let's say, of 2009, you can expect to see it in spring of 2010, no later than fall of 2010. that is my rule. >> thank you. ..

[applause] >> it's nice to be back in seattle. it's actually nice to talk about this book. my partner and i had nine months to get done. from door to door. i had a great day another microsoft. i'm looking forward to tonight. i thought i would talk for 20, 25mens -- minutes and tell you how i got here. the most fun is to answer questions. i hope you won't be bashful. there are no bad questions. only rotten answers, and you are

going to get some of this. by the way this podium moves. if i had to make a fast getaway, i can do it. this book is called "burning the ships" which is kind of an unusual title for a intellectual property book. it's not 12 steps or how to grow your business using your assets or something like that. what it is, the reason for the title, is there was an explorer who literally in his desire to conquer the as -- aztecs not burn his ships. the whole point it was an irretrievable set of circumstances. when i was trying to describe in the book is that microsoft went

through a similar epiphany. we had to burn the ships so the company couldn't go back obvious what everybody thought microsoft might do on some of the commitments we were making. what was this one? there was a clause in microsoft's agreement for years called the n.a.p. clause, that was stool for not officially patented. that was wrote by bill gates. what we were -- they were -- i joined microsoft in 2006. they were really concerned about was a situation where the windows ecosystem, assuming we ever got one, would be fought

with litigation too and from. bill was smart enough to anticipate what the world was like today. he made this clause, you agree got to sue anybody for patent infridgement or following the way they might use windows. that was okay. it was okay as long as microsoft didn't get patented. then microsofts started to get patents. then they built up a great deal of resentment from large companies that incorporated windows into their products because they were defenseless against each other. they couldn't sue each other or do anything. they viewed it as a forced thing, if you will. i didn't know anybody about this thing when i joined microsoft. early on in my involvement in microsoft, i had the pleasure of going back to japan where i once lived. we had this big dinner with all

these high level people from the japanese companies. those of you who know anything about japanese companies and japanese people know they are polite. we are at this big dinner and this big round table. the vice chairman of the major japanese company looked at me and started screaming at me. this was from the chairman and vice chairman of the other major cooperation and i'm the only gringo in the place. he started screaming about in n.a.p. clause issue. i'm taking it back. i used to live in japan. i'm used to this very civil kind of thing. nobody had enough to drink to get into belly talk aspects of the thing. i had really taken it back.

and i had no idea what a n.a.p. clause is but when i get back to redman, i'll find out. i find out bill gates drafted this, but nobody is going to change it and say some new guy arriveed here and doesn't like it and he used to work for i.b.m.. but the other problem was there were no replacement vehicle if you will. i kind of come to the conclusion that microsoft was now filing for thousands of things a year and we were enforcing on the industry and that didn't quite look right. a japanese company wouldn't sue, nobody could sue anybody. by the way, that's not how they are. it looks like somebody was denying them to do the rights what they thought they aught to

have the rights tad. the reaction from bill was, okay, when are you going to replace it with. well, the answer to that had to be since we have intellectual portfolio, we're going to replace with it licensing stuff with other companies. easier said than done. this is a company that had maybe two license agreements when i joined. one that was expired. so we had exactly had a track record. let's just put it that way. so it was kind of an article of faith that we could actually do this. and that was leads to that was a call from bill to say yes, we'll get rid of it. that was a burning the ships moment for microsoft. there are some others, because i can't go into various confidentiality aagreements with half of the world. that was the idea, and that's where the title came from.

the title was called by brad smith, the council, who was my boss, said jesus that was a burning ships moment. microsoft is being doing this and you say we have to kill this. this is bill's agreement. this is not an easy conversation. he said how are we going to do that? well, with that? i said with any of the patents and the technology we have. people are going to be interested in that. now, this is a company in my view that has grown up in a kind of a corner of the united states. which had a big airplane company, and a software and not a whole lot else at the time. it certainly was not anything like the east coast with hundreds and hundreds of corporate head quarters or chicago for that matter.

