looking for the best shot so consequently if you are looking at a table in the round and there is one of the chair, i am going, i will shoot a that bird's-eye view looking down. that is my favorite viewpoint. i did not realize the chair was empty because that is where you're supposed to sit, but anyway i did find that many of these ronald reagan, the camera becomes second nature to them. ..

>> and a lot of these television cables are behind you and you can just fall down. and people will reach out and get you. so in that respect i would say humanity is present. >> in capturing democracy, do you ever get frustrated by how images are used? i mean, i think being a photographer shooting icons, do you ever get, do you ever want to see the beverly hills and the

homeless man, more optimism than say a shot at the capitol? >> that's a great question. one way to answer it is in songs . and i would say the same. when i actually had statistical data of what image am i is the biggest seller of them all, the absolute biggest. that's a big seller and not the biggest seller. the biggest seller is right to my right. is the american flag in a blue sky. go figure. so consequently, when i published a catalogue of my images, and we've started putting little dots, you know, like when you travel on a giant map. and you go, okay, this shot sold

three times, this one sold nine times. this shot sold 187 times. the american flag in a blue sky. now you would think that anybody could take that shot. however, if you work in new york it's a rainy day, you need a shot of the american flag in five minutes. that's where i come in because my shot is the perfect shot of the american flag. no tears, no wrinkles. just perfect blowing in the wind. and on a larger bases, if you really think about it, for a guy that presumably loves america, and he wants to photograph democracy, in some ways it just seems right that my biggest selling shot would be an american flag. now i wouldn't tell a european that. [laughter] >> well, thank you very much. i appreciate it.

[applause] >> joseph sohm's voters have been published over 50000 times in national geographic time, "the new york times," the washington post and others. for more information visit visions of america.com. >> with the birth of a continental army in 1775 local militias were organized under the leadership of george washington that begin an eight year engagement that would be known as the american

revolutionary war. despite the outcome, it was not by all historical accounts a model of tactical brilliance in superior court nation. in fact, as you'll soon learn that was quite the contrary. if not for significant he wrote actions overcoming inept decisions and a fair amount of good old fashioned luck, the result of the war and the future of our nation could have been three different. our program is coming to you from the pritzker military library in downtown chicago. about halfway through we will be taking questions from our studio audience and from those of you is joining us on the internet. a special thanks to our present sponsor along with our individual and program sponsors and associate members. for helping make this presentation possible. for over 40 years john ferling has dedicated his career to early american history. is the author of nine books and numerous articles on the american revolution in early american wars. and has appeared in several television documentaries devoted to revolution and the war of independence.

his book a leap in the dark a struggle to greet the american republic one defrancis tavern book award as the years of best book on the american revolution. he is with us to discuss almost a miracle. the american victory in the war on independent. please join me in welcoming john ferling. [applause] >> thank you for your it's a delight to be in chicago and to be at this fine institution. i wanted to begin by telling you that i had wanted to write this book for a long time. i taught a course on u.s. military history, taught a course on the american revolution and spent about half of that course dealing with the war. and taught a couple of seminars on the war of independence, but i had to wait until my editor finally gave me clearance to

write a book. i also wanted to write it because a book that i wrote in 2003, a leap in the dark, was a political history of the revolutionary era and i wanted to write a book that would deal with the military aspects of the revolutionary era. and i took the title, "almost a miracle," from a line in washington's farewell address to the continental army. he said goodbye to his continental army in november of 1783, about a month before he resigned his commission. he wrote a long address, and as is a rather typical of washington he didn't dwell on the past. he looked towards the future and not address, but in one very small portion of the address to the army he reflected on the outcome of the war.

and he said that the outcome, the american victory was little short of a standing miracle. so from that i came up with "almost a miracle." in every book that i have written, i have learned a great deal. i have gone in knowing something about what i wanted to do, but it was a learning experience for me. and that was true with this book as well. one of the things i think that i came away really impressed with about the revolutionary war was just how tough a war it was. much tougher than i think many people realized today. it was, in fact, america's longest declared war. it lasted for eight and a half years, and a toll on both sides was appalling. there was a book published here

in chicago, as a matter of fact, around the time of the bicentennial in the 1970s called the toll of independence which estimated that the american losses totaled about 25000 men. that's just servicemen who died during the war. and most scholars, including myself, regard at 25000 figure as probably being a very conservative estimate. pretty much it deals only with those in the continental army and not with the militiamen who perished in the war. so that in my book, i estimated that probably at least 30000 americans who fought, who bore arms in this war died. and that included soldiers, sailors, militia men, partisans, crewmen aboard privateers, and

whatever. and even there i think probably the 30000 figure is somewhat low. to try to put that in some perspective, let me talk just a bit in a comparative way about the numbers which served in this war and contrast it with other wars. in the revolutionary war, about one american male of military age in 16, one in 16 served during the war. in the civil war, about one american male of the military age in 10 served. and in world war ii, it was about one in 75 american men of military age. of those who fought and died on

the american side, about one in four who bore arms, at least in the continental army. about 100,000 men served in the continental army, and we are pretty certain that 25000 of those 100,000 irish. so about one in four regular soldiers died during the revolutionary war. in the civil war, if you combine union and confederate casualties and just look at the regular soldiers, it's about one in five which perished. ended world war ii, about one in 40 american servicemen died. the greatest single cause of death for american servicemen in the revolutionary war was disease. this was a time period before anesthesia had been developed, before modern antibiotics had

been developed. it was a time period, in fact, when most people hardly traveled from their place of birth. probably not more than 40 or 50 miles if they went that far from their place of birth. and suddenly they were thrown into army camps with men from all around the country. and oftentimes they were malnourished and alehouse and ill clad and it was a formula for disaster. so the greatest single cause of mortality was disease. but in addition to that, the mortality among american soldiers who were taken prisoners was absolutely catastrophic as well. 47% of the american soldiers who were taken prisoner by the british perished in tact to be.

