tv [untitled] CSPAN July 2, 2009 3:00am-3:30am EDT
3:00 am
h)l/rr@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efficacy of the stretched hand.e some people will interpret that as being a bit naive or full of good intentions but not realistic enough. there is a discussion about realism in front policy. you were there. you remember that. realism -- >> realism is one of the most abused terms of political discourse. almost as out of place as "reset." >> realism is not about being a
3:01 am
well wishing, naive, a beazppea. i'm not saying obama is, but he needs a real achievement for people to support him. >> i also think there was always in inevitability that the obama administration approach on this was right on. he's been on a nonstop apologetic toward around the world with regard to the past u.s. policies and behaviors. that was fine for him as long as they were always looking back at previous policies taken by the united states. it comes forward with the repression in iran following the election. at some stage if he's going to continue this, he will start to have to blame themselves. obviously, that will be a nonstarter. i think at the end of the day this policy that was based on
3:02 am
the idea that it was always u.s. provocations that caused problems in the world, cannot be sustained for long time. >> i've been in too many talking shops were that approach was sometimes to my surprise by former senior officials of the reagan administration. of give you the names later. but the gentleman blamed the u.s. for all of our troubles in relationships with russia. i will take a question from washington. introduce yourself, please. >> dmitry is my name. the first question is related to iran. as far as i've understand, president obama will have a concession on iran with the discretion of a colleague. based on my information, some
3:03 am
people within this administration think that russia has influence in the world and may convince iran to increase its nuclear progress or maybe allow inspectors in their. what do you think about that? the second question is about human rights. it was announced that obama will meet with the leaders of the human rights organization in moscow. how serious do you think will be his attempt to raise the question about lebanon? and what kind of response do you think will come from the russians on that? >> did moscow hear the questions? the first question was -- >> [speaking in russian]
3:04 am
>> does obama have enough influence with the iranians? enough influence to cause turan to freeze the nuclear program and allow inspections both the second question is about the meeting with the leaders of human rights organizations in russia and whether barack obama is going to raise the issue of the jailed oligarch who is now on his second trial? i will start the answers with washington and then go to moscow. do you have an opinion on iran? >> the russians probably have some influence, not comprehensive, though, over iran. we have done extensive gauging of this situation under a multi poehler gaming exercise that we
3:05 am
have designed. the problem is there's a consistent pattern on the part of the individuals that have been playing the russian equivalent players in this bill for it environment to actually exacerbate the non- proliferation or the proliferation problem, more precisely. that is the russian players have found it's to their advantage to try to use new nuclear power as effectively as arrogant for confronting the u.s. and the west. and there's not much of the real world that shows me the opposite of what we're seeing in the gaming exercises. if russia were to exercise its influence, it could no, but not, principally. there's not much incentive for them to do it, based on what we have seen in the virtual environment as well as in the real-world experience. >> i agree with that
3:06 am
perspective. when you get down to it, yevgeny put his finger on it when he spoke of the russian elite. i fully agree with the truth of what he is saying there. it is so much more polite for a russian to say it that an american. that outlook says what yiron is doing on nuclear weapons and terrorism is much more trouble for the u.s. than it is for russia. however, russia is a land of chess players, as is iran. they can do a net assessment of who gets hurt most by the trouble. then they ask, what should we do? the most they can offer is
3:07 am
support in the international community for sanctions. they could do some more concrete things. >> some of the sanctions can be very effective, like cutting the imports of gasoline into iran, where the iranian population will blame the ayatollah. >> if you want are backing for stuff that really matters, what are you going to pay, is what the russians will last? >> any opinion on the human rights? >> nott specific to that, although it will come up during the summit. what i fear is that obama will find himself, giving his background, his agenda, his belief that we can glad hand our way back to better relations, he is going to find himself communicating implicitly, if not
3:08 am
explicitly, some hard-line folks over the years did, and that is, look, dmitri medvedev, i have to complain about that man in jail, because ofmuch political arena takes that seriously, but i'm not personally that concerned about it. hard-headed likeguys like in the kissinger and nixon found themselves in that situation. another hard-headed i handled it very differently and very convincingly, that was ronald reagan. >> moscow, iran and human rights and law. please, if you can do it in 30 seconds, because we need to go to the next one. >> i will tell you about iran
3:09 am
and the gentlemen. i went to the proceedings with the gentleman, but there were some journalists, some wearing ski masks. those interested in this, you can visit in moscow. it would seem to you ridiculous. these proceedings have nothing to do with any law. and i would like to see any russian lawyers who follow these proceedings, not be shocked by what is going on in our country. some were -- the woman was released during the half year
3:10 am
after the meeting started. it was not just because of george w. bush insisting on it, but because 100,000 signatures were taken around russia for her release on parole. i think that nothing will be done and nothing will change even if any promises are given to barack obama in his meeting in moscow. because president medvedev says that is the prerogative of the court. and he does not want to or does not want that destruction. >> the audio is not good. please repeat that? >> when i hear about the allusions that russia can help stop iranian military nuclear
3:11 am
programs, i recall ronald reagan speaking about the role of the government. he said the government is not the solution, it is a part of the problem. russia is not the solution to iran. russia is a part of the problem. in fact, there are many influential people in russia who are in favor of the iranian nuclear program. because it seems a good factor in containing american and israeli influence in the middle east, and increasing russian club in central asia. i believe it's a myopic view. in the long term russia will suffer from iranian threats, because iranian nuclear program will encourage moscow's fundamentalism and extremism in central asia. but many people, including many