and it was very successful, thank you very much. and it was also the wealthiest company in the world. that's kind of what -- and who are you? you're from the outside. and you haven't been vaccinated with the right d.n.a. needle that we all have. who do you think you're doing? that's what we had to go through. somebody had to tell bill we were going to get rid of it and come up with the cross licensing thing and build relationships and all of that stuff. building relationships was not exactly a microsoft strength. that's kind of what we had to do. i had worked 30 years from i.b.m. when i left i.b.m. we had a

world record of licensing agreements. what you have when you have 1826 agreements, you have a nonlitigation pact with 1826 cans. they don't sue each other once they get into this. it was very hard to get microsoft to understand that we can do that. i would have to say they have well over 500 of these kinds of agreements. that's a great thing. and they'll be at 600 probably by the end of this year. they add about 100 a year. and people are going to run out of things to sue each other pretty soon. which will be a wonderful thing. microsoft is kind of a litigation pin cushion. if you believe in the deep pocket of justice, microsoft is a terrific target for this kind of stuff. that's what we started to do. that was the basis for the

book. well, when i got to microsoft, it was obvious to me that microsoft didn't need cash. anybody we did to require tax would look like a further tax on the industry. that was the anxious. when i got the job at i.b.m., they were on the verge of bankruptcy. what did i.b.m. need? cash. big time and fast. the idea, we didn't have a ceo. john acres had retired and i sort of got a free bee to decide what to do. i'm licensing this thing. and on the second day at i.b.m. he called me up on the phone and said what the hell do you think you're doing?

and he said you're licensing or technology to our competitors. i said, yup. and he said, well, i want to know by tomorrow why you are doing this. clunk. i didn't have an opportunity to say i.b.m. had signed an agreement by the justice department that required us to do this. in the way that was the wrong answer. the right answer was to show him why. we look an i.b.m. laptop, and most pcs, you would think the strongest competition is designed the stuff itself. we flipped off the keyboard of a laptop in 1992. it was totally different with today's version. we made red flags. we glued the red flags on the other companies that was in the machine.

we included 150, because we ran out of real estate. and we took that thing and popped it on. here's why we have to license. we're using everybody else's technology. he was a smart man. we continue to do it. we made a lot of money. when i left in 2002 we had $2 million in profit. i think it cost me $36 million to make that $2 billion. which had a pretty good return, and it makes you very confidence with your cfo at the time. so that's quickly what the i.b.m. story. now why did lou act that way? lou acted the way virtually every ceo acts about excellent chewable property. they all view it as a negative right. a negative right is to view it as using the patent or copyright

to stop somebody from doing the same thing you are doing. that's the way almost all ceos do it. why do they view it that way? they view it that way for multiple reasons. in lou's case he came to i.b.m. from nibisco. they had just lost a giant patent issues over the right to make soft chocolate chip cookies. there's a book on this called "cookie wars." he's fresh from being on the receiving. why don't you stop everybody from doing what i want to do. it's perfectly legal. the government granted me an limited monopoly. that last kind of the way most ceo's approach it. let me just compound the problem. there's nowhere on your balance

sheet where the assets show up? they are not there. now where most ceos and cfes, and senior leaders of corporate america and corporate world grew up and went to business or law school the assets values are heavily tipped towards the physical aspect of what's in that company. it was worth somewhere between 70 and 80%. intellectual property was nowhere, until a sale at goodwill. and by the way, that's what the professors thought them. i look at the world today, it's totally inverse. 70 to 80% of your value is in tangible assets and nobody knows what to do with that. that's a minor part.

if you don't think physicals aspects are worldless, look at detroit. you can't give a car factory away to anybody. it's worthless. so that's the world they all grew up in. and so accountants don't value intellectual property because they are scared and don't know how to value it. businessmen don't see it, because it's not on their balance sheet. the finance people don't include it because they don't have to, and they don't know how to value it either. that's why some of this stuff is so mysterious. that's kind of the world i live in and some of you. but the truth is we got to get this stuff out in the sunshine, we got to have the financial accounting standards for some others to start taking a look at this. the fact of the matter is intellectual property is valued every day, on the individual transactions. and the problem with

