why we believe and i believe this is realistic, which is beyond that it is technically realistic. the fact is governments will pursue this path based on idealism and self-interest of their people but in the end they will make their decisions on these issues based on analyses of their national security interests and their domestic politics and our discussions over the last day and half have been very much grounded in looking at the perspectives of various nations from the point of view of interest and the fact that such a group, not just representing different nations in their private capacities but also different political

viewpoints, came around a plan such as this, suggests to me that from a national security and political point of view and technical point of view, there is a realistic way to get from here to a world of no nuclear weapons. >> tom pickering. >> the question of practicality, less up in the atmosphere than the issue of realism. if you look at the last chart called summary, you will see two regions, it is important to understand the practicality of the proposal. the time that it has normally taken to negotiate significant strategic disarmament agreements, an average of 24 years, it projects 14 years to reach a series of agreements and an additional seven years to complete the dismantlement. the second piece of practicality is how rapidly can countries dismantle? the plan, as you will see from

the charts which you have, very carefully attuned to the rates which in the past, both russia and the united states, the two largest holders, have pursued the dismantlement of actual weapons. if you look at those rates, you can understand the time allowed for the practical dismantlement is sufficient to accomplish that task in the proposal we have put forward. >> i will make one more point on the issue of realism because it is critically important point. oh commissioner, ambassador bajpai, was mentioning that at point we make, this process cannot be divorced from regional securities. we have those realities in

northeast asia. other areas including south asia and the greater middle east, we are at a kind of crossroads here. as tom was just pointing out, the good news, that we have tweaked -- two countries having signed up to total elimination. the messages we received from u.s. officials in washington is the bureaucracy takes president obama's words seriously, they are taking the the idea of global zero seriously. the bad news is there are countries on the horizon that could deploy nuclear weapons. in the case of iran, that decision could lead other

countries in the region, maybe turkey, maybe eat it, maybe saudi arabia, to revaluate their nuclear plants and nuclear acquisition. we think there is a window of opportunity here but things could take place that undermines his process. that gives us a sense of urgency. >> why should a nation interested in nuclear power, particularly iran or north korea, care about what the united states and russia are doing? specifically for ambassador khan, does pakistan have any understanding of the islamic world using a the global 0

recommendations? >> you want to deal with the last question first? >> i can tell you pakistan has no reservations in going forward on the global zero program. i say that in spite of the fact that some of the countries in my neighborhood, i can mention iran, the need to have a nuclear weapon which they don't admit to right now. i have no doubt that given the position in the islamic world, pakistan taking the lead, going forward on the aspirations and goals of global zero, will find most of the other islamic

countries following suit. and what pakistan stands for in this environment, becomes especially important. let me elaborate. we need to build a climate of trust in the region with india, china, afghanistan and the countries around, we need to build that up. we need to dismantle the hurdles that stand in the way of cooperation in the region. global zero aims to provide the opportunity and the impetus for us to achieve that regional harmony. >> on your first question about the relationship between a country wanting to take advantage of the civilian or commercial opportunities offered

by nuclear power and why they should focus or care about u.s./russian arms reductions, i am going to ask ambassador pickering, who has dealt with this issue on several occasions. >> north korea is a special, difficult, important case for all of us. all i can tell you is in the past, north korea has agreed and has taken steps to moved back away from its military nuclear posture. that can still be achieved with the negotiating process, with the unity in the six party talks that has been demonstrated in the past, that north korea has in the past indicated a willingness, if you can say it, to pay attention to the concerted interests of others in the region. fascinating that iran has said it has no interest in nuclear weapons and has a seemingly

binding islamic degree from the highest leader against that, on the one hand, and has conducted programs that have led the rest of the world to be deeply concerned. the issue now, i believe, despite what i think or the serious setbacks of the iranian elections, to engage the united states directly with iran as the president has proposed, they chairman weather in negotiating process can provide the assurances that iran's civil program, will not, cannot be devoted to nuclear efforts and the united states has, after a period of time, adopted the idea that it does not wish to develop the civil power program, it wishes to assure that no iranian program results in military nuclear capability leading, as ambassador bird indicated, to further proliferation.

