>> i am not talking here about the political culture. i am talking about the culture in general and i think they would make outstanding examples of people who push for liberalism and individualism. and i think i can use them.

>> can you tell us which ones? >> the two i am referring to is wajeha al-huwaider and from syria to also push the envelope very much. you look at individuals who treasure their rights and their freedoms as individual into question the culture around them. and of course they have democratic inclinations. and i think they can be used as a probing the tolerance and probing their environment. and in fact, they provide outstanding die. i think the most difficult cases you have are the ones on iraq and iran. and the difficulty is one very much within the complexity of the two individuals you chose. and obviously it is not an easy task to try and choose one out of the 18 million iranians, and one i guess in that case out of

arab countries. both characters were maybe with good intentions and definitely i would say being young, attractive to ideals, walk into revolutions and coups and regime changes. and then they get exposed to all sorts of things while they have been part of these regimes. and then either they were forced, kicked out, threatened, whatever it is, they move out. but the big question come, and again i am raising the question because i think this is the implications are enormous. what do we do or how do we tackle forces within regimes that would reach out to the world and try to bring change. and i think here i, based on my expense, have seen how the baath party started with noble slogans, initially, and ended up

being one of the most oppressive regimes both in iraq and syria and again looking at how the revolution started in iran with ideals and ended up sliding into being a tyranny, a religious tyranny. and when you look at these cases, you start wondering, what a change of frater be sufficient or change of position, or do we need to look deeper into changes in mindset. in other words, changing the content of a country or changing the container becomes necessary. and i think those questions i don't have answers to. but i think what you have presented, as i said, certainly is going to stimulate that. if i have maybe one last minute. if i want to sum up, and as i said, through reading the book i was trying to read your mind on how you see a democracy can be brought up to the region. and again, it is most difficult to try to signify such a complex question with a simple formula.

but if i was forced to simplify it, i would not focus on the individuals who i would pin all the hopes on. i think i would look at what we have currently really is strong currents of people pushing for democracy on one hand. and the regimes that are stagnant, maybe they adapt a little bit here or there, but in essence they are stagnant and they are stagnant not because only a culture, but because of the security agency, because of the guns they have, because of the money, their control over the state. and i think our overall approach in supporting those voices that are pushing for democracy need to look at beyond supporting the individuals. we need really to open up the space. we need to use all the tools we have within international law to force some change. and i think that would complement and give aid breathing space where we would see many, many i think of those voices and examples forced in

thousands or hundreds of thousands. >> thank you, laith. i counted on you to interject some controversy in these proceedings. now i will turn to train 20. >> thank you, mark. is an honor to be here to help launch the next founders. not just because as you have already heard it is a wonderful book and a wonderful read. and not just because i am fortunate enough to call josh a friend. but also because joshua muravchik is someone whose work i have read and admired from years back when i was in grad school. and since i have had the pleasure of learning from him for so many years, it is really a great delight to be here to help him send a new bit of his wisdom and insight into the world. today is also a lovely oak asian, i think there is a lot of continuity for me because the first time i had the honor of being in front of a podium here

at hunterdon was five years ago to discuss an article i had written on a topic very closely related in fact to josh's book, an article called the promise of arab liberalism. in policy review. and that article was published in a sort of point, counterpoint with another article that was entitled the false problem of arab liberals. laith was on the panel also. and here we are. it is five years and one presidential transition later, and i think in many ways, in washington we find ourselves facing essentially the same questions that we were addressing five years ago. number one, is this a small number of courageous, isolated but outspoken liberals in the arab world. are they capable of making a meaningful difference in moving their societies toward democracy? and number two, is the united states able to help these individuals in any meaningful way, or does our support a sensually proved to be a kiss of

death for them in one way or another? i want to spend a couple of minutes on each of these questions because i think josh's book, through the rich stories that it tells of the liberal activist provokes us to try again and perhaps try harder for some answers to those two questions. now, five years ago in that other article and policy review, the author argued that liberal reformers in the middle east are quoted increasingly aging, increasingly isolated and diminishing in numbers. these liberals are losing a battle to the hearts and minds of their countries. if josh's book does nothing else, i think it demonstrates conclusively the falsity of that argument. the liberal paragons that he profiled in this book are not aged. they are middle age, and since i am in middle age that means they are not old. [laughter] >> far from being isolated, they