intellectual property is you are only getting what somebody else is willing to pay you for. it's not like a barrel of apples where you can set a price and expect people to pay for it. company a might be allegic to apples, company b wants to make applesauce. we don't have a transparent market. it's all used for different things. so it requires some real expertise. here i am at microsoft. we're tried to do this licensing stuff but we don't have licensing professions. me i went to the recruiting people, because that's what i was told to do. i said i was some licensing professionals. they look at me with a blank stare. they went off to do their job. four months later they said we can't find you any even if you

did know. what i ended up doing was something that i shouldn't have done, but i did anyway. i started calling some of my old colleagues and ended up hiring a few of them to use as examples. and that was fortunate enough to have two or three of them join the company -- three of them actually. we'll pick up their roots, move here, and join microsoft. they were the seed core of what became a licensing organization. and then i needed somebody to hit the licensing organization and that someone was a women by the name of lisa who left the cozy operation and came over. she knew nothing about licensing. here we were in middle of microsoft, and i'm tried to do something of the outward thinking and licensing other

people with a bunch of people who know nothing about microsoft and most of them nothing about licensing. which turned out to be a valuable thing. when you don't know what's going to hurt you, sometimes you just do crazy things. and they started doing that. and as i say, in today's world we got about 500 of these license agreements. and it seems to be working very well. and it seems to be kind of changing, certainly changing microsoft's view of the outside view and slowly clanging the outside world's view of microsoft. why is that? well, there was a religious movement called open source. it's not just in the software, but in patenting and europe and where intellectual property should be a property right at all. whether information is yearned to be free and all this stuff

should be available. it's kind of like a one-time vitamin pill. if everybody is free, who's going to write the second vision? and it is a very, i think plausible thing that people are going to develop the next bunch of seed patents and things like that if it's all free and there's economic return. if all drugs are free, who's going to develop the next -- pfister, who's going to give this away? it's raging around the world. when you do this with the honest concerns of the country and you heard this all the time, you've got geopolitical problems. i'll give you one example. drugs, drug companies, as opposed to that model i gave you

that high-tech world with lots and lots of intellectual property in each product, in the drug world and chemical world they have a molecule. and that molecule ends with a relationship to the product. i got a molecule that becomes to make the drug. one drug company, which i won't mention, developed an effective drug against aids. and you can use the discussion and the corporation. they want a one-world price. it turns out though in some countries that price is more than annual income of the recipient of the drug. how does that work? they wouldn't come up with a dual-pricing strategy. you can hear the argument doing on in the board room, we'll have price erosion across the world. if we charge country a a little

price, country b is going to want a little price. yeah, you are right. so they don't do that. what do you think happens in the world? what happened is country a voids the patent on that drug. and it turns it over to generic company. guess what they lost the entire market. that's why if you look at microsoft, we have a dual-pricing structure. so in a developing country, the price for windows is far less than it is in the united states. far by factors. but that's the world -- that's the world we live in. and so we do have these geopolitical issues that i talk a little bit about some of those in the book. i'll spend a second on the source issue. because it is in a lot of people's interest to keep this open-source debate alive,

basically microsoft. it's a nice way to paint microsoft as part of a paradigm of evil. it's big, it does software, and it has patents, and it might even occasionally enforce them. this is just awful stuff. and the fact that we're doing all these relationships, et cetera, et cetera, are not quickly recognized by the open-source. what my favorite blog have been for four or five days, my favorite blog came out last week. it's by the industry and she said i haven't read the book yet but i know i'm not going to like it. it's starting to get an objective review. some of them have done a lot of work on this stuff. we've gotten a few of thoses. if you look at this

historically, you'll find that 500 things we talking about, a number of them are with open source companies. if you find somebody who's in a commercial business, most of the companies are trying to make money. they may give the software away, but they want to sell you the services and support behind it. they are making their money on that model. our model is we put the software and support and services in the front end and tell you we hope it works right. that's the only difference. much of this religious stuff is, in my view, really not very honest at the end of the day. so what else do i want to say to you? it's a theme that i've been having for a long period of time. that is once you embark on this kind of program what you are

really talking about is a model that i would call open innovation. if i have to put a name to it, open collaboration if you like that. it means the same thing. it's a recognition that companies need the invention of other companies back to the other stories. so here's microsoft, they will spend $9 billion a year. think it's more than any other company in the world. it's an awful lot of money. but even if we do that, it's a recognition that we cannot invent everything that we need. we need the intellectual property of other companies. we need to trade this stuff. and we need -- that is the way of the world and the future. that is the way of the world of the future for not just our industry, if i look at analyze -- airplane industry if there still is one. and i look at boeing 787.

