verifiable? maybe. that depends on exactly how is that they want to account for any reductions they are seeking. that is an open question. will the treaty be enforceable? that is up to the u.s. as to if it will probably enforce this tree. i find it questionable -- if it will probably enforce this

treaty. i find is questionable if the obama is administration is doing anything. i am not sure that the russians are at all in compliance with those only politically and not legally binding agreements. so the final one is william negotiate treaties on the basis that to anything that violates -- that violates your obligation to your allies. it seems to me that the obama administration is coming close to the line of throwing two important nato allies over board in order to achieve this so- called reset with the u.s.-

russian relations. what is it that i think the of ministration should be focused on? fundamentally, we need to move in a direction of what we call a protect and defend it strategy. we talk about that in a background about establishing an arms control policy that is a tool in achieving this new approach that will be defensive. but what we need to do is the following. we need to not worry about the start deadline. i think the u.s. and russia can continue to make progress as we have been doing in recent years on reducing the number of nuclear warheads under the treaty. there is one issue that the treaty is currently dependent on a not truly compatible

transparency and verification regime. the one thing i do think that should be in the near term negotiations is drafting a protocol to the moscow treaty that provides for this transparency measures, specifically against the accounting standard that is associated with that particular treaty which is on his deployed warheads. the third thing they need to do is limit formal linkages. the idea that the u.s. will get into negotiations that will have a formal linkages regarding the question of iran, they will not serve the process very well. we should defer negotiations with regard to the plane warheads that would go below the moscow treaty level.

we got into 2012 that the moscow treaty will be in force, said that gives us plenty of time to negotiate a more fundamentally sound treaty. the most important aspect is to try to get the u.s. and russia, and ultimately in the broader international arena, arms control standards in place that try to posture all countries verses ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and so forth in ways that are more fundamentally defensive in terms of their fulfillment. i would like to ultimately move in that direction. let me say as i come back to this question i opened up with as regard to the russian failure is that the house of representatives surprisingly in recent days adopted unanimously an amendment to the defense

authorization bill that says that the administration may not use any funds to implement a treaty with russia that would not be adequately verifiable. it would not put any limitations on missile defense systems or conventional weapons. and basically president obama would have to certify that. finally, they said you would have to certify he would take steps to improve the safety and security of the u.s. nuclear force, indeed modernize its strategic nuclear weapons infrastructure. if that is not a shot across the mouth at the obama administration i don't know what is, because it was adopted without dissent. >> on this optimistic note, we are going back to moscow. can we have a full screen?

are you ready? ok, yes. do we have moscow? yes. no audio. >> i would like to deal with the problem of arms control from the russian viewpoint. corms control was crucial -- arms control was a crucial issue here during the cold war years. in fact, it was an efficient mechanism for decreasing the risk of nuclear war or establishing rules for iraq initially assured destruction -- establishing rules for mutual leak a shortage -- mutually assured destruction.

i believe this linkage has did not disappear with the cold war. what we see now is an attempt to use the arms control process as a kind of prime mover to solve other issues and bilateral contacts. fritz ermath mentioned that russia is not the soviet union. unfortunately, many people in the russian elite and decision makers believe that russia is the soviet union because it has inherited its nuclear weapons, its security council, it has inherited a large part of its territory and its political elites and political mentality.

if we look at the russian political mentality, it still remains very much motivated by the cold war stereotypes. i would say that the [unintelligible] what is good for america is that for russia and vice versa is still very much there in russia decisionmaking. and the approaches towards forms control and many other issues are very strongly motivated by this zero sum game. if we look at the forthcoming negotiations on arms control, including the issue of strategic nuclear weapons reductions and the issue related to the abatement of the ballistic missile defense in europe, we see that there is a certain contradiction in side of this.

