facilities, pakistan, sri lanka, more of the security presence in sri@@@@ deployments within tibet, and a border dispute. if you look at the indian/china

border, territory claimed by china, ongoing incursions' into this area. again, if you are india, you are becoming a world power, you want your seat as an major player in world affairs, you have to be concerned that the chinese are encroaching on your territory and might complicate things for you if you are concerned about lines of communication. what has india done since the 90s to content with this emerging strategic environment? number one is it is spending more on defense, quite a bit more. particularly more on the

maritime and air dimensions, looking at possibly 3 carrier strike groups as well as nuclear submarines, and also it had a major exercise last year with japan, australia, singapore, and the major mollah bar exercises, countries that have interest in the indian ocean. the defense diplomacy, if you will, is multi dimensional. i don't think defense trade is based on market forces, so the russians in general tend to be

very important to india. one criticism i would have of the deal the bush administration struck, it didn't strike a better deal on how to get out the logistics and supply chain from the russians. that seems to me to be a key national security interests, not just for creating jobs in the united states, but the defense relationship. i don't see that going away anytime soon. i don't see that in the and the united states will ever have the kind of alliance relationship the u.s. has with its allies, the u.s. will be the key arms supplier any time soon to the united states. it is in gauge in multilateral defense, and all seat conventional defense -- multi dimensional defense, and it is understandable as neighbors, at the same time, it is a concern about this matter of chinese

deployments and interest, it has quite an ongoing relationship with russia in the defense sphere and relations with the united states and japan and singapore, the new ones, the burgeoning new ones or the late come ears -- latecomers, quite closely. i think that the u.s./in the a strategic relationship is more akin to what nixon and kissinger tried to do with china in the 70s, it has this emerging power, if you want to get in, as it is emerging, as much as you can, china, you have some convergence interest and try to shake it as much as possible. it is a grand opening, but i don't think it is anything quite like -- expectations have been raised too high in terms of thinking of it as an ally.

it will expect us, it will do the same thing we are doing with china, which is wanting to keep a good relationship at the same time as we had, and maintain a balance of power that is favorable in asia. that is one thing it will expect us to help in with, its maritime security interests, and providing equipment and training. we have to be patient and less optimistic about how soon this will turn into any great alliance. i would also say, i would disagree that this current administration has the same view of indiana as the bush administration did. i think the bush administration did some very good things with respect to india in terms of

this opening in terms of the future of geopolitics and trying to get india a place at the table with american help. it is a great deal in terms of the different arms they will be able to get. but they oversold in terms of expectations. this administration is going the other way, which is when general jones was in india, the indian prime minister made a statement saying we are more than just about aspects -- let's widen the security aperture deeper, let's go back to discussing these other security issues besides -- we are swinging back the other way, there needs to be some

middle way between very high expectations and back to a sort of appendage of that background. >> thanks, that is a very good note to end on. the title for the day's sessions is u.s./india relations in the obama era. before i turn to the audience i want to ask george if he wants to make a few comments about the likely or possible difference between the obama administration's approach for india verses the bush administration or the clinton administration before that. is there a new priority? what would the problems because of those priorities? >> that is a great question. number one, i think now, because of the prominence in capacity and organization of the indian

american community, there is the very narrow band with win which the administration would move -- within which the administration would move. you can't ignore india, you have to pay attention, to the great credit of the americans, that is one thing. secondly, the bush administration, the nuclear deal was such a big deal in terms of the amount of effort it took to change the congress and the legal system and the international framework, that is like giving birth to an elephant. i am going to mess up the metaphor because we have a new mother now. to follow up on that, there's not going to be anything that big you can do for a long time. that needs to get sorted out because it hasn't been implemented. there is going to be dismayed that india hasn't passed a liability law to enable u.s. companies to do business, so there's going to be some backlash and frustration.

