see grant finally getting a serious evaluation from american intellectuals. rand, in the 50s, i felt she was much more -- she always saw herself as apart from the mainstream of american society that she fits in very well with the anti authoritarian pro individual strain you see from other writers like jack kerouac for j.d. salinger or on the left a number of intellectuals such as paul goodman, growing up absurd, and people like phil lowly crowd, david reichmann's book or the man in the gray flannel suit. rand has been doing extremely well over the past couple of months, partly because of things coming out of d.c.. a writer and a figure we should all study with care if we want to have a road map to why people are feeling the way that they are right now. .of

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>> so that's my summer of reading and i hope to get it all done we do by labor day weekend. >> to see more information visit our website at booktv.org. >> benson bobrick recounts the military career of union general george h. thomas. the author contends that general thomas, known as the rock of chickamauga, was the most successful general during the civil war. this event hosted by the civil war round table of new york in new york city is an hour and 15 minutes. >> thank you for inviting me here tonight, and i am astounded at how many people have shown up

for this event. it all has to do with george thomas, i'm sure, and his as yet un- wholly appreciated virtues. i know talk a great deal about them tonight. the upside of an occasion like this where there is a cocktail hour and a dinner is that you get to socialize and a very festive light. the downside is that by the time i'm getting to the podium, my voice feels almost worn out. i could use a glass of water if someone could provide that for me. >> you might want to turn the volume up a bit. >> thank you. one thing thomas and i may be said to have in common, if i may

speak of him in the present tense, is a certain evidence about public speaking. he was always reluctant to do it, and so am i. but i trusted by chattel his courage and also channel george craig, that i will do okay tonight. so, channel i will. [laughter] >> i was thinking on my way over here tonight that it is some 43 years ago when i was just out of high school that i helped organize the first, i believe it was the first, community teach in against the war in vietnam. [applause] >> it was held about a mile from here in chelsea, at ps 11 on

july 30, 1965. i recently came upon the hand-lettered flyer that i did for that event, and i framed it. why do i think of that now? because it was a way of speaking truth to power. and is a noted kind of power that scholars and writers sometimes find themselves up against. it is the power of an established version of the truth. as the story of the civil war is generally told today, we have an entrenched narrative that, in my view, assigns undue credit for the union victory to sherman and grant. and the adherents this narrative into dominate the discourse and debate about the war, both in and out of our schools. and rightly or wrongly, time and

history will be the judge had shaped the thinking of the students and readers for some time. there are many gentlemen and ladies among them, but some of them don't take kindly to dissent, as i've discovered. in that way, one more is like another. especially when it comes to holding those responsible for costly errors to account. so this is another chance to speak truth to power, and to engage in another kind of teach in regardless of the resistance i may meet. so that a full, free and honest and open debate again. we are here to celebrate a remarkable and, general george h. thomas, perhaps the greatest soldier since george washington

america has ever produced. when he died in the spring of 1870, 10000 people attended his funeral, and flags across the nation were hung at half mast. the president of the united states, ulysses s. grant, general william tecumseh sherman, joseph hooker, philip sheridan, george gordon meade, and other notables overrate were among the vast concourse of mourners who gathered to pay their respects. his passing was considered a national calamity. today, textbooks often omit him or giving up just a few lines. yet no man was more responsible for thomas for the union victory in the war. how may we summarize his life? born into a slaveholding family in virginia, not far from the site of the climactic battle of

the revolutionary war at yorktown, he chafed early on that the system of slavery that sustain his family's wealth. as a boy, he told the families slays how to read and write it is said against his parents wishes, and if not quite an abolitionist as a young man, he was one in the making, as revealed by his conduct in subsequent years. at the age of 19, he went off to west point, did well, groomed with william tecumseh sherman, whom he protected from upper-class boys. seem to never forget anything he learned. pot with conspicuous distinction in the seminal and mexican wars. return to west point to teach our children in cavalry tactics where jeb stuart and philip sheridan were among his pupils. in their development close

friendship with the academy's new superintendent, robert healy. lee wrote that there was quote no more capable officer in the quote in the service of the united states. indeed, over lees protest, thomas was subsequently transferred to outpost duty at fort yuma, where despite the blistering heat he made the most of his time. while others as one writer put it, gambled, drank or messed with the cashbox, thomas enrich his desert world. between reconnaissance patrols and the humdrum duty of garrison life, he explored the reaches of the colorado river, gathered plant and mineral specimens, which he sent to the smithsonian institution in washington, discovered a singular variety of that. and with the help of indian interpreters, learn to speak and

write the language of the local yuma tribe. for the next four years or so, thomas served with robert e. lee in texas were together they made the rounds of the court-martial circuit, and tried to keep these on the indian frontier. during one expedition, thomas tang with some comanches and took an arrow in the chest and chin. while on convalescent leave going north to meet his wife in new york, he learned of abraham lincoln's momentous selection as president of the united states. when the civil war began, thomas was a cavalry major and a bronzed and grizzled veteran of 44. in his person, he was a large man of commanding presence with a strong well proportioned body, a formidable head, full beard, and the firm walked.