those are the reasons, that is the process being carried on, not as part of global zero but any process will contribute obviously to the considerations that will bring all of the states that have to be parties to this along with the effort to move toward elimination of nuclear weapons and to achieve that result. >> yelena grossman. i wonder what the panel thinks about the need for conventional security guarantees, or perhaps a whole range of them, substitute for the allure of nuclear weapons on the part of emerging nuclear-weapons states. >> we have not specifically examined what you call conventional military guarantees, but we do have an agenda that will address issues

like that going forward. we say in the handout that we recognize the reality of regional security concerns, and in some cases, one example being japan, whose security is based not only on bilateral treaty with the united states, but a concept of extended deterrence, that is clearly an example of the sort of issue that has to be addressed and would have to be addressed over the next week to decades or so. we recognize that countries have security concerns related to nuclear weapons, and if nuclear weapons go way, that has to be

taken into account. most countries represented on this commission in we one way or another will have to address those questions. that said, there is an understanding that the elimination of all nuclear weapons will not lead to the resolution of all international security problems, that is a fallacy to argue that they will. it will certainly be a much less risky world caught and as a result, a much safer world. yes? >> i am a reporter from china and i have a question for ambassador jianmin wu. what do you think china, as

another major nuclear power, what kind of road china can play in the frost says of nuclear-weapons reduction, and elimination, and also the pursuit of another kind of security -- without nuclear weapons? >> please. >> thank you for your question. first, china was the first to propose to the world a total ban on nuclear weapons, and the total destruction of nuclear weapons. we chinese, we believe nuclear-weapons have been created by human beings. one day, human beings know how to destroy it the nuclear arsenal. this is our goal.

since 1964, china was proposing that to the world. we suggest to convened a global assemblage to discussed that, to reach the sort of agreement, then to ban forever nuclear weapons, destroy all nuclear weapons, so this idea, global zero, coincides with china's sinking. second point, we are living -- how to deal with the threat, the threat is felt not only by developed countries but by developing countries. we believe in that way, if we

move toward global zero, a very positive move, as ambassador burt said, that makes the roads a fair. that is why, in my personal capacity, thank you. >> yes? >> according to -- you recommend united states to reduce the number of -- to 1,000. what brought you to this particular number? any particular reason? and one more question, if you look at the situation, the discussion that is going on in the pentagon, what kind of outcome do you expect from the

meeting between president obama and president medvedev? >> can i address that? >> i can do it very briefly. i don't know, if i did know i obviously would not say it here. i honestly do not. >> i will say that we were briefed today by a senior u.s. official, familiarity with negotiations. the report we received was quite positive. speaking for myself i was left with the impression, the u.s. and russian side are making good progress in those negotiations. dealing with your first, i would like to say the simple answer is that is a nice, round number but there is a vital more thouglitt

that goes into it. it is well known that in the current negotiations, it has been published in newspapers, between a reduction of 15 down to 1500 down to 1700, deployed nuclear weapons, weapons that would be deployed on missiles and bombers. the second phase we talk about would include not simply deployed weapons, but also those that were in stockpiles. we are talking about a fairly substantial reduction, but one that is realistic and plausible. it would still, at this stage, we recognize you have to build confidence and trust. there is an implicit bargain going on here, we recognize that

one of the big steps that has to be taken in any global zero process is bringing other nuclear weapons to the negotiating table. on the one hand, the two big boys in this process, russia and the united states in terms of nuclear holdings, had to be prepared to make serious reductions, serious reductions that are large enough to stay to the negotiating table. you can ask those countries to take reductions that are too dramatic too quickly. it is not politically realistic. the figure of one thousand shows how serious the united states and russia were, on the one hand, and on the other hand, not

be so low as to leaf voices in either country to feel the russian or american security was in jeopardy. you want to add something? >> another symbol dimension of this, if you look where russia and the united states would begin the process, if you look at the rates at which they can destroy weapons, in 2018 you come to 1,000 on both sides. >> yes. >> i am from china central television. i want to confirm the numbers. the first is the commissioners are from how many countries

altogether of this global zero commission? and also, among the 23,000 weapons, how much percentage of them are now possessed by the united states and russia? and according to a previous document of the global z zero action plan, there will be another summit next year and he will present the final version of the plan. this plan we are holding today is the final version? if not, in what perspective you will refine it? thank you very much. >> i have to remember all those questions. the first one, as i think i said earlier, united states and russia have 95% of the world's nuclear stockpile, roughly speaking. that is why i referred to them as the big boys in terms of