are increasingly prominent. in their countries. newspapers, on the airwaves, in the region. and many of them are winning meaningful important political victories, as josh outlined in his opening remarks. in kuwait with respect to the press in egypt, keeping a very flawed palestinian authority government accountable over a period of years to increasingly also, these liberal activists are networking with one another across the region in a way that they weren't able to do effectively 10 years ago. drafting and signing joint statement. coming together at conferences on reform in alexandria or your heart, they would. coming together to confront their governments like the form for the future. so whereas 10 years ago feminists like wajeha al-huwaider were entirely isolated in their feelings and inner struggles, and indeed that sense of isolation comes through so strongly in josh's narrative

of her life. today, aspiring women politicians in kuwait, saudi arabia, oman, and the united arab emirates have this lightspeed network of mobile phone calls, e-mails, text messages. they are constantly in touch with one another relating antidotes, incidents, bucking each other up when the chips are down. so it seems to me that there is something fundamental that has changed with respect to the position of liberals in the middle east today. and finally, these liberal leading people are being followed as josh points out in his book by a rising generation of mobilize and increasingly vocal, young liberal activists. so in some manner these liberals have indeed become role models and they are being emulated. i think it's worth asking ourselves what the characteristics are of these activists that make them

persuasive advocate for liberal ideas in their local context and that makes them effective at creating real change in their own societies. in reading through josh's seven profiles, the one thing that came through very clearly to me is that these individuals are patriots. they love their countries and they have a sense of ownership over their nation and over future development. this story of rola dashti who dropped out of graduate school when iraq invaded kuwait and put her professional and personal life on hold to help prepare and implement plans for the reconstruction of her country. bassem eid, who at great personal cost health a new plo led government in the west bank and gaza accountable for its human rights abuses, because he knew that he had not just the right, but the duty, to help build a palestine that adheres to universal human rights principles. that that was the kind of palestine he wanted to realize and he had a duty and a role to

play in doing that. i think that what josh's profile revealed real wonderful he is the extent to which the sincere and deeply felt love of country is essential to the impact that these liberals have. this patriotism is what empowers them personally to demand changes from their governments and it keeps them in and even as they are painted by their opponents as western stooges, and encouraged to enjoy a comfortable, quiet life in western exile. i think this is very important because there is one point on which i have to confess i disagree with joshua. he says that these individuals, and he just said it in his introduction, are the analogues of like the lesser. in some ways that may be true. but i think that in one important way, the situate them in the middle east today is a very, very different from the situation facing those liberal dissidents in eastern europe.

the communist regimes of eastern europe were accidentally imposed. they were expertly sustained. they didn't have any fundamental domestic legitimacy. and the arab regimes in the islamic republic of iran do have some degree of domestic legitimacy. it is weak. is impaired for all the reasons that laith stated earlier. but nationalism and anti-colonialism are still very potent information. and both regimes use those sentiments of nationalism and anti-colonialism against these democrats. so the fact that the liberals that josh is profiling are patriots who give evidence daily of their commitment to their country, it allows them to reclaim that nationalism for liberal and for liberalism. in a way that is very important. so they are powerful not just

because they are disseminating liberal ideas in the middle east because they act as a living, breathing examples of the idea that liberalism and patriotism are mutually supportive. they are not mutually exclusive. liberalism is not a western import but fundamentally compatible with arab identity and iranian identity. the second question i wanted to address is the question of whether and how the united states can effectively assist this group of liberal activists, or whether as it is known in you can shorthand, american assistance is the effectively the kiss of death. so the question is if the u.s. speaks up in the support of liberal reformers or provides them with material support, is this helping or hurting their cause? and i think here we really come to an important issue which was raised by the previous commentators, which is that liberals are always in every

society a small, elite group that is in many ways isolated from the grassroots. it was true in revolution in america. it was true in enlightenment era. it was true in eastern europe before the fall of the berlin wall. you would not have said that he had a mass following. we didn't know that. until we saw it in the streets. liberals are not usually got popular because liberalism is not fundamentally a populist ideology. so the idea that by providing moral or material support to united states is marginalizing liberals, is at this point in the middle east not that relevant an argument. it may be relevant for some individuals in the region. those who are trying to build a new political party, trying to build a mass movement. different people are differently situated. and different societies are also differently situated with respect to the united states. and a fully autocratic regime