everything about him seemed to emanate tremendous, physical strength, integrity, and moral power. as one who knew him put it, he seemed hard out of live oak. since 1855, he had belonged to an elite corps of officers named by jefferson davis to the second cavalry unit that included albertson johnson, earl van dorn, john bell hood, and robert e. lee himself. lee, a fellow virginian, as well as johnstone and the rest, cast their lot with the south. they regarded their respective states as their country. thomas, with a broader constitutional understanding of his loyalties, went north. in so doing, he placed his country above his state, but also incurred the displeasure of

his family and the wrath of the entire south. in union service, thomas had no political patrons, unlike grant and sherman. and there was a general prejudice against him he does he was southern born. but he rose by merit, and by the end of the conflict, he had an incomparably the finest record of any general on either side. indeed, in a more distinguished by mind-boggling carnage, he was notably free of the promiscuous or chronic blunders that often stained the major clashes of the war. he poured his men into battle only when it counted, and when it counted he prevailed. all this would be little more than academic praise if his battles have been minor, or his role peripheral, as the war played out. but the opposite was true. he gave the union its first

major victory at middle springs, kentucky, which helped save kentucky for the union and open the way to tennessee. he rendered service at the siege of corn, where he practically superseded grant. he held a synod at the stones river where, on a wooded knoll known afterwards as hell has a good, he snatched victory from defeat. he took charge of the most important part of the maneuvering to chattanooga during the tullahoma campaign with its great victory at hoover's gap. once more, save the day in chickamauga were on the crest of fortune ridge with three kids of the union army streaming to the rear, along with its commander, thomas planted himself in a decimated over a broken divisions and held his ground long enough to permit the army to make an orderly retreat.

and subsequent actions, his men routed the confederate at missionary ridge in the battle of chattanooga, which won that engagement for grant. parried john bell hood's all out attack at peachtree creek indialantic campaigned. and destroyed food's army at nashville to end the war in the west. that despite grandes interference, he built a cavalry force that neutralize the industrialized hubs of selma and montgomery, alabama. and helped organize age and helped to capture jefferson davis in georgia with his network of spies. in the end, it could be said of him uniquely that were as sherman never won a battle where he commanded, and grant only battered his way to victory, for the most part anyway, with an overwhelming force, thomas was the only union general to destroy two confederate armies, and the only one besides to save

two union armies from annihilation by his personal valor and skill. william swinton, in his classic book, the 12 decisive battles of the war, published in 1867 while memories were still fresh, wrote the figure of thomas looms up in many respects without a superior in most instances without a rival even among the union generals created by the war. after the war, thomas served with firmness and honor as the military governor of several southern states, and was perhaps the first to sound the alarm about the ku klux klan. although the planned claim to be a patriotic organization, and to recognize the constitution and its laws, thomas off through its mask. and memorable words, he described it as quote, a species

of kant whereby the crime of treason might be covered with a counterfeit marsh of patriotism so that the precipitate is of the rebellion might go down in history hand-to-hand with the defenders of the government. does, wiping out with their own hands their own stands. rightly convinced that the clan would soon develop into an armed organization designed to control southern elections through violence and intimidation, thomas repeatedly warned washington of the peril of its rise. honors came his way. he received the thanks of congress in 1865 in a formal resolution. and the following year he reluctantly agreed to appear before the house of representatives, escorted to the speaker's stand, thomas was greeted by a tremendous ovation.

it was almost too much for him. overcome by modesty and embarrassment, his hand ever steady in battle trembled and he blushed. in 1867, an attempt was made to draft thomases candidate for president. he discouraged such efforts and told one admirer i am a soldier and i know my duty. as a politician, i would be lost. no, sir. i want to die with a fair record, and this i will do if i keep out of the sea of politics. even so, some thought he would have swept the country, had he run. in 1868, thomas, still in service, was transferred to the military command to this pacific with its headquarters in san francisco. and there died of a stroke while writing a letter to a newspaper in response to some slanders

that had recently been published against his career. that career was bound up in unhappy ways with the careers of grant and sherman. and it was not a pleasant task for me to sort it out. grant had emerged from the war as a figurehead of victory. in my view, he hadn't won it, or the battles that really determine its outcome. but he presided over its stained wall. though the list of battles he has always said to have one is extensive, fort henry, for donaldson, shiloh, you can corinth pittsburgh and chattanooga, capped by lee's surrender at appomattox, the fact is that with the exception of vicksburg, he won arguably none of these himself. admiral subdued fort henry before grant could get his men

into position. for donaldson fell after same general cf. smith made his heroic charge. and shilo grants armies saved by general don carlos buell. the incomplete victories at duke and corinth belonged more to general william as rosecrans as most contemporaries actually seem to know. and chattanooga was won by thomas, who was pretty much obliged to manage the battle in his own way directly and indirectly to keep a grant from throwing it away. and i'm not only talking about the charge up missionary ridge, but by the refusal that thomas made to grant early order before sherman arrived to a maturing attack that ridge, which he knew would just lead to useless slaughter. and i'm referring also to thomases advance on orchard knob which grant had ordered, but

then was the knob was taken this was elevation between chattanooga and missionary ridge. grant one of those men pulled back, and thomas objected to that. fortunately, rawlings, grant's chief of, intervened and insisted that the men had advanced to far to be withdrawn and it would have been a terrible development in the process of that battle for them to have been drawn back. and then of course the charge of the ridge which was really inspired by thomas, even though he didn't directly order it. but in looking at all these battles, in every instance of grant received the credit because he was the general in charge. and that of course is usually the way it works. then there followed the unspeakable carnage in the east, in the wilderness, spotsylvania, and cold harbor and before petersburg as grant and lee wore

each other out. as for sherman, his atlanta campaign was largely carried by thomas who did the heavy lifting on it, for sure. and thomas have devised a strategy to win it at the outset, which sherman failed to heed. in brief, thomas had discovered a way to outflank joseph johnston's army by moving in force to an undefended pass known as snake creek at. instead, sherman indulged in foolish frontal assaults against a nearly impregnable precipice, known as rocky face clip where the rebels were entrenched. he later claimed these attacks were mere feints. when he moved through the gap, it was too late for him to do so effectively, and he did so in any case with an inadequate force. johnston escaped, sherman blamed his subordinate commander commander, and so the atlanta

