>> i don't know. i think it is possible to see what we have as a man who's trying to force us to be his friend. doesn't trust us. has somewhat reasonable grounds for not always trusting us. much weaker country. and a korean tradition where for centuries korean leaders have made deals with the key neighbors rather than standing up to them. what his father did and what he did partly to legitimate their rule is we are standing up to all the great powers. that's very bad if he chooses to do it just with weapons. but as colin powell put it very well, you can't eat plutonium. if he chooses simply to stand up to the other powers, simply to

go for strength and not for prosperity, that's not a very good solution for him. and it's certainly not a good solution for his successor whenever that person takes power down the road. so kim jong-il needs to move. >> so if any of you can respond to this question. is there any danger at all that in -- just going back to the table and pursuing this other route which i think you have to do it 'cause i don't think you have many choices. what is the danger level with respect to the reward of that behavior argument? >> well, clearly what we want to do is reward good behavior. and you only do things where, as i suggested with one kind of series of steps, you only do things when they do things that you want them to and you structure the deals that way. the fact is we didn't always do

that and that's a sad fact here. north korean behavior is inexcusable. what they're doing now, i don't have to tell you is harmful to them, harmful to us. above all, harmful to our alliance relationships down the road, which is a very important reason why we have to get back to this negotiating table and see what we can get. >> the flip side of that question, mr. cha, sort of goes to your proposal with respect to redesignating them as a terrorist country. first of all, are there not specific legal standards that apply to that designation? and do not these steps he's taken fall outside of them but equally importantly, wouldn't that designation at this moment in time potentially just escalate the ladder of tit for tat and perhaps undermine the ability to get to the table where you need to do the

constructive work for diplomacy? >> well -- >> if it applies. >> right. well, in terms of getting back to the table, i think everybody wants to get back to the table. the only way we get closer to anything resembling a freeze and a cap on the capabilities is through negotiation. so as bad as that might seem at the current moment, it's something that we eventually have to get back to. you know, having been a part of these negotiations for about three years, as our deputy head of delegation, i can tell you, sir, that i have very little confidence that the north koreans are willing to give up all of their nuclear weapons. i think they're willing to give up some of them. for all the things that we've talked about, assistance, normalization, peace treaty, but in the end they're not willing to give up all of them. and that's a difficult thing for a negotiator to have to deal with as they go into a

negotiation. yet, you still have to have negotiation 'cause you want to maintain a cap, freeze, disable and be able to degrade their program. on the question of the terrorism list, there are legal criteria for being put on and taken off this list. but i think it's also fair to say that it is also -- there are also political -- there's a political environment in which a discussion of putting a country on or taking them off the list is quite relevant. and i think when north korea was taken off the list, there were criteria that justified their being taken off the list but there was also a broader framework in which that was happening in which many people expected the north koreans would live up to their end of the second phase of the six-party agreement, the investigation -- verification protocol and they did not. they did a second nuclear test. they are threatening a third nuclear test and most recently they've taken these two

americans. and threatened to throw them for 12 years into a labor camp. that's not the right political environment. and so i would appeal both on legal grounds as well as on the larger political grounds. >> senator lugar? >> mr. cha, you mentioned in 2005 other countries voluntarily froze north korean assets. we had the single situation in macau. it's important because you point out if, in fact, we had a security council resolution and clearly a multinational, international idea here, that the sanctions, at least through that form would be much more comprehensive and complete. and that they affect the leadership, which is important. i suspect we can make some headway with some of the followers, but the leadership is

what counts, unfortunately, at this particular moment, even thinking about negotiations. i'm really truck by the fact after the negotiations we've been involved in and as yongbyon is partially disassembled and so forth this reversal is really striking and beyond that, a nuclear test, missiles flying over japan and all the rest of it, we can speculate whether they're having an internal problem politically but the affects on the rest of the world is very severe. and i would be in favor, really, of moving very strongly toward the economic sanction route but i think that -- i think that's why we got to the table to begin with. there's not been much movement prior to that point but i'm also intrigued by your thought about an inspection regime. i'll describe -- a counterproliferation regime means and how that is set up.

