you talked about how these are provocative steps several times using the word provocative steps. you said that they must reverse their actions and our policy is a verifiable it denuclearization so i thank you have been very clear about how we react to this and what our goal is, but i want to try to understand a little better what the range of consequences. and what is coming together? maybe you can even share with us some framework of these discussions in new york and give the committee and those listening a sense of what we are anticipating. >> i will certainly be happy to try, mr. chairman. with regard to the discussions in new york as you can appreciate this has been a primary focus of our efforts. the security council is now considering a new resolution

that if adopted would impose unprecedented new measures which two address the threat posed by the dprk missile and nuclear proliferation activities and to compel that country to commit itself to political dialogue in denuclearize asian. these measures will give the international community some new tools to work with on the problem of a north korea. it would include adopted first a total ban on arms exports and a major expansion of the ban on arms imports. new financial sanctions to limit the ability of this dprk to fund its wmd and ballistic missile related activities. enhanced inspection act provisions for ships suspected of carrying prescribed goods such as weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile

parts. designation of new entities and goods for sanctions. and with than in the u. n. security council itself, improved mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of these sanctions which i think is very important. and so that is i think outlining a range of the actions that would take place, will take place and from which an order to retain -- obtain relief the north koreans will have to begin to comply with the earlier commitments and obligations. >> and if they don't? >> these measures won't go forward. as i stressed our strong preference is to engage in serious of active diplomacy with north korea and this is not something that the united states is doing on a unilateral basis. we are acting very much in concert with our two treaty allies, japan and the republic of south korea, and in concert with our partners in the six party process -- namely china

and russia. >> was -- what restraints are on at this point diplomatic route to being pursued? has there been a rebuttal of that? is there a lack of communication in response or is there some indication of this opening in the near-term? >> i think there has been no lack of communication of our concern and what we are prepared to do. north korea has been listening. we have some degree of confidence. so far we have had no effective response from north korea other than its fair assertion in about a month ago before their nuclear test that they were going to test another nuclear device because the u.n. security council had failed as they had demanded to apologize to north korea for its earlier actions. but so far there has not been any demonstrated willingness to

engage with the international community either through the u.n. or directly to this ex-parte process. >> what if this particular round of sanctions it elicits even further provocative response? >> well, obviously we are prepared to respond appropriately and i am really not at this time tables to go much beyond that. as i said in my prepared remarks, the united states will do what is necessary to do to defend u.s. national security and the security ever allies in the region. >> have the chinese -- i know from my conversations when i was there that i've been in touch, has there been any visit or any kind of high level of personal diplomacy in this effort at this

time? >> the chinese have been engaged in various kinds of diplomacy over the last several months with the north koreans. i'm not at this point prepared to comment on what they have done recently or might do in the future only to say that i think we and the chinese are agreed that we each have respectively in varied important role to play in trying to defuse the situation through diplomatic interaction. >> would you concur that the chinese response with respect to this particular test was both quicker and more intense and probable that has been in the past? >> yes. >> wish to further characterize the chinese concern in any way that might help us understand the options as we go forward? >> i think it is very fair to say that we found on our trip to the region and in bilateral consultations here and elsewhere with the chinese that they are deeply concerned about the prospect of a north korea the

continuing board with its nuclear program and with its ballistic missile program. >> have there been conversations similarly obviously there have been in terms of resolution, but in terms of and various other potential options and attitudes with respect to russia? >> well, russia to has shared that deep concern and has been actively collaborating and working together with us in the u.n. security council in accra to say that the b5 is probably more focus and energized and united on this that has been in the past? >> i am not a veteran of human activities but i could say that i'm impressed by the degree of focus that the b5 has bought to this particular problem including, of course, the other two who are actively engaged in this, namely japan and the republic of korea. >> what would it take, is there some precondition that is not public and on on asking to make