campaign went on for months until atlanta fell. but the campaign's main object, johnston's army, lived to fight another day. in a second big campaign, sherman marched through georgia to the seat. in so doing, he marched away from the army, now under john bell hood. he was supposed to destroy. thomas was left to protect all of the union armies western games. he was also left with inadequate force with which to do this. sherman had taken almost the whole of sherman's army and left him with a small force of veterans together with convalescence, scattered rejects and recruits. but in of the great battles of history, certainly the most decisive of the war, thomas at nashville, tennessee, annihilated the confederate army

of the west between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on december 16, 1864, hood's army was utterly destroyed. but thomas was not done yet. the cavalry he had carefully assembled, in spite of grant, now had its crowning task. dismounted it bought with tenacity and brilliant, mounted, its bed after the fragments of whose army and relentless pursuit. the rock of chickamauga had become this sledgehammer of nashville. the victory of nashville marked the beginning of the end. it presented a new southern thrust into the north, which would have prolonged the war. made good sherman's march to see, as lincoln noted in his telegram to sherman at savanna. and left but one considerable confederate army in the field,

beleaguered in and around richmond, and now doomed. had thomas not insisted on taking the time, and again it was not a long time, to remount his cavalry and properly prepare it for its great wall, the western theater would not have been one when it was and without the great catholic campaign that soon followed also organized by thomas in collaboration with general james h. wilson, the south would not have lost its capacity to make war. puts army would have survived. lee would have been heartened and johnston now in north carolina would have fought on. grant and sherman, whatever they may have said to have accomplished on their own, gathered up in the end the harvest that thomas had some. yet grant had tried to undermine thomas before the battle of nashville was thought.

he hectored thomas from afar, from several thousand miles away at city point, virginia, and tried to get him to attack foods confederate army before it made sense for him to do so. before his cavalry was fully mounted, or his men fully organized or in their lines. is telegrams to calm his and the war department on the score form one of the greatest scandals, actually, in the annals of war. and when it came time to write his memoirs, grant suppressed many of them to show himself in a better light. he included only the telegrams he had sent to thomas and stanton, not the ones that thomas had sent in reply here the truth is, grant knowing that he had blundered in allowing sherman to march away from hood's army, panicked and lost his head. but thomas would not be forced.

as the generals, grant and thomas were opposites. grant was a pushing and tenacious man, for one who knew them both. so and so that on several occasions he sacrificed me to experiment, still he went on. on the other hand, thomas was cool, quiet, careful in his movement, a nice calculator of chances, but always intending to win all that could be one. in his judgment, before national, everyday increase the danger to hood while it improved the condition of the union army. why take desperate chances while a reasonable delay would render the outcome sure? nothing was lost, and much was gained. within a few days, in fact, after consistently heroic efforts to make a viable army

out of the patchwork of troops -- thank you. i think it's coming through anyway. i will wait for a moment. >> welcome to new york. >> very unlike the idyllic spot i have in vermont where the quiet is golden. i guess i should try and talk over it, i'm afraid. within a few days, in fact, after consistently heroic efforts to make a viable army out of the patchwork of troops, sherman had left behind for him to work with, thomas was ready. but then an ice storm fell. the ground became one vast sheet

of ice. movement even a low-level ground was hazardous, and impossible up the slopes. grant however renewed his hectoring and demanded that grant attack no matter what the weather was. it seems not to have occurred to grant what an ice storm meant. it was hardly possible for hood to move any case if thomas could not. grant also began to demand that thomas b. replaced. lincoln was mortified, and the war department pushed back at that. but grant kept the pressure up. one contemporary summed up the situation nicely. a weaker man that thomas would have yielded and attacked before he was ready. true if he had obeyed the best interest of the country were in danger, but if he did not, he was liable to the charge of

disobedience of orders. the firmness of general thomas therefore assumes the proportions of a martyr's fate. he would die for the cause, for the honor of the profession of arms, and for his own spotless character rather than over a orders that would imperil the cause and do his men. general james h. wilson, grant's own favorite cavalry commander, later observed quote, grants wyers show that he had a good memory for injuries, real or fancied. they also show a willingness, if not a settled purpose on his part, end quote, to bring thomas down provided the authorities in washington could be induced to go along. what motives did grant have for all of this?

all-knowing contemporaries seem to agree that grant had conceived an implacable resentment of thomas a couple of years before, after thomas had been placed in charge of much of grant's army in the aftermath of the battle of shiloh. a battle in which grant's army, due to his own careless arrangements, and the careless arrangements of sherman, was almost destroyed. that change in command did not last long. but from then on, thomas -- grant rather saw thomas as a rival to be contained. sherman soon with alliance with grant after all, after the schiavo fiasco, grant and sherman were joined at the hip. ascherman put it in a famous assessment of their assessment, he stood by me when i was crazy, and i stood by him when he was

drunk. as grant gross in rank, he brought sherman along. in a political sense, this was not difficult for him to do. grant had strong political backing from powerful political figures in illinois. in particular a congressman from his district. washburn had supported lincoln's drive for the senate in 1854. each year to the appropriations committee in the house. was newly elected speaker. served as chairman of the republican congressional campaign committee in 1860. had lobbied hard for lincoln's nomination, and was the man who met president-elect lincoln when he arrived secretly by night under military guard by train in washington on february 23, 1861. throughout his career he was a power to be reckoned with. and lincoln was much in his debt.