that has adversarial relations with the u.s. government, the consequences of receiving u.s. support may be dire indeed. it may be very easy for such a regime to tar a liberal activist with a press of being a foreign agent. but in a country where the government already receives american support, u.s. assistant may not only be more tolerable, more acceptable, if my government is getting u.s. money, why can't i get u.s. money is the argument that you hear, for example, for many egyptian activists at but getting u.s. support in those circumstances can actually provide a degree of protection to those activists. the key point here is that there is no single a priori answer to the question of whether american support helps or hurts. we can't assume that we know this answer in a priori. and we certainly shouldn't make the patronizing decision to

withhold our assistance out of concern that it might have a negative impact. what we have to do then is listen. we have to listen to the activists themselves to what they are trying to do, and to what they think we can do to help. and we have to understand that even in a given country, there may be a range of answers that we hear. and what that means in terms of u.s. policy is that we have to have a pariah of mechanisms available by which to provide rhetorical support, diplomatic support, financial support that are relevant, different instruments to different actors. finally, i think it is important to underscore one of the point that josh makes in his introduction to the book, which is that these individuals that he profiled are important because they are carriers of ideas. and josh notes that in the middle east for many years, violins or the threat of violence has been the main

currency of governance. in this context, liberal ideas are crucial. even if they don't in the short or medium term produce liberal governance. even if they don't produce popular participation or government accountability. a central idea in liberal thought is toleration. the idea that different individuals have different conceptions of the good life and that we should tolerate one another efforts to realize our individual conceptions of the good life are different visions. and in this context, it seems to me that supporting liberals in the middle east is not only about achieving democratic justice, but it is also about developing a political culture in which disagreements are dealt with through nonviolent mechanisms, in which the fundamentally liberal idea of toleration is embraced and practiced.

and that i think is a point that josh makes it very well this book and one that i think should lead us all be on the debates about democracy promotion to remember the important of supporting liberalism wherever it appears. thank you. >> thank you, tamara. thanks to all three commentators were very stimulating presentation. before we open things up to the audience, josh, did you have any comment you would like to make at this point? >> i can do it in one minute, which i was grateful, great for for all these comments and they were very generous. thank you, each of you. there were just a few points of possible disagreements, and none of which i regard as disagreement.

yes, certainly tamara, the people fighting for democracy in the middle east are different than the eastern europeans. i liken them because they are harar, and b., at the end of the day they may turn out to be more influential that you could judge right now by taking a poll. but certainly a big problem for us is that aiding eastern european democrats was easy because that day and most of their countrymen were very pro-american. they looked to america is kind of a beacon of hope. and the middle eastern democrats are often working in countries that are very angry at america, and it creates a whole different picture. so i certainly agree with that. transiting, i do agree that

peace and democracy are on the one and mutually reinforcing. on the other hand they are both desirable and circle the. we should be pursuing both. and that success, and either will be beneficial to the pursuit of the other. i am not so worried about the possibility that elections will bring back results. they may sometimes, but also i think bad results are part of a learning process for citizenry, that it either takes, in any case country that hasn't had the practice of elections, it usually takes a number of free elections before voters get more sophisticated about how to use their vote. and finally, tamara, thank you

for your categorization. i hadn't thought of it but i am going to borrow it now before the next time i present the book. it is a very useful. and i think you are saying, but you didn't quite say it sort of between the lines of that the two figures in the book who are immersed in politics may be more problematic figures, and i think that is probably fair and it is probably always true of political figures. and that there are, because if you go into politics, you sort of immediately are going to necessarily dirty your self a little bit. and it often will happen that some moments there are political figures who will come to the floor who are much more tarnished then these two men in my book, but who will play truly

important role. and so i think, to revert to eastern europe, i think of them are nosh in hungary in 1956 or to check in czechoslovakia in 1968 or gorbachev. all of them were genuine communist who spent their whole lives in the communist party, without, you know people dissent, but at some critical moment they became the embodiment of reform forces that were tremendously important. and i think that, and in politicians, we may get that. and i am fervently hoping that we may see some analog and iran in which some politician who has been all this time a dyed in the

wool part of the islamic theocracy will seize the moment to present themselves as the embodiment of the popular unrest and play a very positive role. >> thank you, josh. you might have added yeltsin to that list, borst yells into that list of russian. i was thinking the same thing. there also is a more general question of people who become democrats after starting out as committed to some kind of totalitarian or authoritarian view. there is always a question that is happening with ex-communism with questions about the authenticity of their conversion and so on. i think such figures, even when they become a road later on or