a public but is there any precondition with respect to how the united states is back to the table or north korea came tomorrow and send it to you want to have suspended talks, fine, would we be there and when they start? >> we have made it very clear that we are prepared to go back to the table any time the north koreans are. we are not the ones who have announced the withdrawal from the six party talks, that has been the north koreans. >> and would be bilateral and multilateral? >> the president and the secretary had made it clear we are prepared to engage bilaterally and it will bilaterally -- bilaterally within a multilateral context and i think we are prepared to be quite ambitious in both areas. >> in the past those talks were i believe focused on the nuclear issue. would there be willingness this

time to be more diverse with respect to the topics that might be discussed? would be all topics open? >> i think, in fact, all topics would be open and the nuclear issue remains the core from our point of view and i think that of the other partners in the six party process remains of the core of our focus, but my own belief strongly is that to deal in the long term with the problems that north korea poses requires that we brought in our focus beyond the nuclear question alone. north korea is a very weak state despite its boisterous activities in the area of nuclear technology and missiles and in order to achieve the kind of stability in northeast asia that is important for not only the countries of the region but, indeed, the countries of the world including specifically the united states, i think we have to address how we can help

number three and achieve greater economic success as long as it remains as weak as it is if there is a risk and it will generate instability throughout the region. we are also prepared as we have indicated in the past to talk with the north koreans about the normalization of our own relationship with them and we are prepared to talk with them together a chorus with our partners in the region about new arrangements that might be put in place to replace the armistice of 1953. all of these things are affectively interlinked, but again at the core of our concern and it cienega on nona of making progress is serious engagement by the number three is on the issue of the new car as ionization. >> in my opening comments i observed the multiplicity and motives with respect to a kim

jong il choices here. i wonder if he might comment on your perceptions as a veteran. >> i have had my pain and learn not to project my views of why north korea does things very actively. i think sometimes it's very difficult for people on the outside including myself to understand the motivations. i would only say mr. chairman that i think the various motivation's you put forth all make sense to me. >> well, i appreciate that. senator wicker, did you vote? >> i haven't, i would want to squeeze a few chairman -- a few questions then. >> find out how much time there is on love boat. >> i will walk slowly. [laughter] we will try to figure that out. in i have certainly gone over my time so i am happy to do that. we only have two minutes 40 on

the vote and i am happy as you know there is always a little -- >> i will risk if you don't mind mr. chairman. >> i'm delighted so if you would to an offer to senator lugar and i will go boat and tried to keep telling him i thank you, sir,. >> are you going to vote again? [laughter] >> i am going to vote yes, as a matter of fact,. >> let me mention an that there are other countries that are involved that we haven't touched upon at least. i have not heard them in the

course of our talks thus far. such as germany and italy and others who are involved in commercial relations among our nato at alliance. as i recall in this may be an oversimplification of a fierce, but at another juncture difficulty in negotiations may be before progress of the six party talks there were measures taken to the banking system's of various countries in the world in which apparently north korean assets deposits and the leadership of others were obstructed from being a value to them. and then seemed to have a greater effect at that point that many of the threats or pressures that are coming to diplomacy whether it be two did you end or other nations.

can you give us some insight as you take a look at that particular not then and with regard to the current number three in financial situation or that of its leadership as to what kind of pressure is involved in these terminations in the banking system of the country. >> that is a subject that we continue to examine. is a subject which is covered in part and least in the u.s. security council resolution which is now pending adoption in york and is one with which we are exchanging views with our partners and allies in the region. beyond that i am really not able to go very far at this point, senator. obviously we're looking at all mechanisms which would enable us to help to persuade north korea to come back to negotiating framework. >> without belaboring the issue can you describe from your own experience or your own history of the situation really how

those financial instruments work? in other words, as the public takes a look at this hearing tries to understand, something of that complex nature, why was this effective if you believe it was in the past with regard to it north korea? >> i can't really go into much detail on this not because i'm reluctant to comment because i was not involved in these efforts at that time. but i think we're looking at the possibility of additional measures which will be very carefully targeted and which would it as you suggest addressing the issues posed by specific number three in deposits and holdings outside of the country. obviously this becomes very complicated because north korea would have relationships with the banks and financial institutions of other countries and we have to be sure that we are coordinating this with those