3:12 am
decision makers, ignore these objective realities. the second thing to why russia is not an ally in stopping iranian nuclear programs is because russian nuclear industrial complex is very interested in maintaining and developing nuclear cooperation with iran because it is lucrative and beneficial, which brings enormous profits, provides employment for the thousands of people. otherwise there would be unemployed. so the way russia behaved in security council when it was reluctant to go to introduce resolute sanctions against ira n, shows russia is not going to be an active player in cooperating to stop the iranian nuclear program. as for the gentleeman, it's
3:13 am
important obama deal with this problem in this conversation with russian leaders, just as all previous american presidents including ronald reagan dealt with the issues of human rights and dissidents in the soviet union. also, the brezhnev position with andropov, they said, no, we have soviet courts that will decide. still americans interfered. american influence was instrumental in letting free such important figures of many who are now prominent figures in the west. so i believe the issue of human rights is a must for obama for his negotiations in moscow. >> thank you. i will say, we lost a rule of law and rights working group
3:14 am
with prominent lawyers, one of foam will speak in the second panel today. we, also, drafted a memo that went to american decision makers on the issues of the rule of law if it is unnecessary issued to develop u.s.-russia business relations. it's in the interest of russian entrepreneurs in the russian economic growth and of u.s.- russian business relations. president medvedev and an economic forum that i attended said business relations between the u.s. and russia are important in volume and structure. we noticed conflicts in the resolution, requesting or advising president obama to raise the issue of the man in
3:15 am
prison, in his summit. both the senate and the congress resolution are now in play on the floor. with that, i have to bring this very interesting panel to conclusion. thanks to baker and fritz and give jenny and the wonderful lady in moscow there with him. and for those here who put our program together. take about. a 10 minutes to break and we go to the second panel. thank you. wyññ the heritage foundation live on c-span. >> welcome.
3:16 am
by james brooks and i will moderate a panel. we're happy to be joines by the director of the european democracy project senior fellow. the your program at the center for strategic and international studies in washington. you speak about nato and russia, ukraine, and georgia. if next to him is sandy sanders, a partner at greenberg. he was about the need to the rule of law and property rights in russia. arie l. is still appear. he will be there for closing remarks. if you want to start us out this morning, that would be great. >> thank you. >> it's your call. >> good morning, everybody. i was asked to focus on russian policy toward ukraine and
3:17 am
georgia as well as nato, european union, u.s. responses to that policy. soden brown the world in 10 minutes. i will get as much as possible. -- around the world in 10 minutes. let me say this before i speak specifically about ukraine and georgia and how i see russia's policies. there are several points the u.s. administration needs to keep in mind in setting or resetting policy towards russia. these are important. first, i believe russia is revisionist and restoration iis. there in the process of legitimizing the restoration of dominance among its neighbors. moscow, i think, will intensify its campaign during the celebration of the 1989 democratic revolution, the collapse of the soviet union, 1919. it will claim that russia somehow fallen steadily gave up
3:18 am
communism and the soviet bloc and the cold war ended in a stalemate. looking back on 1989, we have the fall of the berlin wall when changes have to the began before that. it is often overlooked that those historic events not only signal the collapse of communism, they also heralded the national liberation of the east european nations from soviet-russian blue chip. while communism now is a fading nightmare, the struggle to maintain state independence from an increasingly assertive russia continues to this day. second, while it is understandable that policymakers in america and europe wish to see russia transformed from a strategic adviser to a strategic partner, it is important to base such an approach on a realistic appraisal of moscow pose a geopolitical objectives.
3:19 am
strategic partners not only share particular policies, they are also bound by common interests and enduring goals. while russia can be a partner with villines in dealing with threats such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, or counter-terrorism, the government in moscow does not share the long-term strategic goals of either nato or the european union. nato allies are committed to respecting the will of sovereign states and multinational institutions of their choice. they also supports the expansion of democratic systems, of legitimate government, that combine stability with respect for human and civil rights. the same foreign policy principles do not apply to the russian authorities. third, contrary to western interests, the kremlin has strategies that revolve around what i call a form of pragmatic
3:20 am
imperialization in which 0 some calculations prevail. russia's administration seeks to be a global player and to achieve this goal it is intent on rolling back american influence, neutralizing the european union by focusing on bilateral ties with selective states, reestablishing zones of privilege to influence along its borders, and curtailing the expansion of western institutions, particularly the eastern ones. fourth, russia's neo imperial project no longer relies on soviet era instruments, at least not primarily. such as ideological allegiance, military force, and the deal with georgia, or implementing government. the principal goal is to exhort predominant influence over the
3:21 am
foreign and security policies of disparate states that will either remain neutral or support russia's policies. fifth, while its goals are imperial, a common strategies are pragmatic. it employs eclectic methods involving a mixture of enticement, threats, incentives, and pressure. russia's national interests are seen as predominating over those of its neighbors. russia deploys a range of weapons to curtail the further expansion of the nato-european union area and to weaken its effectiveness. i will not go into detail. i've published a book at the end of last year and have another one coming out at the end of this year on the same subject, if you are interested in it. >> it's available on heritage.org. >> thank you. russia's administration aims to discredit western institutionas.