strong voices for democracy, their previous history always makes you wonder about them a little bit. in any case, let me now open the floor to discussions. i think i will take two or three questions in a row. if i could ask you to state your name and affiliation, and if you want to direct a question to any particular member of the panel he might indicate that as well. so first we have a microphone. right here down front. >> i am from the center of this democracy. i really enjoyed the discussion, but i have a few points to josh

and to the commentators also. reading, which is really an eye-opener for us who work for democracy in the muslim world and the arab world particularly we find that east, number one support for democracy, support for islamic law or whatever it is. all of you, when you spoke about your work, people who are liberals in the sense mostly people who would represent very minor voices in their societies doesn't mean as tamara said, they are usually the ones who advocate these issues. from our experience in establishing a network of democrats in the arab world, which is both liberals, as long as, altogether it is a unique network, we found out that all of them, the divining i think

description for all them that they all believe in democracy. there is a union for democracy among all walks of life. i wish that you have touched upon some of the islamists who believe in democracy and maybe that is in chapter two. thank you. >> my question is for the author. what would be the ideal conditions for democrats to be influential and not isolated? >> first, john, congratulations on the book. i have read and enjoyed reading

it. my question is prompted by your reference to rosa parks and buy something that andy was saying about the different culture, the fact that in the middle east the democrats are more isolated because of nationalism and anti-colonialism. in the u.s., the civil rights movement of which rosa parks was a part, was able to play upon the contradiction that between the american creed and the american reality. what is it that arab liberals can't appeal to in the middle east that might enable them to develop an effective strategy? that was the core of the civil rights strategy. is there any equivalent of that? because if there isn't, they would be up against a very tough situation. there will be larger changes, changes in communication,

technology and so forth. is that the issue of women, like that plays this kind of a role or is it something else? i think it is something we have to give a lot of thought. >> on the question of why i haven't included the islamists in this book and whether i will in a sql. i will be really happy to do a sequel, entirely about islamist democrats if you introduce me. [laughter] >> i do know that there are a islamists who proclaim their devotion to democracy. but i don't know of cases where

it's crystal clear to me what they mean. that is, there's been a lot of writing about the egyptian muslim brotherhood after the release of their so-called new initiative in 2004. i believe it was, that did speak about democracy and spoke about the rights of women and non-muslims, and there was i think even a moment where the muslim brotherhood supplanted its slogan, islam is the answer with the slogan freedom is the answer. but since then they have gone back to islam is the answer. and we have seen in the effort last year of the egyptian muslim brothers to come up with a new platform or statement of use

that they circulated a draft which was largely based on the iranian system of a completely nondemocratic, theocratic system. actually, the first time i recall way back here in of laith kubba was when he was in london and he was putting out a newsletter that was seeking a kind of liberal islamism. and i was terribly interested in trying to understand what this was. and i would be happy to write a book, profile people like laith. but i think laith's own take on the world is so distinct that if you say there are fewer secular liberal, there are fewer secular

liberals, there are even fewer laith kubba is i'm afraid. so we have a situation in most of the cases, the islamists are not in power. and they are facing regimes that suppress them. and they say we democracy, but that in itself doesn't convince me that they are democrats because it's a very normal for people who are suppressed, out of power to say they want democracy. it would be more interesting to me if there were to emerge some real statement of philosophy in an islamist context that somehow merged these two. i think it is not easy to merge,

because if i understand what islamism means, and i am not at all sure that i do, but it is hard for me to understand in an islamist context how nonbelievers and non-muslims had equal citizenship, or how you can have a full democracy if certain things must come from scripture, and are sort of closed to discourse. but i am open to being educated by you and having my understanding broadened and deepened. about the question about the ideal conditions for the development of democracy, i don't think there are ever ideal conditions. and we better not wait for them. we better start where we are today. i mean, it is not up to us.

