and so-called gcc summit plus two. but we are you interested in that such an approach mysteries the parochial motives of arab regimes and facing the threat. arab leaders have always played in a delicate game of four dimensional chess in the region bouncing competing demands and domestic constituents, appears on the arab states, external patrons and then on arab states like iran and, of course, there is nothing pacific arabic about this. politics has been informed by appealing to constituents. but what we argue is the peculiar nature of their political system where they face challenges and internal dissent and problems of a government and have made this dynamic especially the santa. what we find is a particular concern with iran's ability to meddle in the domestic affairs of arab states to speak over

leaders and mobilize population against the rulers. which you find in the rhetoric is iran off with the chin with fantastic power to bypass state to state channels and mobilize a range of opposition groups ranging from the the zaidis in yemen, the nedj, the reports of shia conversion and even when we look at the fear of nuclear capable iran the biggest fear is not so much that it will use the capability against arab states but provide some top cover for iran to continue the policy of meddling in internal affairs of states. to dynamics may be at work. the first as arab leaders may actually believe their populations are susceptible. particularly reductionism on the arab-israeli front but they remain sensitive to the fact the

islamic public kuiper activism on the palestine issue expos is of their own deficiencies especially dependence on the usn process to domestic and regional audiences and certainly iran does have a number of important ways with nonstick actress in the societies. the sudden dynamic is their regimes may actually be benefiting from threat inflation. they're essentially stamping a return address on problems that are fundamentally internal and homegrown and saudi arabia in discussions with reformists and human rights activist we found the criticism of the iranian threat especially fear of spillover from iraq provided convenient pretext for differing on internal reforms. the logic was the more editorials in the press focused on the persian mannes means less space devoted to discussing issues like women's rights and reform. what this means is the tone and style of a rain foreign-policy matters and this is a matter of

debate in the presidential elections. some have argued the best thing for some machines would be the direction of ahmadinejad because he is a convenient foil for them and convenient boogieman. now because the iranian threat in the minds of many arab leaders is a symbolic and ideological one because of the disagreement in disarray arab resolve has not materialized according to u.s. designs. this ambivalence has been worsened by what many perceive as conflicting signals about u.s. policy toward iran and according to one analyst the gulf states will have a clear and defining policy toward an end only when diplomacy solidifies because they find u.s. diplomacy is vacillating between cooperation so what we find it is a strong inclination toward hedging an insurance

policy against sudden swings in the u.s. policy. deliberations about a u.s. withdrawal from iraq have accelerated this trend of uncertainty and ambivalence there and it is interesting that toward the gulf states iran attempted to exploit the sense of u.s. intransigence and temporality planned a trump card approximately impermanence, one gulf official noted that iran told us repeatedly we are your neighbor, the u.s. assembly and passing visitor. not if he's arab states are ambivalent allies against iran neither should we consider them milling interlocutors, they have little interest in helping the u.s. completely fix if iran problem in many arguably benefited enormously from america's decades long estrangement from the islamic republic and signs of easing this estrangement are frequently met for a house of criticism. if you look at the u.s. iran talks in baghdad in 2007 this

was turned a new a lot of. we have seen increased criticism of the recent average of obama with the one editorial by the editor in chief proclaiming that dialogue with iran and u.s.-style law and who was down a rival echoing a similar op ed in "the new york times". taken in some of this opposition and ambivalence suggests arab states rejected either or approach toward iran. the best course of action for many can be described as a managed stasis of confrontation and toward systems, no peace or war this is what they benefit in an relegates domestic concerns to the back burner. i think this raises my third point which is the opportunity cost in terms of u.s. policy interest in pursuing competitive balance in paradigm against iran in containment approach. there are a number of factors that make a radical shift in our policy toward iran not least of

which are domestic politics inside the republic by a reverse in to peer containment paradigm carries risks the policy interests namely the neglect of domestic reform and possible increase tension resulting from arab iranian cold war. the sidelining of the u.s. democratization and reform agenda is a tradeoff that became to many in the region particularly after the u.s. arms package to the gulf editorial in the daily star noted with the announcement of the arms deal and has been apparent that it has been more or less demand it and the u.s. seems to favor a policy concern and around a fictitious story line that betrays the war as a battleground between the forces of moderation and extremism. the resulting fear of iran what we found in our interviews this fear and sense of extra