well the wings are made by mitsubishi, and italy, and south carolina, and it's put on a funny looking 747, and they are flown over here for final test and assembly. in that world, a lot of intellectual property, a.k.a., value is on the front end that process. they have been to be traded, we hope, we have to hope, they are trading intellectual property on the front end to make sure the japanese wings work with the italian fuel. they have to be trading trade secrets to do that. if you look at the drug companies models today, they actually have ha very difficult business model. develop these kind of productses

in a big bang theory where they have to make $1 million or the product doesn't come out the door. what are they doing? they are going around the world looking for companies and the licensing back and forth and trading intellectual property. this is happening in all kinds of industries and not just mine. and some of you know far more about those industries than i do. but that's the way the world is. what is this innovation thing? what drives that is the inability to have a good schooling of rights navigation so i can use that as a solid frame work to trade information back and forth so i know what i'm giving you and i know what i can expect in person and you know what you're gets and what the obligations are. without that, i think the whole system falls apart. that is where we are today.

those of you who say we shouldn't have, it kind of defied the commercial reality. people need that kind of a calf fulling. that's basically what this book is about. with that i'll stop and do some qs and as for a little bit here. charles. >> we need an i. p. library? >> what do you mean? >> you are making it sound like a book of information. it would seem to make sense to have a clearing house that we can go to, find the piece of i.p. that we need, sell it, and right now it sounds like it's left to guys like you who have a certain piece of i.p. and you go

around the world telling people look we got this. it seems inefficient. >> in somes ways there is an i.p. library. the tradeoff you make, take the patent inside for a second, then i'll get into the other forms. copyrights and pat patents are public. you'll get a limited monooply, but the information is public. there are all kinds of things that you can find out to see what they know. that's not hard. the people who make businesses are running them to you for a period of time. copyright, anything you right down is copyrighted automatically pretty much. since it's written down and if it's public you know what it is. what is opaque are trade secrets.

trade secret is anything that gives you a competitive advantage. it can be very monodane. competitors would love to know who your customers are and tell them your sales calls. so companies will guard their trade secrets with their lives. but the patents and copyrights you can find out pretty clearly. trademarks are also a point area of intellectual area, and are also public. because you have to file and there are list of trade secrets. i think microsoft probably files well over 100 countries for each trademark that it has. so much of this is already out there. interestingly enough, i spent the day on the phone with a bunch of guys who had developed a good way to data arrange all

this stuff. if you want to find out what happened, go into it on an english basis, and go in there and pull that information out. so there is work, there are competitors doing this on some of these data bases. it's there. it shouldn't be the problem that you have to spend $600 an hour for lawyers. you shouldn't be. you aught to be able to do it yourself. yes, ma'am? >> what made you want tory write this book right now? >> this is a longer answer that you want. i originally told bill gates i'd come to work for three years because my family is living in connecticut. it's a difficult commute.

and somehow bill heard five. and at the end of five years i said, okay, that's it, we're going to find my replacement. which we did. and the argument came of around that said, well, look, this person as right as he is doesn't know this field very well. it's not fair of him to expect him to do what you do. you've been in this field. you know the mechanics of it and you know this is all built by relationships. you know who's in the world who does this and who does it well. you can pick up the phone and call most of them. he can't do that. you have to stay and help us do that at least. >>so i said okay he can be mr. inside, i'll be mr. outside. that will allow me to spent more

time. i had four grandchildren that i didn't have when i started. they happen to move within two miles of my house in connecticut. that was becoming a lot more important than how many patents with microsoft. no offense, bill. he said outside, you can be mr. outside, we'll have mr. inside. he'll learn the ropes and you can help him with that too and you can do all these others. well, we want you to do the geopolitical affairs, talk to the government, deal with the japanese, chinese government. if you make a speech every two weeks that'd be great. i'm not being totally -- that's what it was. and so i got to the point very quickly that i had a million miles on united and a million miled on delta. and that was really started,

