the letter of tit-for-tat and perhaps undermine the ability to get to the table where you need to do the constructive work for diplomacy? >> alright. >> if it applies. >> in terms of getting back to the table, i think everyone wants to get back to the table. the only way we get closer to anything resembling a freeze on the cap of the capabilities is for negotiation, so as bad as that might seem at the current moment it is something we eventually have to get back to. having been a part of these negotiations for about three years, as a deputy head of delegation, i can tell you sir that i have little confidence the north koreans are willing to give up all of their nuclear weapons. i think they are willing to give up some of them. for all of the things we have talked about, assistance,

normalization, a peace treaty but in the end they are not willing to give up all of them. that is a difficult thing for negotiator to have to deal with as they go into a negotiation and yet you still have to have negotiation because he wants to be able to degrade their program. on the question of the terrorism list, there are legal criteria for being put on and taken off this list. but i think it is also fair to say it is also, there are also political, there's the political environment in which a discussion of putting a country on are taking them off the list is quite relevant and i think when north korea was taken off the list, there were criteria that justified their being taken off the list but there was also a broader framework in which that was happening and which many people expected the north koreans would live up to their end of the second phase of the six-party agreement, the verification protocol, and they

did not. as you know well, they are threatening a third nuclear test in most recently they have taken these two americans and threatened to throw them for 12 years into a labor camp. that is not the right political environment, so i would appeal both on legal grounds as well as on the larger political grounds. >> senator lugar. >> mr. cha, dimensions in 2005 other countries voluntarily froze north korean assets. we had a similar situation in macau. that is important because you point out if in fact we had a security council resolution, and clearly a multinational, international idea here, that the sanctions at least through that forum would be much more comprehensive and complete. and the affected leadership,

which is important. i suspect we can make some headway with some of the followers, but the leadership is what counts unfortunately at this particular moment, even thinking about negotiations. i am really struck by the fact that after the negotiations we have been involved then, after pyongyang is disassembled then so forth this reversal is really striking and then beyond that, nuclear tests, missiles flying over japan and all the rest of it. we can speculate whether they are having an internal problem politically but the effects on the rest of the world are very severe, and that would be in favor really of moving very strongly toward the economic sanctions route, but i think that may be a difference and that is why we got to the table to begin with. in fact, there has not been much movement prior to that point but i am also intrigued by your

thought about an inspection machine. describer loop what is a counterproliferation regime means or how that is set up. >> the first point on that senator lugar is, as you know well, for denuclearization we need a negotiation. we don't have the negotiation we have to focus on counterproliferation and what often gets missed in the media discussion of the inspection regime is they focus on the high seas intersection, where a comprehensive inspection regime, that would be one small piece. the bigger areas with the cooperation by the chinese and russians at ports in terms of container cargo, in terms of the practice of bunkering at third country ports as vessels that may be carrying that north korean things need to stop on the way to their final destination. if all of these things become part of the u.n. security

council resolution and then as ambassador bosworth said there is a monitoring mechanism within the u.n. security council of countries who are abiding by it, that would be much more effective way of trying to counterproliferation then it the united states on its own, as we were doing during the bush administration, tries to individually persuade countries to do this. that was a much harder route and they think this process would be much more effective and would position the united states much better. >> i agree and it seems to me the central diplomacy for the moment, as with the rest of the world. into chorus we may get some diplomacy because the north koreans to find it necessary, but our job right al is the security council, to make certain that if we go the economic thanking rouch or if we try to set up a non-proliferation, dodd and said the north koreans are gaining

revenue from, their major exports appear to be through these very dangerous substances, information weapons, so this is another essential cut off in a very important one in terms of the security of the rest of the world quite apart from whether we get to the table with the north koreans, just in terms of our own safety and others in the process of all of this. that is why it seems to be your idea of counterproliferation really need more explanation on your part, perhaps some greater information. to give us some out lines in terms of our own thinking of how these things work. so the american people understand how the work. at the end of the day the north koreans leadership may still say, we are simply going to keep threatening the world, as they are. their climbing if we put any of these sanctions on, we can expect more on their part.

