month before the house judiciary committee f.b.i. director robert mueller testified transferring the remaining detainees to u.s. securities, even maximum security prisons, would entail serious security risks. he said "the concerns we have about individuals who may support terrorism being in the united states run from concerns about providing financing, radicalizing others, as well as the potential for individuals undertaking attacks in the united states." mr. president, the guantanamo facility is separated from the american communities. it's well protected from the threat of a terrorist attack.

no one's ever escaped from guantanamo. why should we feel pressure to support president obama's arbitrary deadline to close the facility when the administration has yet to offer a plan about where to relocate the terrorists? and where i would submit a case has not been made for closing this facility and locating those prisoners elsewhere. in fact, other countries told us they don't want them, with the exception of france, which offered to take one prisoner. and a new june 2 "usa today" poll that i talked about before shows that americans by a measure of 3-1 rejected bringing those terrorists to the united states. in his speech, senator durbin also made reference to the torture of prisons held -- of prisoners held by the united states and the treatment of some prisoners at guantanamo. regarding the treatment of guantanamo detainees, i think the record needs to reflect the following: the living conditions at the facility are safe and humane. this is a $200 million

state-of-the-art facility that meets or exceeds standards of modern prison facilities. following his february tour of guantanamo, attorney general holder said -- and i quote -- "i did not witness any mistreatment of prisoners. i think to the contrary, what i saw was a very serious attempt by these guards to conduct themselves in an appropriate way." numerous international delegations and government officials from dozens of countries have likewise visited the facility. during a 2006 inspection by the organization for security cooperation in europe, a belgian representative said -- and i quote -- "at the level of a detention facilities, it is a model prison, where people are better treated than in belgian prisons." detainees get to exercise regularly, receive culturally and religiously appropriate meals three times a day, and access to mail and a library. additionally, international community of the red cross has access to the detainees. they have met all detainees in

private sessions and routinely consulted with the u.s. on its detention operations. the facility provides outstanding medical care to every detainee. in 2005, military completed a new camp hospital to treat detainees who have now received hundreds of surgeries and thousands of dental procedures and vaccinations. so this idea that prisoners are treated badly is patently false. the insinuation directly or indirectly that torture has occurred at guantanamo must stop. torture is illegal. it was never permitted at guantanamo. and torture has never been sanctioned by the united states. in discussions about torture, we've heard a lot of rhetoric that attempts to draw a straight line between what happened at abu ghraib and the legal enhanced interrogations at guantanamo. let's be clear about the distinction. at abu ghraib, a few brutal prison guards abused inmates and

by doing so they violated the law and for that they received army justice. the methods of legal interrogations used at guantanamo which have wrongly been charactered by some as torture were used on a few of the most hard -pdened terrorists after other efforts failed. at guantanamo all allegations of detainee abuse are investigated and the military has not hesitated to prosecute or discipline guards who violate those standards, regardless of provocation. navy rear admiral mark busby, commander of the joint task force at guantanamo said in 2007 the facilities practices have been in keeping with d.o.d. policies. -- quote -- "we tend to get wrapped up in the greater discussion of detainees down here with those detained elsewhere. there have been many, many investigations conducted of the conditions at guantanamo and they found no deviations from standing d.o.d. policies." no deviations from standing d.o.d. policies. end of quote. then there's the idea that's

been floated by the president, senator durbin and others that keeping guantanamo bay open serves as a recruitment tool for al qaeda. by this logic our fight against the taliban or our targeted airstrikes against terrorists in pakistan could be dubbed recruitment tools for al qaeda since both policies involve planning use -- planting u.s. forces in muslim nations to fight jihaddists. this idea is the latest incarnation of what jeane kirkpatrick dubbed blame america first mentality. it makes excuses for the terrorists. recall that al qaeda was sweulg its ranks throughout the 1990's before the war on terror and well before the prison at guantanamo was even created. during that decade it struck the world trade center, the khobar towers, the u.s. embassies in kenya and tanzania. in october 2000 it attacked the u.s.s. cole off the coast of yemen. by the time the 19 hijackers

boarded the four planes that crashed on september 11, 2001, al qaeda already identify numerous grievances with america, including its contempt for western culture, equal rights for women, and men and our support for free speech and exchange of ideas. i've sent a letter to the national security council asking for evidence that keeping guantanamo bay open has created more terrorists than the facility has housed. that was a statement that president obama made. that the existence of guantanamo prison has created more terrorists than the facility has housed. it's an incredible assertion but it's at the foundation of his claim that we need to close guantanamo because somehow it represents a valid symbol of american torture or oppression that hurts our efforts abroad. anything we do is going to cause recruitment of terrorists who hate us, whether we close guantanamo or not, the terrorists will still have plenty of reasons to recruit

fellow jihaddists. i'd like to ask again today that the administration provide us with the information that backs up the president's claim on this issue. ultimately the debate over guantanamo has become a debate over geography. both the new attorney general and the new solicitor general endorsed the government's right to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely. that is correct. whether we detain them at guantanamo or at prisons on u.s. soil does not change the fundamental reality that this administration, like its predecessor, will be holding certain individuals without trial. we've been told that guantanamo must be closed for symbolic reasons, but america should never make national security decisions based on symbolism or false moral arguments. mr. president, i hope that as we continue to debate this issue of the prison at guantanamo and as the president has been asked to provide a plan for how that base would be closed and how much it

would cost and as he continues to ask congress to provide the funding to carry out that plan, that we keep in mind these critical points. the first is that you cannot legitimately make the argument that anything has occurred at guantanamo for which the united states should be embarrassed, should apologize or should at the end of the day close the facility because of some impassement that the united states has about our activities there. our soldiers who are involved in protecting our interests by guarding those terrorists, the medical personnel and all the others who are involved, have done a job which, frankly, we should be thankful for. rather than slapping them in the face and insinuating that they have done something wrong which makes us have to close that prison down is, i think, a terrible indictment on the military men and women who have really worked hard to do their

very best if a facility. and as i pointed out, have in all respects conducted themselves in accordance with army procedures. at the end of the day you can't lie prostrate at the feet of your enemies -- in this case, the terrorists -- and say we're really sorry that we do some things to offend you, and we'll stop doing those and maybe you'll no longer be offended. to suggest that that will cause them to no longer recruit colleagues and plan attacks against us, i think is fantasy. and, therefore, i challenge the administration again, supply the facts on which the president made the allegation that the existence of guantanamo created more terrorists than have ever been housed there. it's a palpably false statement, and he should not be able to argue to the american people and to the congress that he's requesting money for it, that we've got to give money to shut down guantanamo because of that

false fact. i urge my colleagues as we continue to debate this to challenge the administration to provide that information to us. mr. president, i note the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

mr. alexander: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from tennessee. mr. alexander: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the quorum call be vitiated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. alexander: thank you, mr. president. i'm here to present the car czar award for monday, june 8, 2009. it's a service to taxpayers from america's newest automotive headquarters: headquarters. this is the first in a series of car czar awards to be confirmed -- to be conferred upon washington medallers who distinguish themselves by making it harder for auto companies, the auto companies your government owns to compete in the world marketplace. today's car czar award goes to congressman barney frank of massachusetts for interfering in the operation of general