plus i'm writing these stupid speeches. so i had to get some help with the speech stuff. you couldn't write -- do the same speech every time. you had to do a different one. so we found this guy by the name of david kline, the coauthor of the book. and he's a pretty -- he's a really good speech writer and he knows a lot about intellectual property. it is important. he could drive up here. so we hired him as a speech writer for me eventually to help me do this. i got three speeches to make in the next two weeks. one in the tokyo, once in washington, d.c. for the committee on judiciary committee, one in is tim buck too. i'll give you ideas.

david got to be good of speaking in your voice. the best ones can speak in your voice after they know you. we started trading stories. he said, you've had an interesting life. we need to write a book about your life. we ended up 12 steps to intellectual property happiness. you got to read your business titles. they are all kind of like that. so we started writing this thing. and we had it outlined and all that stuff and we worked on it for a couple of weeks. no outline survives the first draft. that's one of the lessons. you got a write the outline. if you makes you feel good, scrap it. we started and realized you know what we had a lot of interesting stories. isn't that better than writing a formula business process book?

which, you know, i don't know about y'all, but i read those things. i get 20 pages and i can't stand it and i don't finish them. so he said, we have to write some of these stories down. and we started writing the stories down. well, the problem with that was that it started to scare the p. r. people at microsoft. i'm still writing a book from the inside out. second of all, bill hired me. i'm going to talk about that. third of all, microsoft is, i think, justifiably and rightly concerned about how everybody takes a negative position on anybody that they do. and so the pr department is, you know, the philistines are coming after us. we're going to stop them.

they had to mentality. and then the book changed. it stopped being a book about me as a book about these stories. that scared them even more. and i have to say, however, the senior management of microsoft, bill gates, brad smith, they were able to say now if you tamper with this too much, nobody is going to read it. and if they read it won't matter. with a couple of exceptions, mostly driven by disclosure agreement, we were given free reign to write in this manner. when you -- it is like a normal business book. it's a bunch of little stories. it's about, you know, it's kind of what we are doing throughout this. but i had no plans on doing

this. if it hadn't been for david kline, i never would have done it. because it takes a lot of time and it's a lot of work. and you have to have a good memory, which i don't have. and if you set out to start this stuff, if i have to do all this stuff, if i knew i was going to write a book i would have kept every e-mail i ever got or received. and i didn't do any of that. you have to go back and say what can i remember and when did it happen? hopefully there'll be another one in there some of the story isokont talk about in this one. time will elapse so i can talk about that one. i didn't plan on doing this at all. i've written a lot of chapters in other people's books -- but no real book totally devoted to,

you know, what i've been through. so when you read this thing, you'll find out that they are a lot of the credit and i mean this go to other people not to be -- i just happened to be the person who was fortunate enough to be the captain of the ship. i had a lot of people who were doing a lot of good work and still do. that's what the book is about. yes, sir? >> i look forward treating your book. sounds better than the other books i've attempted to read in the past. my question is aimed forward what's going on in congress and if you think that's a good thing. as an outsider, i think it's a very good thing. id i'd still like to hear your take. >> a great question about patent

reform that coming up every other year. i think i've testified seven or eight times for the senate or the house on patent reform since 1992. it is clear to me that any system is convey lewded and at a same time robust as the economic interest is tied up in it. it needs to be looked at a lot, and probably needs to be refined a lot. historically, that's what happened. the patent system didn't know how to deal with electricity. could you patent something that's electric? electric is a force of nature. but it's always kind of self-adjusted over time. well, somewhere in the and i don't know when it was. i think the '70s, we created

cafc. what was supposed to be the nations highest court. why did we do that? well, matters were just too hard. we're going to have a specialty court. what do you think a court like that does over time? it just builds into the system to the point that some of the smaller inventors and other people say jeez, i can't play in this game. therefore, let's have some patent reform, let's make it easier to get them or cut back on the subject matter. what about this software thing, why should that technology be patented? why do we have to add more technology? should it be pat ended? same kind of an argument top so this debate has gone on for

quite a period of time. shouldn't we have to first to file or first to invent system? we're the only country in the world that has the first-to-file system versus a first-to-invent system. it's a proceed churl thing. these go on for the past 20 years. let me say two things. the u.s. supreme court hasn't had a patent file in decades. all of the second they'd looked at six and issued six rulings, i think it's six, which have basically sandpapered the sharp edged off.