to put that in some kind of context, at the infamous andersonville prisoner camp in georgia in the civil war, about 37% of the prisoners perished. 47% from the revolutionary war is just about the same percentage as was true of americans who were held captive by the japanese during world war ii. and lifeless to four american soldiers, even when they weren't on the battlefield or for those who weren't taken captive. oftentimes as i think everybody remembers, there were shortages of food, lack of clothing, only rudimentary housing existed for those soldiers.

we usually think of the valley forge winter, that's the one that's the most famous as being a bad winter. but the soldiers are themselves spoke of a winter two years later in moorestown, new jersey, where the winter quarters were as being what they call the hard winter. even worse than at valley forge. but at valley forge, one soldier in seven who marched into the encampment with washington did not come out of the encampment. had to try to put that figure again in some context, and the battle of the bold in world war ii, perhaps the most horrific engagement that the united states encountered in the european theater, about one in 30 american soldiers in that engagement perished. and that was fighting an enemy

that was drawing to kill them and doing a pretty good job as well. but one in seven perished at valley forge. another thing that i think i discovered in writing this book was that while we know of the suffering of american troops, i found that our enemies, those who thought for the british during this war also suffered at times. and in fact, about the death rate for those who soldiered for great britain was just about the same proportionately as it was before the americans. about one in four who fought under the british flag died. that include british soldiers, german soldiers, tahitians, and also americans who fought for

the british. a great many loyalists, or tories, soldiered for great britain and died fighting for great britain during this war. in fact, though we don't tend to remember it much today, there was a point in 1780 when there were actually more americans fighting with the british army then were members of the continental army under general washington. if you add together the number of americans who died and the number who died on the british side during this war, and look at it on a proportional basis in terms of the population of those two countries at the time, and the death toll which would have

been about 80000 actually, would be roughly equivalent of losing some 2 million people from the american population today. would be almost as if, the place that i live, atlanta, georgia, simply was wiped out completely. and it wasn't just soldiers who suffered during this war, but civilians paid a heavy price as well. diseases were brought home by soldiers on furlough. armies which were near civilian areas spread diseases. so that, for example, during the first year of the war, abigail adams, the wife of john adams who was serving in congress, abigail wrote to john and said to him, our house is an

hospital, as she put it. and her next letter to her husband revealed to him that johnson brothers wife and one of his children had died of the disease. and that wasn't untypical. civilians died, civilians living on the frontier died in indian attacks. the british made coastal raids, particularly in the middle states and in new england and in virginia. destroying property, killing people. in the first two years of the conflict, women wer when men weo enlist for just a period of a one year the army was a pretty good cross-section of the free population.

most free men at the time were farmers or artisans, and most of the men who soldiered in the continental army were farmers or artisans. so a great many families had to struggle along in 1775 and 1776 with their husbands away. somehow, they have to find the money to pay the tax collector who came knocking at their door or to grow crops and so crops or whatever. and they had to pay extraordinarily high taxes during this conflict. so civilians suffered. and we think of, we're all familiar i think with the images of the thread, bear, american soldiers, sometimes we don't realize that those who fought for the british suffered as

well. during the first winter of the war, when boston was the seizure by washington's army, the revolutionary war, the revolutionary army, continental army got along very well. they were well fed and well housed. and it was the british who suffered the most during the harsh boston winter. the british to get here had to make an atlantic crossing. and one of the british soldiers wrote in his journey of the crossing, which sounds like a horrid crossing that he experienced your there was continued instruction in the four tops, the pox above board, the plate below decks, hell and the forecastle, the devil at the helm. and a british soldier who was sent to south carolina to campaign, to take charleston in 1780 was landed with a british army at about 20 miles below

charleston, and had to move through swamps and marshy areas. and you can almost feel this grim, white faced british soldier as he writes in his journal about seeing crocodiles 16 feet long, as he put it, wolves and several species of venomous snakes. the revolutionary war was not just a revolutionary war, but it was also a civil war within a civil war. and what i mean by that is that it was a war waged by anglo-american colonists against the british mother country, but within that conflict, there was a struggle between colonists who supported the revolution and colonists who continue to remain

loyal to great britain. john adams, following the revolutionary war, made the remark that about one third of the americans supported the war, supported the revolution, one third supported great britain, and one third to give a damn. but in fact, i think most scholars feel that a better evaluation is that among those who played an active role, probably about 80% supported the revolution, and 20% were tories who remain loyal to great britain. and there was a struggle, particularly in states like new jersey and pennsylvania, and even more so in the south. we think of the south being caught up in a civil war in the middle of the 19th century, at the south first civil war took place in the revolutionary war.