this is not a real shame that looks to me like it's headed to the table happily and willingly and as you are saying even if we got to the table the reticence to give up all nuclear weapons have some accountability for this. you think it is clearly a place too far. wide you reach that conclusion? >> i feel as though, and this is and just the second term of the bush administration. we have been negotiating with north korea for some 16 years. evans revere and others have been involved in this process during the clinton administration. there been several high-level on voice and yet this process leads us only to the point where we got at the end of the bush administration of the phrase and then beginning a process of disablement. in spite of the fact that all of the things the north has thus far have been put on the table, peace treaty, normalization, economic and energy assistance,

and negative security insurance in the 2005 joint statement which says the united states will not attack north korea with nuclear conventional weapons. so what security was driving their need for nuclear weapons, the negative security insurance and everything that came with the political and material incentives should at least offer them enough of an incentive to push harder for word on the process yet in our negotiations they continue to falter when we got to the most crucial moments. >> thanks. >> if i might, senator, without taking issue at all what port inspections and other thing is, i think we really have to keep our eye on the plutonium. the north has saved likely response, nothing certain about the north, to what is going on right now which is to restart the reactor ed pyong yong, which would generate more plutonium.

i think we have to try to prevent that from happening and i don't know a better way than negotiation. i think we can't risk a war here. we have seoul as a hostage, and i think, if you keep your eye on plutonium, right now they have a very limited supply. limited enough so that they had to reprocess in order to have enough for another test. they are going to have to test the more it they want to prove their weapon. i think we have some very serious mistakes here that go beyond the narrow issue of plutonium. think about in unconstrained north korean nuclear program and its effects on the politics of japan and how that plays back into the politics of china. that is the real security risk to the united states of america and i don't know any other way to stop it, guaranteed it might

not work, then through the negotiating process. >> i say respectfully professor of course we want negotiations. the whole point we are making is the north koreans have deliberately walked away from it, have shut missiles across japan and its donough nuclear test. of course we want negotiation but until we really do something as an international community i don't see much movement in that respect. thank you. >> thank you senator lugar. senator corker. >> thank you mr. chairman for this timely hearing. obviously sends mr. sigal, professor sigal that you think that outline that mr. cha is put forth is counterproductive. >> i did not say that. >> so you think the broadness of sort of keeping proliferation from occurring is that is too broad and we ought to focus on the on plutonium?

>> what i am saying is you have to do both. we need to be able to in peter the north from getting things it needs, to make more nuclear weapons and missiles and from sending things. we do need to do that, but we can't stop there nor should we consider that the pressure we are putting on them now will have the immediate effect of stopping them from making more plutonium. that is the part of our problem. i have no objection to part of what he said. i think we have to do that and i am glad that the chinese are willing to join with us but we should not see that as the solution. i think if i heard ambassador bosworth say this, i think that is his view as well. i think that is the administration's you if i heard it correctly. i think that it's very important here and it is very hard. there is no grounds for

optimism. we don't have an alternative. >> eyes sense your concern about war. you talk about themselves so it seems to me that there is a slight variation in what you are saying. what is it you think, you talk about mr. cha's effort or what he has put forth and how you feel that may lead to wars so it sounds like to me-- >> i am sorry, i didn't mean to be misunderstood that way. i think if you are trying to get rid of the plutonium facility by attacking it, that is a risk. that is a different thing from-- >> i would be pretty sure that would lead to war. let me ask you this. what is it that we have specifically that you think they truly want at this time? i guess i hear you talking about

the security issue. certainly it seems to me that their actions do not indicate creating a partnership with our country as it relates to their security is what they are trying to achieve so that does not seem saying that they would take the course they are taking it that is their objective. so, could you outline what you truly think they are after that we have today? maybe they are going a circuitous route and i am missing something but what is the today you think they are after that we have? >> what this has been about, and you do not know if it is still about that, what they have told u.s. officials, the earliest i know is 1999. they told arnold cantor that, under secretary of state in the bush years, was the one it a strategic-- they wanted to be our allies to put it in plain english. that was the way for them to get

security. do they still want that? i do not know, but if you think about it, if you put yourself, and it is very hard to do, put yourself in kim jong-il's shoes. hauck and he feels secure? to nuclear weapons alone making keele? that the is a fundamental new relationship with us, japan and south korea that is a different story. but he can count on that, and he has seen that we have been reluctant to move that way and therefore, he keeps threatening us with the nuclear, but in the end if you look, why what we can't have a good explanation of the if we think it is just about nuclear weapons is, why did he limit his production of plutonium over these years? it is very hard to understand. it is very hard to understand why the north koreans have not