governments, but this is clearly under the pending u.s. security council resolution and an area of activity we're going to look at seriously. >> is it your judgment of the security council resolution that clearly is being discussed were, in fact, to be favorably voted upon that other countries such as the ones i have mentioned or other european countries and others who have these dealings with feel bound to observe that. and other words convey find exceptions that would allow other commercial interests and their banking interest to proceed? >> i think on the whole my view is that they would be inclined to cooperate very strongly with the u.n. security council resolution and as i mentioned the new resolution when it adopted would create new

enforcement opportunities within the security council itself. >> in recent days it appears that after threats to south korea that commercial establishments 6 miles we're told from the dmz would be shut down with cooperation on both sides, if north koreans have relented in that pressure, is that your observation or what information can you give it in terms of the south korea north korea commercial? >> i am not sure i understand exactly what you are referring to, senator. if it is with regard to the industrial zone at quezon, then there are a number of conversations between the north and the south under way for some time we have followed those with interest and i think we would be

happy to get back to you as to where we think those are going. >> and mention in that may well be the name of decided that i have in mind, because it seemed in a moment the north koreans had been aggressive with regard and threatening military action there seemed to be some talks and negotiations proceedings which was interesting and in view of all the other provocative activities. >> my impression is that is correct and i do find it of interest and hopefully it will demonstrate willingness on the part of north korea to look at its own self-interest and make decisions based on that. >> what is your impression still following the economic sanction activity about the economy of the country? normal reports are that obviously many people throughout the country are sorely deprived

and many may be near starvation and our malnutrition of much of the time and this has led the international community to be cautious about economic sanctions particularly when they came with humanitarian situation such as food basically. but in the event that economic sanctions were to become complete what is the likely course of activity in the country at that point? is there an economy that is sufficient to prevent a revolt or others before they die and least having something to say about it? >> well, as you suggest north korean economy is in a desperate condition. it has been steadily going downhill since probably the early 1990's and its industrial output for example is now only a

fraction of what it my been in the late-1980s. is agricultural output is also been very difficult, in adequate to meet the needs of its own citizenry and number three has depended heavily on international contributions of foodstuffs to feed its own people. now, as you are aware, north korea about two months ago asked our humanitarian agencies, and organizations who were there to provide and deliver the food that the u.s. had agreed to and make available more asked to leave by the north american authorities so that food, that quantity of food is no longer being provided. we are concerned on humanitarian grounds about the condition of the north korean population. it is not good. now the country is covered by

such secrecy that one doesn't know exactly what the condition of all the population might be, but it is clear that diet is inadequate in terms of caloric intake and if they have a harvest that, for example, is not as good as a should be or as they hope it would be then the conditions deteriorated even further so we and our partners and other countries in the u.n. security council are very conscious of the need not to further punish the people of north korea and that is very much one of the things that guys us as we try to shape a policy that will respond to what the north korean government is doing and give us some possibility of improvement. >> thank you. i note the president -- senator

demint and in the absence of the chair i recognize him for his round of questions. >> thank you. senator lugar. ambassador bosworth, thank you for being here peridot and would like to have some questions specifically about the designation as states sponsor of terrorism for it north korea and with that designation might do to leverage some american goals. as you know, the new administration has not hesitated to point have a sense of the last administration yet when asked about reinstating the designation of a terrorist nation in the administration has appealed to the decision and that this made it last year about this time. as you know the bush

administration in an attempt to entice north korea the back to the negotiating table took north korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism and i am sure as you know that that designation allows us to freeze assets and pressure them another way is. since then it has been very obvious the north koreans have not honored that in any way. in fact, they have it expedited, expanded their development of nuclear weapons and they have tested it large nuclear-weapons, tested more missiles and have promised to test a missile that could reach our shores. last week about eight senators sent a letter to secretary clinton asking her to put north korea back on the state sponsors of terrorism. we have yet to receive and in the answer.