as a grant constant sponsor, washburn supported him through thick and thin and ultimately pushed through the bill that allowed grant to be named lieutenant general of all the union armies. later, when grant was elected president, washburn served briefly as a secretary of war before becoming minister to france. as for sherman, his brother john was a powerful senator and former candidate for speaker of the house. house. his father in law and adopted father was a former senator and had served as the nation's first secretary of the interior under franklin pierce. another brother, charles, was a federal judge. he was so well-connected that despite his relative lack of military experience, at least compared to many others when the war began, his brother john told him that his friends in high

places were prepared to make him virtually secretary of war. rance alliance with sherman and sherman's alliance with grant represent a powerful political conjunction that assisted both men in their rise. and here let me say a few words about lincoln. about lincoln's relation to grant and thomas and the politics of the war. lincoln's deep humanity, any wisdom, and determined leadership during our nation's most trying time in sure his greatness against all detractors. when his virtues as a statesman rss, as a war leader, however, he remains a figure of uncertain stature and the subject of sharp debate. as with any national rate reviewed and beloved icon, there are always attempts to gloss over his imperfections.

that the best way to honor history is to tell the whole truth about it. even if we have to acknowledge inconvenient truths. to fully appreciate lincoln's importance, we ought to be candid about his mistakes. lincoln was a man of great capacity and showed it in almost every area to which he turned his design. but he had no personal military experience yawned a few weeks of campaigning in 1832 in the black hawk war. he opposed the mexican war as a war of aggression. and when someone once asked him if he remembered anything about the war of 1812, which took place when he was a child, he said i had been fishing one day and caught a little fish, which i was taking home. i met a soldier in the road, and having always been told at home

that we must be good to soldiers, i gave him my fish. so he had no real knowledge of war and the civil war began, and in that, using little antidote i think he was in his own way confessing as much. some of his blunders were completely understandable. in picking generals, he was sometimes flying blind. unlike jefferson davis, an accomplished soldier and former secretary of war, he had no personal knowledge of the officer corps. once the war began, he kept changing his commanders. with disarming candor, he once said that picking a good general was, quote, like putting one's hand and a sack to get one deal from a dozen snakes as a leader he also on occasion let political considerations skew his judgment.

although opposed to states rights doctrine in its dogmatic form, he was moved to much at times by state pride. after four donaldson fell, for example, he said as he signed papers promoting grant, go, southerners think that for man-to-man they are better than our illinois man or western men generally. they will discover themselves in a grievous mistake. grant, in fact, was favored over others who had shown more skill. early in the war, thomas was not promoted as probably as normal protocol would have required it. no one can quite say why, but after thomas won the first great union victory of the war in the middle springs, kentucky, lincoln, for political reasons, may not have wanted a southern born general to get credit for reviving the honor of northern

arms here at nine months later when thomas also had given command of an army in the west, lincoln exclaimed that the virginian weight. yet the greatness of thomas kept thrusting itself at the stones river, tennessee, which lincoln later said save the union. and prevented the intervention of france and england. and then it chickamauga, georgia, when thomas made the greatest stand against an enemy since the ancient greek stand at thermopolis. after chickamauga, lincoln began to understand how great, as was. and awe, he said that it was doubtful that quote, the heroism and skill end quote thomas had shown that they had to quote, ever been surpassed in the world. in the meantime when it had come time in 1864 to pick a new general to head the army of the

potomac, thomas had been considered. general james a. garfield, later president of the united states, was one of his advocates. but then again, partly for political reasons, they may come out of gratitude to grant were not offering himself as a presidential candidate in the upcoming election, lincoln decided to make grant lieutenant general. that placed him in charge of all the union armies. the congressional act is noted that cleared the way for that was introduced by a lie you washburn. that also gave grant affect the direction of the army of the potomac, then led by george gordon meade. given the reckless carnage that followed, grant's appointment made reasonably be considered a mistake. lincoln's friend and counselor, alexander k. mcclure, who admire grant, wrote afterwards all, no

one -- no general was better equipped for the supreme command of all our armies than thomas, who would have taken richmond with grant's army and save tens of thousands of lives of gallant men from untimely death. to lincoln's credit, he later tried to dissuade grant as we saw before the battle of nashville from insisting on his order to remove thomas from command. but it was major thomas eckert of the telegraph department who held onto that order on his own responsibility, just long enough to let thomas make his move. lincoln, however, reluctantly had been prepared to let that order go through. afterwards, lincoln and staton were both grateful for eckert for this insubordinate act. in fact, in a touching theme, as

eckert and stanton wrote to the white house together to tell lincoln of the successful result of the national fight, eckert told stanton what he had done. he said he expected he might be court-martialed for it. stand and put his arm around him and said, if they court-martial you, they will have to court-martial me. so let us celebrate lincoln, but in doing so let us say that his appreciation of thomas was a laudable thing but let's also acknowledge that his belated appreciation of thomas was a significant factor in the conduct of the war. why is thomas not a household name? in the aftermath of the war, thomas was considered by many its most outstanding soldier. indy, a remarkable number of his contemporaries thought george

washington was the only man of stature to whom he could be rightly compared. generals james h. wilson, james a. garfield, secretary of war edwin stanton, and assistant secretary of war charles a. danna all voiced that opinion. others concurred. general oliver o. howard.com is not only greater than stonewall jackson and robert e. lee, but washington's equal with less opportunity he wrote, his achievements put him by washington's side. by that he meant that thomas had accomplished all he had without the advantage of being in supreme command. joseph hooker, in the last letter he ever wrote, called thomas the most gifted soldier america had ever known. general james steedman called

him the noblest figure of the war. in general garfield's opinion, the military genius of thomas equaled that displayed by washington, and the duke of elegant, which is quite a triumph. none of these men were of the formulaic kind. they were heart wrenching and heartfelt. when gideon welles, lincoln's secretary of the navy, finally met thomas after the war, he thought him intellectually and as a civilian as well as a military man, as he put it, exceeded by none. major donkey, judge advocate in the celebrated treason trial of general don carlos buell wrote, grant felt uneasy and ashamed in the presence of thomas, and both