and especially when the british changed their strategy be getting in 1778 to what became known as simply as southern strategy. after the battles at saratoga and the surrender of a burgoyne's army to the americans in october of 1778 the british road off the northern colonies, as they would call the northern states. thinking that they simply could not be conquered. but they thought they might be able to conquer at least for southern colonies. georgia, south carolina, north carolina and virginia. those with the most important colonies, economically, to great britain because that's where the cash crops like tobacco and rice and indigo were grown.

and the british thought that if they could subdue those colonies, they could come out of the war with a large american empire. they could perhaps hold canada. they could perhaps hold everything west of the appalachian mountains. they could hold those up for southern colonies, virginia, the two carolinas and georgia. they already held florida, which they had acquired in the french and indian war, and they held several sugar islands in the caribbean. so they would not only have a large american empire, but their american empire would surround the united states. and the united states might consist of no more than nine or 10 states. in fact, if it was about small and that vulnerable and at hand

in, the chances of the united states remaining an independent country for very long were slim, to say the least. so the british turned toward conquering the south in 1778. it's at that point that they really began to raise an arm provincial units, or units composed of loyalists. the idea, in fact, was at the british regulars would come in and conquer the continental army, flush the continental army out of the southern states with the help of the loyalists. and end of oil is would be left to pacify that area. and they actually succeeded in doing that and georgia. georgia was the first colony or state to be invaded by britain,

just after christmas of 1778. savanna was taken, and the british reinstated the royal governor of virginia, and a loyalist legislature was elected that repealed all of the legislation that had been passed by the revolutionaries state assembly sense of 1776. it was the only state in which something like that happened. and 18 months later, the british invaded south carolina and conquer charlestown in may of 1780. and this is the point following the collapse of charleston that the civil war really begins in the south. and fact, i argued in the book that i think the revolutionary war was actually one in the south in 1780 and 1781.

is one in two ways. once the british take charleston, they move out into the interior of south carolina and establish about a dozen posts in the backcountry of that colony, or state. but starting in the middle of the summer of 1780, south carolinians began to resist the british invasion, as they called it. most of the people who lived in the backcountry of south carolina were of scotch irish background. they didn't have much love for great britain. their ancestors, in fact, had fled the homeland to escape great britain. and many of them, most of them perhaps were presbyterian. and they had little interest in

britain's established church, the anglican church. and certainly didn't want to pay taxes to that church. so they looked on the british as invaders. they believed in the idea of the american revolution, an idea of change that would be brought about by gaining independence. they believed in what thomas paine had written in common sense. he spoke of the american revolution as the birthday of a new world. that's pretty radical when you think about it. this was a revolution to bring about change. not every revolutionary agreed with that, but i think most of those people in the backcountry in the south did. and so a partisan war, or what we might today call a guerrilla warfare began.

bands of guerrillas began to form tooth sally out of forests and out of swamps and ambush british patrols, to attack british supply lines and whatever. a great partisan war began to develop in the summer of 1780. in fact, soon after charleston fell, british headquarters in the south announced that the war was for all -- the american resistance was for all practical purposes broken. but this was a mission accomplished statement that was premature. and, in fact, general cornwallis, who was left to finally subdue the rebellion in

the south by september of 1787 is the opposite. the mission had not been accomplished but in fact there were rubbles everywhere. and so cornwallis finds himself fighting a grim partisan or guerrilla warfare in the south. and the other aspect of the war in the south was a more conventional war, as congress would send a southern continental army's in to contest the british. they didn't always do very well. in fact, the first three continental army's that were sent to the south were defeated, including a defeat that i think very few americans even remember any longer, the surrender of charleston where more than 7000 americans were killed, wounded

or captured during that siege. but finally, at the very end of 1780, general nathaniel greene was named the commander of the continental army in the south. in fact, at that point after the battle of camden and the defeat of our ratio gauge, congress went to general washington and asked washington if he would select the commander of the continental army in the south. washington had always through the war declined to do that, naming commanders was to get into a political minefield. and he wanted to stay out of that. but the situation was desperate in late 1780. and washington at that point did

name somebody, and he named general green. washington early on in the war had seen qualities in greene who ironically had a soldier before the war. he had never been in a military unit until a few weeks, in fact, before the war broke out. but he was a bright guy. he was an extraordinary leader. and washington, who was i think almost unequaled in his ability to judge other people and to judge them very quickly, came to see greene as perhaps his best to general. and in fact, as early as 1776, washington had indicated that if something happened to him, if he

should die of a camp disease or be killed in action, he hoped that congress would name greene as his successor. and so washington in october of 1787 just into congress that greene be named the commander. and greene waged a brilliant campaign over a period of about a hundred days in january, february and march of 1781. in fact, i think it was the most brilliant campaign, sustained campaign, waged by any american commander during a war. it was modeled somewhat on washington's campaign at trenton and princeton that greene had been part of that. and so he was familiar with

that. but this was a longer campaign. trenton and princeton have been a campaign that lasted less than 10 days. greene's campaign lasted more than a hundred days. and actually went on beyond that. by march of 1781, greene had succeeded in causing just enormous attrition in general cornwallis is army. in fact, cornwallis lost about 40% of his men between january and march. and at that point, cornwallis in late march of 1781 made a crucial decision.