so they have aluminated many of the problems that a lot of people have worried about about the administration of the system and what's patented subject matter and things of that nature. yay for them. there are still some issues with the first-to-file thing. whether people have the right to request a re-examination things of that nation. which is really inside base. so there is that debate going on. and it's going on right now in congress. now the senate judiciary committee, if you think about this, has more than a few nominations for people to work in washington that they have to clear, vote on, things of that nature. we may have a -- and it'll

probably happen in the judiciary committees of the world, a look at some of the issues with -- resolving around prisoners and the way they were treated. they got an awful lot on their plate. well, there are those who educate on practical problem. there are those who argue the patent system in the united states is what makes the united states really strong and we aught to leave it alone. you know, by the way anybody wants to modify and make it easier or really trying to rob the united states. these are a group of small inventors ironically. and then there's the black helicopter. these are people who think this is a conspiracy by the big companies to hold on to what they have. on top of that, there's this war of the business models. go back to what i said about the

drug companies and chemicals versus the high-tech companies who approach this differently. the drug companies because of their molecule product, like a little more terror in the system than the high-tech world does. they are not happy about the fact that you can run into certain jurisdictions and beat the heck out of the opposition. i might say, couldn't i add more balance? i kind of legislate the balance is a very hard thing to do. so i would say, i couldn't get overexercised about the prospects of anything are rust going on any time soon in the subject. we'll see. i could be wrong. i think the supreme court has taken a lot of the sting out of the problem. by the way, the cafc, the court that we set up, is not a lot more caution than we were about

extending subject matter. that was a question of opinion only. >> what other industries would use a burning the ships mad the? >> well, i think a lot of them. go back to what i said about the ceos of beth -- both companies. most industries view this as a way to stop somebody. they might be well served if they put a criminal task force together to say what happened if we were expanse i expansive about this. you don't have to abandon one. you want your property respected. you spent a lot of money to get there. you don't want people to steal it. maybe there's another business model you could come up with. i don't want to pick on any industry, just to give you an

example, look what apple did to the licensing of music. the music industry didn't figure that out. it was somebody in the computer industry. wouldn't the music industry had been smarter? this is a little off point. the jobs have figured out a way to build the outreach model that people can tap in to. they are playing the card closed to their issue, and all that kind of stuff. i think in the industry that has technology it's not totally ajournalistic. they will have to say, wait a minute. by the way, i include universities in the discussion. fyi, and transfer officers at

universities, you know? no offense, my dear. but i do. i believe -- i can't speak for the a specific industry. if you were pomped into another industry, i would say is there another way to do this? could we have a hybrid model and do both at the same time? there's no rule that says you can't. other than pick on somebody, you know, every industry, even the most mundane industry has intellectual property. they just don't know that they have it. they just don't know it. i don't care what it is. i was in sushi restaurant with some folks. there's a lot of intellectual property on the conveyor belt with the i.d. tags on the bottom

of what you order. so every industry, i don't care how mundane. they aught to be looking at that. are we all done? i think we all. thank you all for coming. [applause] >> david kline has worked for the "new york times," nbc, and cbs news. marshall phelps is the strategy for policy. for more information on marshall go to microsoft.com. >> all this month we visit the fairs and festivals we've covered this year on cspan 2 book tv. this week, panel from the

annapolis book festival. >> this summer book tv is asking what you are reading? >> congress joe barton, what's on your reading list? >> you just got a list from the library. i go to a used bookstore in waco, texas. they are a table with 20 old paper bags for a dollar. i go and get 20 of the biggest, fattest fiction and nonfiction paper backs they have. sometimes you get a tom clancy novel, sometimes a mystery novel, historical, i just finished reading a book called vortex, which a hypothetical

fictional book about an uprising in south africa. and i'm reading right now a political novel by an author named allen drury. he did advicing consent. this one is called something about tyre and nineveh. but it's a hypothetical about the campaign for presidency in the 1960 with racial unrest and anti-war party tearing the country apart. but i also, i've read a book about davey crock coat, who was one of the texas heros. i've read the vaclav clause novel about a planet in blue skies, a planet in shackles.