3:22 am
it seeks to neutralize democracy-promoting institutions such as the 0 [unintelligible] , it manufactures security disputes with nato, such as the missile defense shield, in order to gain advantages in other areas, it seeks brand bargains to consolidate its interests, and [unintelligible] 7, its domestic problems precipitated by the global financial crisis will not curtail its expansion or ambitions. i believe in order to deflect attention from mounting social and regional disquiet, the kremlin may further cultivate a sense of the siege meanbeseigemg
3:23 am
the caucuses. president obama has had various interpretations. some of russia's neighbors fear the russian imperial impulses may be overlooked by washington and grand bargain is struck with moscow at the cost of central european security and sovereignty. when i pressed hard reset button, i lose all information and go back to my manufacturers setting. i hope that's not the case. now to ukraine and georgia. i will try to be brief. russian leaders, i believe, those in power, don't accept the independence of ukraine. they'd view ukraine primarily as a region near russia.
3:24 am
ukraine is denied a separate history, culture, and distinct national identity. ukraine statehood has been viewed as a temporary aberration and the ideal scenario is to create a closed political and military alliance directed from moscow. the ukrainians have not helped matters. power struggles between interest groups and industrial lobbyists in ukraine provide opportunities to pull the country back into a russian orbit. moscow engages in various forms of subterfuge and subversion to achieve its goal, including energy blackmail, private corruption, economic buyouts, media propaganda, discrediting other politicians, attempts at diplomatic isolation, manipulation of national and regional issues, threats of direct military intervention or
3:25 am
even a breakup of the country, protection of russian ethnic groups or russian speakers on the territory of ukraine, and challenges over the ownership of the naval base in crimea. moscow's ability to enter the ukraine economy through energy blackmail, raising the prices, or by calling in debt, telling the country's social and political stability. the russian minority has been exploited by moscow to apply political pressure on kiev. kiev remains an sund about possible, and support, particularly for separatism in crimea and some eastern areas of the country in the wake of the georgian-prussian war last year. since the orange revolution of 2004, russian authorities have continued to impose -- interfere in ukrainian politics. instead of putting all their
3:26 am
eggs in one basket they have courted the president and prime minister there. they continue to support the other gentlemen and they welcome a coalition that no longer exists. with presidential elections approaching in ukraine in january 2010, moscow, i believe, will have new opportunities to exert its influence over ukrainian policies. ultimately, i think moscow has three options. first, full political domination, which is a despdifficult proposition. second, keeping the country off balance and out of alliance with european structures. the european union, will talk about that later, seen as a threat in moscow. here i think they have been more successful since 2004. third, which is the ultimate option, outright territorial position, which is the last
3:27 am
resort, if the ukrainian authorities were to veer too fall was and is the western open to that of veering. now to russia and georgia. i'll be brief. russian authorities, i think, in middle of last year calculated they would gain several long- term advantages from military invasion. a defacto partition of georgia is the effect. first, holding georges progress toward nato, as several european union states contend membership in mask, let alone in nato, itself, with further provoke moscow to generate european relations. georgia has stiffened its position in your against offering nato maps to any other post-soviet states including ukraine. second, undermining the government of saakashvili, which is depicted in the kremlin as
3:28 am
the property of washington. third, highlighting the limits of american-nato protection of a partner state, in the face of moscow's military assertiveness while displaying russia's right to power. it's a contradiction in the way russia views nato. it depicts nato as a threat to security. on the other hand it depicts nato as too week to manage insecurities both in europe, the balkans, and the periphery. fourth, sending warnings to neighboring states with russian minorities for separatist disputes, including ukraine, azerbaijan, and anothmoldova awy from western influence. fifth, weakening confidence in energy liner notes from the caspian basin to europe.
3:29 am
including the nobuko pipeline. thereby prompting russian monopolization of energy routes to supplies. during the summer of 2008 the european union and nato displayed what i believe was impetus in russia's display in the south caucuses. there was a security vacuum in regions where nato has not committed itself when it comes to its defense. and where russia's expansionism is accelerating. the russian dass georgia warren has become a test case -- the russia-georgia war has become a test case with dealing with crises for nato. and an ability to pressure russia or convince russia to withdraw its troops from occupied territories, to in place
311 Views
IN COLLECTIONS
CSPAN2 Television Archive Television Archive News Search ServiceUploaded by TV Archive on