the united@@ @ rr$rr pressure on north korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. the choices for the future art north korea's. thank you again and for inviting me to testify today. before iespo thank you for inviting me to testify, before i respond to your questions i would like to mention it humanitarian matter that is not related to the

political and security issues. the conviction and sentencing of 2 american journalists in kong yang. as secretary clinton said, we appeal to north korean authorities on humanitarian grounds to release these 2 women and return them to their families. due to privacy considerations i am not able to answer questions about citizens in this public hearing but the department of state and the secretary of state appreciate the interest we receive from members of congress. we are pursuing every possible approach in order to persuade the north koreans to release and send these women home. i look forward to the question of the committee. >> will there be an opportunity for the committee to be briefed in an executive session with regard to the detainees? >> the easiest thing will be on

telephone, i am confident you'll get your briefing or call the ambassador outside the proceeding. i see we have a vote that has started. what i think we will do if you are willing. we could not interrupt the proceedings. thank you. i want to see if we can flush this out of a little bit. we talk about consequences, we talked about challenge to order, how this must be addressed.

how these are provocative steps. you said they must reverse their actions and our policy is verifiable. you have been very clear about how we react to this and what our bowl is. i want to understand all little better what the range of consequences might be. maybe you could even share with us some framework of these discussions in new york, in committee, what we are anticipating. >> i will try. with regard to the discussions in new york, the security council is considering a new

resolution, imposing unprecedented new measures, reducing the threat posed by the missile and nuclear proliferation activities. and to compel that country to political dialogue. these measures will give the international community some new tools to work with on the problem of north korea. it would include a total ban on arms exports and a major expansion of imports, new financial sanctions to limit the funding of weapons of mass destruction. an enhanced inspection, prescribe goods such as weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile parts. designation of new entities and

sanctions, and within the u. n. security council, improved mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of these sections which i think is very important. so that outlines a range of actions that will take place, from which, in order to obtain relief, north koreans will have to comply with their earlier obligations. these measures will go forward. our strong preferences to engage serious diplomacy with north korea, this is not something the united states is doing on a unilateral basis, we are acting in concert with our 2 treaty allies and the republic of south coriander in concert with partners in the 6 party process, china and russia.

>> what restraints are there, at has there been a rebuttal? is there a lack of prevention? is there some opening in the near-term? >> there has been no lack of communication of our concern and what we are prepared to do. north korea has been listening to some degree of confidence. we have had no effective response from north korea other than their assertion about a month ago before their nuclear tests, that they were going to test other nuclear devices because the un security council failed as they demanded to apologize for its earlier actions. so far there has not been any demonstrated willingness to engage with the international

community with the un or the 6 party process. >> what about this round of sanctions? further provocative response? >> we are prepared to respond appropriately. as i said in my prepared remarks, the united states will do what is necessary to do to defend u.s. national security and the security of our allies in the region. >> have the chinese, i know from my conversations, they have been in touch. has there been any visit, personal diplomacy in this effort at this time? >> the chinese have been engaged in various kinds of diplomacy

with the north koreans. i am not prepared to comment on what they might have done recently or what they might be doing in the future. only to say that we are agreed that we each have a very important role to play in trying to defuse the situation through diplomatic interaction. >> would you concur the chinese response to this task was quicker and more intense than it has been in the u.s.? would you characterize the chinese concern in a way that might help us to understand our options? >> it is fair to say that we found our trip to the region and bilateral confrontations, we are deeply concerned. north korea continuing forward with its nuclear program and its

ballistic missile program. >> in terms of the resolution. >> russia has shared that deep concern and has been actively collaborating and working together in the u. n. security council. >> it is probably more focused and energized and united on this than it has been in the past? >> i am not a veteran of the un activities but i am impressed by the degree of focus in this particular program including the other 2 who are actively engaged in this, namely japan and the republic of korea. >> is there some precondition that is not public. is there any precondition with respect with how the united