i do read some current stuff. but basically, old paper backs from the bookstore in waco, texas. >> so see more summer reading list visit or web site at booktv.org. >> the phenomenon of facebook, on the social site and how it tore two best friends apart. >> book expo we're at the yale university press book with the director of the press. mr. donatich what do you have coming out? >> i got the making of americans

by e.d. hirsch. he wrote about cultural literacy . this book is sort of a caption on his career, which includes many best sellers and many decades of education to talk about this information and knowledge and what it means to have a shared corpus of knowledge and how important it is to our national identity and how it's being across the country. it's a book that has a lot of arguments and a lot of ways to look forward to what the old and new administration can do. >> do you acknowledge the other book? you have a elephants on the edge. >> yeah, this is a really marvelous book. it's very moving and very touching. what she does, she's been on 20/20 and 60 minutes.

what she tries to do is understand how human behavior effects the global population of animals and wild in the captivity. it's a very, very touching subject. people who have read this and jeffrey mason will respond pop our actions do have consequences. especially on those creatures to argue for themselves. >> like elephants? >> yeah, she talking about elephants having nervous breakdowns. the emotional life of animals. and actually how our own empathy towards understanding how they behave teaches us something about what it is to be human. it's an interesting turn around. to understand animals we begin to understand ourselves. >> two bioififgraphy coming out. >> yeah, it's interesting.

everyone thinks that we've learned everything we need to know. there hasn't been a biography in 20 years. and it's a couple of decades. we're really excited about this. this is new information and new research, and i think dickins has good information. >> what about arthur danto? >> well, this is a wonderful boyography really of the legacy that warhol left behind. it's more interesting to think about that than look at his paintings and art some people think. what warhol did to the meaning of an american icon. he is such an unlikely icon.

how did that happen? he did it through working icon graphic subjects. whether it's the campbell's soup can or liz taylor. he takes a look at how he redefined what it is to be iconic. >> you are the director of the press. what decisions to you make on a day-to-day basis. >> what don't i? editorially and financially. starting of course with the books. we have a staff about 14 editors. our press is only as good as the books it publishes. that's the good decision we make. with the largest book based university press in the country and the only one with a significant london base. >> you probably celebrated the

100th birthday. >> it started in the left drawer of a lawyer who draughted from yale. over the decades it became more and more famous for his list of humanities and our history. in the 1960s, it was appropriated into the university and the department of the university. we have in the '70s, there was a big london office. and it's still there today. we do about had -- 400 books a year. mostly in the humanities and social sciences. >> john. thank you very much. >> thanks so much. >> book tv sunday the future of the conservative movement. richard viuerio on the panel. >> up next the first of three programs from book tv coverage

from the key west seminar. it's moderated by eric. this is 45 minutes. >> okay. well, the title of this discussion panel is how can we know and tell what happened in the past? good question. i'm not going to introduce the panelist expect by name, jill, david, megan, and patricia. you know or will know them by the end of the weekend. i think the way we will work, i'm going to put a couple of questions out on the floor and ask each to respond in a few minutes. we will then have a discussion among ourselves and then since there hasn't been any time this morning from questions for the audience, we will leave some time for you to pose questions

to us when you do so there will be microphones passing around. please wait for a microphone. for want of any orr organization, we will go in albert call order. which is how we are sitting, that will be easy. the panelists can respond to the any number. one, talk about a surprise that you found in your research. some documents some artifacts, something you found that changed your mind or let you in a different direction or opened your eyes to some aspect of the past. because much of what we do as historians is the interaction. and then the actual record of the past. one professor said to