grant and sherman were troubled with the thought that truth and justice would award to the subordinate in office a higher position on the honor roll. some people have questioned the character of because he became an invested journalist after the war and investigated grants administration. grandson cedric and the confederate broke into his home with club when he wasn't there and terrorized his family. and so needless to say, piott did have a grudge against grant, but the grudge was not an inappropriate one given the circumstances i would say. so i think that his opinion is not to be discounted. and he was good investigative

journalism by the way. but the scramble for postwar theme and fortune had other things in store. grant and sherman would both outlive thomas by many years, and successfully promote their own reputations, often at his expense. both would also glorify each other, write popular memoirs that at times revised the facts, and worked to ensure that thomas would be placed third or last in the acknowledged of union commanders who have determined the outcome of the war. the main rap against thomas, fostered by grant and sherman behind his back, was that he was slow. good on defense maybe, that slow to attack. this was a canard. as a cavalry instructor, he was affectionately dubbed old slow

trot. not because he was slow, as later slander would have it. started by grant. but because of the wise direction he would give his cadets as they readied for charge. during exercises on the academy playing. after the command to trot had been given and the cadets begin to anticipate a gallop, thomas would check their order with the order slow trot. some recent books on grant, sherman, and the various aspects of the war, and even some standard histories show and unhappy inclination to repeat information long disproved. that is a sad thing. the only ascertainable time, swiss and personal was in withdrawing under fire. not only did he win every battle he ever fought, proving that his deliberate preparations were

sound, not slow, but he rose to meet every occasion, however unforeseen. that shows you how really quicky was. only a razor like judgment combined with an incredibly sure and prompt capacity for action could have rescued the union army from calamity at stones river, chickamauga, and peachtree creek. there is absolutely nothing in the careers of either grant or sherman that remotely compares to it. so then, what remains? nashville. and there we see he was not slow that wise. to the impetuous grant and the hyperactive sherman, who did almost everything at a neurotic speed, the news article thoughtful thomas dallas seemed to. the fact that he was also somewhat slow-moving and careful in his physical movements provided them both with a

metaphor. that physical carriage, however, was due to the pain he suffered from a wrenched spine. it had nothing substantive to do with any thing like it in his conduct in the war. one contemporary wrote that grant was apt to couple thomas' name with some innuendo, as was sherman, to their own peculiar shame. when grant composed his memoirs, he slighted the achievements of thomas and some others, as mentioned, and took credit for some achievements that were not his own. but toward the end of the writing, he tried to work in a tribute to thomas that he knew history would applaud. in summing up, he portrayed him as a sensible, honest and brave commander who gained the confidence of all, who served under him. and as the great defensive general of the war.

most civil war historians have accepted this appraisal on its face. those most more familiar with the record have known it to be half-truth and its praise. the late great boost catton said of thomas, what a general could do, thomas did. no more dependable soldier for a moment of crisis existed on the north american continent or ever did exist. as for thomas being a defensive general, a description calculated to excuse grants harassment of him, at chattanooga and nashville, he wrote thomas comes down in history as the rock of chickamauga, the great defensive fighter, the man who could never be driven away. yet it may also be worth making note that just twice in all the war was a major confederate army driven away from a prepared

position in complete rout at chattanooga and nashville. each time the blow that routed it was launched by thomas. there was nothing subtle about thomas, he also said, or primarily defensive. grant was wrong. towards the end of his life, kant and was thomas after all the greatest commander of them all. and that civil war history would one day have to be upgraded, as he put it, to give him his rightful place. i could wish that he had taken that task on. let me add one more thing about thomas being slow. grant and sherman may of course convince themselves of it, to justify their behind the scenes efforts to limit his reputation in rank. but even that may be doubted.

in 1902, a bundle of old autograph records, some of them by sherman, all private and unpublished turned up in a third avenue secondhand bookshop in new york. in one dated november 9, 1875, sherman admitted to having described thomas as slow but have excused himself by claiming that quote, general grant knows well that it was he and not me who first used that expression. however, he said he had been willing to take the heat for it for grant's sake. i would call that special pleading. shermans conscience had clearly begun to not have him a little bit. i know full well that my book is controversial, and it goes against the grain. or maybe i should say it is

engaged in an uphill fight. those in defense of the grant-shermans legend, and to some degree i think it is a legend, have entrenched themselves on their own missionary ridge. but in the long view of history, i think they are not likely to hold their ground. my judgments on grant and sherman may seem severe, but i did not write my book out of something dead against them. i voted to right a grievous wrong. it is a known vendettas that grant had against thomas that really matters anyway. and in that regard, let me add that thomas, after the war, continue to suffer humiliations at grant's hands. nor did i set out to run grant and sherman down to run thomas up. but as thomas grows in stature, they are bound to shrink.

after all, my book is partly about stolen honors, and we can hardly expect those who claimed them to maintain their former place. in the scale of things, grant and sherman are bound to diminish, at least in relation to thomas, as he gets the credit he deserves. god forbid that i should ever knockdown icons for its own sake. anyone who is ever read my examination of the founding fathers in the fight for the american independence, in my book angel in the whirlwind, i think it is fair to say now considered widely considered standard, knows that. but i will not deny that my sense of outrage at his treatment and passion of my pages with what felt at times like righteous wrath. the first draft of history is always written by those in

power. the military coterie of grant, sherman, philip sheridan, and john scofield all closely allied constitute a dynasty of command that lasted for more than 20 years. during this period of unprecedented military control, as one writer put it, sherman succeeded grant as commander of the army in 1869. shared and exceeded sherman in 1884, and scofield succeeded sheraton in 1888. the trend of civil war history largely shaped by their memoirs, but also by the official control their postwar prominence gave over the public understanding of events, long enjoyed the stature of tradition as fixed in the popular mind. this has been unfortunate for the national memory, and for the true story of the war.