as a laith pointed out, if there is going to be democracy in the middle east it will be brought by middle easterners. but i think it is incumbent upon us to do everything to encourage and support them in whatever ways we can, and that they want our support. the conditions are never ideal because if you don't have democracy, you don't have ideal conditions. i suppose the ideal condition was when we transformed japan, that is, which we defeated much more thoroughly and occupied much more thoroughly than we did iraq. if we are willing to take over a country, lock stock and barrel the way we did japan, and every single bureaucrat in the country

has an american military figure behind him saying now do this and now do that. that worked in japan, but maybe what made those conditions ideal was that we had dropped an atomic bomb on them first. i don't know. so i don't think they should. >> make it clear you're not advocating. >> right. >> i am advocating the opposite. literally, there are analysts who say one reason it worked so well in japan was that japan was completely prostate at the time we took over, and so we can sort of mold it likely. and my point is exactly, you know, we better not look for the ideal conditions because they not be conditions that we want to replicate. and lastly, to carl, it is a very interesting question you

raised about what is the sort of intellectual ground that this can -- that the fight for democracy can stand on, take root in as the american constitution was, for the civil rights movement. i don't know that we need the analog because we have many other countries in the world where we have seen struggles for human rights and democracy waged successfully that didn't have the same kind of symbol or this kind of thing to hold onto that the civil rights movement had in

the u.s. constitution. and ratherappealing to the same thing that the people who wrote the u.s. constitution that people do, which was not an existing document but was a sense of natural law that human beings want to be free, they want to live with dignity, they want to be governed only with their consent. and i think that talking from a universal perspective, that's all we got. but that might be enough. >> any other comment? >> i think i would like to comment on your question. the civil rights movement is a movement that happened in one country. so it is possible within the context of the country to come up with a unifying country.

and the arabs were there are 22 different countries, and some with 36 different countries, so it is impossible to come up with a generalized view, an ideology to present to combine people and have them routed around it. i think the opposition in the islamic arab countries that we are talking about is defined by the power of the status quo. if the status quo is for a pro-western country in the opposition is islamic. and by definition, almost not liberal regardless of the claims of the few. it is strident anti-democratic by definition because it adheres to the tenets of islam. on the other hand, opposition in place like i run now, which is an islam and anti-western country is more liberal by definition. so we'd need to actually specify for each country and around

around what we might call the democrats in that country, and to oppose the policies in that country that are anti-democratic so it has to be specified, both country specific and etiological specific. we cannot also separate the government systems from the political realities of the middle east of the middle east right now is defined by huge conflict that is unresolved. so back to the point that was made about, if these people who are democrats are not perceived as idiotic and defending something of value and worthy of the support of their country then they will be discredited. that is pretty much what happened i think to the liberal democratic movement is they were perceived as a pro-western, not genuine and not connected to their country. so the need having stated that, the need then is to combine people who are for reform, as

they are for moderation on international policy issues. if such a thing is formed and it is perceived to be patriotic and will have something legitimate than people can support. i don't think it has happened so far. >> also, i think that is an important question. and just when you raised the question, the first thing that came to my mind without thinking about it too much, i do believe where the region is having people what life with dignity. it is something very basic. it has nothing to do about big grand ideas are complex ideas. because conditions in most of these countries are so bad, not only because life is difficult, because of development, but lack of dignity. there is no real social contract of any kind that would preserve the minimum. and you can get away with it, regimes can get away with it if their population were really

isolated from the rest of the world. but because the world is one today, i do not believe this can last long. and i am more optimistic about the future. i really -- where i look for the region is heading i don't look to its past. i looked to where it is heading and i can see clearly where it is going to head and i am more optimistic about its. >> i have one quick note on this, which is that it seems to me the statistics that josh started out with is one that provides us a bit of an answer which is if you live anywhere else in the world but in the middle east or chance of being in a democratic country is 70%. there is a global norm here. that has emerged. and especially which the overwhelmingly youthful population of the middle east. and the fact of globalization, the fact that these young people have access to information about what the rest of the world is like and how the rest of the world is governed and what opportunities young people have

in india and brazil and all these other countries that develop mentally 30 years ago were on a par with the countries they are in now. but they know in the arab world that they have slipped farther and farther behind. so the desire to join the rest of the world, be part of this global trend, i think is a very powerful tool. >> thank you. are there other questions or comments? there is one here and in one in the back. >> i am from east africa. i originally am from somebody. i want to share a grievance, from the last two months which gives me some kind of glimpse of hope in the region now we are talking about. what was the launch for the

center and training for human rights in doha are. we had commissioner just launch it. and it was a ceremony which i attend. i found activist, and i hope, i say this, for the future. activists from doha are, from kuwait, there was none at all, women began, and some of them come in and speaking of freely because it largely focus on democracy. someone training. but highlighting, pointing out the difficulty and now we're talking about the other countries. i am saying together where the government represented, i point out one person who was from doha