i'm. does russia really need the reductions -- a certain contradiction on this side of the paradigm. because if we take the weakness of russian economy, at the political weakness of the russian regime, we see the nuclear potential still remains the core of russian political influence in the world. antique -- and russia is recognized as a global superpower. in fact, if russia reduces its nuclear weapons, it will be a clear signal that russia becomes a week at least in the eyes of the russian decision makers kerik the second reason why russia does not want dramatic

cuts in nuclear weapons is that the lord levels of nuclear potential would become -- the lower levels of nuclear potential would become -- to obtain nuclear weapons, because when nuclear potentials are lower with countries to have them, it means that the role of such countries as iran, north korea, with their smaller nuclear potentials, will grow. they will play a more significant role in international affairs tahn they plate before -- than they played before. if i believe nuclear reductions will make the political environment of the world more dangerous. so while russia is ready to negotiate a new treaty with the u.s. and reduce its nuclear

weapons, my answer is very clear. russia wants to prevent the deployment of ballistic missile defenses in eastern europe by all means. it is the key issue in the russian arms control agenda and it has very serious motivation which has little to do with national security concerns, but which has very deep political motivation. russia is not afraid of american ballistic missile defense in poland or czech republic. no one believes here it is a threat to russia, but the russian elite cannot reconcile the idea that the u.s. can deploy it modern weapons close to russian borders in the nation's sick which two decades ago -- in the nations which two

decades ago or a part of the [unintelligible] as you may have noticed in remounts, putin and medvedev, here they were doing everything to encourage this linkage between its strategic nuclear katz and the issue of ballistic when -- strategic nuclear cutrs and ballistic missiles. it is clear that it has a political explanation. russia wants to show that the u.s. and nato cannot deploy the weapons in europe without russian consent and without russian agreement. russia wants to show they are politically influential and they have a serious impact in europe and their relations with the u.s. that it can prevent any kind of military deployment close to its borders.

this will be the core of the obama-mad that if discussions, and it certainly will be a serious test -- the core of obama-medvedev discussions. whether it is a global ballistic missile defense or not. i would mention that the russian attitudes towards obama are not so straightforward s irina yasina has mentioned. many people see obama's charisma, they enjoy his openness, but many people doubt whether he is really experienced, whether this charisma is translated into american leadership and protecting american national interests in inappropriate ways. whether his his speech in egypt or other places, it actually

increases his personal popularity but many believed it does not solve the american leadership -- they don't believe it serves american leadership. there is a strong temptation in moscow to test obama in a way that nikita khrushchev tested john kennedy in 1961. you remember the berlin crisis and the cuban crisis. the military exercises which are now going on near the georgian border, which is a clear demonstration of russian forces and an attempt to intimidate, it is also a kind of test for obama because i believe it is creating a certain background, a certain environment for the forthcoming negotiations, including those on

the@@@@@@"")rr arms control problem we should not forget that russia is the only country which can destroy america and america remains the only country which can destroy russia. this mutual destruction remains on the agenda. we cannot deal without it and we cannot forget about this legacy of the cold war. i believe fritz ermath remembers an interesting experience of

the 1980's went american competitive strategy brought to lead an interesting phenomenon in russian military buildup. -- brought to life in interesting phenomenon. the soviet union actually started a kind of dual approach in response to single military program. russia simultaneously developed offensive and defensive programs. this was such a severe burden for russia economy that it has undermined the soviet union and has accelerated its collapse. unfortunately, he what we see of the russian leadership is following the same light. we see the intense not only to increase his strategic nuclear potential, but also the attempt to increase potential weapons

and build up strategic missile defenses. it is a way -- i believe the american message of the forthcoming negotiations with moscow should be clear that arms control should be a two-way street. it should prevent not only the present threat but it should also prevent the fourth coming of france -- prevent the forthcoming threats. we should understand the threats for russia are not coming from the u.s. but the new actress -- but the noon actors -- but the new actors. thank you. >> thank you very much. .