the official records of the war of the rebellion as they were called were collated and published between 1880 and 1900. with supplementary volumes appearing in later years. shermans memoirs were first published in 1875. grants, a decade later, in 1885. the veracity of both were challenged from the start, and often contradicted by the record that emerged. even so, as early as 1893 in his speech before the society of the army of the cumberland, the army that thomas led, general joseph fullerton, former chief of staff to general ds stanley, lamented the serious errors that have become part of the popular account of the war. he noted that the truth had often been suppressed, and that

many had not spoken up because they knew that they would have been, quote, stoneman to political and social death. as a result, quote, the names of some of our greatest soldiers and heroes are lusterless, and almost unknown to the generation that has come on since because credit for the deeds of those great but modest man was unjustly assumed by or awarded to some hero of the hour, and quote. and then he drove the point home. you, men of the army of the cumberland know of such a soldier. you have seen him. you remember him well. now is the time while your memories are yet fresh, your mind active, your spirits strong, to see that his star be properly set in the galaxy of the great generals of the world.

if that has not happened yet, questions about the competence of grant and sherman have a long lingered as a subtext of civil war studies, and forced themselves to the forefront whenever the documentary record is examined with care. their shortcomings as generals were well-known, and well described by a number of military scholars and historians, including john fiske, john cubin ropes, and theodore a. dodge. a civil war veteran who lost a leg at gettysburg and went on to write a 12 volume history on the art of war. they all consider grant and sherman true patriots, but they also noted as common knowledge grants ignorance of or disregard of the basic principles of good strategy and tactics, as well as shermans conspicuous in order to

successfully execute his assigned task at vicksburg, chattanooga, and on the atlantic campaign. has potentially catastrophic folly in marching away from hood army leaving thomas with inadequate force to meet its threat was also acknowledged as a simple fact. dodge wrote that grant, quote, show during his military career on more than one occasion a singular lack of aptitude in using what are recognizes a best method in modern warfare. is a few brilliant successes were one against generals of second rate capacity, and when he met opponents of acknowledged strength, he accomplished the results he aimed at only with the aid of pre-pondering forces. he also noted that grant, however tenacious, hardly ever seem to learn from his mistakes.

he had a propensity to divide his forces, never won a battle when the fighting was really desperate, and at cold harbor and elsewhere launched uniform attacks against fortified lines. that went against the fundamental role in attacking entrenched positions where the only advantage at the attacker has is to keep the defenders guessing at where the attack with mass forces would occur. uniform attacks are usually suicide. had grant surprised invention and achieved great things for his disregard of military doctrine, we would marvel at him for it here but the opposite is true. dian wells noted in his diary that grant -- gideon welles being late and great secretary of the navy, noted in his diary that grant was reckless with his

men. john ropes observed that he threw away min 10000 at a time. winston churchill, when he came to write his history of the english speaking peoples, decried as he put it unflinching butchery of grant coulthard souls. again, speaking of grant's plan for a simultaneous advance in the east and the west, ropes road if the two armies of lee and johnston could be destroyed, there would be an end to the war. it is therefore rather remarkable that neither he nor sherman succeeded in the campaign which they began in may, 1864 and a couple should these objects. at the close of close of that year the main army of the late its arms in front of saint petersburg in richmond, sherman also reoccupied, demolished and left atlanta without destroying the army of johnston and hood.

that task he finally abandoned to thomas who executed in a memorable and decisive victory of national. . . opportunity and is wary and skillful opponent presented him with no other. chairman was compelled to turn in that position and force him to fall back without ever being able to bring in today, in a situation where the superior

numbers of the union army would tell. sometimes in his endeavor to find the weak places in the enemy's position, sherman lost more men than he need have lost and it must be said that his assaults at kennesaw mountain, which thomas stopped by his protests, did not do credit to his tactical judgment and his desire to bring matters to a crisis, he failed to recognize that his losses would not only be severe but fruitless. strange to say, many commonplace truth, especially those reflecting poorly on grant and sherman have largely disappeared from accounts of the war. when not absolutely absent, they are often dampened down. in a number of recent books, grant and sherman have generated

generally flourished, with thomas also in eclipse. the battle of chickamauga is often celebrated as his one great achievement but of course it belonged to a continuing that made up his unrivaled record in the war. in the revised standard version, grant gets blurry for shiloh, attention is obscured, thomas is called ponderous, and grant is made out to be in full control of the battle of chattanooga, chairman's failed assault at the outset of campaign are omitted often, the idea for the stop crack maneuver is credited and the failure of sherman slated in adequate move to the gap is blamed on his subordinate commanders just as chairman hoped it would be. in the wind up to national we

are told that sherman led thomas, more than enough men to cope with anything the rebels might try in that sherman to, quote, his own army of 62,000 pot and campaigners on the georgia campaign, the army sherman took with him is not his own army but the army of thomas by and large including all his good cavalry horses. as for the battle of natural, we get a picture of grand exerting thomas to action as if you were too in there to move on his own and so on. you will find statements of this kind of omission, errors of omission and commission in many books in their concurrence with each other, almost approaching paraphrase. the truth is even if we grant

grant and sherman more than i am inclined to, if you grant all the loral's their admirers claimed for them, why should these troops, about the contribution made by thomas, be amended. and does that not distort the story of a war? shelby remarked not long before that there was a movement underway to homogenize the history of the war, not to deal with the good and evil of it, or of the people who fought it, but to make it all good. he was concerned about this in the way that civil war battlefield parks were being presented, which made the war a romantic object of our past. the right way to honor the past is to tell the whole truth about it, to give credit where it is due. otherwise, the ordeal of the

nation is sentimentalized. that can happen whenever or wherever your task is glorified simply because we are past it, so it belongs to the heritage we claim. time and history will do him justice. general howard agreed it takes time for jealousy and ambition, spewing out nash and consume themselves, but time is long, justice never dies. it is thomas, in my view, not grants or chairman, to stand beside lincoln in our memory. thank you very much. [applause]