>> well, i mean, the first point on that, senator lugar, is as you know well -- i mean, for denuclearization we need a negotiation. if we don't have a negotiation we have to focused on counterproliferation. and what gets missed in the media discussion in the inspection regime is they focus on the high seas interception, where a comprehensive inspection regime, that would just be one small piece. the bigger areas would be the cooperation by the chinese and russians at ports in terms of container cargo, in terms of the practice of bunkering at third country ports as vessels that may be carrying bad north korean things need to stop on their way to their final destination. if all of these things become part of a u.n. security council resolution and then as ambassador bosworth said there is an enforcement or a monitoring mechanism within the u.n. security council of countries who are abiding by it, that would be a much more

effective way of trying to counter proliferation than if the united states on its own, as we were doing during the bush administration trying to go out individually and persuade countries to do this. that was a much harder route. and i think this process would be much more effective and would position the united states much better. >> i agree. and it seems to essential diplomacy with all the rest of the world and in due course we may get some diplomacy because the north koreans do find it necessary but our job right now is the security council to make sense if we go the economic banking route because after all, the items that the north koreans are getting revenue from, their major exports appear to be through these very dangerous

substances, information weapons. so this is another essential cutoff and a very important one in terms of the security of the rest of the world. quite apart from whether we ever get to the table with the north koreans just in terms of our own safety and others in the process of all of this. and that's why it seems to me your idea of the counter-proliferation regime really needs some more explanation on your parts, perhaps some greater information. if you've published such -- to give us some outlines in terms of our own thinking of how these things work so the american people understand how they work. now, at the end of the day the north koreans' leadership may still say we're going to keep threatening the world as they are. they're claiming if we put any of these sanctions on, you can expect war on their part. this is not a regime that looks to me like it's headed to the table happily and willingly. and as you're saying, even if we got to the table, the reticence

to give up all nuclear weapons have some accountability for this. you think is clearly a place too far. why do you reach that conclusion? >> i feel as though -- and this isn't just the second term of the bush administration. we've been negotiating with north korea for some 16 years. evans revere and others have been involved in this process during the clinton administration. there have been several high-level envoys that have gone to north korea and yet this process still leads us only to the point where we got at the end of the bush administration of a freeze and then beginning a process of disablement. in spite of the fact that all the things the north has asked for has been -- have been put on the table, peace treaty, normalization, economic and energy assistance, a negative security assurance in the 2005 joint statement which says that the united states will not attack north korea with nuclear conventional weapons. if security was driving their

need for nuclear weapons, the negative security assurance and everything that came with the political and material incentives should at least offer them enough of an incentive to push harder forward on the process, yet, in our negotiations, they continue to falter when we got to the most crucial moments. >> thank you. >> if i might, senator, without taking issue at all with port inspections and other things, i think we really have to keep our eye on the plutonium. the north has a likely response, nothing certain about the north, to what's going on right now which is to restart the reactor at yongbyon which would generate more plutonium. i think we have to try to prevent that from happening. i don't know a better way than negotiation.

i think we can't risk a war here. we have sold as a hostage. if you keep your eye on plutonium, right now they had a limited supply and limited enough to have another test. i think we have some very serious stakes here that go beyond the narrow issue of the plutonium. think about an unconstrained north korean nuclear program and its affects on the politics of japan and how that plays back into the politics of china. that is the real security risk to the united states of america. and i don't know any other way to stop it, guaranteed it might not work, then through a negotiating process. >> i won't cede my time but i would say specifically, professor, of course, we want negotiations.

the whole point we're trying to make is the north koreans have deliberately walked away from it. have shot missiles across japan and done a nuclear test. of course, you want negotiation. but until we really do something as an international community, i don't see much movement in that respect. thank you. >> thank you, senator lugar. senator corker? >> thank you, mr. chairman, for this most timely hearing and for all of y'all being here. i obviously sense, mr. sigal -- that you, professor sigal, that the outlie that mr. cha has put forth is counterproductive -- >> i didn't say that -- >> so you think the broadness of sort of keeping proliferation from occurring is that's too broad and we ought to focus only on plutonium; is that what you're saying? >> what i'm saying you have to do both. we need to be able to impede the north from getting things it