non-emergency has provided a useful pretext for opponents of reform to batten down the hatches and deeper on any domestic experiments. it is not clear and cisco lessons of state power is cause for celebration from the u.s. perspective. there are a number of internal trends in the region that predate the iraq war and concerns with iran, related to miss governance, lack of civil society and problems of illegitimacy. many identified after the wake of the september 11th 2001 attacks is been a wellspring of radicalization and terrorism and persistence argues domestic reform should not be sacrificed at the expense of a containment strategy. so i'll leave it to earnings closing speaker to discuss the way board in a regional approach but in this diverse are diverging threat perception in response has shown the question of iranian power is intimately

tied to a number of local agendas and parochial interest in the region and these revolvers on a question of arab hierarchy and governance and can be argued that the iranian threat has a certain utility in certain quarters there is important to recognize the agendas and avoid try to impose a consensus on the region to isolate iran not only does it find a multi dimensional politics industries the nature of iranian towns but carries an intentional to announce in terms of interests. all they have for some purpose in the arab world will return to prince turki anavar but could actually and they say holes and other unintended consequences so that i will close and take questions. [applause] >> thanks, fred. i just want to start with one quick question to both of you

and all open up to the audience in a david, you mentioned a number of retaliatory capabilities, the finance told to offset their inferior position conventionally. in this specific instance in attack on its nuclear facilities either from israel or the u.s. which seems unlikely right now of the israel option is still talk about the, what do see would be their preferred choice of retaliation and where do think it might take place? and fred, in the same scenario can do things the arab side will react to such an attack? >> it's a very good question and i don't predispose to be a moment to define what iran's escalation ladder is, for example,, but it has a number of options which i think early on could take in the event of an

attack on as nuclear facilities and one certainly is the use of its ballistic missiles as a way of trying to increase the cost of potential u.s. attack would be increasing cost to our allies of providing support for our power production capabilities and also potentially some shots against israel. if it is an israeli attack to be to try to show that iran is going on the offensive against this attack and even in the event of a u.s. attack to try to draw israel into the conflict. one question is though whether they would try to close the state's in this event and i

think that might be a little more difficult because as keith show iran is quite an owner of all to xiaoning, its oil exports and the iranians will have to think very carefully about whether to try to inhibit exports out of the straits of hormuz with the possibility they could get hit in this area as well. i should point out though that this would be something that iran it attempted it would be one of the areas where a could impose a strategic cost on the united states by internationalizing the complex, global energy markets was speak to that. after a conflict in the strait of our moves or around the persian gulf and other than that i think one would have to look

for not just immediate retaliation but potentially retaliation over time that could, in the form of a proxy and tax if there are proxy is that what this into iran's request for support but also potentially terrorist attacks and other parts of the world and this is something that would necessarily happen right after a u.s. attack and could happen over time. >> it is support and diplomacy and you see a great deal of support to women number of our traditional arab allies but at the same time tremendous pressure to oppose it in the public domain as symbolic level to mps to their domestic constituents to play to their domestic audiences. regarding the threat of iranian

retaliation and think he may find this becomes a pretext for a dragnet ran up of internal dissidents. our interviews in the gulf service suggest there is a lingering fear of sleeper cells of a fifth column presents but in many cases this is overblown. an asset is still seen a conflict being used to top cover to suppress a lot of internal dissent. >> we will open up to the audience. robin wright and the front. >> i have a question for friend. a couple of questions actually -- can you take a look or compare for us the kind of activism ec and the melon by man today resisted early days of the revolution when they had dreams of exporting and were a visibly helping a lot of groups on the

eastern some golf and region as well deeper in the arab world and also compared with what the saudis are doing with a use of your own funds in promoting mosques in the region. it to what degree those to are trying to counter each other or in this really their own domestic agenda. >> i think there is opposed revolutionary time in that in the appeal or i ran's ideology it is time to sell is a mix of rejection as some, it can arguably called pan-arabism and there is an interesting quote from an official in has a love that's and iran foreign-policy is essentially sunni because iran has essentially coopted your ticket number and number of traditionally pan arab concerns and i think it's an interesting dynamic, no longer export a pure revolutionary shi'ites as some