nuclear weapons. how many questions, 7 or eight or nine? in terms of total commission, we have representative from nine nuclear weapons states. we couldn't have nine because we have so many from north korea. i am sorry. that is correct. we have representatives from seven nuclear weapons states, and we have also representatives from two countries that are non nuclear but have a great deal of interest in this issue, japan and germany, the republic of germany. again, this handout you have is really a summary of the link to your document which is still

under preparation. as i said before, it is a work in progress, an interim report, an interim document. we have several issues we have to continue to work on and we will do that between now and the next commission meeting and at the next commission meeting, most likely in october, between that meeting and the end of the year, we need to complete that work so that we will have a finalized plan, action plan, not simply a power point, but a real document that we will not only present to the public but present to governments to give them and detailed roadmap for how to get to zero and we intend to present that at what we call

our global zero summit at the end of january in paris next year. over here. >> from 20 first century business harold. my question, based on your knowledge, how soon can the u.s. and russia and the administration take the real action plan to reduce nuclear weapons in eaton, when will the first war had to be reduced, and the second question regarding the upcoming trip obama is going to make to russia, what kind of progress do you expect patent,

this meeting can produce? >> the united states and russia have begun the process of nuclear weapons. they began that process with the implementation of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty in 1991 and those have carried our reductions since that period. what we are proposing, as the plan describes, the u.s. dismantling rate is 350 warheads per year, if you follow the stage of 1,000 warheads, that would wrap up from 350 to 1,000 warheads per year. we think that is doable, that

can be done. the same is true for the warhead reductions that would take place on the russian side as well. those warheads have been reduced in the past and they can certainly be reduced in the present. the second question you had, i am sorry? >> it is about upcoming trips, obama going to russia, what is going to result in terms of nuclear weapons reduction? >> i can only repeat what i said earlier, we have heard from administration officials that they are making good progress in the talks and i assume that good progress will be reflected in statements made by both presidents in moscow next week. >> some small addition -- just have this to say.

the united states and russia and the soviet union destroyed 40,000 warheads. c-span3 ask for another 20,000. we are long way to zero. >> good point. >> how do you address japanese television? how do you address the nuclear weapon -- it is not clear, but some weapons affect the intention by some islamic countries that they're going to have another weapon in the future. i wonder, because the information of other countries, members of this organization,

not a part of it, could you address that issue? >> that is a very good question. i can tell you that in the deliberations of the commission eaton yesterday and today, we are including israel in our plan. we are assuming that way will be found so that israel can and will participate in a process of undertaking reductions and elimination. i say that in full knowledge, just to repeat, we are realists here, we recognize there are regional issues that will affect our ability to get to zero, and that includes, i would argue, the ability to get israeli forces to 0 -- zero. i would hope that in the next 20 years, we will see sufficient

progress in the peace process, maybe even a realization of a peace treaty and a two state solution that will enable israel to participate in this process. it will require a lot of, let's call it creative and sensitive diplomacy, have them participate in this process, but we do assume that they will be part of the solution here. tom, did you want -- >> you couldn't have said it any better. >> that is high praise coming from ambassador pickering, i have to tell you. maybe you are the last question. >> has the recent work led by the former u.s. senators, bob graham and jim talent,

attempting to reduce wm d proliferation and terrorism, influence your commission at all? >> the simple answer to that is yes. there are a number of in different processes and enterprises and studies, some u.s. some on u.s. some multilateral, multinational, i might mention the efforts of the former australian, and former japanese foreign ministers to look at nuclear arms control, with a focus on asia, is a very worthwhile effort, and we are in touch with that group. we are very aware of the work that is under way by the so-called gang of four.

george shultz and military -- i milt perry and others, we have a staff that is in touch with these different efforts. we want to be fully collaborative. i want to emphasize, we don't believe that we have all the answers, but what we are trying to to do in a kind of unique way, is provide a long-term plan, a long-term concept, end to end solution, looking at global zero. if other people's work and analysis and political insights can aid in that process, we welcome that