needs, to make more nuclear weapons and missiles and from sending things abroad. we do need to do that. but we can't stop there, nor should we consider that the pressure we're putting on them now will have the immediate affect of stopping them from making more plutonium. that's part of our problem. i have no objection to part of what he said. i think we have to do that. and i'm glad that the chinese are willing to join with us. but we should not see that as a solution. and i think if i heard ambassador bosworth say this, i think that's his view as well. i think that's the administration's view as well if i heard that correctly. i think that's very important here. and it is very hard. we should not -- there's no grounds for optimism. it's just we don't have an alternative. >> but i sense in another breath you're concerned about war. you talked about the south. so it seems to me that there's a

slight variation in which -- in what you're saying. and how you may -- you feel that may lead to war. so it sounds like to me -- >> i'm sorry. i didn't mean to be misunderstood that way. no, i think if you are trying to get rid of the plutonium facility by attacking it, that's a risk. that's a different thing -- that's a different thing. >> yeah, i would be pretty sure that would lead to war. let me just -- >> thank you. >> let me ask you this, what is it that we have specifically that you think they truly want at this time? i guess i hear you talk about the security issue. certainly, it seems to me that their actions do not indicate creating a partnership with our

country as it relates to their security is what they're trying to achieve. so that doesn't -- it doesn't seem sane that they would take the course they're taking if that's their objective. so could you outline what you truly think they're after that we have today. maybe they're going in a circlecircl circlecircl circlear -- circular route and maybe i'm missing it. >> what they have told u.s. officials, the earliest i know is 1999. they told arnold cantor undersecretary of state in the bush years was they wanted a strategic -- they wanted to be our ally to put it in plain english. that was the way for them to get security. do they still want that? i do not know. but if you think about -- if you put yourself -- and it's very

hard to do, put yourself in kim jong-il's shoes. how can he feel secure? do nuclear weapons alone make him secure? i don't think so. but if he has a fundamentally new relationship with us, japan, and south korea, that's a different story. okay? but he can't count on that. and he has seen that we've been reluctant to move that way. and, therefore, he keeps threatening us. with the nuclear. but in the end, if you look why -- what we can't have a good explanation of if we think it's just about nuclear weapons is, why did he limit his production of plutonium over these years? it is very hard to understand. it's very hard to understand why the north koreans have not tested missiles over and over gentile they have reliable missiles. they certainly have the capacity to do that. something else is going on here and what i don't know is, is it

still going on? but we have to find out. >> ms. lindborg, you know, the notion of talking about prosperity in the year 2012 from his point of view. what was your experience inside the country and your sense of his desire, if you will, based on what you saw, what your organization saw, in working with these other groups that there was a better well-being, if you will, for the citizens of this country? >> well, from the perspective of the last 13 years, there's no question that north korea is better off than it was in the mid-'90s when they were gripped with a very serious famine. things have definitely improved since then but as i noted, there's still a significant food insecurity particularly when you go into the rural areas. which is what our programs have focused on. >> but is there any -- i mean, this would be -- is there any

sense within the agencies that there's any desire on the part of the leadership of north korea that standard of living, that the quality of life, that the people there who are living there, that they're even concerned about that? is there any sense of that as you deal within that country? you know, we are not dealing at the highest political levels so i would actually defer to my colleagues who may have better-informed opinions than i do on that. >> mr. revere, do you want -- >> over the years in discussions with fairly senior dprk officials, we have repeatedly encountered opportunities in which we've discussed the welfare of their people and america's desire to help. and it was my experience over the years that at least the people that we were dealing with were genuinely concerned about the welfare of their people. many of the negotiations that i participated in in the past focused on the issue of food

assistance and humanitarian assistance and new projects designed at helping the north korean people. and i would say i have never encountered a dprk official who brushed aside the needs of their people, the people that we were dealing with took this seriously, so seriously that hours and hours and hours of negotiations were devoted to this topic of how can we best improve the lives of their people. >> actually, senator corker, if i could just add onto that. it is undeniable that the recent food program that we just conducted had very high levels of approval and support. and that was in and of itself, i think, important evidence of the desire for ensuring there was well-being. >> mr. chairman, thank you. and i thank each of you. >> thank you very much. we need to wrap up in a couple minutes. just one quick question. the proliferation threat is the

threat to the united states of america right now. barring some missile development that we're not aware of. but even then strategically, fundamentally, proliferation issue is the challenge to us. china, however, russia, south korea, and japan have far more immediate and frankly pressing strategic concerns. why can they not sum john a stronger response given their surrounding clout and already-existing leverage, particularly, china? mr. revere? >> senator, i've been talking with the chinese since the late '70s about north korea.