are, largely i could say not that much eastgate is a but you would think the real issue of this country whereby his own government didn't want that as you say, and to one point he should be removed from the meeting because he was not invited. so i think to offer myself into thinking that there is some possibilities inside these groups. it could be having some newspapers. the other one is doubtless one of two things which they call air commission for human rights. unparallel to the u.s. commission or unparalleled to the african commission. where people can come and sit together and if the state fails the rights, maybe you could have a discord and going to complain

to the commission, otherwise one setback which i really want to establish for democracy is the emergence of a group, not necessarily, at the human rights council which was just in geneva. together with russia, china, cuba, they come out from the middle east and they want to, but there was some kind of line up of 10 or 20 cubans, and sudanese, and a lineup and to say you have done a great job, thank you very well, and in the review, the real view comes, what you call it, a brief. so there are some opportunities open up, and i am of the opinion that in the states for religious

things. the problem is the way of life, from mentally we must come up and what i'm saying the people in those regions say that in the region because i know what is happening in my country, somalia where not even the current president, who has the ideology that they are saying he is not islamic. but it is not enough. it is discrimination, but it is not about democratic country, but they want all to come to power to stop. that is it. thank you. >> in the back. >> i am from chad.

chad is in, and you know that most parts of the country in the area are total tyrian region like the middle eastern country. i would like to know to listen, learn from middle east countries should be used in africa. and that is my question. >> i have to par question. one y. should be afraid of results, but how should the countries react and promote democracies when the elections don't go their way like in gaza

or now in iran, you could have good arguments against the iranian election, but there is still a high possibility that the majority of iranians voted, but they be not with as high a margin. so how should a country that promote democracy, i would like to know from mr. kubba what makes it so positive when it comes to the future when it comes to this? >> speaking on a purely personal capacity, and so my questions come more from that angle. the iraqi in your book, joshua, why did he go to israel? from the point of view of all these things to talk about looking at the patriot, occupying the west bank and

gaza, and any arab democrat that goes to israel thinks to me is going to discredit himself, am i wrong? and why did he go and he also tell them about democracy in iraq by doing so. second question, you said that the results of elections, they also teach outside or something? i was thinking of the 2006 elections of the palestinian authority and the kinds of trade-offs that he pointed out to them. has the u.s. learned something from those elections, and with the u.s. and the western have something differently before and after? >> thank you, and now let's have josh -- well, maybe we should have let josh finish up altogether clear you first ask of any of the other commentators want to respond to those questions.

>> i'm sure he has things to say on questions related to palestine, but i do just want to address, martin, question about elections and specifically hamas and what may have happened in iran. the first thing is i hope you'll come away from this discussion, and if not then i really urge you to buy and read the book. with the sense that democracy promotion is not about elections, per se. but that these individuals are promoting a set of liberal principles that they are trying to disseminate within their societies and they believe that if their societies embrace these principles, then elections will be meaningful exercises in democracy. a lot of these countries have elections today, but i don't think that we would call most of them democratic elections. but getting specifically to the hamas case, i think this points up to the point that is the odd was making that there is an

integral link in certain parts of this region between conflict resolution efforts and efforts of democracy promotion, and iraq is also irrelevant here and so is lebanon, from which i returned. in the case of gaza, we had an opportunity that we failed to pursue, which was an israeli willingness to withdraw and turn over this territory to the palestinian authority and a period during which the palestinians were preparing for legislative elections. all of this was known. if that withdrawal had gone through, had occurred through a process of negotiation and agreement between the parties, it would have furthered the process of conflict resolution. it would have created a situation in which the removal of occupation was seen as an outcome of negotiation. instead, since it occurred unilaterally it was interpreted

as the removal of occupation being achieved through the defiance and resistance of hamas. and in that context, i don't think the outcome of that election should surprise anybody. also, we failed during the period leading up to this election to effectively promote democratic ideas and practices within the palestinian authority so that its government was corrupt and arbitrary and course of. and it went to elections with a very poor record in that regard. so i really think ziad was absolutely correct when he points to the necessity of processes of conflict resolution and democracy promotion in tandem with your dealing with situations like palestine or lebron untranslated on or iraq or you have ongoing conflict. >> thank you. >> i pretty much agree. i think and also with very significant point that was made by laith. a lot of what is happening here