one that we heard in the press was that there is no evidence that there has been a new terrorist activity since they were taken off the list, but the point is they never ceased their terrorist activities. the most recent congressional research service pointed out that north korea has and continues to come lab -- collaborate with iran, syria as far as weapons distribution in supporting terrorism. nothing has changed about north korea except that we have taken the pressure off of them and it does seem that one of our best sources of leverage at this point is to put that pressure back on them and to do it quickly because north korea has not responded to our talk, our good will in any way except to expedite their whole mission of

being able to threaten most of the world so what is the hesitation to put north korea back on that terrorist list? >> thank you read much, as secretary clinton has said we take very seriously the calls by members of congress to read this in a north korea as a state sponsor of terror. as a legal matter in order to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism the secretary of state is only authorized to make a designation based on a determination that the government of a given country has repeatedly provided support for access to international terrorists and i can say unequivocably we will follow the provisions of that log completely. i would note that every designation of north korea as a state sponsor of terrorism would not result in any new material

penalty to the north koreans since many of the activities we are talking about are covered under other sanctions applied to north korea under other provisions of u.s. law. including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for delivering those. >> it does send a message to them and the world and that king highlights what we know has been going on continuously. there appears to be little doubt as i look to this congressional research research report that whether it is supporting activities of the iranian revolutionary guard or material support to the taliban, hezbollah, the shia militants and iraq, that this is serious provocation and it seems that we're holding our punches by not

calling it one and is into my encouragement would just be for us to take this seriously because when we lighten up on north korea by taking them off the list we did lineup on then we in a sense rewarding bad behavior hoping we would create good behavior and we got worse behavior than we had before. in makes absolutely no sense to continue with this and i think it basically iwo amplifies and growing sense of americans are a paper tiger full of talk and no action. it appears that this is maybe one of the few things we can do at this point that can actually put some pressure on them and if you say we're already doing all the things such as freezing their assets and the other economic sanctions that go along with this, the message it sends to the world is that we're getting serious of least in my

mind. >> i appreciate your thoughts and we will reflect on that and get back to you. i think as i said earlier the question is based on a legal determination as to whether a given country is repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. now we don't like in any way when many of the things that north korea is doing, has done, and we will continue to object to those and we will continue to sanction those as a program under u.s. law. >> well, i appreciate your bringing up the law because the threshold of law was met by north korea in both the bush administration and the obama administration, they admit that nothing ever changed, that this was only change as an enticement not because the bases to any of the activities. the legal threshold for being honest a sponsor of terrorism was met, they have been on that list since 1988, and there has never been any reason to take

them off from a legal perspective. it was a diplomatic move to take them off, so i hope we don't use that as an excuse not to move on this. but i will yield to your research on the issue. i am just looking as i'm sure you are as a way to appear more serious than rhetoric that what they are doing is a danger to the whole world right now. >> thank you again for being here with us. i yield back. >> in the absence of the chair i recognize senator demint but i will yield the chair now to senator feingold and recognize him for his question. >> i think he senator lugar. let me do around here myself, i am very pleased of this hearing is being held. it's been quite some time since the committee has explored this issue and one that i think we can all agree remains one of the greatest on just for a national security. although we did appear to make some initial headway at the end of last administration it is

clear from north korea's recent provocations we have not yet found a lasting solution. as the situation on the korean peninsula continues to deteriorate the u.s. needs to take a central role in determining how best to engage p'yongyang and also send a clear message to north korea cannot use illicit weapons programs, demand concessions from the international committee of monorchid the arrest american citizens are apparently trumped up charges and find them guilty in a closed-door trial. these actions will only invite further isolation, greater hardship for the north korean people and the chorus continued rejection by the international community. i am pleased that president obama is seeking to engage meaningfully on this issue in the administration is working with many of our friends and allies in the region and that the united nations to craft a strong multilateral response. the stakes are far too high for an ad hoc uncoordinated policy and we must mak c