and i find today a remarkable difference in the tone and content of our dialog with the chinese, my conversations with the chinese, from those days. i find more and more chinese officials but particularly senior think tank representatives and former officials with whom i've had long relationships looking at north korea in a very different way today. i've had a couple of chinese officials actually use the term "security liability" in their descriptions of north korea today. that's a remarkable thing for even semi official chinese to say. the bottom line to this is that i think attitudes in beijing are changing. we're starting to see op-eds. we're starting to see publications come out very clearly questioning past policy with respect to the dprk. i think we are at an important turning point in terms of chinese attitudes towards north korea. i don't want to overstate this but i think we are at a turning

point. one final point on japan. japan has been very much focused on one issue in recent years, the abduction issue, a serious and emotional and important issue, yes. but i think it has focused to such a degree on that issue. it has not focused as much attention as it should on very immediate and important threats to japan, such as north korean missiles. when the united states started to move away from fulfilling our part of the bargain on the missile moratorium that prevented north korea from launching medium and long-range ballistic missiles for the better part of seven years, we did not hear great cries of opposition from tokyo that i expected to hear. that was very unfortunate and one of the things i hope we do when we get back to the table with the dprk and i believe we will eventually get back to the table with the dprk is put the missile issue back on the

agenda. >> well, let me -- did you have a comment? >> no, i just -- i just -- one thing with respect to china. i don't think fundamental chinese interests have changed yet. instability is a problem not simply nukes. and i think that means that to expect china, for instance, as some people hope for to cut off all food and fuel to north korea is to make it act contrary to its interests, and i would say -- i think the chairman and certainly senator lugar knows this is hardly the time to put our relations with china in jeopardy over north korea. if we try to push it too hard. but china is going to do a lot more, i think, to get tough with north korea and we will not always see it but they're going to do that. i think i agree with -- totally with evans. >> well, i don't think we're -- i don't think we're going to put our relationship in jeopardy

over it. i don't think we're going to need to. >> right. >> you know, it's interesting in diplomacy and in international relations sometimes the biggest opportunities are staring you in the face when things look the bleakest. i do not agree just because of all this saber rattling and internal succession game going forward and so forth, i'm not -- i'm not, frankly -- i'm concerned about the proliferation issue but i'm not concerned that there is an impasse that we can't get over or there isn't a way to get back here. i believe ultimately -- i think there are mistakes that are made on our side of the fence over the last few years, too. and they don't get heralded enough. but, you know, there were some promises made about certain things being delivered and they were never delivered. there were misinterpretations, you know, about communication.

the post-9/11 atmosphere altered the axis of evil and other kinds of things, you know, iraq had perceptions of regime change in other countries. a lot of attitudes shifted and people responded to those things. and personally i believe that if we behave as confidently as we ought to, given the superiority of a number of strategic fronts in which we're sitting here, not to mention the presence of russia, china, south korea and south korea and china alone are enormously strong and we will remain committed to south korea's strength, we got a lot of -- you know, we've got a lot of cards to play here and so i'm really quite confident that if we play them adeptly and intelligently, i think north korea's longer term interests with respect to a security arrangement, a treaty, not an armistice from '53 but an

understanding where we go and an economic future, i think there are ways to get through this. and so i think the key here is to get back to the table and not do things that make it harder to get there rather than easier. so that's just a quick summary take on it. i think your views have been helpful, important. i think it's been good to air this and we have a distinguished visitor coming in about 5 minutes and so we've got to get over to the capitol to meet him, and i apologize. i will leave the record open for a week for colleagues who'd like to submit any questions. and we will -- if you want to articulate any further in answer to anything i just said or anything any senator said we'll invite it because we'd like to have as complete a record as possible. we may follow up to you infe

effect and we thank you and we are adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] ..