the obama administration, one big difference is they, example, support a ban on nuclear weapons testing because the bush should ministrations did. one of the president's high priorities is to ratify that treaty, that treaty would not go into force even if the u.s. ratified it. if india doesn't sign it, india is giving no indication that it will, you have a very high global objective of the administration on nuclear arms control, which india may be a major impediment to. so that, that is the difference between administrations, which has implications. it is in that very as well as the afpak area, because this administration is focusing more on afghanistan than the bush administration did and that brings in the head down. >> please identify yourself and

ask the question. we can all go home. please. wait for the mike. >> i am dr. pete from indian nations. the point i would like to ask -- >> i think it is on. just speak quietly. >> can we say it will not go down further, but we continue to go out differently? or do we have -- the downside taken out, for example, the

question of pakistan and terrorist relationships, there is a feeling the u.s. would be tanked. it is a question of time when an attack will happen. it is not a question of if, it is the question of when. there is a great deal, on opposite sides of the nuclear issue, lastly, the question of iran. how significant is iran going to claim u.s./india relations? many people believe there is no other way but confrontation with iran to continue. >> i am happy to say -- i think is the bottom protected? that is a great question.

mainly for the first reason, if or when there is another attack in india, there will be a natural tendency to say the u.s. is pakistan's patron. partly because you asked, in the at held back in a remarkable display of self retrained which was in indiana's interest. often states do things for political reasons that may not be in their interest, but it was the smart thing to do. but it becomes a convenient and very understandable politically to blame somebody else that you have been counting on if something like this happens. on the indian side, that could cause a problem.

i don't think the iran issue will be a problem for reason that we may be heading towards a confrontation with iran. the stakes that would be more important are russia and china, the u.s. will be more angry at them, the expectations of india are relatively lower. >> i would add one note to that, what they're writing about is the kind of strike and air force capabilities they want, this is not about striking china, they want the capability to strike back and retaliate if they i hit again, i am not talking about next year but 5, 6, 7, 8 years from now, india with strike

capabilities and more strength conlan and independence, we can see some divergences that would not create a catastrophe but would be a divergence from what the united states is trying to accomplish in pakistan. >> how much progress is made in the relationship in response to the terrorist problem that india faces when it comes to building a relationship the united states in a corporate level and also in the government to government level? >> what i have seen is a willingness in the industry to look at u.s. technology. it will come down to price for the technology they're looking for.

it was mentioned several times that there is an embedded supply chain that@@ the domestic security and defense. they can, and on the result of u.s. companies participating in defense needs.

>> i would agree with what susan said, u.s. companies have to prove themselves, this is not a market where they have participated historically. there is perhaps more familiarization that needs to happen, the initial procurement decision and trade offs of u.s. technology verses other countries's technologies in security and defense. in the security area, an issue that may arise down the line is the liability issue. the u.s. passed and safety act in 2002 in order to protect companies from the risk, potentially catastrophic liability, if received as having not done what they're supposed to do, that issue is very

significant in europe right now where they do not have a liability protection regime which makes it more difficult for companies to sell products to european governments with confidence that they will be protected against unreasonable liability. it could be the same issue that could arise in india with lack of liability protection. >> the only thing i would add, in a lot of industry, the large players as well as small, medium enterprises, they have a desire to be part of the western world's global supply chain when that comes to defense, partnerships being defined from a legal perspective, they really have a desire to have the procurement process as well as

policy associated with exportability and releaseability to, in relationships with licensed manufacturing or other relationships to be on the world stage in defense and security capabilities. i see a very positive out reach for many and -- indian enterprise to accept technologies. but as i mentioned before, we have to earn our seat at the table against other foreign players that do have competing capabilities. >> back there. >> kelly kerri from project 20149 institute. my question is for dan and george, that border issue with japan and india.