has something to do with the very concept of dignity, much discounted concept in figuring out the politics of the middle east. i do not think, i think the very concept of each and every country is defined itself whether it is islamic or leftist or whatever, in terms of people who are defending their dignity more than they are defending their housing and the children, education etc., etc. it is not possible to say in this beach of the president obama in cairo the other day this deep understanding of what what makes the people have a real sense of grievance, not just against the united states or israel but in case of their own governments because of the deprivation of this conflict and that is why he talked to the people. i do believe that this sort of

approach would have consequences and would have a basis for support for the democrats and who are sitting there waiting to be supported on the issue of the palestinian elections and on the issue of hamas, etc. etc. i think i have said in my notes it is not possible to build democracy, foundation for democracy by forces who by definition are ideologically committed, religiously committed against the concept of including others as equals. this is a problem that the iran evolution has outlined very clearly where all the forces that joined khomeini and his attempt, successfully the people he got with for the democrats. i think this illustrates what hamas has done in gaza, and i

don't think anybody should be surprised. if you have a serious interest in democracy, you need to depend on the democrats in power them and enforce this space available to them by their own governments. this is what the united states has a role. does is where united states uniquely qualified to help democracy is to force its way through the many means available to it to make it possible for democrats to function in these countries and develop region. the defining ideologies makes them look. ♪ (singing) thank. >> i will try to respond. what makes me optimistic. well, it's not because i believe democracy will come to the region because people think it sounds nice. it looks nice, or for other

sentries. i think the trajectory of where the regimes in the region are heading are one of three. either stay still and pressure will build up or partial reforms and partial reforms i think will reach a breakdown as we are seeing in iran. you allow partial reforms you end up ultimately to reforms. or if governments insist on holding power, and i think some of them will, it will reach a breakpoint. it will be messy. so i think what is driving and what will bring democracy to the region may be in a painful way the pressure, trial and error, but ultimately there is no alternative. the pressures are building up because of the economy. because of governments can no longer control what flows in and out of the country. because they have a young

population demanding. the current system just cannot cope. their inability to deliver services, necessary services. and i think, i do not know when countries like golf countries can shield themselves from democracy. the emirates may be kuwait, i think shield themselves but i think others like egypt or algeria, i don't think they can shield themselves for long. >> thank you. and now for the final work, we will turn to our author, joshua muravchik. >> thank you. there were four questions, and i have quick answers. to the gentleman from somalia about the un human rights council. the un human rights council was created because the un commission of human rights was such a disaster, and the human rights council has proved to be

given a bigger disaster. and i don't think there is any solution to that because the very principle of the un is that all member states are equal. those that defend human rights and those that violate human rights, even in the most egregious ways. and the best that i can imagine to do, there is -- that after the formal thing called marker sees, it would grow stronger, and most useful thing he could do was to create its own human rights council that is made up of only governments that are democratic, and that could eventually in effect supplant the un human rights council, not officially, but people would understand there are two human rights councils. one takes human rights seriously and the other makes a mockery. the gentleman in the back of asked what african from the middle east. i think it is the other way

around. despite the poverty and the other development problems in africa and tribal divisions within countries, we have currently about half of the governments in africa or upwards of half are elected governments. so, in fact, africa has made more progress toward democracy in the middle east, even though the per capita income in the african countries is considerably lower than in the middle east countries. so it is more a question of what africa can teach to the middle east, which is that you don't have to have achieved wealth and development to start developing democracy as well. or in tandem with developing economically.

to the question about how to respond to election results. i have often heard in the arab world, the united states was hypocritical because we supported elections and then hamas was elected and we didn't continue to give aid to hamas. it seems to me that is just an illogical argument. i think we can believe in elections for all people, all countries. but if they elect governments that are hostile to us, that are violent, that are bad actors, then we will respond to those governments accordingly, including that we don't owe them our money. that's not something that they are inherent in the entitled to. and will give our money to those who conduct themselves in a way that we think is constructive. and finally to the question about why did he go to israel. both kind of a moral question and analytical question.

the moral question i think was that you didn't think anyone should go to israel as long as israel was doing things that were violating the rights of palestinians, but if you took that standard and apply it consistently, that would mean that no arab could travel anywhere within the middle east. if he should travel to a country where human rights are being violated. so i don't think the moral side of the question really holds up very well. more interesting is the factual side, why did he go to israel. he is very passionate about terrorism, for one day thing, and he was even before he was himself and his family the victim of it.