but this plan and protectionism that sells very well comparing one as contrasted with sort of the hesitation and caution of arab regimes. another dynamic that we found in the region looking at sections of iran who was in the sense that iran is trying to promote pluralism and the fragmentation of the arab states system promoting and added a politics in saudi arabia and this is interesting that they are so concerned about it within their own borders and that you find a broad and i think the speeches that promote pluralism and the promotion of identity politics is an interesting dynamic. i'm not in saudi arabia the saudis are petrified the areas are trying to stir up not just the shia but the hijaz against the nedj. you go back to the '90s and there were a number of the

iranian propaganda channels coming out the specific appealed to the hijaz against the nedj so it goes beyond shia, it is rejectionists and an anti status quo ideology here regarding the saudi i rating contest, it is a subject and i think the saudis now at the level of symbolic politics they are behind. they're fundamentally crippled by their association with us, but there are trying to outspend the iranians which is what they learn in the conflict in the contest for the post-soviet republics in the '90s especially with those of a contest with our spending bill iranians in new content their symbolic advantage that they enjoy in the arab public opinion. >> we will take one here and then barbara, you can identify yourself before your question.

>> i'm with resources and my question was i was wondering what other reasons iran seems to act up is because it feels surrounded. the u.s. has bases in imad, kuwait, saudi arabia, bahrain, the persian gulf, afghanistan, pretty much every single country, turkey, iran as a u.s. presence. my question is do think there would tone down the rhetoric and things could be is smoother if we chose to return to a strategy of osher balancing and reduce our presence in the middle east? and i david, do you want to speak to that at all? >> i think that would probably help -- i think it is more than our posture that determines whether they feel encircled and not. >> how could they not feel

encircled and favor surrounded if they were in cuba and canada and mexico? >> they also at the same time have a confidence, a new-found confidence despite the presence of u.s. forces especially and iraq and afghanistan year ago they believe they are on the march. number of daily believe they on the march in the region and i have a greater confidence in their ability to present themselves as alternative to the u.s. so i think is probably more than the posture but how relations are and when our interests are in the region that makes them feel encircled and not. >> barbara.

>> talking to talk more about the every new relationship with their proxies, partners, clients, however, you want to identify them particularly hezbollah and how you see that relationship evolving and hezbollah does well and the lebanese elections coming up, if it does even better and has more power than it currently does. thanks. >> well, we tried to convey in our studies that iran's relationships with the same actors are in bad real and leave though it is some sentiment. the same time they are bound by certain realities in the domestic states with a professors is designed and i think the group ultimately follow their own domestic agenda as and iran has a long history of being disappointed and exacerbated by the lack of reciprocity that a rise from the process is and give us all this

aid and support and doesn't always translate into the desired degree of reciprocity. regarding hezbollah i think hezbollah response to a domestic constituents. much of their appeal we found in our field work in lebanon was due to rising sectarian tensions, the fear that there was this sunni empowerment, this growing radicalism -- salafi radicalism and reverting to his bow as the only defense in this arising sunni threat. but i think hezbollah is planned to that domestic constituents seem, regarding the elections i don't want to predict what the relationship obey. i think there could be a strong case that hezbollah will increasingly and as irresponsible political actor inside lebanon on that this increased political power could,

in fact, moderated but i think the relationship will still be solid but again it won't translate into direct control and what we tried to convey understanding is it's certainly influences the group's but cannot control them and should not be thought of as automatons. >> okay, in the back over here. one and then the other one behind it. maybe you could both ask a question after the next and will have the responses. >> john duke anthony, i agree with most of what has been said here but additional points on a possible reactions. some macro on semipro ones. in my talks with officials from all six of the gcc summit countries of the henson outside of it, a consensus seems to be in the u.s. which two attack iran and they could probably with the reaction of locally and their society is becoming israel