tested missiles over and over again until they have reliable missiles. they certainly have the capacity to do that. something else is going on here and what i don't know is, is it still going on? we have to find out. >> ms. lindbergh, the notion of talking about prosperity in the year 2012 from his point of view, what was your experiences and side, what was your experience inside the country and your sense of his desire if you will, based on what you saw in working with these other groups, that there was a better well-being if you will for the citizens of this country? >> from the perspective of the last 13 years there's no question north korea's better off than it was in the mid 90s when they were gripped with a very serious famine. things have definitely improved since then but as i have noted there is still a significant food insecurity particularly

when you going to the rural areas, which is what our programs have focused on. >> but, is there any-- this would be-- is there any sense within the agencies that there is any desire on the part of the leadership of north korea that the standard of living, the quality of life, that the people who were living there, that they are even concerned about that? is there any sense of that with that country? >> we are not dealing at the highest political levels so i would actually defer to my colleagues who may have better informed opinions and i do on that. >> mr. revere? >> over the years in discussions with fairly senior dprk officials, we have repeatedly encountered opportunities in which we have discussed the welfare of their people into america's desire to help, and it was my experience over the years that at least the people we were dealing with were genuinely

concerned about the welfare of their people. many of the negotiations i participated in in the past focused on the issue of food assistance and humanitarian assistance and new projects designed in helping the north korean people. and i would say i never encountered a dprk official who brushed aside the needs of their people. the people that we were dealing with, the officials we were dealing with took this very seriously, so seriously that hours and hours and hours of negotiations were devoted to this topic of how can we best improve the lives of their people. >> actually center corker, i could just add on to that, it is undeniable the recent food program which is conducted at high levels of approval and support and that was in and of itself but think important evidence of the desire for ensuring there was well-being.

>> mr. chairman thank you and i thank each of you. >> we need to wrap up in a couple of minutes. just one question. the proliferation threat is the threat to the united states of america right now, barring some missile development that we are not aware of. but even then, strategically, fundamentally, proliferation issues are a challenge to us. china, however, russia, south korea and japan has far more immediate and frankly pressing strategic concerns. why can they not summon a stronger response, given their surrounding cloud and already existing leverage, particularly china?

mr. revere? >> senator i have been talking with the chinese since the late '70s about north korea, and i find today a remarkable difference in the tone and content of our dialogue with the chinese, my conversations with the chinese from those days. i find more and more chinese officials, but particularly senior think-tank representative and former officials with whom i have had long relationships, looking at north korea in a different way today. i have had a couple of chinese officials actually use that term security liability in their descriptions of north korea today. that is the remarkable thing for even the official chinese to say. the bottom line to this is i think attitudes in beijing are changing. we are starting to see op-eds, we are starting to see publications come out clearly

passed dprk. i think we are an important turning point in terms of chinese attitudes towards north korea. i don't want to overstate this but i think we are at a turning point. one final point on japan. japan has been very much focused on one issue in recent years, the abduction issue, a serious, emotional and important issue yes but i think it is focused to such a degree on that issue it is not focused as much attention as it should on immediate an important threats to japan such as north korean missiles. when the united states started to move away from fulfilling our part of the bargain on the missile moratorium that prevented north korea from launching medium and long-range ballistic missiles for the better part of seven years, we did not hear a great price of the opposition and anger that i had expected we would hear. that was very unfortunate and one of the things i hope we do when we get back to the table,

and i believe the will to give back to the table with the dprk, is but the missile agenda back on the table. >> did you have a comment? >> no, i just, one thing with respect to china. i don't think fundamental chinese interests have changed yet. and stability is a problem, not simply ngs and i think that means that to expect china for instance, as some people hoped four, to cut off all food and fuel to north korea is to make it act country to its interest and i would say i think the chairman and certainly senator lugar knows this is hardly the time to put our relations with china in jeopardy over north korea. if we push it too hard, but china is going to do a lot more i think to get tough with north korea and we will not only see