his orders from the commander of the british army, his orders were not to leave south carolina, or the carolinas until he had succeeded in pacifying those two states. but cornwallis decided that he could not pacify, could not subdue the rebellion in the carolinas and in georgia, unless he could shut down the supply routes through virginia. food was funneling in to those guerrillas, those partisans from the north, through virginia. and that was what was sustaining them. and so cornwallis violated clinton supporters. and there was a small army, about 2500 british soldiers in

virginia. cornwallis took his army into virginia in the spring of 1781 to link up with that british army. and he thought that with that larger british army in virginia, and with the british navy, and his ability to use the rivers through virginia and use their speed, that they could just simply outrace the continentals, and that they would be successful. in shutting down those supply routes. but as we know, something else happened, when cornwallis went to virginia it opens up the possibility of yorktown. and that was something that washington didn't envision so much as the french did. in fact, washington met twice

with the french commander in america, he met with him at hartford in september of 1780. and that weatherfield connecticut, in may of 1781. and at both of those meetings, he asked washington what do you want to do? in both instances washington said i want to campaign to take in new york city. and he argued with washington, we can't succeed there. we cannot succeed in an attack on new york city. the british have held too long. they have had six years to prepare their defenses. we cannot win. but he had been ordered by louis the 16th, defer to washington. to do what he wants to do. and so after the wethersfield

conference, or at the wethersfield conference, he agreed, okay, we will attack new york and washington rode back to west point thinking that would be the next item on the agenda. but as soon as washington road back, roadway, he went to his desk and he wrote to the admiral of the french fleet in the caribbean asking him to bring his fleet north, notched in new york, as washington expected, but to the chesapeake. because they saw that british army in virginia and he saw the possibility of trapping it. and that was exactly what happened. one last thing very quickly, and that is there's been a debate really since the moment of the

peace settlement ending the war over whether britain could have one this war. for a great many people in england, the idea that britain could not have won the war was attractive. for the navy, for the british army, even for opposition politicians who had opposed the war all along by saying it was an unwinnable war that presented them in a better light. but i don't think that is true. i think the british could have won the war in 1776, and should have won the war in 1776. i think the british, had the british had a more resolute, more active commander than sir william howe, they would have defeated washington's army on

long island, or on manhattan island. and could probably have ended the war then. and even in 1777, i think the british might have won the war. the basic british idea was for an army, in 1777, was for an army under burgoyne to invade new york from canada while a general howe took his army with the labadie up the hudson river and joined with burgoyne at albany. but at the last minute, how changed plans. he let burgoyne, himself and he went after washington at philadelphia. and it turned out to be an egregious blunder on howe part. most people think the british could not have won the war after

1777. but what i tried to argue, and almost a miracle, is that when 1781, the last year of the war broke out, or began, america was very close to defeat. james lovell, a congressman from massachusetts, wrote a letter on the second day of 1781 to john adams. and he began that letter by saying we are bankrupt with a mutinous army. washington thought america had to do score a decisive victory in 1781, or there would be no other chance. and john adams who was in europe was writing that the french would not remain in the war beyond 1781. they had accomplished nothing to this point. they were looking for an honorable exit.

so had there not been a decisive victory in 1781, i think what probably would have happened would have been a european peace conference, and the european powers who had no sympathy for an american republic would have devised some sort of solution for the war. and it wouldn't have been a very rosy solution for the americans. and the americans would have had to accept a bad solution, or fight on by themselves which would have been unthinkable. and so cornwallis decision to go north into virginia and rochambeau's brilliance at saying the opportunity to ensnare cornwallis in the summer and fall of 1781 turned

everything around and made a war that in january of 1781 had seemed hopeless unwinnable war. and i think washington understood that. and that was why in his farewell to the continental army he was saying that the american victory was a little short of a standing miracle. thank you very much. [applause] >> we have some time for questions here. i would like to take the first one though, john. i would like to ask you a little bit about the balance of the navy. we did have an 80 when this all started out and the britons came and overpowering force. could you talk about that force and with what was the decisive

turning point of that? wasn't when the french came up? or was it before that? >> well, actually you mentioned earlier that james mcpherson is coming soon, and mcpherson wonderful book, battle cry on the civil war, mcpherson argues that in a war as long as the civil war, there wasn't a turning point but there were several turning points. and i think that's true in the revolutionary war as well. i think there were five or six turning point in that war. bunker hill, the first pitched battle of the conflict in june of 1775 was absolutely crucial because it demonstrated to the americans that they could stand up against british regulars. i think the naval engagement on lake champlain when benedict

arnold built the navy for america and slow down the british so that when the british tried to invade new york at ticonderoga in the fall of 1776, they had been slowed to the point that winter was setting in. and so they had to postpone the invasion until 1777. and that year gave the americans time to get ready for the invasion. washington's campaign at trenton and princeton between christmas of 1776 and early january of 1777 was absolutely crucial. it probably not only saved washington as commander of the continental army, but it was a victory that enabled another army to be recruited for 1777. to that point, who would have wanted to go into a continental