doesn't the consensus is all bets would be off and if it is alleged that israel doesn't even if it doesn't do it all bets would still be off and if there were some collusion of all bets would be off and that is a consensus and get. on the micro side, you can't walk the streets physically if you have ever been there and it's a white in terms of the death and the with but you can block it rhetorically and block it analytically by saying you have done this not in the other and you're going to get really hit and people might want to call the bluff. this happens from time to time during the iran iraq war, all eight years of it, the convoys that wouldn't go into this race because lloyd's of london with clean their clocks stretch all the way back and this happened for years and years so something like that could happen again and

be catastrophic on prices and another things. ensign at bahrain you have the last country in the world were the shia and the majority and in this case to the overwhelming majority farmer so than in iraq but not in control of the government and so the degree of dissidents, bahrain has more civil and industrial and political unrest than the other gcc countries so there is an exposure there. with regard to the uae there are other i'm still occupied and i rams' special operation forces and undersea capabilities are seriously to be taken in consideration. almost every year since 1993 iran has had naval exercises practicing in some cases amphibious landings, the amphibious landings would not be targeted to brazil argentina and in this particular concern and one of the statements iran feels

it is on the in mitchell of and the justice level in terms of supporting so-called reg is resistance in lebanon and palestine. and various gcc summits, is it still does circulates is america attack by iran and iran one without firing a single bullet or shedding a single drop of blood. >> thank you, says there were a few questions we will have respond barrett wanted to questions after that. >> a couple of points. i definitely agree with most of what to said. i would suggest that whether it is the u.s. acting without israeli collusion or israel acting by anselm israel in the united states will be considered to be inclusion certainly by iran and i ron will try to promote the perception in the

arab world so i'm not sure as far as perception is concerned and in deference between just israel attacking in the u.s. attacking if that were to come about. we should expect that when israel will be brought in one way or another. the second thing about the strait of hormuz, i think this acclaimed you're right. it is impossible to close it and when i talked about the strategic cost that iran could impose on the u.s. and pretty much internationalizing any conflict is not because they physically close to but because of a have made it very expensive for commercial ships to go through or just minutes bad enough to the point where crews will not take their ships through the strait of hormuz and

even with u.s. navy escorts. >> there was one back there. >> [inaudible] >> richard parker, a foreign-policy project. i was adjusted in your comments on the iran's missile work and i wanted to just push to a little bit if i could. there are sort of two lines of thought i have heard about the missiles and one is this is been their pursuit of a nuclear capability because their missiles are imprecise and could only be useful with nuclear warheads on them and the other point of view i heard is which seems more closely they do have a conventional deterrent particularly in light of i iran's the bonus with regard to any other response to an air

attack, their planes would not stack up very well against israel or the u.s. at all so i am wondering what you feel is the fairest and friends to draw -- is it fair to say that this is a data point that shows nuclear intentions risen much more ambiguous? >> i don't know of a show's intention of art about as capable as they can become a this point. one was suggest their long-range missiles are much less accurate than their shorter ones and that this could suggest if they are now working on ways of improving the accuracy of their long-range missiles then maybe they have the question of that you asked of a year or a and i think it is

both. i believe you and in the event they have nuclear weapons they cannot give up their conventional deterrent capability is and now i am talking in terms of nuclear purses conventional and that they would continue to work on the the conventional accuracy of their conventional weapons and whether they have nuclear weapons are not they want to maintain and think a number of different avenues to the term. i really don't know what you're asking suggests they are not trying to improve the accuracy of their long-range missiles because there are waiting for that nuclear warhead to be placed on top and i don't know of that is the case. there are going as far as they can with their accuracy and capabilities.

>> the question was whether there was sufficient justification for these missiles as a conventional deterrent that one could plausibly say there was sufficient justification and to this even if the had known a clear intention -- would be irrational to pursue this missile technology purely for missile deterrent if i had no nuclear? >> i think absolutely rigid they learned a lot about this from the iran-iraq war and i looked up ballistic missiles if not necessarily accurate, they weren't that accurate in the iran-iraq war, they were a major psychological weapon and i think the fact they can reach israel even with very bad accuracy is both a big part of its self-image and the way it portrays itself to the region in particular to the a