it but they are going to do that. that i agree totally with evans. >> i don't think, i don't think we are going to put our relationship in jeopardy over. i don't think we are going to need to. you know, it is interesting in diplomacy and international relations, sometimes the biggest opportunities are staring you in the face when things looked bleak is. i do not agree that, just because of all this saber rattling and internal succession game going on and so forth, i am not come up i am not frankly-- i am concerned about the proliferation issue but i am not concerned there is an impasse that we can't get over or there isn't the way to get back there. i think there are mistakes that have been made on our side of the fence over the last few years too and they don't get heralded enough, but there were

some promises made about certain things being delivered that were never delivered. there were misinterpretations about communication. the post-9/11 atmosphere altered the axis of evil and other kinds of things. iraq had perceptions of regime change and other countries. the lot of attitudes shifted and people responded to those things. personally i believe that if we behave as confidently as we ought to given the superiority of a number of strategic fronts in which we are sitting here, not to mention the presence of russia, china, south korea and south korea and china alone are enormously strong and we will remain committed to south korea's strength. we have got a lot of cards to play here, so i am really quite confident that if we played them intelligently, i think north korea's longer term interests

with respect to a security arrangement, a treaty, not an armistice from 53 biden understanding of where we go, and economic future, i think there are ways to get through this, so i think the key here is to get back to the table and not do things that make it harder to get their rather than easier. so, that is just a quick summary take. i think your views have been helpful and important. it has been good to hear this and we have a distinguished visitor coming in about five minutes so we have got to get over to the capitol to meet him. i will leave the record open for a week for colleagues who would like to submit any questions, and we will certainly, if you want to articulate any further, in answer to what i just said or anything any senator said we and by that because we like to have as complete a record as possible. we may just follow up with you

to that effect. thank you very much. i think it has been very helpful. we stand adjourned.

>> how is c-span funded? >> i have no clue. >> may be some government grants. >> i would say donations. >> advertising for products. >> public money i am sure. >> my taxes? >> how is c-span funded? 30 years ago america's cable companies created c-span is the public service, a private business initiative, no government mandate, no government money. >> now a conversation with louisiana senator mary subeleven and member of the natural resources committee. she was a guest on today's washington journal. this is about 30 minutes. >> host: what did your energy committee recently due? >> guest: we have been doing a lot. the committee has been very busy lately trying to find a path forward for energy security and renewable energy for america,

and it has been a theory he did in tufts today, not necessarily republican versus democrat but region versus region which is how these energy debates go so it has been very interesting. >> host: you just recently passed out a bill on drilling. >> guest: we have not actually passed it up. we voted on oil and gas drilling because there is a major bill that has many titles to it and the main title is renewable electricity standard, trying to get our electricity. we are right now using mostly coal and gas to produce electricity. some people, including myself, would like to see some alternatives but it is the way we treat the traditional sources of energy that have some of us concerned because as you know millions of people are employed in the coal industry and the oil and gas industry. we think that we can clean a lot of those industries up, make them more efficient and provide renewable electricity subthat is what the debate is about.

yesterday we talked about opening offshore oil and gas drilling in america which to me makes perfect sense, because we have saudi arabia to increase their production to help us out when prices go too high. the lease we can do is produce more ourselves, so we had a pretty good vote yesterday opening up more for drilling, but it did not include revenue sharing which is very important for coastal states. >> host: but, are you satisfied with the fact that you had a vote on drilling and it opened it up more? >> guest: i am halfway satisfied. i think we are moving in the right direction, moving towards more domestic drilling again. it is kind of shameful that we sent letters asking people of around the world to increase oil and gas drilling and yet won't do it here at home so and that i am happy, but on the downside peter, interior states since

1920, have received a portion of the taxes that the industry pays to the government, the state keep 50%, and send 50% to the federal government which makes perfect sense to me. it is the partnership between the states and government to produce resources for the american people. we don't have that same option on the coast than that is really might major issue. for 50% of the american people that live along the coast, if they think that there could be some oil and gas drilling safely off their coast, i believe those communities should share in the revenues. >> host: senators landrieu you brought a map along. >> guest: this map is actually the gulf of mexico, as uchitelle and the gulf is divided into three different areas, the western planning area, the low taxes, the central belleau mississipians louisianans and the eastern. the little spots of the middle are what