army that was losing almost every battle that it was fighting? the defeat of burgoyne when he invaded new york, and october of 1777 was crucial. congress' decision made at the beginning of 177 h. actually in late 1776 that implemented in 1777 to move from an army of one year enlistees to a regular army was absolutely crucial because it gave washington an army of hardened veterans and time. and they develop into pretty good soldiers. and then of course your town in october of 1781, and the surrender of cornwallis is army of more than 8000 men was the final decisive turning point that led to the collapse of lord

north government and ushered in a british government that was committed to a peace settlement. >> you know, a leap in the dark, you frequently condemned washington with a praise and you are openly critical of him. there's a cut line helping to promote his current book, that's also critical. and my question to you is, if james thomas lester, one of washington's biographers called him indispensable man as has dave mccullough and many others, do you think washington was dispensable? thank you. >> i am rather critical of washington in this book. although i tried to temper it by pointing out that washington was an amateur. he certainly was not a professional soldier. he hadn't attended a military academy. if you add up what washington

did during his adult years, he only soldiers about 15% of the time. he is a farmer and a businessman, a land speculator, and whatever. he made i think a great many blunders. particularly in the new york campaign in 1776. and i think during the valley forge winter, i don't think that there was a cabal, a conway cabal as washington thought of it and as many historians have called it to remove washington. i don't think congress was close to removing washington at that point, but a great many people in congress were extraordinarily critical of washington. these were people who were close to washington. people like joseph reed, who had been washington's first

secretary during the war and was maybe washington's closest confidant during the first year or so of the war, said a couple of years into the war that he thought washington was maybe 50 command a regiment but nothing beyond that. thomas mifflin, who was the quartermaster, washington's first aide to camp, and quartermaster general for the first couple of years in the war was even more critical. he said that he thought washington was hooted maybe to be a clerk in a countinghouse but not as a general. i think they probably went too far, but the point is that a great many people were extraordinarily critical of washington who were very close to washington, or who saw washington up close. but having said all of that, i can't think of anybody else that i would have rather had as

commander. i think toward beige then the daniel green of 1780 might have been able to have done a job as well as washington did or perhaps even better. but greene was not prepared for that kind of position in 1775. and people like charles lee or horatio gates, they were just out of the picture altogether because they had been professional british officers. and congress was in to go there. congress wanted a native born american to be the commander. and you look at who is around. i mean, people like john sullivan, who had been a lawyer in new hampshire and whatever. i just don't see anyone who would have fit the bill. and i think you have to look at the total picture of washington.

he is a pretty good administrator of the army. the officer corps was blindly loyal, by and large, the washington. he worked extraordinarily well with state governors and with congress. so he i think made up for some of his deficiencies for lack of experience as a soldier with other qualities. and so in the end, i think the country was fortunate to have had him. in fact, i sometimes say that i think the country was fortunate to have had washington and a lucky to have survived. [laughter] >> i read that hundreds of american prisoners died in the halls of ships of new york harbor. what prevented the british and the americans from working out a system of a prisoner exchange or

parole like we have had in other wars? >> .com about a good point. actually there was something of a conflict between washington and congress regarding prisoners, prisoner exchanges. and the problem was that if once the prisoners were exchanged, the american prisoners would go home and wouldn't serve again. but the british prisoners would serve again, or they would be rotated down to the caribbean and replaced by soldiers who were rotated up from the caribbean, or from europe. and so that became an obstacle to prisoner exchanges. and the result was there really are no significant prisoner exchanges until after yorktown. then they come pretty quickly in

1782 and most of the prisoners are in fact exchanged. you have a few here and there who are swapped out, but no really large exchanges before then. >> how important do you judge the battle in south carolina in january of 1778 that colonel lost badly? >> tarleton is active after the fall of charleston in south carolina in the spring of 1780. and in fact, he said after a collection of continental soldiers from virginia. essentially what had happened was the american army was

defending charleston against a british siege. and congress ordered troops from the north down to the south to augment general benjamin lincoln's army in charleston. and those troops sat out for charleston out around the end of march. and by the time the american army surrendered in may, they were just entering south carolina. and so tarleton went after those for junior soldiers who were trying to retreat and get out of south carolina. and he overtook them up there this south carolina, north carolina border toward the end of may of 1780. attack them, routed them, and after the american surrendered, the massacred about 75% of

those. and it's following that that the war in the south really becomes a grim civil war. the americans time after time exacted revenge for tarleton's massacre. in fact, at kings mountain in october after tarleton's massacre in may when the americans that he had a loyalist force at kings mountain, they not only killed a great many who after they had surrendered, but then they forced them on a long march, about a 50-mile forced march that there is something of a resemblance to the tanned death march. and so many british soldiers, loyalists were killed during that march. let me read you the order from the american commander to his