>> ladies and gentlemen, we have time for a few questions. alan, wait for the microphone and enjoy yours. you don't have to touch it. >> did thompson's sisters forgive him for being a union man and are there any family members still alive today? >> there are collateral relatives. i don't know what their view of him is. they tried to gather material for a sketch of thomas's life, around 1890, and he wrote to

thomas's two surviving sisters to get them to say something about his childhood and his growing up and all. thomas's sister, judas, wrote back of the general howard, he was well brought up, that is all she would say about him. >> it is -- your remarks very interesting. i never realized just how effective a commander george thomas was, other than his well-known reputation as a great defensive general but isn't it a fact that the main theater of operations was against the union army, against the potomac, against the army of northern

virginia? namely, defeating robert e. lee, and the fact is thomas never had an engagement because of his situation. against robert e. lee, we don't really know how well thomas would have done in grant's place other than the fact that thomas reduced, was very careful about casualties? >> as bruce remarked, richmond and washington d.c. where the nerve centers of the war, so the focus of the war was -- the political focus was, in many ways, on the eastern feeder. but he concluded that the really decisive fighting was in the west and the south, and i quite

agree with that. thomas's victory in nashville pretty much isolated and set up the conditions that would lead to his surrender. we can't know what thomas would have done with grant's army. but even that being said, i think this series of achievements, victories, and battles where thomas prevented union armies from being destroyed, in many ways, are more determined of the outcome of the war than the horrible stalemate that grant and sherman endured in the east. >> in 1862, thomas was ordered

to take command in kentucky in the campaign. he turned down that command and talked him into leaving you'll in charge. he was going to be finished a man anyway, why didn't he take control of that army? >> it is one of the paradoxes of thomas, the very character trait which enabled him to stand firm and do the right thing in battle also slow down his own advancement. as a man of honor, he felt that you -- buhl had earned a second chance at shiloh. when thomas was offered the opportunity to take command from him, he felt that he didn't have a complete grasp of the battle plans and strategies that he had already worked out for is coming

campaign. it was a gesture of self-effacing and and modesty which was typical, and clearly retarded his own promotion. but it was done in such a high-minded way that it is difficult for me to find it in myself to fault him for that, although i understand, fully understand, can follow the reasoning of those who do find fault with him for it. >> one more over there. paul? >> let me ask you a question about a story you mentioned that the beginning of your talk, about how general thomas, as a boy, taught the slaves in his family farms, read and write, which is something of an echo of stonewall jackson, similarly found in a sunday school for

blacks in lexington, famously sending in a check to support it immediately after the battle of bull run, when everybody was expecting news of what a hero jackson was. as you are an expert, among other things, in religion, and particularly the development of the bible, you wrote an excellent book about that, could you tell us about thomas's religion, how it played with his views for slavery, and was thomas an abolitionist? >> the story about him teaching his family slaves to read and write has been discounted by some as a legend. but i find it impossible to discount because it is firsthand evidence. it came from a slave, an elderly

slave who played with thomas as a boy, slave who exists in the records that oliver howard interviewed for the sketch of thomas's life that he is trying to repair in 1890. i wanted to mention that because someone did to portray thomas as a typical member of the slave family. i don't think he was an abolitionist when the war started. he had a quarter of unrelated labor so the idea of slavery was appalling to him but he evolves the way lincoln did, into a general who believe that emancipation was not only the

politically correct thing to do, great military use, but was something which ought to have been done. the only union general to use blacks in a decisive battle and gave them an honor roll in the battle of nashville. i discovered while writing this book that there are many members of the black community, who are civil war buffs, look upon him as their hero because after the war, blacks would often point to the battle of nashville and say we earn our full rights of citizenship, we proved we could be complete soldiers of this nation. as for his religious beliefs,

the evidence about them is scant. professing a profound christian conviction -- one could hardly go into battle and the truly brave. he said it was analogous to a soldier having confidence in his commander. i think in a way there's something about the way in which thomas commanders that inspired all of his soldiers and officers around him, always to stand firm. general stevens was asked what hold, had over his men that they could do this no matter how desperate the fighting was. he replied no one would ever

think of not being noble and courageous in thomas's presence. it just made them ashamed. by example, almost a religious example, he had that kind of power over his officers and troops. >> last one from our friends from new jersey, civil war roundtable. >> i agree with you about thomas's performance in nashville. but don't we overblow that here, by what really destroyed franklin? and national is more shville is the finishing touch? >> hood could have caught thomas

before thomas could organize. the army that thomas was assembling in nashville, when hood arrived before him, was just coming together, the army that could be good. it was very much into the air until thomas was able to pull these elements together, the catch workforce that he made to make it nearly certain that he would prevail. he was attacking in trench position. in the force of the attackers to overcome positions of that kind, thomas really didn't have the numerical proportion. it was really the strategy of

his battle plan. could's army fought back hard, desperate fighting the first day. the battle went according to the plan that thomas worked out. nothing was guaranteed. until the battle of the second day was over. >> i want to bring out the vice-president. [applause] >> we would like to give bentsen this plaque to commemorate his talk. thank you for attending and for watching so good night. >> benson bobrick is the author of several books including angels in the whirlwind, the triumph of the american revolution. he received the literature award of the american academy of arts and letters in 2002. the civil war roundtable of new