i wonder if you could comment on how that is shaping in the's security environment and the decisions going forward? >> i would put this in the larger context of latent and dormant indian concerns about china's rise and what it means within south asia as well as in the at's desire to play a greater role in southeast asia in particular, it is shaving regional institutions, and the economic activity as it, quote, looks east. there has been a long time suspension -- suspicion within india that china has been trying to way it down with -- continuing to keep the border issue, not as heightened in tension but festering and not

resolved with incursions' in what india claims as its own borders and to keep speak to that issue sensitive and put pressure on the indians in terms of how much tibetans and the dollar llama can speak out. we saw this in the tibetan uprising, how much pressure was put on india to try -- it is hard to do this, to try to

indians to put some claims on pakistan and south asia when they want a wider perspective of security matters, maritime issues in particular. i would put that in my contacts and the chinese have no incentive to resolve the dispute as long as it serves the interests of distracting india, making sure that india doesn't rise as a competitor to china. >> i would add a couple points. the 2 countries have the situation well managed in this sense that india and knows it can defend that border. china doesn't have an interest in starting a military conflict, they joust a little bit, but the big issue is attitude and

psychological. china still treats india like a little stepbrother. and that is the thing that is very frustrating to india. where china has resolved all of its other outstanding border issues it has not resolve the one with india, partly for these reasons of leverage and they're concerned about to that and everything else. i remember the first time i went to beijing to have a meeting on south asia and the chinese foreign minister was going to gather all the people who worked on south asia and it was like a round table of 5 people, where is everybody? this is it. it is just not that important. which is very infuriating or disturbing if you are in the and rising as a global power. the chinese are very good at conveying that they are not as

big a concern to us which could be worse because they could be nasty and mean and aggressive. that is one reason it doesn't get resolved. >> everyone seems to not be wanting to tie this to the afpak issue so i will ask the question, there seems to be a lot of concern in pakistan about the growing conventional superiority of india these of the pakistan. i am wondering in light of the recent military campaign pakistan has been waging which presumably india supports against the taliban and other guerrillas. you see any change in this doctrine or this structure through the military forces to

makes this less of a threat to pakistan to deploy forces against these guerrillas? >> india developed this doctrine out of the frustration in 1999, and the crisis in 2001 where they get attacked by terrorists affiliated in pakistan. you have to do something but there's not much you can do, pakistan and nuclear-weapons would the chair india from teaching pakistan a bigger lesson, got very frustrating so you tried to develop forces that say we could go pound them without risking the escalation to nuclear force. that is the motivation which is

very hard to do. that puts more premium in pakistan on nuclear-weapons to escalate which is not so good but to answer your question about could india -- the indian mistrust of the pakistan army is earned, first of all, and long-lasting, so they would take a lot of persuasion that the pakistan decision to fight violent extremists within pakistan, the idea is the greatest threat to pakistan a security is in turtle, we have to focus on that. the corollary to that is the india threat has receded for is not as important. that is very important to all of us but the indians won't believe that is a genuine decision.

they will shift capabilities and not put that kind of pressure on. >> i agree with that totally. i will also say after the mumbai attacks people were expecting retaliation and this just added to the dynamic george has described. i think indians are keeping the pattern dry, and we will need to wait and see if they can trust that this is the direction pakistan is going. >> in the back? ..

>> just briefly, you reflected a long-standing indian frustrati frustration. and it's true. i know in the first part of this decade, that when indians or others would say there are still

can't, isi backed kansai jihad he groups operating in filtration, and pakistan hasn't shut them down or at some point president musharraf promised to shut them down and then the camps moved. that the u.s., when this was brought to the attention said we don't want to overload the system because we actually need their cooperation in its more important hunt al qaeda, and pakistan was able to basically play off those things. we're not going to do everything, and so this is more important and then they would say they were doing what was asked but didn't just wouldn't do it and i think in the real world of government, you go in with a list of the things that you quote are wanting or demanded from the other side and the order of the list matters. and the first thing is you are hunting al qaeda, and in the camps in kashmir are the six thing on the list and the guy on the other nsaids that was a six thing on the