men. he issued an order, and i am quoting, to restring the disorderly manner of slaughtering the prisoners. and that was just one instance of exacting revenge for tarleton's massacre. so it really becomes a very, a very grim war in the south as civil wars tend to be. >> we have time for one more quick question before the break. >> you stated at the beginning that if the southern campaign is gone better the british were hoping to how the southern colonies they were less interested in holding the middle in new england. do you really think it was politically possible for a piece to be arrived at under which british would have consented to king george, of a large part of

the colonies if they had in fact secured the whole southern area, do you think that on the other hand the middle and northern colonies would have had let the southern colonies fall, including possibly virginia. i think it would have been very difficult for many of the revolutionary leaders because they were from virginia. >> well, i think there's a tendency in stalemated wars when the war is stalemated and there's a negotiated settlement to simply leave the belligerence in control of what they possessed at the time of the armistice. so that i think had there been a european mediation conference, in 1781, assuming that there hadn't been a decisive victory that year, and had the war been

settled in that fashion, then i think south carolina and georgia certainly, and possibly north carolina as well would have gone to the british. lord nourse majority was dwindling and there certainly were the opposition was growing more powerful every day and wanting to get this war over at that point. so i think there is a realistic possibility that it could have ended that way had it not been for yorktown. >> john ferling. [applause] >> our thanks to john ferling for joining us. the book is "almost a miracle" published by oxford university press. you can learn more about this library, download the audio podcast by visiting us at pritzker military library.org.

i'm a traci. thanks for joining us. [applause] >> and we are back for the webcast part of the program. john, step back up your. i have one question to follow up and we will get to a couple others as we go. you said that georgia was the first falling state in the revolutionary war. is there any repercussions today because you're from atlanta. you live in atlanta. is there any repercussions of georgia today for that? i mean do you see anything different in georgia that you see in any other southern states? >> no, actually i think borst georgians are aware that there was a revolutionary war. the revolutionary war was consumed by the civil war in the south. . .

in front of the courthouse there is a statute of a soldier, not a revolutionary war soldier, a confederate soldier and he is facing north to protect the south against what some old-line seveners always referred to as the war of northern aggression. three weeks ago i was at the citadel in charleston and came

by frances marion park, a huge park in downtown charleston, and i saw a statute and i went over to see the statue of frances marion. it was a statue of john c. calhoun and not frances marion. [laughter] >> yes, there is a story, i don't know whether it is true or f mythology imad george washington having a lucid dream or a prophecy that he shared a with floppy hat to -- being that in the united states was going to win the war and revolution and see the borders of the united states extend all the way to the pacific ocean. is that true or just ecology? >> i think that is just

lithology. washington and certainly look to the west. he and 60,000 acres. he had fought to win the west and the french and indian war fighting in what was the ohio country at that time, but generally kind of in the midwest. was later been ohio, indiana, illinois, michigan, wisconsin, and so washington and i think certainly hope that in the united states would gain that area and even after yorktown washington proposed to roche demo a joint invasion of canada. he writes to congress and in his letter he talks about all that great man in canada and also securing the frontiers of america and securing the

american national security by keeping great britain out of canada in the postwar years and most southerners i think, never quite interested in what they call the southwest of that time, what we think of as the southeast today, alabama, mississippi and whatever. but i don't think that very many people thought at least anytime soon of going beyond the mississippi river. they hope to get to the mississippi river. many of loyalists argue that what i'm of the great reasons for remaining tied with great britain when be that with the combined power of lowell of america and great britain much more rapidly than in americans could swing to the mississippi river and then beyond the

mississippi river to the pacific and they didn't stop there. my thought in terms of central america and south america so that the the whole western hemisphere, north and south america, would be anglo-american. in the and. >> you mention a name that out like you to expand on if you run -- francis marion, the swamp fox. over the years i have been told, i have read that he was largely in the version, that he was no significant figure. which you expand on that, please,? >> i think historians debate that point. there is not a uniform interpretation of marion and i think it grows out of the fact that mary anne was sort of a cantankerous independent sort who did not always work

particularly well with continental army. certainly when corrine came in and took command of the southern continental army, he had problems with marion. but that said, i think as i tried to argue in the book, the partisan leaders not just marion bought some derrin and others waged a war that really turned things around. it through the british on the defensive, the british were beleaguered, there attrition rate was really serious 31780 and 81 because of that, and the partisan fighters i think ultimately plein-air really a crucial role in saving in the american revolution.

>> returning to the question of could this be two have won the war, when the act have been in arnold and been unable to surrender west point. >> i think arnold had pulled off his treasonous act, it would have been just devastating. from a psychological standpoint it was almost devastating as it was, that a general who was this important and this esteemed. he had fought heroically at lake champlain and at saratoga. to do something like this and this late in the war and just as the french army was arriving, that act in itself was almost devastating and i can tell you how much washington wanted to get his hands on arnold.