>> is there anybody in moscow interested in asking the question, of the journalists there? >> the floor is yours. >> it's good that there are no questions in moscow. let's go to washington than. there's a gentleman to my right. please introduce yourself and ask a question. wait for the microphone, please. we're going to start any minute. >> thank you.

thank you for this great presentation and great panel. i'm from georgia and an associated with the jamestown foundation. i have a question regarding energy. you talked about other issues, mostly nuclear issues and defense and the negotiations, but energy is kind of missing from the discussion. in this regard, the alternative for the caucusesus. the follow-up question related to this one, are you participating in any war against georgia? >> let's go to moscow first. the energy part, the energy part

will go to the economist. and the question on georgia will go to yevgeny volk. let's keep our answers short. do you want to start about the energy corridor, please? >> we cannot hear the energy part of the question. please repeat it. >> the questionnair said what du think about the future of the southern corridor, through georgia, as an energy route that by passes russia? related to that, how old do you see a chance of another conflict between russia and georgia? >> rocha of course is going to

do its best to avoid and not allow any energy deliveries except through russia. i don't think there's anyone strong enough to counter this. i'm not a champion of russian geopolitics. the and pluralistic approach. but i have to admit that for the time being russia is strong enough to fight and the nobuko pipeline, there is no gas to fill. [unintelligible] as to the corridor through georgia, i hope so. >> the situation in the caucasus mountains remains very tense.

politically and militarily. the problem is that saakashvili, the president of georgia, is an enemy of the russian elite. russia does everything to try to remove him from power. i believe that the massive opposition movement, which was active some months ago, it was a signal to shock as dealsaakashvt russia wants to change the regime in georgia. the problem is that the escalation, the political and military escalation as a phenomenon has its own laws, its own norms which sometimes go out of control of those who started the escalations.

an accidental shot or provocation during these caucuses in exercises, some kind of tension, explosion, a terrorist attack, can really encourage both sides to use military force at a large scale. they can provoke a larger war. >> can you just explain to the audience here what exercises you're talking about? when are they taking place? and what are the scope of them? >> yesterday russian forces in the caucuses started a large scale exercise called caucuses 2009, which is participation of some 8000 military men, 250 naval ships from the black sea fleet participating as well as

numerous aircraft. so it is a very impressive demonstration of force across the jordan borders -- close to jordan borders. this event is taking place on the eve of obama's visit to moscow. it can happen, theoretically, although the exercises on monday, july 6. still it can happen, tension can rise through these exercises. that will cast a shadow on the russian-american relations when obama goes to moscow. it can really be a threat to the success of these negotiations. as such. >> thank you. let's check if there's another question from moscow.

is there a question in moscow? >> it was indirectly mentioned in the mass media. [unintelligible] it's not about obama. my question is what would happen if moscow becomes barack obama's frustration? >> what would happen in moscow that would disappoint or frustrate the american president during the visit? baker, do you want to take a crack at this one briefly and then go to fritzl >> the only thing i could imagine would be

if the russian side of the negotiations did not put forward a list of things they would want the u.s. to go along with, because i think that basically the obama administration has been in a very accommodating mood with regard to that. but it is clear that the russian side at the end of the day is really not that interested in significant nuclear weapons reduction. essentially, it puts forward a list of items that the obama administration continues to pursue with no finality. in other words, these things continue to be stretched out. i think that from the perspective of this administration, that they would be disappointed in that. >> for i don't know what would

frustrate the president, because i don't know what he really wants in his heart of hearts. i have a little better idea what the administration has asked for. i can identify write off what would give him a lot of trouble. first, there is the demand from the russians that there will be no arms control agreement the situation goes forward in poland and the czech republic. some in the obama administration don't do those deployments anyway. that could include the president, himself. but i think that would be politically and strategically a very costly concession.

which, i would strongly urge him not to do. if he's put in a situation where no arms control agreement happens with those deployments, he will recognize that he will have serious political trouble if he makes this concession. he will work really hard to find a technical, strategic rationale for making it without making that concession to the soviet union. that is a sow's of trouble. another big source of trouble for him will be russian assistance on some recognition of the severe privileged interest, to use his language. i have read in the press that in some way the obama administration has signaled to the russians that the u.s. just does not accept that. frankly, i don't know where that was stated. >> the administration is trying

to send a signal by sending vice president biden right, a week after this visit of the ukraine to georgia. i don't know what people say there. if there's any continuity, he will say pretty much what you just said, that we don't recognize russia playing for exclusive interest. let me make a broader point year. we're trying to put it into context and perspective. if barack obama went to the iranians and said, if you unclench your fist, we will stretched our hand out. he went to cairo and spoke to the sony world and said we don't have problems with islam, which is true. -- the sunni world. but we do oppose radicalism and tourism. the question