states, north korea came back tomorrow, search party talks. would they start? >> we made it clear we are prepared to go back to the table whenever the north koreans are. we have not announced withdrawal from 6 party talks. that has been the north koreans. >> would be bilateral or multilateral? >> the president and secretary made it clear that we are prepared to engage bilaterally, and within a multilateral context, we are prepared to be quite ambitious in both areas. >> in the past, those talks were focused on the nuclear issue. would there be a willingness to be more diverse with respect to

the topics that might be discussed? >> all topics would be open. the nuclear issue remains the core from our point of view and our partners in the 6 party process remain in the process. my belief is to deal in the long term with the problems north korea poses requires that we broaden our focus beyond the nuclear question alone. north korea is a very weak steak despite its boisterous activities in the area of nuclear technology and missiles. in order to achieve the stability in northeast asia that is important for not only the countries of that region but the country's, including the united states, we have to address how we can help north korea achieve greater economic success.

as long as it remains as weak as it is there is a risk that it will generate instability throughout the region. we are prepared, as we indicated in the past, talk with the north koreans about the normalization of our own relationship. and we are prepared to talk with them, together with our partners in the region, about new arrangements that might replace the armistice of 1953. these things are interlinked. the core of our concern is serious engagement by the north koreans on the issue of denuc a denuclearization . >> i observed the motives with respect to kim jong il's

choices. comment on your perceptions. >> i have learned not to project my views of why north korea does things very actively. sometimes it is very difficult for people on the outside including myself to understand their motivations. i will only say the various motivation's you put forth will make sense to me. >> did you already vote? >> i will try to squeeze a question or 2 in. if you walk slowly, mr. chairman. >> find out how much time there is on the vote. we will try to figure that out. i got over my time. we only have 2 minutes. i am happy. >> i will risk it if you don't

mind. >> i am delighted. if you would turn it over to senator lugar when he comes back, we will try to keep going. >> thank you. >> i you going to vote against? >> i am going to vote yes, as a matter of fact. >> it was worth a try. let me mention there are other countries we haven't touched upon. i have not heard them in the course of our talks, germany and

italy, others who are involved in commercial relations among the nato alliance. as i recall, this may be an oversimplification, at another juncture of difficulty in negotiations before progress at the 6 party talks, there were measures taken for the banking systems of various countries in the world, in which apparently north korean assets because of the leadership of others, were obstructed from being a value to them. that seemed to have a greater effect at that point than many of the threats or pressures coming through diplomacy to the un or other nations. can you give us some insight, as you look at that particular

method with regard to the current north korean situation or that of its leadership as to what kind of pressure is involved, these terminations of the banking system? >> that is a subject we continue to examine, a subject which is covered in part by the u. n. security council resolution which is pending adoption in new york. it is one which we are exchanging views with our partners and allies in the region. i am not able to go very far at this point. we are looking at all mechanisms which would enable us to help to persuade north korea to come back to a negotiating framework. >> can you describe from your own experience or your own history of this situation how those financial instruments

worked? as the public looks at this and tries to wonder stand something of that complex nature, why was this effective in regard to north korea? >> i can't go into much detail on this. not because i am reluctant to comment, but because i was not involved in these efforts at this time. we are looking at the possibility of additional measures which will be targeted, and which would, as you suggest, address the issues of specific north korean deposits and holdings outside the country. this becomes very complicated because north korea would have relationships with banks and financial institutions of other countries, we have to be sure we are coordinating this with those governments. but this is particularly under

the pending un security council resolution, this is an airy as if to the -- of activity we're looking at seriously. >> the security council resolution being discussed, favorably voted upon. we feel bound to expose that. could they find exceptions that would allow their commercial interests, they're banking interests, proceed? >> my view is they would be inclined to cooperate strongly with the un security council resolution. the new resolution would, if adopted, create new enforcement opportunities within the

security council itself. >> in recent days, it has appeared that after threats to south korea, commercial and establishments, 6 miles from the dmz, the cooperation on north sides, they relented that pressure. is that your observation? what observation can you give in terms of south korea/north korea? >> i am not sure i understand what you are referring to, with regard to the industrial loan. there have been a number of conversations between the north and south for some time. we follow those with interest and we would be happy to get back to you as to where those are going.