he captured a major entrée and tried to trade on trade for arnold and the british wouldn't have that and the american center and a volunteer from virginia who was to try to capture or kill arnold and he actually succeeded in in listing in a tory, a prudential unit, that arnold commanded the end of wallis that provincially unit under arnold was part of the invasion of virginia manhattan -- va. that poor soldier was in a situation where if he had been taken prisoner he could have been executed as a deserter from the american army. unfortunately one sing and into virginia he managed to escape and made his way to a friendly

place us. his real identity and a mission or revealed, but at the british have gotten their hands on west point then they would have accomplished and that was when arnold was trying to do, trying to get west point to the british. had this british gotten west point then they would have accomplished what they hope to accomplish in 1776 and that was that they would control the hudson river and if they controlled the hudson river then new york end of the four new england states would be divided from all of the states on the other side of the hudson river. it would probably have been unthinkable for the americans to have continued the war in that situation. >> he mentioned earlier the disagreement with washington about northern campaign and you went on to describe how he went

only as far as the chesapeake. do i take that that the essentially went into falling on and taking on the yorktown campaign? >> i am glad you raised the point because they did not have time to develop then it earlier in. when washington and met with rochambeau at the wethersfield conference and rochambeau wrote the letter to come to the chesapeake, washington and rochambeau knew at that point that there was a fairly small british army the relatively small, about 2500 men in virginia. washington thought that was pretty small potatoes and he wanted to go after the bigger force in bigger prius in new

york. what they did not know was that cornwallis at that very moment was actually marching from north carolina into virginia. but given the lag in communications, weeks went by before they understood that. and by june they did know that cornwallis was in virginia and they knew that clinton, the british commander in york was sending reinforcements down to cornwallis' so that cornwallis his army was growing and eventually came up to almost 8,000 and. and at that point in june rochambeau revealed to washington and that there were coming but he did not tell where he was going to. and he said to washington, what do you prefer and at that point washington said, well, let's let

them make the decision where they go. but i am okay with going after cornwallis so i think eventually washington came to see that possibility, but everything had been put in motion and really envisage originally by rochambeau. there is an interesting quote, let me read this quote to you because it kind of goes back to the idea of washington being an indispensable man and the quota is from a volunteer in the french force to came over to america to fight with the americans in 1777. one of the county is in atlanta have been named for dekalb who had been there for a quarter of a century and was one of the soldiers who didn't think are

much of washington and, in fact, said he was the weakest general under whom he had never served, but in 1777 general dick allyson this: if washington ever does anything sensational he will always get more into his and in good luck or to his adversaries mistakes than to his own ability. well, he may be went a little too far but he was somewhat pressured i think in that big test had not been for cornwallis is a mistake he violated his orders by taking his army into virginia. had had cornwallis dave and the carolinas york -- yorktown had never taken place and i don't think america's could have defeated the british in new york. there were three generals involved in 71 -- general clinton of the british army, rochambeau, commander of the

french army, and general washington. two of those generals, clinton and rochambeau, were professional soldiers and neither of them thought the franco american army to defeat the british in new york. it would take a siege of two years. they couldn't get enough men together and hold of that army to gather for that length of time. the british have held new york since the summer of 1776 and had five years to life in supplies and prepared defensive works written, have the showdown been a battle for new york i don't think the french and americans could have one that. still in the end in a sense general the cowboys' right. washington succeeded because of cornwallis' this mistake in

going north. >> i'm still a little confused about the glue that held of the union to gather. the 13 colonies seemed at times like strange bed long before the civil war gave the issue of this union and economic industrialization, slavery and all of that. in a part so quickly during the civil war. what are the major elements of glue that held them together through the revolution which seems in itself kind of a wonder? >> that's a good question. i think there are probably to a answers to that paragon. in the early stage of the revolution i think there was, i think the glue was what we might call the revolutionary ideology. not everybody believes it the same thing, but there was a general belief in wanting to

become autonomous. a belief that opportunities would be greater for americans if they ran their own country. you could never served in parliament if he were american and never become a general on a british army, if he were american you can never hold a position in the british ministry, if you were an american economist and there were just greater opportunity is for social ability and economic mobility and i think as i said earlier thomas paine in common sense capture that sentiment when he talked about the revolution as the birthday of a new world. so i think that was one thing that really sustain this war in the early and threw out to a considerable degree year ago but then i think washington and became something of a glue.

and i think what happens is that during that valley forge winter there is a great deal of opposition to washington. a gates has succeeded as saratoga. there were people in congress who wanted to get rid of washington, who had failed sun-times and replace him with gates. henry lawrence of south carolina was the president of congress and he wrote a letter to his son, john lawrence, who was an aide to washington in january and 1778 and said, i have just come from a meeting with several congressmen in washington's ideas were greeted with laughter and direction. a great many people in washington -- congress have lost confidence in washington, but at the same time i think there was a feeling that for better or

worse they had in washington and i had to keep washington. dr. benjamin rush from philadelphia wrote that he thought there was a concerted decision made by congress in the winter of 1778 to sort of make washington and the national eye,, the glue around which people group. we're the only country that did not have a keen and the kings in europe or to a considerable degree sort of symbolic figures. they read the figure, the glue around which people can valley and the nation could be sustained. and john adams after the war said the same thing. he said he thought there was a decision made early in 1778 in congress to make washington in this central stone as he put it

in the national march. that is where the glorification of washington really began this and this idea of washington and being indispensable develops. as adams said, congress protected washington in many ways. and hid from the american people washington's mistakes, it embellished small triumphs that washington had to try to make washington. to be better because they realized that they had to have some sort of glue of that sort. >> one observation and another one -- that business about the john adams and the 1/3 1/3 1/3. there was an article i think in