york posted this event. for more information, visit c.w. artie and why see.org. >> three days of peace, love, and music. 40 years ago this weekend, half a million people gathered for woodstock. co-founder michael lane takes us behind the scenes on bothtv. >> uncle sam wants you, world war i and the making of the modern american citizen. who is james montgomery flagg? >> james montgomery flagg is the man who won one of the most important images in american politics, the uncle sam wants you poster. he was working in new york and in that period after the war started but before the u.s. was involved, he wanted america to be more involved and he wanted to come up with a perfect image,

he gave us this image of uncle sam wants you, the finger pointing at you. >> was he under contract to present that image? >> at that time he was working for a magazine, illustrated weekly, a popular magazine of the day. he was under a tight deadline to finish. he didn't have a lot of ideas. the story as we know it, particularly from his memoir, he got an idea of a picture of himself, looking into the mirror and adding a few years, putting on a family -- funny hats. that gave him the magazine cover. a year or so later, the recruiting poster came out. at the time he created. >> of this not a government effort to recruit soldiers. >> no. it was a popular image that ran under a headline called what are you doing for preparedness,

getting ready in case we were drawn into the european war. >> was there a national effort in 1916 to get into world war i? >> there was. some people wanted the u.s. to enter, especially theodore roosevelt, who felt this was an international crisis, even a humanitarian crisis, the u.s. had an obligation to be involved. others wanted the u.s. to be more prepared, to have a larger army, to have more capabilities in case the world events drag america into the war. than the european problem, the u.s. should stay away from. >> but not a centralized government effort. >> there was not a centralized government effort. woodrow wilson tried to avoid this as president because he worried that he would end up alienating voters on both sides. >> how did the u.s. get into

world war i? >> despite woodrow wilson's efforts to keep america out of the war in a series of decisions that slowly backed us into the war particularly by giving preference to britain by not trading with germany and as the germans in spring of 1917 launched desperate last-minute gambit to win the war knowing they were going to drag the americans into a. the germans thought they didn't have a strong federal government and would never get into the war in time to make a difference. that is one place they are wrong. >> prior to woodrow wilson's decision, what were the grass roots's separate efforts that got us into world war i? >> among the people who wanted the u.s. to be more prepared, preparedness was approved. most people, some republicans, disciples of theodore roosevelt, who set up a volunteer military training camps, the big one was in new york, thes -- plapsburg

movement, people preparing to the military officers. after the war, the rotc as we know it today, tracing its roots back. >> was there a grass-roots movement to get into the work? was the work popular before the americans got into it? >> the war was popular with some people but one of the things most people forget about world war i is it was very divisive. those entering the war and how to fight the war after it starts. , lot of that has been forgotten. >> where did your book uncle sam wants you come from? >> it started from a group of people, the footnote of another book, i found reference to slacker rage, that was the slang term in world war i for draft

dodgers. they were carried out by a group of volunteers, mostly middle-aged men, overdraft age, who would go around in cities and small towns and try to track down the draft dodgers in their communities. i thought this is just unusual. people volunteering to enforce the draft, perhaps 200,000 people were part of this group. i started by researching them and it became a bigger story about america and the federal government. >> what was the effect on the federal government in world war i? >> it was enormously transforming live. historians have not paid enough attention to that because a lot of the organizations that got very large during the war got smaller after. the army got much bigger, the budget got much bigger and contracted but it never went back to what it was before. that is an important turning

point. the mindset of a federal presence in everyday life for generations to come. when new crises came, whether it was the great depression or world war ii, it was the previous image that other people looked at when they looked at what the federal government should do. it was tapping into voluntary association, civil society, turn of the century, this is when people were trying to use the voluntary sensibility to mobilize the population, mobilize the nation at a time when the state itself may not actually -- >> is that why you include suffragists in this book? >> i do. the war is a crucial moment for women's organizations, whether -- women's suffrage organizations were not, trying to find a place for themselves at a time when men's

responsibilities work-release stated. women have to find their own place. hundreds of thousands of them volunteers in various organizations, particularly in areas where there is activity, food, conservation and things in the home. >> why is it that there was a rise in anarchy, rise in domestic terrorism, and instances of anarchists' during this period? >> there had been violence particularly around questions of labor for quite a while before the war. world war i marks the turning point. for me is captured in a word that appears almost everywhere in the press during the first world war. it may not have anything to do with actual germans. any subversive activity or violence could be labeled as pro german. a lot of the labor radicals who had been around through the

period of industrialization found themselves under the gun. >> was it used against a lot of people and was it an effective tool? >> it was used against pretty much anyone challenging the status quo. it was used against striking workers, it was used against african-americans who started to migrate from south to north, and it was effective in silencing them. a pretty remarkable thing. >> >> this summer, book tv is asking what are you leading? >> what are you reading? >> my political books are in the chandra of going back to the

future, liberty and tyranny. skaw -- i am reading the 17 volumes, vince flynn and this new young author named lisa l z lutz, very funny reader and writer. if i get through that this summer i will feel good. >> i am looking forward to my summer vacation. i'm going to read adam got neck, the story of lincoln, darwin and modern life. that is my lead in. i carry my books about lincoln and fdr, i've taken on each trip and forget to read, i will do it

this summer. >> to see more summer reading lists and other program information, visit our web site at bothtv.org. >> radio talk-show executive brian jennings on the new fairness doctrine. why it is a bad idea and alternatives to censorship. he is interviewed by radio and television commentator monica crowley on afterwards, part of c-span2's book tv weekend. book tv weekends continue all week in prime time. more books on the economy, currency events and politics. fritz henderson and harry reid. >> former new york