>> that may well be the name of the site. because it appeared at a moment when north korea was very aggressive with regard to south korea. there were some talks and negotiations proceeding. it was interesting in view of the other measures. >> my impression is that is correct. i find it of some interest and it will demonstrate a willingness on the part of north korea to look at its own self-interest and make decisions based on that. >> what is your impressions so far following the economic sanctions activity about the economy of the country? normal reports, many people throughout the country are sorely deprived, near starvation, malnutrition much of

the time. this has led the international community to be cautious about economic sanctions particularly with humanitarian situations. but in the event that economic sanctions were to become complete, what is the likely course? is there an economy that is efficient to prevent revolt? at least having something to say? >> it is in a desperate condition, steadily going downhill since the early 1990s and the industrial output is only a fraction of what it was in the 1980s.

its agricultural output is very difficult. it has been inadequate to meet the needs of its own citizens and north korea has depended heavily on international contributions to feed its own people. as you are aware, north korea a few months ago asked our humanitarian agencies, and organizations who were there, to provide, to deliver the food u.s. had agreed to make available, were asked to leave by the north korean authorities. that quantity of food is no longer being provided. we are concerned on humanitarian grounds, about the condition of the north korean population. it is not good. the country is covered by such secrecy that one doesn't know exactly what the condition of

all the population might be, but it is clear that diet is inadequate in terms of caloric intake, and if they have a harvest that is not as good as it should be or they hope it would be, the conditions deteriorated even further. we and our partners and other countries in the u. n. security council are very conscious of the need not to further punish the people of north korea. that is one of the things that guides us as we try to shape a policy to respond to what the north korean government is doing and give us some possibility for improvement. >> in the absence of the chair, i recognize the senator for his

round of questions. >> thank you. thank you for being here. i would like to ask some questions, specifically about the designation as a state sponsor of terrorism for north korea and what that designation might do to leverage some american goals. the new administration has not hesitated to point out the mistakes of the lasted ministration, yet when asked about reinstating the designation of a terrorist nation, the administration has appealed the decision that. made about this time last year, the bush administration, in an attempt to entice north korea

back to the negotiating table, took north korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism and that designation allowed us to freeze assets and pressure them in other ways. since then, it has been obvious the north koreans have not honored that in any way and they have expedited, expanded their development of nuclear weapons, they have tested large nuclear weapons, tested more missiles and promised to test a missile that could reach our shores. last week, 8 senators sent a letter to secretary clinton asking her to put north korea -- we have yet to receive an answer, one that we heard in the

press, there's no evidence that there has been new terrorist activity since they were taken off of the list but the point is they never ceased their terrorist activities. the most recent congressional research service pointed out that north korea has, and continues, collaborate with iran and syria as far as weapons distribution, supporting terrorism. nothing has changed about north korea accept we have taken the fresher off of them. one of our best sources of leverage at this point is to put that pressure back on them and to do it quickly because north korea has not responded to our talk, our good will in any way, except for the whole mission of threatening the rest of the

world. what is the hesitation to put north korea back on the terrorist list? >> as secretary clinton has said, we take very seriously calls by members of congress to read designate north korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. as a legal matter, in order to designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, the secretary of state is only authorized to make a designation based on a determination that the government of a given country has provided support for acts of international terrorism. we will follow the provisions completely. ab designation of north korea as a state sponsor of terrorism would not result in any new material penalty since many of the activities we are talking

about are covered under other sanctions applied to north korea under other provisions of u.s. law. including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for delivering those. >> it does send a message to them and the world and highlights what we know has been going on, what continues to go on. there is little doubt as i look through this report, whether it is supporting activities of the revolutionary guard or material support to the taliban, militants in iraq, serious provocation. it seems we are holding our punches by not calling it what

is. my encouragement would be for us to take this seriously. when we take them off the list, we rewarded bad behavior hoping to create good behavior and we got worse behavior than we ever had before. it makes no sense to continue with this and it amplifies a growing sense that americans are a paper tiger, full of talk and no action. it appears that this is one of the few things we could do at this point to put pressure on them. if you say we are already doing things like freezing their assets and the economic sanctions, the message it sends to the world is we are getting serious, at least in my mind. >> we will reflect on that and