the '50s in the william and mary quarterly that discusses that and he was talking about the french revolution, not the american. >> i don't think so, i think that john adams did say that he thought one-third of the american people are loyalists during this war, but as i said it scholars have looked at and is fairly easy to study because what happened was that in the peace negotiations on the british at one end the americans to provide restitution for the proper name that the loyalist and lost, their property had been seized and sold to raise money now is the country went bankrupt and there were three american negotiators of the

peace settlement. john adams, john j., and benjamin franklin and adams mingei where willing to include a provision in the final peace treaty under which congress would have to provide restitution. and intriguingly, benjamin franklin who son of william franklin was a loyalist said absolutely not. franklin would not go along with it. you can look in that into way this. did franklin his son that much or did franklin think that his son had a better chance of getting restitution if it came from england and then from congress? in any rate it didn't go into the peace settlement and so there was political pressure in england to provide restitution and the british established a wilmont commission after the war

in every committee who was a loyalist and to provide evidence of what they had possessed before the war, how much property they own, what they're in, and then, when they became loyalists, what they had done to help britain during the revolution -- to provide a great deal of information and all of that was written out, they had to make five copies of what they rode out. they submitted that and from all that evidence historians have been able to go in and come up with a printing and idea of how many tories there actually were. they concluded that among those who ran active during the revolution and about 20 percent were tory. i did not imagine when i was talking about civilians perhaps

i should have that in the civil war for a sample less than one-half of 1%, just an infinitesimal fraction of southerners went into exile following the civil war but 5% of the free population in america and the time of the revolutionary war when into exile following this war. >> perhaps even a little bit more. when i was doing work on that in the early '70s i guess it was, the numbers i came up with that proportionately speaking as with you, more americans went into exile then cubans after castro or french after the french revolution or russians out of the russian revolution and i wonder if you would agree with pat? >> i have seen those figures on

the french revolution and i think that certainly is right. i just don't know about the cuban revolution or the russian revolution but you're exactly right. more americans did go into exile as results of the american revolution then went into an sow as a result of the french revolution. >> most historians agree that spain, when they spell the of the war's and the jews in france itself and expel the huguenots -- can you speculate what america will be like if loyalists were forced out after the revolution -- my this country be incomparably more rich? >> i guess historians have a hard enough time trying to figure out what did happen. maybe that is a good way to

dodge the question. two what i was saying is that probably most of the revolutionaries shed very few tears as seen those people go into exile because their departure open a great many doors and opportunities for other people. people were able to take positions of state legislatures and business positions and whenever that wouldn't have existed previously. >> he mentioned something earlier rather surprising -- use and then there were among the tory propaganda some pundits of the time arguing for a continued loyalty to britain with british power backing them, british america could sweep into the

interior, could counter not only north america but central america and south america. this price is a very expansive vision for the time. can you give any examples of anybody because i like to look into this later. >> i was thinking especially of joseph galloway. gallery of pennsylvania politics, he had been speaker of the house of the pennsylvania assembly for about 20 years before the revolution. he was benjamin franklin's political partner, they cobbled together, party did what they call the quaker party in dominated pennsylvania politics during this 20 years of some before the revolution. galloway was really the head of pennsylvania's delegation to the first continental congress, but the war broke down before the sentence -- second continental congress program and alloyed though he was elected to that congress refused to serve.

he wrote a pamphlet and actually wrote a pamphlet in the fall of 1774, a candid examination and a really long and after that and another pamphlet that came out in the spring of 1775 and he makes that argument in both of those pamphlets that we wouldn't be better off with remaining tied to great britain if we become independent peer down the book that was alluded to early in the introduction that i wrote then came out in 2003, a leap in the dark, that phrase was an galloway's raise but it was the phrase of someone from pennsylvania taken from an article in a philadelphia newspaper that was published

about six weeks before independence was declared in he didn't make the argument about sweeping after the pacific but he did make the argument that to declare independence was as he called it a leap in the dark. there were too many uncertainties in trying to become independent and that we would be better off remaining with great britain and not many people remember this any longer but for the first 15 months of the war our objective wasn't independence but it was a reconciliation written. it was to force britain britain to make peace on our terms and when would remain part of the british empire. but once the cat was out of the bag so to speak and the war

begins and the british began killing american soldiers and american politicians hold positions that they had never held before and state governments in congress, then the idea of independence kept growing and growing and took on a life of its own in. but as i shrine to argue in the book would really clinched the declaration of independence and least at the time it was declared, it probably would have been declared later on any way but what led to the declaration in july of 1776 was in the american defeat in canada. the americans had sent an army up there in the fall of 1775 and they sent another re in the spring of 76 and was defeated in

dragged back into york and the scales fell from the eyes of congress and at that point they knew it was going to be a very long very tough war. and that it was probably an unwinnable war without foreign assistance. what reason was possibly there for france to assist america if are attentive was to reconcile with great britain but if we declared independence and and lost 20 percent of its population they were sending about one-third of their exports to america and getting about one-third of their imports from america, america became independent france could capitalize on that and so i think it was the defeat in france that really led to the timing of independence